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a new Framework for Investigating and Managing Business Fraud
The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud provides a clearly defined framework for approaching a 
fraud investigation. This comprehensive resource was developed by the fraud investigation team 
at Ernst & Young. The chapters are written by subject-matter experts and may be read individually 
as reference guides for specific topics or together as an overview of a fraud investigation.
This book will enable you to examine the principles and techniques that guide the experts 
through a fraud investigation and answer these questions:
 • How do experts examine and work a fraud case?
 • How do they reason and make decisions at critical times during an investigation?
 • How do they evaluate a case and interact with colleagues?
 • How do they handle preventative antifraud programs?
Features of this book include:
 •  Fraud experts share their veteran, practical knowledge
 •  Tools and techniques address new fraud schemes and challenges
 •  A threaded case study shows how fraud investigation principles can be applied in practice
 •  Two-color interior highlights concepts key to understanding how business fraud works
ernst & Young’s Fraud Investigation & dispute services
Dealing with complex issues of fraud, regulatory compliance, and business disputes can  
detract from efforts to achieve your company’s potential. Better management of fraud risk and 
compliance exposure is a critical business priority, no matter the industry sector. Our more 
than 1,000 fraud investigation and dispute professionals around the world bring the analytical 
and technical skills needed to quickly and effectively conduct financial investigations,  
quantify economic damages, and gather and analyze electronic evidence. Working closely with 
you and your legal advisors, we assemble the right multidisciplinary and culturally aligned 
team and bring an objective approach and fresh perspective to these sensitive and conten-
tious situations, wherever you are in the world. Because we understand that you need a  
tailored service as much as consistent methodologies to achieve your potential, we work to 
give you the benefit of our broad sector experience, our deep subject matter knowledge, and 
the latest insights from our work worldwide. It’s how Ernst & Young makes a difference.
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The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud does not represent an official position of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, and it is distributed with the understanding that the authors and publisher are 
not rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services in the publication. This publication contains 
information in summary form and is therefore intended for general guidance only. It is not intended to 
be a substitute for detailed research or the exercise of professional judgment. Neither EYGM Limited nor 
any other member of the global Ernst & Young organization, nor the authors or publisher can accept any 
responsibility for loss occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any material in 
this publication. On any specific matter, reference should be made to the appropriate advisor.
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Preface
For the veteran fraud investigation professional, core 
concepts in business fraud investigations are embed-
ded in everyday practice, firm policy, and proce-
dure. Quite often, however, a fraud investigation 
reaches business professionals who are not familiar 
with how investigations are conducted, their role 
in an investigation, and possible outcomes. With 
frauds such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Parmalat, 
Adelphia, Societe Generale, the Ponzi scheme re-
cently perpetrated by Bernard Madoff, and the re-
cent billion dollar fraud at Satyam in India, it has 
become even more important that business own-
ers, controllers, and management understand how 
a fraud investigation is run. These cases are just a 
few examples of frauds that have occurred, result-
ing in devastating effects on their organization, em-
ployees, and investors. The continued onset of one 
of the worst global economic downturns in recent 
history has now created a robust environment for 
fraud. Based on these painful lessons learned in the 
past and the current environment, companies, regu-
lators, and other key stakeholders are putting more 
emphasis into addressing their approach to fraud 
investigations and how they view fraud proactively 
and reactively. This book tackles the complex issues 
involved in fraud investigations and gives a detailed 
understanding of the many complex nuances that 
investigators and others who deal with fraud have to 
consider when faced with a fraud-related matter.
Background
The idea for this book was first conceived by the 
Fraud Investigation and Dispute Services practice 
within Ernst & Young. In developing the core con-
cepts for this product, what emerged became not 
just another treatise on business investigation theory 
but a practical framework to approach a fraud in-
vestigation along a timeline. Several other published 
texts are devoted to this topic, but none of them ap-
proach this topic with a practical, business-minded 
approach. The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud 
is dedicated not only to the study of how business 
frauds are conducted but also to the understanding 
of how and why fraudulent activities occur.
Audience
The targeted audience for this book is, of course, 
business professionals who need to understand 
core fraud investigation topics, key considerations 
with-in a fraud timeline, and measurable outcome 
ix
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indicators at various stages in an investigation. Busi-
ness professionals finding themselves involved in a 
fraud investigation at any level often need a broad 
understanding of how and why fraudulent activities 
occur. This text is written to serve as a reference 
for those professionals, as well as collateral employ-
ees who would benefit from understanding business 
fraud core concepts and considerations. Finally, stu-
dents who enter accounting or business fields fre-
quently will be enrolled in coursework that outlines 
business fraud. For those students, this text will serve 
as a primary source for understanding fraud and how 
business fraud investigations are conducted and the 
complexities that are dealt with when conducting 
these investigations.
Concept and  
Importance to the  
Profession
The fraud investigation framework found in chapter 
1 of this text was one of the initial steps consid-
ered in the creation of this book. The ultimate ben-
efit achieved by understanding the concepts in this 
book within this framework is coming away with 
a practical knowledge of how the various pieces of 
a fraud investigation work together and how those 
pieces change over the course of an investigation. 
The book is organized in a manner that is consis-
tent with how issues arise during the course of an 
investigation.
It is critical that the reader understand that in these 
times, the demand for evidence-based practices and 
procedures is important for achieving desired out-
comes in an investigation. This text has been de-
signed and written by some of the leading experts 
in the fraud investigation field at Ernst & Young. 
These authors have conducted numerous investiga-
tions in different industries and countries through-
out the world and, therefore, have dealt with the 
complex issues that arise during an investigation. 
We purposely selected subject matter experts within 
our practice to construct the various chapters in-
cluded in this book. Their insights and abilities to 
relate this book to practical real-life scenarios and 
issues faced in an investigation make this book a tre-
mendous guide to gaining a deeper understanding of 
the issues faced during an investigation.
Organization
The book is organized to look at the concept of 
fraud holistically and the issues that are dealt with in 
fraud and fraud investigations. We have organized 
our thoughts to address the previous concepts in the 
overall design of the book (figure 1-1).
	 •		Chapter	1	introduces	the	reader	to	the	core	
concepts in a fraud investigation, introduces 
the fraud investigation framework, and outlines 
the steps that must be addressed throughout the 
course of every fraud investigation 
    As noted in this diagram, it really begins with 
identifying the type of fraud involved in an 
investigation. The three main areas of fraud are 
misappropriation of assets, fraudulent financial 
statements, and corruption. In an effort to select 
what we feel are the most relevant and current 
schemes under these three main categories, we 
have organized the next three chapters to address 
those particular schemes.
	 •		Chapter	2	deals	with	selected	types	of	misappro-
priation of asset schemes. Misappropriation of as-
sets entails any scheme that involves the theft or 
misuse of an organization’s assets. These schemes 
could include fake vendors; theft of assets, such 
as cash, inventory, accounts receivable, and fixed 
assets; payroll; and travel and entertainment 
fraud.
	 •		Chapter	3	deals	with	fraudulent	financial	state-
ment scheme issues and what happens when the 
financial statements need to be restated as a result 
of a fraudulent scheme. A fraudulent financial 
statement scheme is the falsification of an organiza-
tion’s financial statements or other nonfinancial 
statements prepared by the organization to make 
the organization appear more or less profitable.
	 •		Chapter	4	deals	with	the	concepts	involving	
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) viola-
tions, which are one of the most talked about 
and investigated forms of corruption in the 
market place today. It is gaining significant atten-
tion by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Department of Justice and, therefore, 
x
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is top of mind for companies trying to under-
stand the issues involving compliance with this 
statute. This is one of the primary reasons we 
have focused a chapter specifically on this type 
of corruption scheme. Corruption relates to any 
scheme to which a person uses his or her influ-
ence to obtain unauthorized benefit contrary 
to that person’s duty to their employer. These 
schemes could include FCPA violations, bid-
rigging, and conflicts of interest. After gaining an 
understanding of the various types of fraud, the 
next area of an investigation is the planning and 
organizing of a fraud investigation when one of 
these fraud schemes is uncovered.
	 •		Chapter	5	deals	with	the	first	48	hours	of	an	
investigation. This is an overview into the com-
plex issues that an investigation creates and how 
critical the first 48 hours are to an investigation 
once a fraud has been identified or uncovered.
	 •		Chapter	6	deals	with	roles	and	responsibilities.	
Upon consideration of the complex issues in an 
investigation, it is helpful to determine the roles 
and responsibilities that different parties involved 
undertake.
	 •		Critical	to	any	investigation	is	the	collecting	and	
processing of documentation critical to gaining 
an understanding of the issues involved.
    Chapters 7–8 deal with the complex issues 
of sources of evidence (chapter 7), the areas of 
documentation on which the investigation needs 
to focus, and the elements of electronic evidence 
(chapter 8) that need to be considered and how 
to gather that information once this determi-
nation has been made. Another key element 
described in these two chapters is gaining an 
understanding of the concerns that investigators 
face when conducting investigations outside of 
the United States and the complexities that this 
places on the data collection efforts of the inves-
tigation team.
    In addition to the data collection concerns, 
throughout the duration of the investigation, 
organizations, investigators, and other key stake-
holders need to worry about who is involved and 
where the investigation is being conducted and 
the ramifications of those issues to the overall 
success of the engagement.
	 •		Chapter	9	deals	with	these	cross	jurisdictional	
issues. The globalization of business has increased 
the extent to which investigations are likely to 
be impacted by legal requirements from more 
than one legal jurisdiction. In addition, fraudsters 
have long known that moving their assets (and 
themselves) to a different location beyond the 
reach of the “long arm of the law” is an effective 
strategy. For ease of reference, we’ll call these 
cross jurisdictional investigations. Differences 
and variations in laws, governing and regulatory 
bodies, accounting standards, business practices, 
governmental policies, litigation forums, and 
even language can make cross jurisdictional 
investigations quite complex.
	 •		Once	an	investigation	has	started,	one	of	the	
considerations that is made is determining when 
or if outside counsel is involved. In chapter 10, 
we deal with the concepts of working with at-
torneys on an investigation. The circumstances 
brought forth in an investigation raise a variety 
of intertwined business, legal, and financial 
reporting challenges. An understanding of the 
underlying facts will be the foundation of deci-
sion making regarding the best course of action. 
Accounting, auditing, and finance skills will be 
needed to help develop an understanding of the 
facts and determine the best course of action 
from a business and financial perspective. At the 
same time, these circumstances will drive a need 
for sound legal advice, and oftentimes, outside 
counsel is retained by an organization to deal 
with these issues.
	 •		Another	reason	that	makes	investigations	so	dif-
ficult and the reason to obtain sound legal advice 
is that, oftentimes, parallel investigations are oc-
curring on a particular matter. Chapter 11 deals 
with the complex issues of multiple investiga-
tions (for example, this might include multiple 
government regulators conducting an investiga-
tion at the same time).
	 •		Upon	completion	of	an	investigation,	it	is	
almost as important to determine how to report 
the results as it is to conduct the investiga-
tion and compile the results. Chapter 12 deals 
with reporting after the investigation has been 
performed and data have been gathered. The 
xi
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forensic accountants or those assigned within an 
organization to conduct an investigation have to 
determine how they want to compile and report 
the results of their findings. The objective of the 
written or oral report often is to present the find-
ings and observations to the organization or the 
opposing party, or both, in a litigation matter.
	 •		Upon	completion	of	the	report	and	presentation	
of the findings, organizations have oftentimes 
not considered or are not aware of the investiga-
tive protocols or potential recovery options, such 
as insurance. Chapter 13 deals with the various 
considerations that organizations should consider 
in dealing with these recovery options.
	 •		Finally,	once	an	investigation	has	been	com-
pleted, board members, chairmen of the audit 
committee, or c-suite executives within an 
organization often try and determine what, if 
anything, the organization can proactively do to 
mitigate this occurrence or another occurrence 
of fraud within their organization in the future. 
Chapter 14 deals with the various elements of an 
antifraud program and what companies can do 
to mitigate against fraud and deal with fraud not 
only reactively but proactively.
Distinctive Features
	 •		A	comprehensive	look	at	fraud	investigations	
from the earliest stages all the way to identify-
ing areas for remediation and consideration of 
measures to prevent or detect fraud in the earliest 
stages.
	 •		A	case	study	has	been	included	to	apply	a	hypo-
thetical fraud scenario throughout the book to 
give a practical example to reiterate the concepts 
illustrated within the book.
	 •		Subject	matter	expertise	for	each	chapter	was	
identified from within the Fraud Investigation 
and Dispute Services practice of Ernst & Young, 
and these individuals were asked to construct 
their respective chapters based on their extensive 
experience conducting investigations across vari-
ous industries and countries around the world.
	 •		The	book	is	being	published	by	the	AICPA.	
Their collective knowledge on how best to 
construct and create a book and introduce it into 
the marketplace has taken a tremendous amount 
of information generated by Ernst & Young and 
polished it into a user friendly format that has 
not been created before, which is truly one of a 
kind thought leadership.
	 •		An	extensive	key	word	list	has	been	created	to	
add clarity to the various terms and ideas dis-
cussed throughout this book. This list allows the 
users of this book to vary across different levels 
of experience in dealing with fraud and allows 
for a broader distribution of potential users.
xii
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This book is intended to provide the reader with 
knowledge and resources needed to understand and 
manage a fraud investigation. It is important not 
only to recognize and understand the underlying 
concepts that are typically encountered in a fraud 
investigation but also to apply those concepts in a 
practical setting. In this section, the reader will find 
a case example that outlines a fictitious company 
called Grand Forge Company. This case example is 
designed to provide the reader with practical back-
ground information about this company that is fur-
ther referenced in selected chapters throughout this 
book.
The benefit to creating this hypothetical scenario 
is an attempt to generate real world type examples of 
issues that one may encounter when investigating a 
potential matter. The case study illustrates in various 
ways the issues and concerns that arise when con-
ducting an investigation and complements the in-
depth subject matter expertise portrayed throughout 
the book.
The reader will follow Grand Forge Company 
through the identification of an issue via the whis-
tle-blower hotline to proactively addressing fraud 
through the creation of a holistic antifraud program 
to mitigate the potential for the fraud scenario oc-
curring in the future. It is strongly encouraged that 
the reader becomes familiar with this case example 
and references it often as Grand Forge Company 
navigates through troublesome incidents introduced 
throughout the book. The case study starts with this 
overall example and uses the same names of execu-
tives and directors from important strategic positions 
from Grand Forge Company throughout for ease of 
use to the reader.
Grand Forge Company
Grand Forge Company1 (Grand Forge), a Delaware 
corporation and a public company registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Introduction
1  Please note that Grand Forge Company and its specific circumstances are wholly fictitious, though the depiction of its situations falls broadly in line with 
events and circumstances from the authors’ experiences.
xxiii
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is a global company that manufacturers precision 
components for steel processing. Grand Forge was 
founded in 1873 as a domestic manufacturer. In the 
1970s and 1980s, Grand Forge went through sev-
eral acquisitions of international steel companies to 
continue expanding in key international locations 
to improve its ability to serve key international 
customers.
Currently, Grand Forge’s corporate headquarters 
is located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It has four 
manufacturing plants located in Shanghai, China; 
Sao Paulo, Brazil; Mumbai, India; and Siberia, Rus-
sia. Grand Forge also has global distribution centers 
in Australia, Puerto Rico, Spain, Singapore, Japan, 
South Africa, Argentina, the Philippines, and the 
United States.
Grand Forge employs over 12,000 personnel 
globally, with 57 percent of those employees lo-
cated outside of the Untied States. Grand Forge is 
the third largest producer of precision components 
for steel processing in the world. Competitors to 
Grand Forge are structured similarly, and most of 
their manufacturing is conducted outside of the 
Untied States, due to cheaper labor costs in other 
countries.
As an organization, Grand Forge has prided it-
self on its ability to compete internationally while 
achieving a high level of safety in its operations. 
During the past 4 years, its global rate of recordable 
injuries has decreased by 48 percent, and days away 
from work cases have been reduced by 71 percent. 
Safety, along with a culture of integrity, are 2 of 
Grand Forge’s most important values.
Roland Brasky is the chair of the audit commit-
tee, which comprises independent directors. The 
board of directors and the audit committee are 
experienced board members and understand their 
oversight responsibilities and duties.
The Internal Audit department is well trained and 
reports to the audit committee and the CFO. Given 
the international operations, the audit committee, 
management, and internal audit are concerned about 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance 
and considerations.
The following organization chart illustrates key 
board and management roles:
Board of Directors
Internal Audit Director
Michele Hart
Chairman of the Audit Committee
Roland Brasky
CEO
Bill Peterson
General Counsel
Jacob Willis
Chief Operating Officer
James Holt
International Controller
Kelley Friedman
North American Controller
Christopher Simmons
Director of International Operations
Thomas Singy
Director of Sales
Julia Manzky
CFO
Jon Waltz
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Grand Forge is audited by the independent ac-
counting firm Handel & Smith LLP, which has been 
auditing Grand Forge for the last four years.
The following table presents selected financial in-
formation for the year ended December 31, 2008:
Statement of Operations Data
(Dollars in Millions) 2008 2007 2006 2005
Net Sales $11,187 $13,573 $17,154 $14,997
Income (Loss) from operations $ (213) $  417 $ 1,304 $ 1,710
Net income $ (817) $ 1,101 $ 1,125 $  997
Balance Sheet data—12/31
Total assets $14,011) $17,081 $22,053 $19,043
In 2008, Grand Forge experienced the second 
consecutive year of sales decline after nearly a de-
cade of 10 percent to15 percent growth. The de-
cline is mostly attributable to significantly higher 
product prices driven by the soaring cost of raw ma-
terial. Grand Forge also posted a second consecutive 
annual net loss for the first time in the company’s 
history. The reaction from industry analysts was sig-
nificant, and, as a result, the stock price has declined 
31 percent over the last 2 years. As previously il-
lustrated, the company’s earnings are declining, the 
cost of raw materials is rapidly increasing, and the 
demand for the company’s product is suffering in 
the current global economic recession. Grand Forge 
is dangerously close to violating its debt covenants, 
and the 5 year outlook is gloomy.
Additionally, Grand Forge has recently ex- 
perienced several circumstances, including the 
following:
 1. Cash Embezzlement
   The controller of Grand Forge’s facility based 
in Shanghai called corporate headquarters. 
The facility held about $2 million in cash bal-
ances at local banks. When the controller had 
recently followed up on vendor complaints of 
slow payments, the controller learned that the 
actual cash in the bank was almost zero. Upon 
scrutiny, the bank statements in the compa-
ny’s files look as if they may be inauthentic. 
One of the facility’s cash clerks admitted to 
the controller that he had taken the cash. The 
controller also said that the clerk sounded sui-
cidal over the discovery.
 2. Inflating Expenses
   A Grand Forge employee made a report on 
the company’s whistle-blower hotline alleg-
ing that her supervisor had been inflating his 
expense reporting to receive reimbursement 
in excess of the amounts actually incurred. 
Allegations of widespread abusive accounting 
practices from employees in its operations also 
have come through on the hotline.
 3. Stock Options Inquiry
   Grand Forge recently received a seemingly 
routine inquiry from the SEC, which sug-
gests some regulatory inquiry or scrutiny of 
the company’s executives trading in stock and 
stock options.
 4.  Revenue Recognition and Product 
Quality Issues
   A significant overseas customer called to 
complain about the quality of a large volume 
of product that was recently shipped. They 
stated that the country manager routinely 
pressured them to take product in excess of 
their needs, especially at the end of the quar-
ter. Now, they allege that the product they 
received is substandard, unusable, and out-
side their contract specifications. They allege 
damages to their company related to the sub-
standard product.
 5. Cross Jurisdictional Issues
   The attorney for Grand Forge has contacted 
Perusi & Bilanz LLP, independent accoun-
tants. The attorney reports that he received 
an e-mail over the weekend from a new 
xxv
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accountant working in the procurement unit 
at a foreign distribution center of Grand Forge 
located in the Philippines.
  a. Inappropriate Procurement Practice
    The attorney stated that the accountant’s 
e-mail reported concerns regarding inap-
propriate procurement practices at a re-
mote production facility in another coun-
try. Goods were being purchased for cash 
under a cost plus arrangement from a par-
ticular vendor.
  b.  Data Protection and Local Privacy 
Laws
    Upon receiving the call from Jacob, Perusi 
& Bilanz LLP quickly assembled a team, 
and, upon reaching the destination, the 
work began. The records storage facility is 
located within the European Union, and, 
therefore, the location falls under the ju-
risdiction of the European Commission’s 
Directive on Data Protection (Directive 
95/46/EC). The forensic accountants 
from Perusi & Bilanz LLP are subject to 
the local privacy laws and, therefore, draw 
upon the knowledge of those included in 
the team from the regional location to es-
tablish protocols for the review.
  c. FCPA
    It is apparent that there may be issues in 
the Philippines related to possible FCPA 
violations. However, because of privacy 
laws in the jurisdiction, the forensic ac-
countants at Perusi & Bilanz LLP do not 
have access to the banking records of the 
implicated individuals.
    Further, Perusi & Bilanz LLP has iden-
tified “shell” companies to which large as-
sets have been transferred. Grand Forge is 
now dealing with a number of different 
issues: 
   i. FCPA violations (bribery)
   ii. Kickback
   iii. Vendor fraud
   iv. Illegal transfer of assets
  d. Investigative Team
    The investigative team from Perusi & Bi-
lanz LLP consists of experienced experts in 
international investigations, including indi-
viduals who have conducted investigations 
in Asia. Although Filipino and English are 
both spoken in the Philippines, nobody on 
the U.S. team speaks or reads Filipino, nor 
are they familiar with the local customs, 
laws, or accounting standards.
 6. Earnings Management
   Grand Forge had another large issue come to 
light as other matters were being investigated. 
With the economy continuing to tailspin in a 
downward spiral, sales showing flat to nega-
tive growth, and the pressure mounting to 
show positive results, Bill Peterson, the CEO, 
determined that he needed to “adjust” some 
of the financial statement numbers.
  a. Manipulate Inventory and Reserves
    Grand Forge has accounts that require sig-
nificant estimations each quarter and year-
end and involve ultimate sign-off by Chris; 
his CFO, Jon Waltz; and the controller, 
Christopher Simmons. Bill devised a plan 
with the help of Jon and Christopher to 
manipulate the inventory and the reserves 
for bad debts because these areas typically 
had large month-to-month fluctuations in 
valuations, and Bill and his team thought 
they could get away with manipulating this 
area for the benefit of the company. The 
company, with the manipulated numbers, 
appeared to be turning the corner, and bo-
nuses, which were the first in two years, 
were given to employees, based on the 
performance of the company.
In an effort to quickly resolve the issues, the board 
and senior management had directed Grand Forge’s 
internal people to look into all the issues. As more 
information became known, it was decided that they 
needed an independent investigation by lawyers and 
forensic specialists. From management’s perspective, 
the entire process seems to be outside their control 
and is costing more than they had ever expected. 
The financial people are still crunching the numbers 
and working on the disclosures. The company’s em-
ployees are exhausted and are not able to focus on 
operations. The investors are skittish, and the stock 
price is down. Management wonders, if it were to 
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be done all over again, what could have been done 
to prevent this mess.
Antifraud Program
Roland Brasky, the Chairman of the Audit Com-
mittee for Grand Forge, was becoming concerned 
with the large number of recent allegations and the 
previously identified issues. Roland was fearful that 
the prefect storm for fraud was brewing. The con-
cern caused Roland to ask his Internal Audit Direc-
tor, Michele Hart, what the company was currently 
doing proactively to address this potential increase 
in fraud in the current economy. Based on this di-
rective from Roland, Michele wanted to develop an 
overall process to address fraud proactively and re-
actively. Michele contacted the company’s preferred 
independent accountants, Perusi & Bilanz LLP, to 
determine options she should be considering to ad-
dress fraud proactively, what these options might 
look like, and how to implement them.
Perusi & Bilanz LLP’s recommendation was that 
Michele work to implement a holistic antifraud pro-
gram for Grand Forge.
xxvii
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Introduction
Fraud investigations have been in the news with 
greater frequency over the past decade and have in-
volved some of the world’s largest companies, such 
as Enron, WorldCom, and Siemens. It is estimated 
that U.S. organizations lose 7 percent of their an-
nual revenues to fraud, amounting to potentially 
$994 billion in fraud losses when 7 percent is ap-
plied to the U.S. gross domestic product.1 How can 
companies weather the storm of a fraud investiga-
tion? How should a company prepare to address a 
potential fraud? Although the timing and extent of 
a fraud are impossible to predict, each investigation 
requires procedures focused on the fraud, regardless 
of its size or scope. This introductory chapter of the 
book will provide an overview of investigations and 
the various considerations that an entity involved in 
a fraud investigation must consider.
The success or failure of an investigation can 
be due to many factors; however, the procedures 
used by the investigative team are most crucial in 
determining the investigation’s outcome. Processes 
and procedures to be considered will be discussed 
throughout the various chapters of this book.
The overall goal of this chapter is to give an over-
view of fraud and fraud investigations, to set the 
tone for the rest of the book, and to answer those 
overarching questions listed at the beginning of this 
chapter.
The Current Context 
of Business Fraud 
Investigations
Dealing with complex issues of fraud, regulatory 
compliance, and business disputes can detract from 
efforts to achieve a company’s potential. Better 
management of fraud risk and compliance exposure 
is a critical business priority, no matter the industry 
sector and geographical location.
The nature of business fraud is such that a formal 
investigation requires the services of many profes-
sionals across several different fields of practice, in-
cluding accounting, law, forensics, auditing, regula-
tors, and ownership. In the global world of doing 
business, fraud investigations often require that the 
right multidisciplinary and culturally aligned team is 
organized at the very start of an investigation. This 
team will work with the company’s internal and 
external stakeholders and other professional advi-
sors and regulators. Over the course of a full inves-
tigation, professionals in these various fields will all 
work with each other at various points and times, 
and this book covers those interactions in detail in 
later chapters. For the accounting professionals or 
owners involved in an investigation, it is impor-
tant to not only understand the specific roles and 
responsibilities’, duties, and expectations that he or 
she will encounter but also the general functions of 
the other groups of professionals, such as legal advi-
sors, regulators, and other constituents involved in 
the investigation.
Historically, the number of fraud cases in the 
United States in the past two decades has ranged be-
tween 1,498 and 4,5722 and is considered to be on 
the uptick in this current, weak economic environ-
ment. The following examples illustrate the frauds 
that have received the most visibility in the last sev-
eral years. Box 1-1 includes a short overview of each 
high-profile fraud case to give insight to the issues 
dealt with in each investigation. When the general 
public reads about these high-profile cases, they of-
ten do not realize that business fraud occurs with 
much greater frequency every year in the United 
States. To the extent that cases make the news, the 
prevalence of fraud is quiet astounding.
If a business is on the cusp of a fraud investiga-
tion, it may seem like a daunting task to marshal 
the necessary resources and manage an investigation 
from the outset. However, it is important to under-
stand that all areas have professionals who are pro-
fessionally trained with extensive forensic, account-
ing, legal, and investigative experience and who are 
1	Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners	2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse.
2	Ibid.
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Box 1-1:  Top 10 Frauds of the Decade
 1.  Stanford. Allan Stanford has been charged in a Ponzi scheme fraud that began to unravel as a 
result of the economy and the uncovering of the Madoff scheme.
 2.  Madoff. Bernard L. Madoff operated a Ponzi scheme that has been called the largest investor 
fraud ever committed by a single person. On March 12, 2009, Madoff pled guilty to 11 counts 
of fraud. He admitted committing the fraud that affected thousands of investors, with losses 
potentially exceeding $65 billion during the time he perpetrated the fraud. A federal judge 
sentenced Bernard L. Madoff to 150 years in prison for running a huge Ponzi scheme that dev-
astated thousands of investors, calling his crimes “extraordinarily evil.”*
 3.  Siemens. Officials from Siemans traveled around the world with large sums of cash, paying in 
excess of $1 billion dollars in bribes to win large, lucrative contracts in various countries around 
the world. The German engineering company was ordered to pay $1.6 billion in fines to U.S. 
and German regulators for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which is the 
largest fine to date under this statute.
 4.  Computer Associates. According to a report issued by the Computer Associates’ (CAs’) board 
of directors, “Fraud pervaded the entire CA organization at every level, and was embedded 
in CA’s culture, as instilled by Mr. Wang, almost from the company’s inception.” The report 
was authored by two directors at CA, with assistance from outside counsel, in response to a 
massive accounting fraud estimated at $2.2 billion. The report aimed to determine the board’s 
position on recovering funds from Wang and other executives, as well as its position on share-
holder lawsuits arising from the fraud. The board report recommended suing Wang in order 
to recover $500 million. Prior to the report, Wang had not been publicly accused, despite a 
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation and prosecution that led to the indictment of 8 CA 
executives and a 12-year prison sentence for the former CEO.
 5  Parmalat. Parmalat, the largest financial fraud in Europe to date, was able to achieve both its 
size and massive fraud through international expansion. By purchasing companies around the 
world and then reporting complex intercompany transactions in obtuse financial statements, 
the Italian-based company was able to operate under little scrutiny for years.
  However, once the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) equivalent in Italy began 
inquiries into the classification of current assets and debts in November 2003, the company’s 
corporate malfeasance was quickly made apparent. Within weeks, the CEO, Calisto Tanzi, 
and the entire audit board of directors had resigned, and Parmalat’s stock was trading at zero. 
Almost immediately, the board of the directors hired an outside accounting firm to conduct an 
investigation.
  The investigators were unable to review all the evidence because much of it had been de-
stroyed, but they did determine in initial estimates that earnings before interest, taxes, deprecia-
tion, and amortization were overstated by 530 percent; liabilities understated by C1.8 billion; 
and net indebtedness understated by 800 percent. The Tanzi family owned 51 percent of 
the company and occupied executive positions within it. Yet a company the size of Parmalat 
interacted with external auditors, investment bankers, and credit-rating agencies throughout its 
13 years life as a public company. Thus, with its downfall, came additional investigations into 
the responsibilities of the external professionals and their respective companies. Tanzi and the 
former CFO were ultimately sentenced to jail time in Italy, though Tanzi served his on house 
arrest due to his age.
(continued)
* New York Times,	June	30,	2009.
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focused on performing the tasks needed to execute 
a fraud investigation. What is of critical importance 
is assembling the correct team of professionals on a 
timely basis depending on the nature and extent of 
wrongdoing.
Business Fraud 
Investigation Practice
The purpose of fraud investigations is to help man-
age risk, investigate alleged misconduct, review 
financial activity, measure the financial implica-
tions, and assess legal and regulatory ramifications 
of noncompliance. This often involves electronic 
evidence discovery. A fraud investigation helps de-
termine what happened, how it happened, who was 
involved, how long it went on, and what evidence 
supports the findings.
Experienced fraud examiners, forensic accoun-
tants, auditors, electronic data analysts, and lawyers 
work together with a company’s board of directors, 
executive management, audit committee, and em-
ployees to understand the facts in a fraud investi-
gation. When an event occurs, such as a whistle-
blower allegation, a regulatory inquiry, or a business 
dispute, a company must decide whether to conduct 
an internal investigation or hire outside counsel to 
conduct an independent investigation.
Investigations of corrupt business practices have 
been among the headlines in recent months. Com-
panies have seen their reputations diminished as 
fines were imposed; profits disgorged; and, in some 
instances, executives were sent to prison. Compa-
nies, therefore, have to abide by anticorruption laws 
in their home countries and the foreign countries in 
which they have commercial interests. The FCPA 
has become the de facto international standard re-
garding the bribery of foreign officials.
Earnings management involving revenue rec-
ognition and other accounting fraud would result 
in restating the financial statements of a company. 
An investigation involving financial restatement re-
quires the investigating team to assist management 
in identifying the full scope of issues, implement-
ing controls to compensate for deficiencies in the 
financial systems, implementing a remedial measure 
program, and providing additional financial resource 
capacity.
Box 1-1:  Top 10 Frauds of the Decade (continued)
 6.  HealthSouth. Through a series of fraudulent financial transactions, HealthSouth’s executives 
overstated revenues and assets to hide the fact that the company wasn’t meeting Wall Street 
projections.
 7.  WorldCom. Company executives created fraudulent financial accounting transactions by inflat-
ing company assets in excess of $12 billion, which ultimately led to the company filing bank-
ruptcy in 2002.
 8.  Waste Management. Waste Management fraudulently manipulated the company’s financial results 
to meet predetermined earnings targets by improperly deferring and eliminating current period 
expenses to inflate earnings.
 9.  Enron. Through a series of fraudulent financial accounting schemes, executives within Enron 
designed the fraud to make the one-time giant energy company appear more profitable and 
stronger than it actually was. This became one of the largest corporate scandals in American his-
tory and was primarily responsible for the desires of Congress to push through the implementa-
tion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
10.  Sunbeam. Albert Dunlap, CEO of Sunbeam, directed a fraudulent financial earnings manage-
ment scheme to create the illusion of a successful restructuring of Sunbeam and to inflate the 
price of the company prior to the sale, which benefited him.
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The Calm Before 
the Storm—What 
Can a Company’s 
Management Do to Be 
Prepared for an 
Investigation?
A fraud investigation can be a very expensive event 
for any company, not only in monetary cost but in 
reputation, time, regulator scrutiny, employee re-
tention, shareholder reaction, and so on. The time 
commitment for a fraud investigation by company 
management and its board of directors can be signifi-
cant and costly. No longer is management’s focus on 
the large task of running a company; now manage-
ment and the board must work through all aspects 
of an intrusive investigation. A company suddenly 
facing the financial and reputational risks associated 
with an allegation of wrongdoing may be tempted 
to keep investigations as low-key and narrow as pos-
sible. However, that approach carries its own risks 
because an investigation sends a strong signal about 
management’s integrity and how management ac-
tually feels about wrongdoing. A timely, thorough, 
visible, and independent inquiry shows that senior 
management really wants to correct misconduct, 
not simply out of fear of penalties but because of a 
desire to run an honest and ethical company. Time 
invested in developing and implementing fraud 
prevention controls and a plan to respond to fraud 
events pays dividends when fraud occurs.
Because of the resource costs associated with con-
ducting an investigation, it is critical that a company 
have appropriate fraud prevention and detection 
measures in place, as well as a detailed response plan 
to a suspected fraud occurrence. Perhaps the most 
important piece of a company’s fraud prevention 
strategy is to establish and follow a framework to 
handle various types of fraudulent activity. The fol-
lowing section outlines a practical fraud framework 
based on how an investigation is conducted over 
time. By taking these preliminary prevention mea-
sures and following a fraud investigation framework, 
a company can aim to prevent fraud while potential-
ly minimizing the overall cost of identifying, quanti-
fying, and correcting any fraud discovered.
Additional internal control activities that com-
pany management should institute to help prevent 
fraud and minimize the cost of an investigation can 
be found in box 1-2.
In addition to the internal controls found in box 
1-2, consultation with both internal and external 
counsel should be one of the first steps taken if an 
allegation or identification of fraud occurs. By tak-
ing these proactive steps, a company’s management 
can lessen the likelihood of fraud occurring, but in 
the event a fraud is alleged or identified, manage-
ment will be prepared to respond quickly. Regula-
tors will expect a company to have a defined fraud 
detection and prevention plan, and companies could 
face larger penalties or fines if found to be deficient 
in this area.
A swift and organized response to a potential fraud 
event is never more important than when it is actu-
ally needed. For example, the CFO of a company 
could be performing his or her normal duties for any 
given day when he or she gets a call from the board 
of directors demanding an immediate response to 
one of the following:
	 •		A	whistle-blower	sends	an	anonymous	letter	
to the audit committee raising concerns about 
management.
	 •		An	internal	audit	report	notes	significant	vari-
ances in reserve accounts for a foreign subsidiary.
	 •		A	letter	from	the	SEC	informing	the	company	of	
an investigation into the company’s accounting 
practices.
	 •		The	controller	raises	potential	travel	and	enter-
tainment report discrepancies during a random 
audit.
What is the CFO’s response? If the company has 
a response plan in place, the response will be orga-
nized and quick; however, without a plan, critical 
mistakes could be made and valuable evidence may 
be lost.
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The Fraud Investigation 
Framework
Combating business fraud crimes is not an optional 
exercise. One of the difficult but necessary aspects of 
business ownership involves planning for potentially 
fraudulent activities to occur within the business at 
some point and time. It is shocking to think that 
even in Fortune 500 businesses, fraud risk manage-
ment plans can be in disarray. Too often, in both big 
and small business culture, policy and practicality do 
not intersect. The authors of this book have seen 
many high-profile cases in business mismanaged be-
cause a measured, practical, and consistent investiga-
tion framework was not implemented and followed 
by the affected business.
There is no one correct way of approaching a 
fraud investigation. It is the primary responsibility 
of management to take appropriate action when an 
event involving fraud or alleged fraud is brought to 
his or her attention. An inadequate response to fraud 
or an allegation of fraud can result in a protracted 
investigation that involves rework and wasted time 
and resources. In such instances, a fraud investiga-
tion framework comprises involvement of people 
who lack credibility or are perceived to lack ob-
jectivity relative to the issue, activities, or persons 
involved. Another investigation scenario could in-
volve participants, investigators, and advisors who 
lack sufficient competence in critical areas. Investi-
gators and decision makers stumble into preventable 
pitfalls. The potential downsides of certain decisions 
are not understood until after the fact. Poor decision 
making in the first few hours after an allegation or 
a fraudulent activity is brought to light can lead to 
disastrous consequences.
By contrast, a strong, credible, and competent re-
sponse ensures that adequate, relevant, and complete 
information is assembled to support decision mak-
ing; legal rights and responsibilities are respected; 
and any applicable legal privileges are preserved.
Box 1-2:  Business Fraud Internal Control Measures
•		Reviewing, implementing, or strengthening internal controls designed to prevent fraud. This is probably 
the most important step company management can take to prevent fraudulent activity. Even an 
investment in an external company to help develop these controls will pay dividends over time.
•		Ensure that the tone at the top of key management at the parent and subsidiaries does not create an environ-
ment that would encourage fraud to avoid reporting bad news. Every company wants to be successful, 
and, often, the pressure to report ever-increasing earnings and profits is a trigger to “cook the 
books.” The fraud can occur for personal gain, such as a performance bonus for meeting targets 
or out of fear of losing a job. Driving employees to excel should not be communicated in such a 
way that “do whatever it takes or else” is the message.
•		Have a documented plan to preserve hard copy and electronic media in the event knowledge of a possible fraud 
comes to light. The documentary evidence, whether hard copy or electronic, is key to the investi-
gation. A plan should be in place to preserve all such documentation once a fraud is suspected.
•		Develop a whistle-blower program and a response plan to investigate any whistle-blower allegation. Whistle-
blowers should feel comfortable coming forward, but that is only part of the purpose of the 
whistle-blower program. There must be a documented investigation plan to follow up on the 
allegation; otherwise, the whistle-blower program has no real purpose.
•		Company management should consult with internal or external counsel to understand the difference between 
the criminal and civil laws regarding fraud. This is an important distinction, and it should be consid-
ered at the onset of any fraud investigation and throughout the investigation as facts regarding the 
fraud are identified.
•		Employee training programs regarding fraud prevention and reporting should be developed and delivered on 
a regular basis. Training programs that heighten the employees’ awareness of fraud increase the 
incidence of detecting red flags and prevention of fraud. 
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Unique considerations for each business are on 
the front end of fraud investigation planning, but 
the most critical consideration involved in imple-
menting a fraud investigation framework for any 
business is practicality and timeliness. If you learn 
nothing else from this book, take this away: what is 
key for any fraud management architecture, regard-
less of how the framework is structured, is that the 
architecture is followed consistently over time. The 
best way to encourage the proliferation of fraudu-
lent activity in a business is to either not follow an 
investigation framework or to do so inconsistently.
This book approaches a fraud investigation from 
the standpoint of looking at the different compo-
nents of an investigation over time.3 Approaching 
an understanding of fraud investigations in this man-
ner allows for the reader to enter into a knowledge 
base at any point before, during, or after an inves-
tigation and locate where they are in an investiga-
tion timeline. Figure 1-1 depicts an overview of the 
investigation framework that this book follows in 
subsequent chapters in great detail. Following this 
framework will provide the foundation for a base 
understanding of fraud and the steps that must be 
addressed in sequence over the course of a fraud 
investigation.
This approach has been found to be a highly prac-
tical one, and the concepts discussed within this 
framework can be applied collectively or selectively 
to any size and type of business. The following sec-
tions outline how this framework has been con-
structed and should be approached at various points 
in time over the course of a fraud investigation.
Defining Fraud
The American Heritage Dictionary defines fraud as “a 
deception deliberately practiced in order to secure 
unfair or unlawful gain,” and the Collins Essential 
English Dictionary defines an investigation as a “care-
ful search or examination to discover facts.” Al-
though these two definitions provide guidance on 
what legally constitutes a fraud investigation, they 
do not address the practical nature of uncovering 
and remediating a fraud scenario. What is more im-
portant is being able to encompass the entirety of 
not only what the crime is and who has perpetrated 
it but the effect(s) that the crime and an investiga-
tion may have on a company or organization.
In grade school, most of us were introduced to 
the five “Ws,” which are generally understood to 
represent fundamental rhetorical questions to be 
used in scholarly, journalistic, and other evidence-
based treatises. Although it seems reasonable that ar-
riving at evidence-based conclusions in an investiga-
tion need not be mentioned in a field that deals with 
forensics, it should be. The framework presented in 
figure 1-1 and throughout this book is designed to 
arrive at those conclusions in a systematic fashion.
Types of Fraud
Fraudulent activities in businesses can fall into three 
main classes of activity: asset misappropriation, fi-
nancial statement fraud, and corruption. Understand 
that the type of event is a significant factor in de-
termining a proper response. Furthermore, in each 
class, unique activities (if understood) can help focus 
an investigation even further. Chapters 2-4 cover 
each of these three classes in great detail, but the 
following examples should help serve as real-world 
case studies for these three types of fraud. 
Asset Misappropriation
•		The	 former	 CFO,	 accounting	 manager,	
and accounts payable supervisor conspired 
to embezzle over $35 million dollars from 
PBSJ,4 an employee-owned engineering and 
construction firm, in Miami, Florida. The 
FBI conducted the investigation and re-
vealed that the employees were able to steal 
the funds by writing unauthorized checks 
to a private account and also by transferring 
funds from the medical benefits account into 
private checking accounts. The money was 
then shown to be spent on real estate, lux-
ury cars, a yacht, jewelry, and gambling ac-
tivities. The accounting manager, who had 
3		This	book	does	not	look	into	the	legal	ramifications	arising	from	fraudulent	activity	or	misconduct.	Legal	responsibilities	of	the	company’s	management,	
board	of	directors,	audit	committee,	and	legal	advisor	also	are	not	the	focus	of	this	book.	This	publication	is	intended	for	general	guidance	only.	It	is	not	
intended	to	be	a	substitute	for	detailed	research	or	the	exercise	of	professional	judgment.
4	See	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	Litigation	Release	No.	20340	issued	October	18,	2007.
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Figure 1-1: Business Fraud Investigation Framework
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worked for the company for over 25 years, 
was sentenced to 63 months in prison and 
ordered to pay over $10 million in restitu-
tion. The CFO was sentenced to 97 months 
in prison on the embezzlement charges and 
24 months on the campaign finance charge, 
to run concurrently.
•		The	 president	 and	 CFO	 of	 Continental	
Express,5 an Arkansas-based trucking com-
pany, worked closely together to transfer 
funds into personal accounts, only to have 
the CFO testify against his accomplice at 
trial. Together, the two men established an 
insurance company with the same name as 
that used by Continental Express, but it was 
incorporated in a different state. They then 
made payments to the fraudulent insurance 
company. In addition, they paid themselves 
multiple salaries. According to the pros-
ecution, it was a sense of entitlement that 
motivated the former president to scam the 
money from his employer. The CFO re-
ceived a reduced sentence for his coopera-
tion in the prosecution.
Financial Statement Fraud
•		In	August	2007,	Dell	announced	the	com-
pletion of a year-long internal investigation, 
overseen by its audit committee, into the 
accounting practices that led to an overstate-
ment of profits by $50 million. The audit 
committee investigation was in response to, 
but conducted separately from, a continu-
ing SEC investigation. Employing outside 
professional services firms, the investigation 
required 375 professionals who conducted 
233 interviews and reviewed over 5 mil-
lion documents. As a result of the investiga-
tion, Dell restated financial statements for 4 
years and reported management would con-
tinue to report to the audit committee on 
their actions to correct previous control 
deficiencies.
Corruption
•		Pacific	Northwest	Financial	Services	(PNFS),6 
using a name quite similar to the publicly-
traded and trusted Pacific Financial, sold 
fake surety bonds to 57 trucking companies. 
The trucking industry is required to pur-
chase $10,000 bonds from licensed bonding 
companies. Licensing is obtained through 
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Adminis-
tration (FMCSA). The FMCSA discovered 
the documents filed with them by PNFS 
were falsified and notified the Department 
of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector 
General. The owner of PNFS, Larry James 
Jackson, never intended to actually provide 
the bonding service and spent the money on 
himself. Jackson was sentenced to 70 months 
in prison and ordered to pay $236,347 in 
restitution.
•		Kmart	 conducted	 an	 internal	 investigation	
into management practices amidst their 
2002 bankruptcy and external investigations 
by both the SEC and FBI. The investiga-
tions were triggered by anonymous letters 
claiming to be from employees who accused 
Kmart	of	intentionally	violating	accounting	
standards.	Kmart’s	CEO,	who	was	oversee-
ing the investigation, reported that they un-
covered “credible and persuasive evidence 
demonstrating that certain former manag-
ers	of	Kmart	violated	 their	 stewardship	re-
sponsibilities	 to	Kmart,	 its	 employees,	 and	
shareholders.” The investigation included 
more than 570 interviews and the review of 
more than 1.5 million pages of documents. 
In	 addition,	Kmart	provided	over	620,000	
pages of documents for use in the external 
investigations.
Phases of the Investigation
Understand that each fraud case is different, and ev-
ery investigation must be adjusted to the variables 
encountered by the investigation team. The time-
line of the investigation either can be focused and 
short in duration (a few weeks to a couple months) 
5	See	USA v. Wooldridge—4:08cr137	and	USA v. Tiefel—4:08cr42.
6	See	USA v. Jackson—2:05cr49.
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or wide ranging and last for several months or even 
years. Although the specific procedures employed 
to investigate an alleged fraud vary depending on 
the size of the fraud and its potential scope, each 
investigation will typically include all of the follow-
ing steps:
 •		Occurrence	of	the	event
	 •		Planning	and	organization
	 •		Information	and	evidence	collecting
	 •		Recommendation	and	reporting
	 •		Remediation	and	follow-up	steps
These steps align with the framework found in 
figure 1-1 and are generally sequential, and it is im-
portant to understand that all investigations, regard-
less of scope, should address all of these consider-
ations across time. It is recommended that the reader 
reference figure 1-1 often throughout the course of 
studying this text to help him or her locate what 
aspect of the fraud investigation is being studied in 
relation to the framework.
Multiple components go with each of these steps, 
and a wealth of considerations must be taken into 
account. The following sections describe each of 
these steps in general terms, and chapters 5-14 ad-
dress the most common approaches, considerations, 
techniques, and possible outcomes at each of these 
points across a fraud investigation timeline.
Occurrence of the Event
Ground zero for any fraud investigation is the ac-
tual fraudulent activity. Some examples include the 
following:
 •		An	employee	makes	a	report	on	the	company’s	
whistle-blower hotline alleging that his or her 
supervisor has been inflating his or her expense 
report to receive reimbursement in excess of the 
amounts actually incurred.
	 •		A	significant	overseas	customer	calls	to	complain	
about the quality of the large volume of product 
they were recently shipped. They state that the 
country manager routinely pressured them to 
take the product in excess of their needs, espe-
cially at the end of the quarter.
	 •		When	the	controller	of	a	division	follows	up	on	
vendor complaints of slow payments, the con-
troller learns that the actual cash in the bank was 
almost zero. Upon scrutiny, the bank statements 
in the company’s files look as if they may be 
inauthentic.
Planning and Organization
Depending on how the fraud was identified or why 
an alleged fraud was suspected, the scope and issues 
will be identified based on personnel involved and 
accounts and operational groups impacted. Institut-
ing and following a fraud framework, such as the 
one presented here, will guide the investigation 
team concerning the extent of time and resources 
that will need to be dedicated to any given occur-
rence. Numerous factors should be considered when 
planning an investigation, including the following:
	 •		What	are	the	key	issues	involved	in	the	suspected	
fraud?
	 •		Who	is	potentially	involved	in	the	fraud,	or	who	
could have knowledge of the company opera-
tions involved in the fraud?
	 •		How	pervasive	is	the	fraud,	potentially?
	 •		Should	external	counsel	be	engaged?
	 •		Should	external	consultants	be	engaged,	and,	if	
so, in what capacity?
	 •		What	is	the	potential	population	of	relevant	
documentation, both hard copy and electronic, 
that could provide information related to the 
suspected fraud?
	 •		Who	should	be	informed?
Once these questions are answered, the investiga-
tion can be planned to allow for the best chance of 
success in identifying the fraud and its impact. Sev-
eral of these questions are discussed in detail in later 
chapters of this book, such as the types of evidence 
and working with external counsel.
Information and Evidence Gathering
Evidence consists of anything that can provide fac-
tual information about a particular matter, including 
the testimony of witnesses, records or hard copy and 
electronic documents, and communications. This is 
a wide-ranging definition that basically includes all 
company documents, electronic media, information 
gathered from interviews, and any other identified 
source. The process of gathering should be well 
planned, organized, and documented. By answering 
the questions in the planning phase, the investiga-
tion team will know who and what to target in a 
search for relevant evidence.
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The evidence gathering process will include the 
following steps:
	 •	 Preservation. This includes activities designed to 
prevent the loss of relevant evidence, such as the 
company issuing a communication to its employ-
ees to not destroy any hard copy or electronic 
information and to cease rotating server backup 
tapes.
	 •	 Collection of evidence. This is the actual retrieval 
by the investigation team of the preserved 
documentation and other document collections, 
whether hard copy or electronic. The potential 
electronic evidence sources include backup tapes, 
network drives, hard drives, flash drives, and 
BlackBerry devices.
	 •	 Processing. This involves the organization of the 
relevant hard copy and electronic documentation 
and, in the case of electronic media, the process-
ing of the electronic files to identify information 
directly related to the fraud investigation.
Once the evidence has been processed, it is ready 
to be reviewed and analyzed to answer the “who,” 
“what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how” 
questions. This is accomplished through both a 
review of the hard copy documents as well as a 
review of electronic media, including documents 
and e-mails. In addition, although interviews are 
a source of evidence, interviews of other person-
nel and second interviews also are conducted after 
the analysis of the evidence due to new information 
obtained or new questions raised.
The gathering and analyzing of evidence is repeat-
ed throughout an investigation to answer the inves-
tigation questions. The “why” question is typically 
the key to the investigation and can be answered in 
the following ways:
	 •		Interviews of key company personnel. Once the po-
tential scope has been identified, key personnel 
should be interviewed. This will include those 
company personnel suspected of the potential 
misconduct, as well as personnel with knowledge 
of the operations and accounts that are the focus 
of the fraudulent activity, who may or may not 
themselves be involved in the fraud.
	 •		Hard copy document collection, preservation, and 
potential processing. This is a key step in any inves-
tigation, and it should be planned and executed 
as early as possible to avoid the potential destruc-
tion of relevant evidence.
	 •		Electronic media collection, preservation, and potential 
processing. Similar to the hard copy document 
collection, electronic media should be collected 
early to preserve it for further review.
	 •		Analysis of collected data. The hard copy docu-
ments and electronic media will be reviewed to 
identify the extent of the fraud, the method 
employed to perpetrate the fraud, and the 
individuals involved.
Recommendation and Reporting
Once the investigation has been completed, the 
fraud has been identified, and the impact has been 
quantified, the results must be reported. Most inves-
tigations occurring at publicly traded companies will 
have reporting requirements to both internal and 
external constituencies. The reporting to the various 
constituencies could be verbal, written, or both.
The internal constituencies would typically in-
clude the following:
	 •		The	board	of	directors	or	subcommittees,	such	
as the audit committee or a special investigation 
committee
	 •		Management
	 •		External	constituencies,	which	could	include	the	
following:
  –  Regulators, such as the SEC
  – Auditors
  – Other investigative bodies
  –  Shareholders and the public
As noted earlier, the remaining chapters in this 
book will provide detailed discussions of many of 
the topics highlighted in this chapter, such as the 
following:
	 •	 Determination of findings, results, and recommenda-
tions. The results of the analysis of available evi-
dence and interviews of key personnel will lead 
the investigation team in arriving at a determina-
tion regarding the impact of the fraud.
	 •		Communication of findings, results, and recommenda-
tions to appropriate parties. The investigation team 
will document and communicate the results of 
the investigation in either a verbal or written 
report to the appropriate parties.
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Remediation and Follow-Up Steps
Those performing an investigation are in a unique 
position to provide information to a company 
about potential weaknesses in internal controls or 
areas where fraud prevention could be enhanced. 
In many cases, suggestions to improve prevention 
or detection controls or procedures are part of the 
communication of findings to the company.
The Fraud Triangle
One commonly referenced schematic in a fraud 
investigation study is called the fraud triangle. In-
troduced to professional literature in Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in 
a Financial Statement Audit (AICP, Professional Stan-
dards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), the fraud triangle con-
cept is one way to determine the “why” of an inci-
dent. This concept provides the drivers that allow a 
fraudulent event to occur and, as the triangle name 
would imply, includes the following three items:
 1.  Incentive or pressure on the person(s) who 
will commit the fraud, such as debt problems
 2.  Opportunity to commit the fraud, such as an 
identified weakness in controls that does not 
provide for proper segregation of duties
 3.  Rationalization for the fraud, such as “this is 
what I have coming to me”
Figure 1-2 summarizes the interrelationship 
among these three elements.7,8
7	Wells,	Joseph	T.	Occupational Fraud & Abuse.	Obsidian	Publishing	Co.,	1997.
8	Albrecht,	W.	Steve	and	Chad	O.	Albrecht.	Fraud Examination and Prevention.	Thomson	South-Western	Publishing,	2003.
Figure 1-2: The Fraud Triangle
Opportunity
Circumstances that allow
an employee to carry out
the misappropriation
of cash or other
organizational assets.
Pressure or Incentive
Pressure on employees to
misappropriate cash or
other organizational assets.
Rationalization
A frame of mind or ethical
character that allows
employees to intentionally
misappropriate cash or
other organizational
assets and justify their
dishonest actions.
The following examples of fraud are focused on 
each of the triangle’s component parts:
	 •		Small business suffers from lack of oversight (fraud 
triangle: opportunity and incentive). The opportuni-
ties to commit fraud may seem less numerous at 
a small company, but one rogue bookkeeper was 
able to embezzle material amounts by taking  
advantage of the opportunity of lack of supervi-
sion. The bookkeeper had an alcohol and gam-
bling addiction, resulting in large personal debt.
 •		 The owner only found out about the stolen 
funds after two years. According to the owner, 
“I trusted her. She was a full charge bookkeeper, 
and I didn’t check her work. She took care of 
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everything on the financial side so I didn’t have 
to worry.” The bookkeeper was able to siphon 
off funds through her paycheck, benefits, and 
expense reimbursements. Since uncovering the 
fraud, the owner has taken a greater role in over-
seeing the financial management and reporting 
and has changed the payroll responsibilities to 
include two people.
	 •		Small business suffers from lack of oversight (example 
2) (fraud triangle: opportunity). The bookkeeper 
of Aloha Termite and Pest Control in Hawaii 
began siphoning off funds in her first month of 
work. Over three and one-half years, she stole 
between $900,000 and $1.2 million in her fourth 
embezzlement scam. As the fraud was being 
perpetrated, the owner knew he was struggling 
financially and was even considering filing for 
bankruptcy. However, the bookkeeper had so 
much independence over the financial records 
that she was able to conceal the fraud from the 
owner and his accountant, despite their review 
of the financial statements. Upon indictment, 
the bookkeeper blamed a gambling problem. 
The owner will not likely see any of the funds 
returned due to the bookkeeper’s gambling, and 
he struggles to keep his business afloat.
	 •		Revenge as rationalization for fraud officer’s scam 
(fraud triangle: rationalization). In 1999, a police 
officer on the Canadian telemarketing fraud task 
force was arrested after conducting a phone scam 
against senior citizens. During his presentencing 
hearing, the former fraud officer told the judge 
he was out to embarrass his bosses. He com-
plained of unfair treatment by senior officers, 
including refusals for time off. The officer was 
caught within two months of the scam, but the 
department admitted the ordeal was nonetheless 
embarrassing.
	 •		Revenge as rationalization for controller’s embezzle-
ment (fraud triangle: rationalization). The assistant 
financial controller of Chromalock, an electron-
ics firm in England, embezzled company funds 
after deciding her compensation was too low and 
not receiving promised bonuses. According to 
her defense lawyer, “By way of partial revenge, 
this is the only way she thought she could get 
back at them.” The mother of 3 had worked 
at the firm for 14 years before she began the 
scheme. She was ordered to pay back funds and 
serve 10 months in jail.
Constituency 
Considerations
Not all investigations are initiated by regulators or 
law enforcement agencies, such as the SEC and FBI, 
and highlighted on the evening news. Many frauds 
are identified internally, and the investigation is 
conducted internally, even though external counsel 
and consultants are typically involved. However, if 
a fraud investigation is commenced by a company’s 
management or its board of directors, certain other 
internal and external constituencies must be included 
or at least informed of the facts of the investigation, 
as identified in the following chart. Each identified 
constituency will have some role and responsibility 
in the investigation. Table 1-1 outlines in general 
terms the level of involvement that core stakehold-
ers own during the course of different kinds of fraud 
investigations. The specific roles and responsibilities 
of these key stakeholders along with those of pe-
ripheral stakeholders are covered in chapter 9.
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Conclusion
One of the keys to success in dealing with issues 
of fraud, bribery, and corruption is the system a 
company has for reporting and investigating alle-
gations of misconduct. If the subsequent investiga-
tion is perceived by stakeholders to be biased or not 
competently managed, negative consequences could 
ensue. Trust in senior management to do the right 
thing will be eroded and disillusioned employees 
will think twice about future cooperation.
Investigations offer management the opportu-
nity to demonstrate that, although everyone will 
be treated fairly, dishonest or unethical behavior 
will not be tolerated. Commitment from the top to 
do the right thing and act responsibly builds a cul-
ture in which employees with concerns will come 
forward, confident that they will be taken seriously 
and treated professionally.
A robust investigation helps safeguard the com-
pany’s reputation. A key aspect is having an expe-
rienced and independent investigating team that 
has the ability to discover relevant facts and secure 
the relevant documentary and electronic evidence. 
Many companies, boards of directors, and indepen-
dent auditors insist on a competent and thorough 
investigation performed by an independent inves-
tigative team. This often includes a law firm and a 
professional advisory firm with experience in foren-
sic accounting and leading investigation practices.
In the subsequent chapters, this book will dis-
cuss in detail the various aspects and areas of a fraud 
investigation.
Table 1-1:  Stakeholders’ Level of Involvement in a Fraud Investigation
Type of Fraud 
(Internal Discovery 
and Investigation)
Internal Neutral External
Party	
Identifying	
the	Fraud
Direct	
Employee	
Supervisor
Management	
of	the	
Subsidiary
Executive	
Management
Board	of	
Directors Auditors SEC DOJ
Asset	
Misappropriation	
(Immaterial)
Owner	of	
the	asset X X X X
Asset	
Misappropriation	
(Material)
Owner	of	
the	asset X X X X P P P
Financial 
Statement	Fraud Varies X X X P P P
Fraud Varies X X X P Civil Criminal
Whistle-blower
Whistle-
blower—
either	
known	or	
anonymous
X X X P P P
“P”=Peripherally	involved.
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Introduction
Cash Frauds
	 •	Larceny
	 	 –	Petty	Cash
	 	 –		Cash	Larceny	From	the	 
Deposit
	 	 –		Sales	Process	Voids	and	 
Returns
	 	 –	From	Cash	Register
	 	 –		Counterfeit	Checks,	Check	 
Theft,	and	Forgery
	 •	Skimming
	 	 –		Accounts	Receivable	and	 
Sales	Fraud	Schemes
	 	 –		Lapping	of	Accounts	 
Receivable
	 	 –		Manipulation	of	Credits,	 
Discounts,	and	Receivables	 
Write-offs
	 	 –		Underrecorded	Sales	and	 
Overshipments
Charles Owens, Executive Director
Vince Walden, Senior Manager
	 •	Fraudulent	Disbursement
	 	 –	Fictitious	Venders
	 	 –	Overpurchasing
	 	 –	Contract	and	Construction	Fraud
	 	 –	Other	Procurements	Frauds
	 	 –	Pay-and-Return	Schemes
	 	 –	Personal	Purchases
Non-Cash Frauds
	 •	Payroll	Fraud
	 	 –	Falsified	Wages
	 	 –	Ghost	Employees
	 	 –	Commissions	and	Bonuses	Schemes
	 	 –	Workers	Compensation
	 •	Inventory	Fraud
	 •	Intangible	Asset	Fraud
Asset Misappropriation Detection,  
 Prevention, and Deterrence
Beyond Traditional Fraud Detection  
 Analytics
	 •	Structured	Data
	 •	Unstructured	Data
	 •		Practical	Applications	for	Model-Based	
Analytics	in	Structured	Financial	Data
	 •		Practical	Applications	for	Unstructured	
Data	Analytics	using	the	Fraud	Triangle	
and	Text	Mining
Conclusion
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Introduction
Protecting a company’s assets is one of the most 
important roles of management. Frauds against and 
thefts from companies can be perpetrated by com-
pany insiders acting alone or in collusion with others 
and outsiders sometimes acting with the cooperation 
of insiders. In its fraud research, the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has labeled fraud 
perpetrated by insiders as occupational fraud. Occupa-
tional fraud is a pervasive problem for organizations, 
and, year after year, studies demonstrate that both 
the incidences of and the losses attributable to fraud 
are significant across all types of companies.
As defined by the ACFE, fraud takes three prima-
ry forms: asset misappropriation, financial statement 
fraud, and corruption. Asset misappropriation com-
prises any scheme that involves the theft or misuse 
of an organization’s assets. Financial statement fraud 
is the deliberate misrepresentation of a company’s 
financial statements in order to mislead users of the 
financial statements. Corruption entails a person using 
a position of influence to obtain an unauthorized 
benefit that is counter to his or her employer’s in-
terests. Figure 2-1 identifies the three forms of fraud 
and many of the schemes that comprise each one.1
The forensic accountant charged with investigat-
ing suspected fraud knows well that even though 
each fraudulent act is unique, common patterns are 
often present in asset misappropriation and the steps 
taken to cover up the act. This chapter will explore 
asset misappropriation fraud schemes in detail, and 
chapters 3 and 4 will address financial statement 
fraud and corruption, respectively.
Although not every asset misappropriation fraud 
scheme is addressed in this chapter, the more com-
mon schemes will be explored, which include frauds 
related to cash, procurement and accounts payable, 
payroll, inventory, and intangible assets. We also will 
discuss current best practices on deterrence, preven-
tion, and detection, as well as some new fraud de-
tection analytics that expand beyond the traditional, 
rules-based queries and matching functions.
A plethora of literature is available that addresses 
“red flags” regarding misappropriation of assets and 
internal controls that are designed to prevent misap-
propriation of assets. It is not our intention to in-
clude in this chapter the myriad of “red flags” and 
controls that exist because that would require much 
more than this one chapter. For additional resources 
on fraud prevention schemes, we recommend start-
ing with the following:
	 •		The Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention and 
Detection by Joseph Wells
	 •	 Managing the Business Risk of Fraud: A Practi-
cal Guide, a joint publication by the Institute of 
Internal Auditors, the AICPA, and the ACFE
	 •		Resources	and	publications	available	on	the	
ACFE’s website at www.acfe.org, as well 
as the AICPA’s antifraud resource center 
Web	site	at	http://fvs.aicpa.org/Resources/
Antifraud+Forensic+Accounting
Notwithstanding high-profile cases of financial 
statement fraud in the last decade, asset misappro-
priation, due to its high incidence, is the type of 
occupational fraud that is most likely to occur and 
is, therefore, of great concern to both large and 
small businesseses. The problems for businesses that 
handle cash, produce goods easily transported, or 
develop technologies critical to the success of the 
business are particularly acute; however, any asset 
is vulnerable to theft by employees or third parties 
acting alone or in collusion with others. Accord-
ingly, it is vital for financial managers, internal audi-
tors, and other executives to at least have a general 
understanding of the nature of these schemes and 
have controls in place to minimize exposure from 
these risks.
In the ACFE’s 2008 Report to the Nation on Oc-
cupational Fraud & Abuse,2 a detailed review of fraud 
cases reported in its survey revealed approximately 
1	Wells,	Joseph	T.	Occupational Fraud and Abuse.	Dexter,	MI:	Obsidian	Publishing	Company,	Inc.,	1997.
2	See	www.acfe.com/documents/2008-rttn.pdf.
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Figure 2-1: Financial Fraud Schemes by Category
(Reprinted with permission. 2008 
Report to the Nation on Occupational 
Fraud Abuse. Copyright 2008 by 
the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners, Inc.)
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89 percent included asset misappropriation (figure 
2-2). This number is only slightly lower than the 
91 percent reflected in the 2006 report. In the 2008 
survey, the median loss from asset misappropriation 
was $150,000 (figure 2-3), which was identical to 
the loss from asset misappropriation reported in the 
2006 report.
Figure 2-2: Percentage of Fraud Cases Reported in 2008
Figure 2-3: Cost of Fraud Cases Reported in 2008
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As is the case with any other fraud or business 
risk, the company’s executives and its operational 
management have the ultimate responsibility for 
safeguarding the organization’s assets; however, at-
tending to fraud is not always a high priority. Fre-
quently, executives and managers do not have the 
knowledge to appropriately address the risks of fraud 
faced by their organizations or, for other reasons, do 
not take steps to adequately address the risks. Con-
sequently, fraud is usually addressed after the fact 
rather than proactively. Fraud prevention is an over-
head expense, and although the cost of postincident 
investigation is high, oftentimes, companies are only 
willing to commit minimal funds to fraud preven-
tion measures and proactive assessments that could 
result in early detection of fraud and potentially re-
duce losses from fraud. For lengthier discussions on 
business owner roles and responsibilities as well as 
fraud	 prevention	 strategy,	 see	 chapters	 6	 (“Roles	
and	 Responsibilities:	 How	 Different	 Stakeholders	
Work	During	 Investigations”)	 and	 14	 (“Antifraud	
Programs”) respectively.
The following sections describe more common 
schemes of misappropriation of assets, such as cash 
fraudulent schemes that can occur in the asset cat-
egories or processes previously indicated in figure 
2-1. These schemes represent what is typically en-
countered in misappropriation of assets frauds, and, 
therefore, this chapter does not describe each mis-
appropriation of assets scheme. The area of noncash 
misappropriation of assets schemes, as depicted in 
figure 2-1, has not been described in this chapter 
due to the minimal significance of this information 
and these schemes related to misappropriation of as-
sets in general.
Cash Frauds
Although any business asset can be stolen by em-
ployees or others acting alone or in collusion, cash, 
by its very nature, is the easiest to steal and one of 
the most frequent targets for theft. Cash includes 
cash on hand in petty cash or any other cash fund or 
reserve and cash in bank accounts. As with all com-
pany assets, cash should be properly accounted for 
in the company’s books and records and is generally 
classified as cash on hand or cash in bank accounts.
The amount of cash on hand varies according to 
the needs of the business and its operational philoso-
phy. From a global perspective, in certain countries 
where the banking system is not well developed or 
trusted, businesses conduct more and larger cash 
transactions. The increased amount of cash on hand 
in these countries presents an inviting target for per-
sons inclined to misappropriate cash.
In conducting forensic accounting work, it is of-
ten an objective to determine if off-book cash is 
being	maintained.	Such	cash	is	often	referred	to	as	
slush funds, and it can be used for illicit purposes, 
such as corruption or the personal benefit of those 
company representatives generating and maintain-
ing	the	funds.	Slush	funds	are	frequently	built	from	
the improper conversion of a company’s cash. The 
forensic accountant should always be alert for indi-
cations of the maintenance of slush funds.
Misappropriation of cash can be categorized as 
follows: (1) larceny or theft of cash on hand, (2) 
skimming of cash, and (3) fraudulent disbursements 
of cash. Each category is addressed subsequently.
Larceny
Cash larceny is defined as the straightforward or ac-
tual theft of cash on hand or from daily receipts. At-
tempts to conceal cash larceny are typically under-
taken in one of three ways: by making no record of 
cash received, by altering supporting documents to 
conceal theft of cash, or by falsifying journal entries 
to cover up the fraud.
Certain types of businesses, including retail stores, 
restaurants and bars, convenience stores, and gas sta-
tions, as well as religious and charitable organiza-
tions are more vulnerable to cash theft simply be-
cause large amounts of cash are collected in these 
businesses. Increased opportunities for cash larceny 
arise in these and other organizations that vest a high 
degree of trust in individuals handling the cash. Un-
fortunately, it is not uncommon to hear of cash theft 
in all of these organizations and efforts to mask the 
theft.
Petty Cash
Many businesses maintain one or more petty cash 
funds to have cash on hand to pay for generally 
small operational expenses or other small items in a 
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convenient and expedited manner. Theft from petty 
cash is a common form of larceny. When a petty 
cash fund is established, appropriate controls should 
be instituted to prevent misuse or theft of funds, and 
the amount of the fund should only be the amount 
deemed necessary to meet the obligations for which 
the fund was established. The controls should in-
clude assigning responsibility of the fund to one 
person and performing periodic unannounced cash 
counts to account for the full amount of the fund.
Stealing	 from	petty	cash	can	occur	 in	a	number	
of ways. In most cases, petty cash thefts are small 
in amount, although if not uncovered timely the 
amounts can become substantial. Thefts from petty 
cash can be outright thefts (though the perpetrator 
will often justify the actions by thinking of the theft 
as a “loan” to be repaid); another theft is through 
submitting bogus, forged, or altered receipts, sug-
gesting that the cash was used for the purchase of 
goods or services that were never in fact purchased. 
Providing bogus receipts and illicitly obtaining funds 
from a business is a common practice in some parts 
of	 the	world,	 including	Asia.	 Such	 bogus	 receipts	
have been known to be acquired at local markets in 
Asia and often include counterfeit tax or regulatory 
stamps to make them appear authentic.
Other forms of cash larceny have the potential 
to result in much greater loss and are described 
subsequently.  
Cash Larceny From the Deposit
As businesses take in cash, it is prudent to deposit that 
cash in the bank as soon as possible. It is critical to 
have good internal controls from receipt of the cash 
until the deposit is verified. This includes having a 
method to document all incoming cash and different 
individuals responsible for recording incoming cash, 
making the deposit, and performing bank reconcili-
ations. When these controls are not maintained or 
if there is collusion, thefts of cash intended to be 
deposited in the bank may well occur.
Concealing theft of cash from deposits may occur 
by altering original cash receipt documents, bank 
deposit slips, or deposit receipts after the deposit has 
been made. In such instances, detection is very like-
ly as long as there are good internal controls. When 
there is collusion, detection is much more difficult.
Sales Process Voids and Returns
This type of cash larceny is most prevalent in busi-
nesses that rely heavily on cash sales. After a sale 
has been completed and payment has been received, 
the unscrupulous clerk can steal cash by voiding 
the sale in the system or entering a return while si-
multaneously removing cash. Businesses often give 
their clerical employees authority to void a transac-
tion or process a return in order to provide a high 
level of customer service. With such authorization, 
a	measure	of	internal	control	is	removed.	Requiring	
approval for voids or returns minimizes the risk of 
losses from this scheme but also can be perceived as 
reducing the level of customer service.
From Cash Register
Cash register thefts are generally small in amount but 
can grow quickly if remedial measures are not taken 
when shortages are reported or theft is suspected. 
Frequently closing out the registers, requiring that 
all customers receive copies of receipts, and requir-
ing that each register operator is solely authorized to 
operate only a designated register are some controls 
that can minimize cash register thefts.
Counterfeit Checks, Check Theft, 
and Forgery
With the advent of more sophisticated payment sys-
tems and controls, these frauds are less common but 
are	still	prevalent.	High	quality	word	processing	and	
graphics programs are available to assist fraudsters 
in creating counterfeit checks that can be negoti-
ated and placed into the bank clearing system and 
potentially victimize companies. Law enforcement 
has indicated that many of these attempted frauds 
are being perpetrated by company outsiders who 
are affiliated with criminal rings or gangs but often 
have the assistance of company insiders. Companies 
should be ever vigilant in responding to evidence 
that their corporate checks are being counterfeited, 
in	an	effort	to	minimize	any	damage.	Serious	con-
sideration should be given to bringing such matters 
to the attention of law enforcement to assist in com-
bating these crimes and, hopefully, reduce the expo-
sure to the company and others, as well.
Check theft and forgery, on the other hand, are 
generally perpetrated by company insiders taking 
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advantage of any weaknesses in controls to gain ac-
cess to company checks. The check theft schemes in-
clude those in which blank checks are obtained and 
fraudulently prepared or checks intended for a legiti-
mate payee are pilfered and altered in some way for 
the benefit of the fraudster. The basic scheme is one 
in which a blank check is obtained and made payable 
to the perpetrator or an illegitimate payee, and the 
perpetrator negotiates the check with a forged signa-
ture of an authorized signer. Other schemes include 
intercepting a check made payable to a legitimate 
third party and either altering the payee of the check 
or affixing a fraudulent endorsement on the check 
and then negotiating the check or having a coop-
erator negotiate the check. Check fraud also can be 
carried out by preparing a check payable to an en-
tity name controlled by the perpetrator and having 
it signed by an authorized signer. This scheme can 
be successful when the check signer is signing many 
checks and is not diligent about closely looking at 
each check and supporting documentation.
Skimming
One of the most common forms of asset misappro-
priation is skimming. Skimming is the theft of all or 
a portion of the cash receipts of a business at a par-
ticular point of sale or other point when cash or 
payments	 enter	 a	 business.	 Skimming	 schemes	 are	
off-book frauds, meaning that the money is stolen 
before it is recorded in the accounts of the victim or-
ganization. By its nature, a skimming scheme leaves 
no direct audit trail. Because the stolen funds are 
never recorded, the organization may not be aware 
that	the	cash	was	ever	taken.	Depending	on	the	na-
ture of the business, many persons may be in a posi-
tion	to	receive	cash	or	payments.	Some	skimming	or	
cover-up methods include accounts receivable and 
sales fraud schemes; lapping of accounts receivable; 
manipulation of credits, discounts, and receivables 
write-offs; underrecorded sales; and overshipments, 
which are described subsequently.
Accounts Receivable and Sales 
Fraud Schemes
Accounts receivable and some sales schemes differ 
from the cash misappropriation schemes previously 
described because they occur after there has been 
a sales transaction recorded in the books, and they 
can take different forms. An unscrupulous employee 
who has access to payments on account may take 
steps to manipulate that activity for his or her ben-
efit. Likewise, certain actions can be taken with re-
gard to credits, discounts, and bad debt write-offs as 
a means of covering up misappropriation of assets.
Lapping of Accounts Receivable
In an accounts receivable lapping scheme, an un-
scrupulous employee diverts a customer’s payment 
on account to realize a personal benefit and conceals 
the diversion by applying other customers’ payments 
to cover the account from which the payment was 
originally diverted. Once started, such a scheme de-
mands an ongoing juggling act of applying subse-
quent customer payments to cover the last account 
from which payments were diverted and can be-
come a daunting task to conceal and keep going.
Manipulation of Credits, Discounts, 
and Receivables Write-offs
Another method for concealing diverted funds from 
customer payments involves fictitious credits or dis-
counts or a write-off of a portion or all of the re-
ceivable balance as uncollectible. The unscrupulous 
employee can issue credits or discounts to cover a di-
version of a customer payment or benefit a customer 
who has paid a bribe or kickback or with whom the 
employee has an undisclosed relationship or hidden 
interest. Bribes can be defined as something of value 
provided to an individual in a decision-making or 
other role of authority in an effort to encourage or 
reward the individual to violate his or her responsi-
bility in such a way that the person paying the bribe 
is	 benefited.	 Similarly,	 kickbacks are something of 
value, usually money, generally paid to an individual 
in a decision-making or other role of authority after 
the individual has awarded a contract or payment to 
the person paying the kickback.
Underrecorded Sales and  
Overshipments
In these schemes, the value of a sale is underre-
corded or excess product is shipped, resulting in a 
loss to the company. When a customer is the ben-
eficiary of one of these schemes, the unscrupulous 
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employee has likely been compromised with a bribe 
or kickback or is the beneficiary in some other way. 
A variance of the overshipment scheme is when the 
unscrupulous employee diverts the excess shipment 
to another party to realize a personal benefit. In this 
case, inventory is overstated unless some effort is 
made to manipulate the amount of the sale in the 
Fraudulent Disbursement
The procurement of goods and services and accounts 
payable roles presents opportunities for unscrupulous 
employees to personally benefit to the detriment of 
the company. In this section, we address some of the 
schemes in which companies sustain losses as a result 
of the actions of its employees in performing these 
functions. Procurement and accounts payable dis-
bursement frauds include paying vendors for goods 
and services never provided or procured at excessive 
amounts, usually due to bribes or kickbacks being 
paid by the vendor, and paying fictitious vendors 
who were set up with the intention of perpetrat-
ing a fraud. Losses also can be sustained when com-
petitive bid policies are ignored and in construction 
contracts when insiders are not operating with the 
best interest of the company or contractors actively 
attempt to defraud the company.
When organizations are operating globally, cul-
tural issues in some countries and regions of the 
world place a greater acceptance on bribery and cor-
ruption; therefore, the risk that a company’s assets 
may be misappropriated is increased. Companies are 
well served by understanding the culture and expe-
riences concerning corruption in the global markets 
in which they operate. Chapter 9, “Cross-Jurisdic-
tional Issues in the Global Environment” discusses 
the various factors involved when considering is-
sues in a fraud investigation that involve overlap of 
global markets. 
Fictitious Vendors
One common procurement fraud is carried out 
when a fictitious vendor is successfully placed in the 
company’s approved vendor list. If a company has 
weak internal controls or the controls concerning 
approving vendors are circumvented, the unscrupu-
lous employee has taken a significant step toward 
successfully perpetrating a procurement fraud by 
getting approval for adding a fictitious vendor to 
a company’s vendor list. Thereafter, the fraudster 
need only get an approved invoice into the system 
to have payment disbursed. Payments to fictitious 
vendors are often made to a post office box or an 
address under the control of the person perpetrat-
ing the scheme. These frauds are particularly insidi-
ous because they reflect advance planning and the 
clear	intent	to	defraud	the	company.	Depending	on	
the level of controls existing at the company, this 
scheme can be carried out by a lone individual or 
may require collusion and can become very costly.
Overpurchasing
This scheme results in a company paying more than 
appropriate or necessary for goods or services that 
may have been totally unnecessary or may have been 
procured at a price above the best price. Usually, 
when this occurs, the employee with procurement 
responsibilities has been compromised through brib-
ery or kickbacks. In such circumstances, the corrupt 
vendor can benefit greatly by successfully submitting 
excessive invoices for which payment will be made, 
in excess of or sufficient to cover the amount of the 
bribe or kickback paid to the corrupt employee. If 
the compromised employee is not too greedy, this 
scheme can be difficult to detect or prove and can 
go on for an extended period of time, thus increas-
ing the loss to the company.
Contract and Construction Fraud
Large contracts or construction projects present 
inviting opportunities for fraud to be perpetrated 
against a company. For unscrupulous employees and 
vendors, the rewards for compromising the award 
or completion phase of the process can be great if 
they are willing to accept the risks. This type of 
fraud usually occurs when there are lax procedures 
for awarding such contracts or when there is bid-
rigging.
Bid-rigging is a particularly pervasive and costly 
problem in certain industries. Generally, bid-rigging 
occurs in the procurement process when a member 
of the offering organization that has placed a request 
for proposal fraudulently assists a vendor or contrac-
tor in winning a sale or contract through some form 
of manipulation of the competitive bidding process. 
Several	phases	of	the	bidding	process	are	susceptible	
to bid-rigging and are outlined in box 2-1.
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Prebid Technical Specification Phase
In the context of large contracts, the prebid 
phase is where technical specifications 
are developed as the basis of a request for 
quotation or solicitation. One of the most 
common schemes during this phase is to 
design bid specifications that completely 
match the qualifications and abilities of a 
targeted, sole source or favored vendor 
who then pays a bribe in exchange for the 
exclusivity of the contract requirements. 
These requirements may be either prequali-
fication procedures that meet only the 
target vendor’s products or services as they 
presently exist or are specifications pre-
pared in a manner such that only the target 
vendor can understand the specifications or 
design its products to meet them.
Request for Quotation or Solicitation 
Phase
In the invitation phase to bid on a project 
or purchase contract, a common fraud is to 
provide advance notification and specifica-
tions only to the target vendor or create 
fake quotations from fictitious vendors to 
paper the file to make it appear that other 
bids were made when in fact only the tar-
get vendor submitted a bid.
Presubmission Award Phase
Common frauds during this phase of the 
process when the organization receives sub-
missions from the various bidders include 
providing the competitors’ bids or pricing 
to the favored vendor or providing addi-
tional details or privileged information to a 
favored vendor that other vendors did not 
receive, thus affording the favored vendor 
an unfair (and likely winning) advantage.
Box 2-1:  Bid-Rigging Phases
Pay-and-Return Schemes
So-called	 “pay-and-return”	 schemes	 are	 frequent-
ly carried out by using the invoices of legitimate 
third-party vendors who are not a part of the fraud 
scheme. In these cases, the perpetrator is an internal 
employee who intentionally mishandles payments 
owed to legitimate vendors. The following different 
versions of the scheme generally are used:
	 •		Double paying invoices. In such cases, someone 
in the Accounts Payable department purposely 
double pays a legitimate vendor invoice. For 
example, a clerk might intentionally pay an in-
voice twice then call the vendor and request that 
one of the checks be returned. The clerk then 
receives or takes steps to intercept the returned 
check and converts it for his or her benefit.
	 •		Paying incorrect vendors. In these cases, an accounts 
payable clerk or another company employee in-
tentionally pays the wrong vendor (that is, sends 
a check written to vendor A to vendor B). After 
the check is mailed, the employee calls vendor 
B to explain the “mistake” and requests that ven-
dor B return the check to his or her attention. 
When that check arrives, the employee converts 
it for his or her personal benefit. Of course, if 
vendor A is still due payment, that will have to 
be addressed by the fraudster.
	 •		Vendor overpayment. In cases of overpayment, 
an employee in the accounts payable function in-
tentionally overpays a legitimate vendor and then 
contacts the vendor to request that the excess 
funds be sent back to the employee’s attention. 
The employee converts any funds returned for 
personal benefit.
Personal Purchases
Some	 pervasive	 frauds	 can	 be	 very	 simple.	Many	
fraudsters simply purchase personal items using 
company accounts, corporate credit cards, or some 
other	company-based	mechanism.	Such	frauds	usu-
ally begin on a small scale but can become costly if 
not detected early. Companies should require that 
employees be diligent in adhering to controls and 
react appropriately when there is an indication fraud 
has occurred, even if the amounts involved appear 
to be small. Often, these schemes can be detected by 
comparing an individual employee’s purchases to his 
or her employee peer group.
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Non-Cash Fraud
Payroll Fraud
Misappropriation of a company’s assets can oc-
cur when actions are taken to cause disbursements 
through its payroll system that are not proper. The 
most common types of payroll schemes include fal-
sification of wages that result in overpayment, plac-
ing so-called “ghost employees” on the payroll, 
fraudulent commission or bonus schemes, and false 
workers compensation claims.
Falsified Wages
The most common method of misappropriating 
funds from the payroll is overpayment of wages. For 
hourly employees, the size of a paycheck is based on 
two factors: the number of hours worked and the 
rate of pay. For an hourly employee to fraudulently 
increase the size of his or her paycheck, he or she 
must either falsify the number of hours worked or 
his or her wage rate must be changed. Because sala-
ried employees do not receive compensation based 
on their time at work, excess payment to these em-
ployees generally is accomplished by arranging for 
the periodic pay rate in the payroll system to be 
changed.
Ghost Employees
Companies will sustain losses when names of indi-
viduals are entered in the payroll system, and the 
individuals are paid but do not perform any work. 
The individuals who do not work but are paid have 
come	 to	 be	 called	 “ghost	 employees.”	 Sometimes	
the individual whose name is in the payroll system 
but does not work is the recipient of the payments, 
but on other occasions, bogus names are placed in 
the system and the proceeds are received by the per-
son or persons who are perpetrating a fraud on the 
company. In another variation, although not com-
mon, entering “ghost employees” into the payroll 
system and receiving the proceeds can be a meth-
od of establishing a slush fund that can be used for 
off-book payments, which are frequently related to 
corruption. Entering a government official, either 
domestic or foreign, or a relative of the government 
official in the payroll system also can be a method of 
making an improper payment to that government 
official. For “ghost employees” to be successfully 
entered in the payroll system and paid, serious inter-
nal control weaknesses will have to exist.
Commission and Bonus Schemes
Schemes	designed	to	 improperly	 increase	commis-
sion payments or pay bonuses to employees are 
other types of payroll frauds. Commission schemes 
are perpetrated by either falsely reporting sales or 
other activity for which a commission is to be paid 
or the rate at which the commission is to be paid. 
Bonus schemes are carried out when a bonus pay-
ment is improperly entered in the system and paid. 
For either of these schemes to be successful, internal 
controls must be weak or ignored or there must be 
collusion.
Workers Compensation
Payments for employees injured on the job are re-
quired to be made under the law. When the medical 
condition of the employee is falsely reported either 
by the employee acting alone or in collusion with a 
medical professional, companies are victimized.
Inventory Fraud
Misappropriation of inventory is a common scheme 
and represents a significant cost to many organiza-
tions. The schemes include the outright theft of 
inventory and more complex schemes designed to 
make it appear that inventory was not improperly 
removed.
A common inventory fraud scheme is to falsify 
records of incoming shipments of goods by mark-
ing the receiving documents as short of the quantity 
purchased in order to conceal theft. Another inven-
tory misappropriation scheme is perpetrated by fal-
sifying sales and shipping documents, shipping the 
goods to an alternate location out of the control of 
the company. Inventory also can be stolen by clas-
sifying it as scrap, which is then sold for pennies on 
the dollar. This scheme can be very costly for items 
such as precious metals and, in some cases, often in-
cludes collusion with third parties, customers, deal-
ers, or distributors.
Theft of inventory can be concealed in a num-
ber of ways. One way is to charge a fake receiv-
able, which will be written off through bad debts. 
The theft also could be concealed by writing off the 
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missing inventory as part of the perpetual inventory 
system adjustment or, prior to the adjustment, classi-
fying it as missing. Moreover, the inventory account 
may be used to conceal other types of fraud or theft 
of assets, such as when someone has stolen cash or 
written themselves a check and booked the amount 
to inventory. These types of schemes can be more 
easily disguised than other frauds because it is com-
mon to adjust the inventory account for the cost of 
goods sold or after a physical inventory.
Intangible Asset Fraud
Although there are complexities in valuing intan-
gible assets for financial reporting purposes, it is 
clear that intangible assets, including intellectual 
property, such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, 
business methodologies, trade secrets, research and 
development, marketing strategies, and so on, can 
be of significant value to a business. If compromised, 
very negative consequences can occur, including 
substantial economic loss or loss of profit potential. 
Any such compromise of intangible assets in which 
closely held proprietary information is involved usu-
ally occurs by insiders of the company or with the 
cooperation of a company insider. Certain types of 
intangible assets are routinely targets of economic 
espionage schemes.
Much information about a company can be en-
tirely obtained through legal methods, if one knows 
where to look. In order for a spy or corporate intel-
ligence professional to harvest the real “plums” of 
information, however, it may be necessary to resort 
to illegal methods. Organizations that have intan-
gible assets that would be valuable to competitors or 
foreign government entities must be cognizant that 
they are not immune from this form of attack.
Protecting intangible assets should be a priority 
of management. A clear policy should be designed 
to protect intangible assets, including proprietary 
information, and the policy should be effectively 
communicated to all employees. Protection should 
include clearly identifying all intangible assets as pro-
tected assets. Anyone who is in a position to have 
access to intangible assets that require a measure of 
confidentiality or secrecy should sign a confidenti-
ality agreement, and management should make it 
clear that actions will be taken against anyone who 
improperly compromises these assets, including 
criminal prosecution.
Asset Misappropriation 
Detection, Prevention, 
and Deterrence
According to the ACFE’s 2008 Report to the Na-
tion on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, the majority of 
fraud schemes were detected by tips or accident, not 
by internal audit, internal controls, or external audit 
(figure 2-4).
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Figure 2-4: Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds
(Rep i ed with permission. 2008 Report to the Natio  on Occupational Fraud 
Abuse. Copyright 2008 by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc.)
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Although all of the potential detection methods 
depicted in figure 2-4 are important and it is es-
sential to follow the long-prescribed internal control 
mechanisms that are designed to minimize fraud, it 
is increasingly being recognized that it also is impor-
tant to create an ethical culture within a company 
and effectively communicate policies, procedures, 
and expectations to employees. This fosters an atti-
tude in which employees will respond appropriately 
and come forward when they observe something 
indicating possible fraud. Box 2-2 outlines some of 
the steps that should be taken in creating and main-
taining that culture.
•		Establishing	a	code	of	conduct	that	clearly	
conveys the company’s expectations 
that all employees will operate ethically 
and in compliance with the law and will 
report any information indicating possible 
misconduct
•		Displaying	a	tone	at	the	top	by	manage-
ment that clearly conveys management 
fully supports the company’s ethical stan-
dards and will enforce them
•		Following	up	on	any	indication	or	allega-
tion of misconduct that appears credi- 
ble and taking remedial action when  
appropriate
•		Punishing	those	persons	found	to	have	
violated company ethical policies, includ-
ing dismissal if deemed appropriate and 
referral to law enforcement for criminal 
prosecution when laws may have been 
potentially violated
•		Conducting	fraud	awareness	training	for	
employees
•		Requiring	annual	attestations	from	em-
ployees that they are not aware of any 
wrongdoing in the company, including 
any potential conflicts of interest
Box 2-2:  Creating and Maintaining an Ethical 
Culture
Additionally, companies are seeing the benefit of 
performing fraud risk assessments to identify areas 
where frauds are most likely to occur and those frauds 
that will have the greatest impact on the company 
if they do occur. After identifying the high-priority 
fraud risk areas, enhanced attention can be given to 
these areas to minimize the fraud risk and economic 
exposure, should fraud occur in these areas. This is 
when substantive testing and forensic analytics can 
be of high value to the organization, and specific 
tests are designed around the areas of most risk, as 
described in the next section. For a more compre-
hensive discussion on risk assessments and preven-
tions, see chapter 14, “Antifraud Programs.”
Beyond Traditional 
Fraud Detection  
Analytics
One potential reason why fraud is detected more 
by chance (that is, by tip or accident) rather than 
by proactive efforts, is that companies are still using 
traditional rules-based queries and analytics, which 
rely heavily on the individual to ask questions of 
the data based on what is currently known. Further, 
these analytics are sometimes done with minimal 
input from outside the Internal Audit department 
(for example, interviewing the business line leaders 
about where fraud risks might occur in their divi-
sion) or by simply doing a repeat of last year’s stan-
dard testing. Although traditional approaches are 
vital to ongoing efforts to monitor and detect errors 
in the data, they are limited (with respect to success 
in detecting fraud) due to the fact that they often re-
quire a significant amount of both time and luck to 
uncover potential anomalies in the accounting data. 
Also, they typically focus on structured, financial, 
and accounting data, such as ledgers and transac-
tional database systems, which, according to Gart-
ner	Research,	 only	make	 up	 about	 20	 percent	 of	
the data within an organization. The remaining 80 
percent of an organization’s data is made up of text-
based, unstructured data (for example, documents, 
e-mails, presentations, Web sites, and so on).3
3 Introducing the High Performance Workplace: Improving Competitive Advantage and Employee Impact.	Gartner	Research,	May	2005.
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Albert Einstein is attributed with saying: “The 
definition of insanity is doing the same thing over 
and over again and expecting different results.” 
Rather	than	pouring	more	resources	into	the	same	
technologies and processes over and over, a more 
sophisticated approach to increasing fraud detection 
is to incorporate a proactive model-based approach, 
which, when coupled with leading visualization 
tools and unstructured data analytics, allows the data 
to define itself. When combined with traditional 
rules-based analytics, these technologies can be a 
powerful toolset to identify large and unusual trans-
actions derived from the multidimensional attributes 
in the data. Model-based mining shifts the focus to 
high-risk areas in which controls may not necessar-
ily exist or, if they exist, may be bypassed. Integrat-
ing visual analytics also can increase detection rates, 
based on the identification of patterns or clusters.
A helpful framework for describing the types of 
available tests for asset misappropriation, as well as 
other leading fraud schemes, is set forth in figure 
2-5. Note how detection rates increase while the 
number of false positives decrease as we move be-
yond traditional rules-based queries and analytics 
(structured data) and keyword searching (unstruc-
tured data). Moving up the spectrum into model-
based visual analytics, latent semantic analytics, and 
natural language processing helps companies better 
analyze, categorize, and draw conclusions from large 
amounts of data in a more efficient manner.
Figure 2-5: Asset Misappropriation Tests Framework
 Low Detection Rate High 
 
 High False Positive Rate Low 
 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 
(N
u
m
er
ic
) 
D
at
a 
U
n
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
 
(T
ex
t)
 D
at
a 
Traditional Rules-Based
Queries and Analytics
Traditional Keyword 
Searching 
Model-Based Analysis 
 
Visual Analytics 
Latent Semantic Analysis 
 
Natural Language 
Processing 
Sources: E-mail, documents, presentations, Websites, etc.
Sources: Financial accounting systems, transaction databases, etc.
Structured Data
Query instructions like “sort,” “match,” “compare,” 
and “filter” are typically used to describe tests that 
are rules based. For years, internal and external audi-
tors have used these types of queries that match one 
discrete set of data, such as the vendor master table, 
to another discrete set of data, such as the employee 
master file, to look for employees or employee ad-
dresses that also appear on the vendor’s list. Numer-
ous tests of similar nature incorporate all the ledgers, 
subledgers, and master tables of a corporate account-
ing system and are readily available in a multitude 
of accounting, internal audit, and fraud-detection 
literature. Contrary to this approach, however, ana-
lytics that incorporate statistics and use more sophis-
ticated analytics, such as cluster, anomaly detection, 
regression, predictive modeling, heat mapping, and 
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data visualization, move into the model-based com-
puting range in which higher levels of detection 
rates coupled with a lower number of false positives 
typically resonate. Today, software applications have 
become more affordable and sophisticated, and you 
don’t	have	to	have	a	PhD	in	statistics	to	run	some	
simple, yet powerful, analyses.
Using model-based computing can be particularly 
helpful in detecting accounts receivable schemes in 
which clients who have high returns or defaulted on 
their accounts can be profiled to look for clusters of 
similar variables (for example, location, frequency, 
product type, and so on) so that a predictive model 
can be built to monitor for risks. On the procure-
ment and accounts payable side, known erroneous 
or suspicious transactions can be analyzed to build a 
statistical model to spot future suspicious payments.
Unstructured Data
When it comes to unstructured text-based data, 
words like “Boolean syntax,” document or e-mail 
“date range” filtering, or “file type” sorting are 
common under the traditional keyword searching 
model. Typically, accountants avoid doing these 
types of queries on a proactive basis, especially with-
in e-mail communications, given the high number 
of false positives these searches generate, coupled 
with the extensive amount of time and perceptions 
of privacy surrounding such data sources. On the 
other hand, forensic accountants are well aware of 
the importance of unstructured data in a reactive in-
vestigation or litigation because e-mail is one of the 
first data sources requested by fraud investigators, 
government agencies, regulators, or opposing coun-
sel.	However,	unstructured	data	can	and	should	be	
considered on a proactive basis without undergoing 
the drudgery of sifting through countless documents 
or reviewing the personal communications of an 
employee’s e-mail word-for-word.
Software	 applications	 that	 incorporate	 analyt-
ics, such as document concepts, name extraction 
and recognition, “fuzzy searching,” social network 
analysis, sentiment (emotional) analysis, clustering, 
and fraud triangle e-mail analytics, also are becom-
ing more affordable and, in some cases, integrate 
with structured data applications in the form of a 
text analytics module or add-on.4 When combined 
with traditional keyword searching, these analytics 
help forensic accountants understand the “who,” 
“what,” and “when” of key business events or 
risks that are particularly applicable to asset misap-
propriation fraud schemes. Chapter 8, “Electronic 
Evidence,” covers unstructured data retrieval and 
analysis in greater detail.
Practical Applications for 
Model-Based Analytics in 
Structured Financial Data
As previously indicated, using model-based comput-
ing can be particularly helpful in detecting accounts 
receivable schemes in which clients who have high 
returns or have defaulted on their accounts can be 
profiled to look for anomalies (or unusual patterns) 
for risk analysis. Additionally, accounts receivable 
data could be analyzed to identify clusters of similar 
variables to spot trends,(for example, location, fre-
quency, product type, and so on) so that a predictive 
model can be built to monitor for risks based on 
confidence intervals (for example, 95 percent con-
fident that, based on previous fraudulent case data, 
this account matches the fraud risk profile). Many 
large companies may already be doing these types of 
analytics from a business risk-management perspec-
tive; however, few apply these analytics to look for 
fraudulent activities.
On the procurement and accounts payable side, 
known erroneous or suspicious transactions can be 
analyzed to build a statistical model to spot future 
suspicious payments. For example, in one engage-
ment, the team sampled 2,000 transactions from a 
population of 400,000 vendor payments that were 
deemed “high risk” from the fraud risk assessment 
previously completed. Of the 2,000 transactions, 
the team identified approximately 400 suspicious 
payments, with the remaining 1,600 being labeled 
not suspicious. By analyzing the fields in the pay-
ment ledgers, including the date; location; vendor 
name	 and	 ID;	 amount;	 and,	of	note,	 the	unstruc-
tured text in the comments field, the team created 
a statistical model to analyze the remaining 398,000 
4	Torpey,	Dan,	Vince	Walden,	and	Mike	Sherrod	“Exposing	the	Iceberg:	E-mail	Analytics	and	the	Fraud	Triangle,”	Fraud Magazine	(May/June	2009).
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transactions, based on the profile of a suspicious and 
not suspicious transaction. The team then applied a 
confidence interval of a 95 percent threshold of “is 
suspicious,” which identified approximately 15,000 
similar transactions totaling over $8 million in pay-
ments. The team started with the highest confidence 
interval at 99.9 percent (that is, lowest hanging fruit) 
and worked its way down in terms of remediation 
and identification of internal controls weaknesses.
Practical Applications for 
Unstructured Data  
Analytics Using the Fraud 
Triangle and Text Mining
In a hypothetical case, suppose internal audit was 
concerned about a group of employees collaborat-
ing in a suspected cash larceny scheme, although no 
direct evidence was provided to launch a full in-
vestigation. In this case, six months of live server 
e-mail would be copied from the IT department’s 
servers for analysis (not necessarily e-mail review). 
Through collaboration, terms unique to the indus-
try and company’s culture would be developed to 
look for the frequency of words or phases in em-
ployees’ e-mail communications related to the fraud 
triangle theory, which include “incentive,” “pres-
sure,” “opportunity,” and “rationalization.”5 The 
individuals who “scored” the highest, in terms of 
hit counts, on all three components would be the 
focus of additional inquiry, according to the fraud 
triangle theory. Figure 2-6 provides a diagram of the 
keyword frequency “hits” for the individuals from 
each component of the fraud triangle. As shown, 
those individuals with the highest frequency rose to 
the top, are easily spotted,6 and will then be the fo-
cus of additional inquiry.
5		In	many	companies,	corporate	policy	states	that	e-mail	communications	are	the	property	of	the	company	itself,	not	the	individual.	However,	before	ana-
lyzing	e-mail	communications,	one	should	consult	with	management	or	in-house	counsel	to	determine	if	such	analytics	are	authorized	from	a	corporate	
policy	and,	if	multinational,	from	a	data	privacy	perspective.	
6		For	more	information	on	this	type	of	analysis,	please	see	“Fraud	Triangle	Analytics:	Applying	Cressey’s	Theory	to	E-Mail	Communications,”	Fraud Maga-
zine	(July/August	2009).
Figure 2-6: Plotting an Individual’s Fraud Score Relative to Their Peers
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Once identified, additional text mining techniques 
can be run on the high-risk individuals to uncover 
who is talking to whom (social network analysis), 
about what (latent semantic analysis), and over what 
time period (time series analysis).
Conclusion
This chapter has addressed a number of asset mis-
appropriation schemes that can occur and result in 
losses for businesses, ranging from small amounts 
to very substantial amounts. Although the median 
loss for asset misappropriation, according to the oc-
cupational fraud survey conducted and reported in 
the ACFE’s 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational 
Fraud & Abuse, was $150,000 per incident, asset mis-
appropriation accounted for almost 89 percent of all 
occupational fraud cases reported in the survey. Giv-
en the relative high frequency of occurrences, indi-
viduals responsible for protecting assets of businesses 
will benefit from understanding the wide variety of 
schemes that exist; however, awareness of the fraud 
schemes	 is	only	 a	 small	 fraction	of	 the	battle.	De-
tection, prevention, and deterrence, implemented 
within the combines of a strong corporate culture; a 
zero tolerance fraud policy; adequate internal con-
trols; and advanced, efficient analytical monitoring 
procedures are what will ultimately protect and pre-
serve the assets of a business.
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Introduction
These words above, when included in Form 8-K 
filings and press releases, can result in drastic chang-
es in share price, employee morale, and customer 
sentiment.
The corporate scandals earlier this decade, as well 
as the continuing market turmoil from the credit 
crisis, have heightened the public awareness of fi-
nancial statement restatements resulting from busi-
ness fraud, which is the focus of this chapter. The 
sections that follow provide additional background 
on the motivations driving financial statement fraud, 
the internal and third-party implications of large fi-
nancial statement restatements, and the protocols 
and processes followed during a large-scale investi-
gation of a financial restatement.
What are Financial 
Statement Restatements?
Financial statement restatements are required when 
a company (or their auditor) identifies an error in 
historical financial information. Financial statement 
errors may be the result of an unintentional mistake 
or the consequence of intentional and fraudulent ac-
tions intended to deceive the users of financial state-
ments. The latter case, financial statement fraud, is 
typically evidenced by the falsification of accounting 
records and the misapplication of accounting prin-
ciples to achieve a desired financial statement result. 
This is certainly the more well-publicized type of 
financial statement restatement. The primary focus 
of this chapter is intentional financial statement mis-
statements that are the result of business fraud and 
result in a financial statement restatement. Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement No. 
154, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections—a re-
placement of APB Opinion No. 20 and FASB Statement 
No. 3, (FASB ASC 250, Accounting Changes and Error 
Corrections) which replaced Accounting Principles 
Board (APB) Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes, 
May 2005, is the prevailing U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles (U.S. GAAP) guidance rela-
tive to accounting changes and error corrections. 
FASB Statement No. 154 (FASB ASC 250) defines 
an error as follows:
[A]n error in recognition, measurement, pre-
sentation, or disclosure in financial statements 
resulting from mathematical mistakes, mistakes 
in the application of GAAP, or oversight or mis-
use of facts that existed at the time the financial 
statements were prepared. A change from an ac-
counting principle that is not generally accepted 
to one that is generally accepted is a correction 
of an error.
In recent years, there has been a global movement 
toward International Financial Report Standards 
(IFRS) to provide consistency in worldwide report-
ing standards. Although IFRS is not yet the financial 
reporting standard in the United States, it has been 
adopted in Europe and other countries around the 
world, and its guidance relative to errors and restate-
ments offers a relevant comparison to U.S. GAAP. 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) No. 8, 
Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates 
and Errors, offers the following, similar definition of 
an error under IFRS:
Errors can arise in respect of the recognition, 
measurement, presentation or disclosure of ele-
ments of financial statements. Financial state-
ments do not comply with IFRS if they contain 
either material errors or immaterial errors made 
intentionally to achieve a particular presentation 
of an entity’s financial position, financial perfor-
mance or cash flows.
IAS No. 8, as opposed to FASB Statement No. 
154 (FASB ASC 250), notes that financial state-
ments containing immaterial errors, not just mate-
rial errors, may not comply with IFRS. In practice, 
however, errors made intentionally by management 
“Based on recent events, our previously issued 
financial statements for the period ended December 31, 20XX, 
can no longer be relied upon.”
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to achieve a particular financial result are typically 
material. After all, management would rarely have 
the incentive to manipulate financial statements in 
an immaterial way that would ultimately not influ-
ence the decisions of end users.
The overall importance of materiality cannot be 
understated because it often makes the difference 
between maintaining the status quo and undertak-
ing a costly and time-consuming financial statement 
restatement. Both U.S. GAAP and IFRS do not 
require immaterial items to be restated. IAS No. 8 
notes that “the accounting policies in International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) need not be 
applied when the effect of applying them is imma-
terial.” Similarly, FASB Statement No. 154 (FASB 
ASC 250), consistent with other standards issued 
by FASB, concludes with the statement that “[t]he 
provisions of this Statement need not be applied to 
immaterial items.”
How does a company determine if an error re-
quires a financial statement restatement? In general, 
both U.S. GAAP and IFRS deem an error material 
if it influences the decision making of a financial 
statement user. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Staff Accounting Bulletin (SEC SAB) No. 99, 
Materiality, references FASB Concept No. 2, Quali-
tative Characteristics of Accounting Information, for a 
definition of the concept of materiality. FASB Con-
cept No. 2 promulgates the following:
The magnitude of an omission or misstatement 
of accounting information that, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances, makes it probable 
that the judgment of a reasonable person relying 
on the information would have been changed or 
influenced by the omission or misstatement.
This definition is similar to the explanation 
provided in IAS No. 1, Presentation of Financial 
Statements:
[I]tems are material if they could, individually or 
collectively, influence the economic decisions 
that users make on the basis of the financial state-
ments. Materiality depends on the size and nature 
of the omission or misstatement judged in the 
surrounding circumstances. The size or nature of 
the item, or a combination of both, could be the 
determining factor.
The Supreme Court interpretation of federal se-
curities laws, as it pertains to materiality, generally 
concurs with this interpretation, as well. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court’s interpretation, a fact is 
material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
… fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total’ mix 
of information made available.”
U.S. GAAP and IFRS do not offer any quantita-
tive thresholds to be used by a company in judging 
materiality. However, in SAB No. 99, the SEC did 
acknowledge that companies and auditors typically 
use some sort of “rule of thumb” as a basis to deter-
mine the materiality of misstatements. The SEC staff 
noted the following in regard to using such a “rule 
of thumb” in assessing misstatements:
The staff has no objection to such a ‘rule of 
thumb’ as an initial step in assessing materiality. 
But quantifying, in percentage terms, the magni-
tude of a misstatement is only the beginning of 
an analysis of materiality; it cannot appropriately 
be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all rel-
evant considerations.
Therefore, SAB No. 99 states that it is important 
to consider both quantitative and qualitative factors 
when assessing materiality. Box 3-1 (quoted from 
SAB No. 99) outlines certain considerations that 
suggest a quantitatively small misstatement of a fi-
nancial statement may be material.
In addition, SAB No. 99 goes on to state the 
following:
This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances 
that may affect the materiality of a quantitatively 
small misstatement. Among other factors, the 
demonstrated volatility of the price of a regis-
trant’s securities in response to certain types of 
disclosures may provide guidance as to whether 
investors regard quantitatively small misstate-
ments as material. Consideration of potential 
market reaction to disclosure of a misstatement 
is by itself ‘too blunt an instrument to be de-
pended on’ in considering whether a fact is mate-
rial. When, however, management or the inde-
pendent auditor expects (based, for example, on 
a pattern of market performance) that a known 
misstatement may result in a significant positive 
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or negative market reaction, that expected reac-
tion should be taken into account when consid-
ering whether a misstatement is material.
•  [W]hether the misstatement arises from an 
item capable of precise measurement or 
whether it arises from an estimate and, if 
so, the degree of imprecision inherent in 
the estimate
•  [W]hether the misstatement masks a 
change in earnings or other trends
•  [W]hether the misstatement hides a failure 
to meet analysts’ consensus expectations 
for the enterprise
•  [W]hether the misstatement changes a loss 
into income or vice versa
•  [W]hether the misstatement concerns a 
segment or other portion of the regis-
trant’s business that has been identified as 
playing a significant role in the registrant’s 
operations or profitability
•  [W]hether the misstatement affects the 
registrant’s compliance with regulatory 
requirements
•  [W]hether the misstatement affects the 
registrant’s compliance with loan cov-
enants or other contractual requirements
•  [W]hether the misstatement has the effect 
of increasing management’s compensa-
tion—for example, by satisfying require-
ments for the award of bonuses or other 
forms of incentive compensation
•  [W]hether the misstatement involves con-
cealment of an unlawful transaction
Box 3-1:  Qualitative Factors That Could Affect 
Materiality
It also is important for companies to consider that 
the failure to accurately record immaterial items may 
result in violations of federal securities laws. Federal 
regulations note that each registrant “must make 
and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of assets of the regis-
trant and must maintain internal accounting controls 
that are sufficient to provide reasonable assurances 
that, among other things, transactions are recorded 
as necessary to permit the preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with GAAP.”1
Why Do Intentional 
Misstatements and Fraud 
Occur?
Certainly, the specific drivers of intentional financial 
misstatements and fraud are unique to each individ-
ual company, but three common factors will pro-
vide the opportunity or cause for their occurrence: 
weak internal controls, the relationship of executive 
compensation to financial reporting, and the corpo-
rate culture and tone at the top.
Weak Internal Controls
One of the purposes of internal controls is to fos-
ter the preparation of accurate and reliable finan-
cial statements. Effective internal controls can help 
companies prevent accounting fraud or at least de-
tect fraudulent practices earlier. Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reemphasized the im-
portance of effective internal controls and defined 
additional management responsibilities that pertain 
to internal controls over financial reporting.
The absence of effective internal controls creates 
the opportunity for officers and employees to per-
petrate inappropriate accounting actions that may 
necessitate a later financial statement restatement. 
Certainly, a company may not have intentionally 
designed a poor system of internal controls. In a fast 
growing company, it is often the case that the inter-
nal controls are just not able to keep pace with the 
rapid growth of the company, particularly in new 
and enhanced risk areas. 
It also is possible that a company has designed and 
developed a strong system of internal controls, but 
the company does not have the sufficient resources 
available to implement, monitor, and test the ef-
fectiveness of its internal controls. Essentially, the 
1		SEC	17	CFR	Part	211,	Staff	Accounting	Bulletin:	No.	99	Materiality.
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internal audit department, audit committee, and 
other compliance functions may not have the stat-
ure, independence, and resources within the com-
pany to be effective.
A key component of an effective internal con-
trol system is providing employees the opportunity 
to report observations of possible misconduct. A 
2006 report by the U.S. Government Accountabil-
ity Office indicated that 58 percent of all financial 
statement restatements are prompted by notifica-
tions from internal parties.2 If whistle-blower lines 
and other reporting systems are not implemented 
correctly or advertised effectively, there may be 
insufficient opportunities to take action on reports 
received.
Relationship of Executive 
Compensation to Financial 
Reporting
Executives are often rewarded based on the financial 
performance of the company. Bonuses, stock op-
tions, and granting of shares are particular forms of 
compensation that may create an improper or ex-
cessive alignment between executive compensation 
and certain subjective financial reporting measures. 
This can create tremendous pressure to book or re-
cord transactions in such a way that may increase 
performance-based remuneration. 
Bonuses, in particular, can be linked to the profit-
ability of the company or the performance of the 
share price, which can result in pressure to make 
or exceed the analysts’ expectations so that bonus-
es are paid and the share price is boosted, thereby 
maximizing the return to the executive. In addi-
tion, corporate executives and management may 
find themselves pressured not only to meet analyst 
expectations but also to meet internally designated 
targets or established debt covenants.
Finally, in the case of a distressed company, of-
ficers or other employees may initiate accounting 
improprieties to ensure that they are not fired due 
to the poor performance of the company or to per-
haps pass blame to a previous employee for the poor 
performance.
Corporate Culture and Tone at  
the Top
In all companies, leadership sets an example through 
its actions and communications, which is commonly 
referred to as the tone at the top. Ideally, leadership 
should foster an environment of integrity and com-
pliance; however, if leadership continually over-
rides or ignores internal controls, the message may 
transfer down through the company. Additionally, 
a message from the corporate executives that em-
phasizes meeting financial targets, regardless of the 
consequences, may send the impression (or, in the 
worst case, a mandate) that proper accounting prac-
tices can be bypassed in order to meet the necessary 
earnings targets. Statements such as these create a 
culture that facilitates business fraud and the manip-
ulation of financial statements.
What Parties are Involved 
in a Financial Statement 
Restatement?
Numerous parties representing varying interests are 
frequently involved in the financial statement re-
statement process. These parties and their roles are 
outlined in box 3-2. To place financial statement 
restatement roles and responsibilities in a larger 
context, see chapter 6, “Roles and Responsibili- 
ties: How Different Stakeholders Work During 
Investigations.”
Common Types of 
Financial Statement 
Issues
Investigations into potential financial statement ma-
nipulation can be identified by a number of sources, 
including whistle-blowers, internal and external 
auditors, senior management, or regulators (SEC, 
Department of Justice [DOJ], and so on). Post 
Sarbanes-Oxley, changes in the regulatory and 
oversight environment have prompted an increased 
focus on corporate governance. This is causing 
corporations to focus more internal efforts on the 
identification and remediation of financial statement 
irregularities, and, as a result, a growing number of 
2		July	2006	U.S.	Government	Accountability	Office	report	titled	Financial Restatements: Update of Public Company Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory 
Enforcement Activities.
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financial statement frauds are being identified by 
internal sources.
The first step in any investigation into potential 
improper financial statement manipulation is to 
identify the nature of the allegations and the avail-
able information. Each financial restatement case 
is unique, and the detailed issues to be considered 
will vary from company to company. In general, 
Management—This could include both senior level executives of the company, such as the CEO 
and CFO, and midlevel management, such as the financial controller and the internal audit direc-
tor. The greatest interaction is typically with those personnel in the finance and internal audit 
groups.
Audit Committee—For a publicly traded company in the United States, the audit committee com-
prises nonexecutive members of the board of directors, and the committee is charged with oversee-
ing financial reporting, disclosure, and risk-management protocols for the company. As such, the 
audit committee would typically take the lead role in overseeing a fraud-related financial statement 
restatement for the company, including hiring any external law firm and forensic accountants.
External Auditor—External auditors are independent accountants who may be hired to conduct a 
financial statement audit for the company in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS). The opinion of an auditing firm typically provides reasonable assurance to third parties 
that the financial statements of a company are free of material misstatements. To maintain their 
independence and comply with regulatory requirements, the external auditing firm would not be 
hired by a publicly traded company in the United States to assist in an investigation or restatement 
process. The external auditing firm, however, would ultimately audit the financial statements that 
reflect the results of the restatement process.
External and Internal Counsel—This includes both the company’s internal general counsel’s office as 
well as any external law firms engaged to provide legal advice to the company during the restate-
ment process. Counsel also would have direct involvement in assisting the company in responding 
to any regulatory inquiries received during the restatement process. Certain company executives 
also may have individual representation in defending any civil or criminal charges resulting from 
the restatement.
Forensic Accountants and Consultants—Forensic accountants are often engaged either by the company 
or external counsel to provide the financial and accounting expertise necessary to assess and correct 
any financial statement issues. Due to independence considerations, forensic accountants are not the 
external auditors engaged to conduct the annual financial statement audit.
Regulators—The SEC and DOJ typically investigate and prosecute civil and criminal charges, 
respectively, resulting from financial misstatements. Both government agencies have an important 
role in protecting the rights of the shareholder, ensuring stability of the financial markets, and mini-
mizing corruption in the system.
Shareholders—Shareholders are essentially the owners of a publicly traded corporation in the United 
States, and, therefore, they have a particular interest in the outcome of a financial restatement 
because it affects the value of their stock and their financial interest in the corporation. The board 
of directors, executive leadership of the company, and government agencies are all ultimately ac-
countable to the shareholders and the public interest.
Plaintiff’s Firms—Large plaintiff firms may have a role in cases in which the shareholder is facing 
financial losses due to fraud or misrepresented financial statements and the shareholders elect to 
initiate legal action against the company.
Box 3-2:  Roles of Key Parties Involved in a Financial Statement Restatement
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companies and industries with more complicated 
products or accounting guidance are more susceptible 
to irregularities.
A few of the common areas for financial statement 
fraud are as follows.
Revenue Recognition
Revenue recognition schemes seek to increase the 
amount of revenue recognized or accelerate the 
timing of the revenue recognition. For example, fi-
nancial statement fraud may include recording sales 
in the current period that actually occurred after 
the quarter close or recognizing revenue in cases in 
which the key conditions of the sale have not yet 
been completed.
It also is possible that financial statement fraud 
may be the result of booking nonexistent revenue. 
For example, the SEC filed a civil action against 
GlobeTel Communications Inc.3 and three of its 
former officers on May 1, 2008, related to revenue 
recognition. In this case, an employee initiated a de-
liberate act to overstate revenue by creating false re-
cords and intentionally misleading the external and 
internal auditors. According to the SEC complaint, 
the company recorded $119 million in revenue on 
the basis of fraudulent invoices created by two in-
dividuals in charge of its wholesale telecommuni-
cations business. To conceal the fraud, the officers 
booked entries in the general ledger that improperly 
offset the receivables associated with the revenues 
against the liabilities.
SAB No. 104, Revenue Recognition, issued in 2004, 
is the prevailing accounting guidance related to rev-
enue recognition and specifies the following criteria 
for revenue recognition:
 •  Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists
 •  Delivery has occurred or services have been 
rendered
 •  Seller’s price to the buyer is fixed or 
determinable
 •  Collectability is reasonably assured
To accelerate revenue recognition, companies 
may try to bypass one or more of the preceding 
criteria, such as recognizing revenue of the sale of 
goods prior to the transfer of the associated title or 
risk of loss or in cases in which there is the right of 
return. As an example, on February 21, 2008, the 
SEC filed civil charges against one of the former 
executives of AXM Pharma, Inc.4 The complaint 
alleged that the officer directed the company to 
overstate its revenues by over 700 percent for the 
quarter ended June 30, 2005, by inflating sales to 
distributors. The distributors had a right to return 
the goods and were not obligated to pay for them 
until they resold the goods; thus, the company had 
not met the SAB No. 104 criteria to recognize the 
revenue for these sales.
Two other common schemes used by companies 
to accelerate revenue recognition are bill and hold 
arrangements and channel stuffing.
Bill and Hold Arrangements
Bill and hold arrangements may arise when a com-
pany completes the manufacturing of a product, but 
the customer is not, in reality, ready to take delivery 
of the goods, due to lack of space, delays in cus-
tomer production schedules, and so on. To acceler-
ate the recognition of revenue, companies might try 
to segregate the inventory or ship it to a third-party 
warehouse and then recognize the revenue before 
the goods have been delivered to the customer.
In general, the SEC staff has stated that deliv-
ery is not considered to have occurred unless the 
customer has taken title and assumed the risks and 
rewards of ownership of the products specified in 
the customer’s purchase order or sales agreement. 
This typically occurs when a product is delivered to 
the customer’s delivery site (that is, free on board 
[FOB] destination) or shipped to the customer (that 
is, FOB shipment). However, the SEC has provided 
the following list of criteria5 that constitute a general 
guideline for recognizing revenue in cases in which 
delivery has not occurred:
 1.  The risks of ownership must have passed to 
the buyer.
3		Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	(SEC)	Accounting	and	Auditing	Enforcement	Release	No.	2822	issued	May	1,	2008.
4		SEC	Accounting	and	Auditing	Enforcement	Release	No.	2790	issued	February	25,	2008.
5		SEC	Staff	Accounting	Bulletin	No.	104,	Revenue Recognition,	issued	December	17,	2003.
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 2.  The customer must have made a fixed com-
mitment to purchase the goods, preferably in 
written documentation.
 3.  The buyer, not the seller, must request that 
the transaction be on a bill and hold basis. The 
buyer must have a substantial business pur-
pose for ordering the goods on a bill and hold 
basis.
 4.  There must be a fixed schedule for delivery 
of the goods. The date for delivery must be 
reasonable and must be consistent with the 
buyer’s business purpose (for example, storage 
periods are customary in the industry).
 5.  The seller must not have retained any specific 
performance obligations such that the earning 
process is not complete.
 6.  The ordered goods must have been segregated 
from the seller’s inventory and not be subject 
to being used to fill other orders.
 7.  The equipment [product] must be complete 
and ready for shipment.
Channel Stuffing
Channel stuffing occurs when a company offers 
large discounts and other incentives to a distributor 
or retailer to take large orders late in the reporting 
period in order for the company to meet the des-
ignated sales or profit targets. The problem is that 
these sales may not have met the standard criteria for 
revenue recognition set forth in SAB No. 104. One 
reason for this may be because the distributor has a 
side agreement with the company that gives them 
the right to return any unsold merchandise. It is im-
portant to note that in cases in which the distributor 
or customer ultimately does want to purchase the 
goods, companies may have difficulty making future 
sales targets because channel stuffing is essentially 
advancing future sales into the current quarter.
Costs and Expenses
Although there are certainly many high-profile ex-
amples of financial statement restatements resulting 
from revenue recognition schemes, companies also 
may manipulate their costs and expenses in order to 
achieve bottom-line profit targets. Box 3-3 provides 
a list of expense schemes that may result in a finan-
cial statement restatement.
Delaying Expenses—Failing to accrue for 
goods and services at the period end or 
creating a prepayment for an expense for 
which the good or service has already been 
received by the end of the period.
Capitalizing Expenses—Capitalizing costs as 
an asset on the balance sheet that should be 
expensed in the income statement, such as 
research and development charges.
Long-Term Contracts—Underestimating the 
costs to completion on a contract or not 
adjusting costs for overruns on the budget.
Impairment Charges—Not writing off fixed 
assets or inventory that has become obso-
lete or otherwise declined in value.
Nonrecurring Expenses—Defining ongoing 
expenses as one-off, nonrecurring items. 
For example, companies might try to 
include routine expenses in restructuring 
charges because analysts and other users 
often focus on the operational results that 
exclude the nonrecurring expenses.
Big Bath Adjustments—Taking a large 
charge in a quarter in which the company 
knows that it will not make its earnings tar-
get. The idea is that a company will incur 
a “big bath” charge in a bad year in order 
to artificially inflate its earnings in future 
quarters.
Rebates—Receiving significant rebates from 
suppliers without maintaining sufficient 
paperwork or basing rebates upon verbal 
agreements.
Box 3-3:  Types of Financial Statement Restatement 
Expense Schemes
Clothing retailers are one type of industry that 
has faced significant financial statement restate- 
ments due to understating expenses, particular- 
ly from rebate charges and inventory write-offs. 
As an example, the SEC filed a civil injunctive ac-
tion against luxury department store owner Saks 
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Incorporated6 on September 5, 2007. Saks has sub-
sequently settled the case, but the original complaint 
alleged the Saks Fifth Avenue Enterprises division 
engaged in the following two deceptive practices to 
materially overstate income in order to achieve fi-
nancial targets from the mid-1990s to 2003:
 •  Saks buyers allegedly understated to vendors 
the sales performance of the vendor’s merchan-
dise. Based on that information, Saks was able 
to collect from the vendors millions of dollars 
in “vendor allowance” payments to which the 
company was not entitled. This practice allegedly 
continued from 1996 to 2003, with net income 
being overstated by 32.3 percent for the fiscal 
year ended February 2, 2002, and 42.6 percent 
for the fiscal year ended February 1, 2003.
 •  Additionally, the SEC alleged that Saks improp-
erly deferred (or “rolled”) permanent mark-
downs or inventory impairment charges from 
one period to the next. Deferring permanent 
markdown charges to future periods would 
result in a lower cost of goods sold amount in 
the current period and higher net income on 
the income statement. Inventory balances on the 
balance sheet also would be overstated in the 
current period. The SEC’s complaint alleged that 
the markdown rolling allowed Saks to overstate 
its net income by 86.5 percent in the second 
quarter of fiscal year 1999.
Reserve Manipulation
Recent scandals have heightened the awareness of 
financial statement fraud committed through the 
manipulation of reserves (or “cookie jars”). A re-
serve is a contingency or liability that is placed on 
the balance sheet in anticipation of a future expense 
or loss. FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for Con-
tingencies (FASB ASC 450, Contingencies), defines a 
contingency as
an existing condition, situation, or set of circum-
stances involving uncertainty as to possible gain 
… or loss … to an enterprise that will ultimately 
be resolved when one or more future events oc-
cur or fail to occur. Resolution of the uncertain-
ty may confirm the acquisition of an asset or the 
reduction of a liability or the loss or impairment 
of an asset or the incurrence of a liability.
At the time that a company books a reserve for 
a liability, a corresponding expense is charged to 
income.
FASB Statement No. 5 (FASB ASC 450, Contin-
gencies) defines the following criteria for accruing a 
loss contingency:
An estimated loss from a loss contingency (as 
defined in paragraph 1)7 shall be accrued by a 
charge to income if both of the following condi-
tions are met:
 a.  Information available prior to issuance of 
the financial statements indicates that it is 
probable that an asset had been impaired or 
a liability had been incurred at the date of 
the financial statements. It is implicit in this 
condition that it must be probable that one 
or more future events will occur confirm-
ing the fact of the loss.
 b.  The amount of loss can be reasonably 
estimated.
Reserves are particularly subjective and, therefore, 
are especially open to abuse. It is management’s re-
sponsibility to determine a reasonable estimate of 
those losses that are probable and that require charg-
es to income. The judgmental nature of reserves 
provides management with the opportunity to use 
them to smooth out the results of a company using 
transfers to and from reserves. For example, a com-
pany can overstate reserves (and the corresponding 
expense) in times when the company is exceed- 
ing expectations and can subsequently release the 
excess reserve into income in future quarters when 
additional income is needed to meet earnings 
targets. 
6		SEC	Accounting	and	Auditing	Enforcement	Release	No.	2674	issued	September	5,	2007.
7		Paragraph	1	of	FASB	Statement	No.	5,	Accounting for Contingencies	(FASB	ASC	450,	Contingencies)	states,	“For	the	purpose	of	this	Statement,	a	contin-
gency	is	defined	as	an	existing	condition,	situation,	or	set	of	circumstances	involving	uncertainty	as	to	possible	gain	(hereinafter	a	“gain	contingency”)	
or	loss	(hereinafter	a	“loss	contingency”)	to	an	enterprise	that	will	ultimately	be	resolved	when	one	or	more	future	events	occur	or	fail	to	occur.	Resolu-
tion	of	the	uncertainty	may	confirm	the	acquisition	of	an	asset	or	the	reduction	of	a	liability	or	the	loss	or	impairment	of	an	asset	or	the	incurrence	of	a	
liability.”
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By establishing reserves in periods when earnings 
targets are exceeded and by dipping into “cookie 
jar” reserves during more difficult times, manage-
ment can report more consistent earnings from 
quarter to quarter.
As another example, Nortel Networks,8 the large 
Canadian telecommunications manufacturer, faced 
particular scrutiny from both U.S. and Canadian 
regulatory authorities for its use of reserves to meet 
internal targets and Wall Street expectations from 
2000 to 2003. The SEC complaint alleged that 
Nortel improperly established over $400 million in 
excess reserves by the time it announced its fiscal 
year 2002 financial results. SEC Auditing and En-
forcement Release No. 2740 cited the following:
[T]hese reserve manipulations erased Nortel’s 
fourth quarter 2002 pro forma profit and allowed 
it to report a loss instead so that Nortel would 
not show a profit earlier than it had previously 
forecast to the market. The complaint alleges that 
in the first and second quarters of 2003, Nortel 
improperly released approximately $500 million 
in excess reserves to boost its earnings and fabri-
cate a return to profitability. These efforts turned 
Nortel’s first quarter 2003 loss into a reported 
profit under US GAAP, and largely erased its 
second quarter loss while generating a pro forma 
profit. 
In April 2004, Nortel’s management terminated 
its CEO, CFO, and controller. During 2004 and 
2005, Nortel performed an extensive review of its 
financial records, ultimately restating over $2 billion 
of revenue.
Unrecorded Financial 
Statement Activities
Unrecorded financial statement activities as a form 
of fraud first came to the public’s attention during 
the Enron restatement. Although certain special 
purpose entities are permissible under the account-
ing guidance, these vehicles also can be used to mis-
lead investors about the true nature of the underly-
ing transactions. As an example, off-balance sheet 
financing can be used as a way for companies to raise 
financing that is ultimately not reflected in the bal-
ance sheet. If not properly disclosed, investors may 
not understand the total substance of the liabilities 
incurred by the company.
More recently, Refco Group Ltd.9 and its former 
chairman Phillip R. Bennett faced SEC action for 
allegedly orchestrating a scheme to conceal hun-
dreds of millions of dollars from Refco through the 
use of a private entity (a so-called “special purpose 
entity”) controlled by the former chairman. The 
complaint alleged that shareholders incurred hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in losses after the scheme 
was revealed to the public in October 2005. From 
1998 to October 2005, Refco allegedly concealed 
debt, resulting from trading losses and operating ex-
penses, that was owed to it by Refco Group Hold-
ings, Inc. The company used a series of short-term 
loans to temporarily transfer debt to third parties im-
mediately before the end of the fiscal periods, and 
then the company would reverse the transactions 
shortly after the close ended. This ultimately had the 
impact of understating the amount of liabilities that 
were reported in the quarterly and annual financial 
statements.
The Financial 
Restatement Process
When allegations of potential financial statement 
fraud first surface, the board of directors typically 
forms a special committee (usually comprised of 
independent directors) to evaluate the veracity of 
the allegations and lead the related investigation. 
The special committee also would be responsible 
for engaging and managing any third parties that 
are involved, such as external counsel and forensic 
accountants.
The financial restatement process can be traumat-
ic for a company and require the dedication of sig-
nificant resources. To continue our discussion of the 
restatement process, we look at the following steps 
8	See	SEC	Accounting	and	Auditing	Enforcement	Release	No.	2740	issued	October	15,	2007.
9	See	SEC	Accounting	and	Auditing	Enforcement	Release	No.	2788	issued	February	19,	2008.
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typically involved in the financial statement restate-
ment process:
 •  Defining the Project Scope
 •  Evidence Collection: Establish the Facts
 •  Analyze the Evidence
 •  Evidence Retrieval and Reporting: Quantifying 
the Amounts Involved
 •  Solving the Problem—Before, During, and After 
the Restatement
Defining the Project Scope
The most difficult and critical activity for the special 
committee tasked with evaluating the allegations is 
defining the scope of the investigation. Allegations 
are often very broad and yet potentially touch such 
a high level in the organization that they cannot be 
ignored. The special committee must work closely 
with its outside counsel and their advisors, including 
the forensic accountants and the company’s external 
auditor, to ensure that the scope of the work is suf-
ficient to completely address the allegations.
Once agreement is reached and the special com-
mittee has identified the areas of focus, the next step 
is to define the overall scope of the project. The 
following questions when analyzed in detail help 
to provide insight into the overall scope of the 
project. 
What are the specific allegations?
 The company, with the assistance of external 
counsel and the forensic accountants, must first 
consider the types of financial reporting issues 
that are evident in the allegations. As previ-
ously described, each financial restatement case 
is unique, and the detailed issues to be consid-
ered will vary from company to company. Some 
common issues include revenue recognition, cost 
and expense manipulation, reserve manipulation, 
and unrecorded financial statement activities. 
How many of the company’s operations, countries, di-
visions, and offices may be affected by the restatement?
It may be appropriate for the company to con-
duct some type of diagnostic review in its other 
locations to determine whether the financial re- 
 
porting issues have a broader reach beyond those 
initially suspected.
What are the responsibilities of each of the parties in-
volved in the restatement, including the external coun-
sel forensic accountants, and consultants?
This may include responding to any regulatory 
inquiries, defending company personnel in any 
regulatory proceedings, and managing which 
documents may need to be turned over to regu-
lators as a result of any requests or subpoenas. 
Will there be any residual impacts of the financial state-
ment restatement? For example, what are the tax im-
plications of the restatement? Would restated financial 
statements affect historical debt covenants?
The company and its advisors should be aware 
of potential residual impacts on an ongoing ba-
sis, such as tax considerations and potential debt 
covenant violations.
What are the time constraints that need to be consid-
ered? Will the company face any SEC penalties by 
delaying the release of its financial statements or poten-
tially breach any debt covenants?
The company may need to consider delaying the 
release of the quarterly financial statements until 
the issues have been appropriately addressed and 
there are no concerns over the adequacy of the 
internal controls over financial reporting.
 It is also important to note that both manage-
ment and the external auditors, in cases of finan-
cial statement fraud or other illegal acts, have 
specific responsibilities under the accounting 
guidance that are important to consider in the 
context of defining the project scope.
Management and Audit Committee 
Responsibilities
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed by Con-
gress in response to the Enron and other scandals, 
defines the responsibilities of management and the 
audit committee, relative to financial reporting. 
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the audit commit-
tee is responsible for addressing any accounting or 
internal control complaints received by the com-
pany. To respond to these concerns or in the con-
text of addressing financial statement fraud, the audit 
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committee also has the authority to engage inde-
pendent counsel and other advisors as it determines 
necessary for carrying out its duties.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the principal 
executive officer or officers of the company to certi-
fy each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted 
under sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. By certifying the financial 
statements, the officers are attesting that the report 
does not contain any material false statements (or 
does not omit any material information), and that 
the financial statements fairly represent in all materi-
al respects the financial condition of the company.
U.S. auditing and accounting standards, as well 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, place the responsibility 
on management to establish and maintain effective 
internal controls. The burden is ultimately on man-
agement to disclose to the auditors and the audit 
committee all significant deficiencies in the internal 
controls that could adversely affect the company’s 
ability to record, process, summarize, and report fi-
nancial data. Management also must report any form 
of fraud, whether material or immaterial, that in-
volves management or other employees who have 
a significant role in the company’s internal controls. 
To place management and audit committee roles 
and responsibilities in a larger context, see chapter 6, 
“Roles and Responsibilities: How Different Stake-
holders Work During Investigations.”
External Auditor Responsibilities
Management, not the external auditors, has the 
primary responsibility for ensuring that the com-
pany’s annual financial statements fairly represent 
the financial condition of the company in all mate-
rial respects. External auditors have a more limited 
responsibility for considering and addressing illegal 
acts and fraud.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 54, 
Illegal Acts by Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 317), describes auditor responsibili-
ties that relate to considering the possibility of illegal 
acts when conducting a financial statement audit, as 
well as auditor responsibilities when a possible illegal 
act is detected. In the context of SAS No. 54, an 
illegal act is a violation of law or government regula-
tions. Generally, an auditor’s responsibility to detect 
and report misstatements resulting from illegal acts 
is limited to those acts having a direct and material 
effect on the determination of financial statement 
amounts.
With regard to acts that have a material indirect 
effect on the financial statements, the auditor should 
be aware of the possibility that the acts may have oc-
curred and apply necessary procedures to determine 
if the illegal acts have occurred. Due to the nature of 
illegal acts, however, an audit conducted in accor-
dance with GAAS provides no assurance that illegal 
acts will be detected during the course of the audit.
SAS No. 54 provides the following guidance to 
external auditors when an illegal act is identified 
during the course of the financial statement audit:
When the auditor becomes aware of informa-
tion concerning a possible illegal act, the auditor 
should obtain an understanding of the nature of 
the act, the circumstances in which it occurred, 
and sufficient other information to evaluate the 
effect on the financial statements. In doing so, 
the auditor should inquire of management at a 
level above those involved, if possible. If man-
agement does not provide satisfactory informa-
tion that there has been no illegal act, the auditor 
should
 a.  [c]onsult with the client’s legal counsel 
or other specialists about the application 
of relevant laws and regulations to the 
circumstances and the possible effects on 
the financial statements. Arrangements for 
such consultation with client’s legal coun-
sel should be made by the client.
 b.  [a]pply additional procedures, if necessary, 
to obtain further understanding of the na-
ture of the acts.
Unless the matter is clearly inconsequential, the 
auditor should ensure that the audit committee, or 
others with equivalent authority and responsibility, 
is adequately informed about the illegal acts that 
have come to the auditor’s attention.
Specific to fraud, an external auditor’s responsi-
bilities are defined in SAS No. 99, Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Profes-
sional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). SAS No. 99 
defines fraud as “an intentional act that results in a 
material misstatement in financial statements that are 
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the subject of an audit.” Consistent with SAS No. 
1, Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1), SAS No. 99 
reiterates that it is management’s responsibility “to 
design and implement programs and controls to pre-
vent, deter, and detect fraud.”
It is an external auditor’s responsibility to plan 
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assur-
ance about whether the financial statements are free 
of material misstatements, whether caused by fraud 
or error. Due to the nature of fraud, however, it is 
not possible to obtain absolute assurance that an au-
dit detected a material misstatement resulting from 
fraud. SAS No. 99 defines the following responsi-
bilities for an auditor in detecting and addressing 
material misstatements of the financial statements 
resulting from fraud:
 •  Auditors should conduct a financial statement 
audit with an attitude of professional skepticism, 
recognizing the possibility that a material mis-
statement of the financial statements may exist.
 •  Audit engagement teams should conduct discus-
sions as part of the planning stage of the audit 
to consider how the financial statements might 
be vulnerable to a material misstatement due to 
fraud.
 •  Auditors should accumulate the information 
necessary to determine the risks of fraud, includ-
ing interviewing management, considering the 
results of analytical procedures, and assessing 
other risk factors.
 •  The audit team should identify the appropriate 
fraud risk factors, which may be based on the 
size, complexity, and ownership of the client or 
the incentives and pressures, opportunities, and 
attitudes and rationalizations to commit fraud.
 •  The auditor should consider the internal controls 
that the company has in place to address the 
identified risks of material misstatement due to 
fraud and determine whether these programs ap-
propriately address the identified risks.
 •  As necessary, the auditor should adjust the na-
ture, timing, and extent of the audit procedures 
to respond to the identified risks of material mis-
statement due to fraud.
 •  If a material misstatement due to fraud is identi-
fied, the auditor should communicate the issue 
to the appropriate level of management or report 
the issue to the audit committee.
To place external auditor roles and responsibili-
ties in a larger context, see chapter 6, “Roles and 
Responsibilities: How Different Stakeholders Work 
During Investigations.”
Evidence Collection: 
Establish the Facts
At the start of an investigation, once the project 
scope is defined, it is important to secure the transac-
tional data to prevent the accidental (or intentional) 
modification or deletion. This may include suspend-
ing the routine recycling of backup tapes to ensure 
that all transactional data and electronic correspon-
dence is maintained. In establishing the work plan, 
the special committee, external counsel, and ac-
countants must work together to identify the sources 
of available documentation and client resources and 
initiate the collection of both hard copy and elec-
tronic evidence. The parties involved in an indepen-
dent investigation should maintain frequent contact 
with the audit committee and special committee to 
ensure they are adequately informed and have the 
opportunity to provide assistance as appropriate and 
needed. Additional content on evidence collection 
can be found in Chapter 7, “Sources of Evidence.”
An investigation might include the collection of the fol-
lowing documents:
 •  Internal audit working papers that discuss any 
prior reviews or investigations related to revenue 
recognition, depreciation estimates, the calcula-
tion of reserves or other pertinent issues.
 •  Accounting policy documentation used in the 
controllership organization, particularly those 
policies related to revenue recognition.
 •  Accounting policy documentation related to 
revenue recognition, depreciation, and reserve 
estimates. General accounting policy documen-
tation related to the quarterly close process also 
may be helpful.
 •  Manual journal entries booked by the company 
at the end of the quarters at issue, particularly 
those that affected the allegedly manipulated 
accounts.
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 •  An extract from the general ledger containing 
transactional level detail for the impacted ac-
counts during the relevant time period.
 •  For relevant periods, the quarter-end calculations 
(and supporting documentation) of the reserve 
calculations.
 •  Based on the extract from the general ledger, it 
also may be useful to select a sample of transac-
tions to determine if appropriate revenue recog-
nition procedures were followed.
Documentation for each of the sample selec-
tions may include the following:
 –  Purchase orders
 –  Invoices
 –  Shipping documentation
 –  Journal entries documenting revenue 
recognition
 –  Accounts receivable ledgers
 –  Proof of cash payment
 •  Correspondence with the external auditors, 
regulatory authorities, and accounting policy 
boards regarding any questions or concerns about 
the accounting issues that were raised
 •  Identify the custodians from whom to collect 
both hard-copy and electronic data. These custo-
dians may be important to interview during the 
course of an investigation. Possible custodians 
may include:
 –  CEO
 –  CFO
 –  Controller
 –  Assistant controller
 –  Director, Internal Audit
 –  Senior accounting clerk
 –  Accounting clerk(s)
 –  Director, Sales & Marketing
 –  Sales representative(s)
E-mail correspondence and attached files are an 
increasingly important source of information during 
an independent investigation. These records may be 
searched by “keyword” search terms and it is im-
portant to appropriately establish search terms at the 
onset of the investigation. This allows for a more 
focused investigation and review of the key issues. 
The following three categories of search terms are 
commonly used during an e-mail review process:
 •  Generic fraud and misconduct terms, such as 
kickback, manipulate, irregular, conceal, scandal, 
illegal, deception, and so on
 •  Terms specific to the issues in the investigation, 
for instance terms related to depreciation, rev-
enue recognitions, sales and pressure, reserve and 
warranty, and so on
 •  Other accounting search terms related to the 
broader integrity of the financial statements, such 
as bad debt reserve, excess and reserve, earnings 
management, inventory reserve, unapplied cash, 
and so on
Based on the initial review of the search term re-
sults, it may be necessary to revise and refine the 
search terms, particularly those search terms that re-
sult in a large volume of e-mails.
For a broader discussion on data collection, see 
chapters 7 (“Sources of Evidence”) and 8 (“Elec-
tronic Evidence”).
Analyze the Evidence
Conducting interviews of individuals who may have 
information pertinent to the investigation is an im-
portant step in accumulating and analyzing the evi-
dence in an independent investigation. Possible in-
terviewees may include those previously identified 
as custodians during the electronic evidence gather-
ing. Interviews may be led by the accountant or in-
clude both the accountant and the lawyers involved 
in the investigation. Some employees, particularly 
those potentially implicated in the investigation, 
may request the presence of their own counsel at the 
interviews. Topics to cover during the interviews 
may include the following:
 •  The employee’s knowledge regarding the exis-
tence of irregular financial practices and unsup-
ported journal entries, particularly those at issue 
in a whistle-blower letter
 •  Employee’s perception of the financial reporting 
culture and tone at the top
 •  Information from the employee on the internal 
control structure and possible deficiencies
During the course of the investigation, key em-
ployees may leave the organization (either by choice 
or cause), which can make it difficult to obtain his-
torical knowledge of the accounting practices and 
policies.
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An independent investigation also may include 
an analysis of general ledgers and selected journal 
entries and transactions. The independent investiga-
tion team may want to identify potentially unusual 
entries and then conduct follow-up procedures, 
including additional interviews and document re-
quests to assist management in determining the ap-
propriateness of the entries. The selection of sample 
entries may be based on the following:
 •  A fixed dollar cutoff threshold to select those 
entries of a large magnitude
 •  Considering entries with debits and credits that 
do not appear to make sense (that is, debits to 
assets and credits to cost of good sales)
 •  Entries with large and rounded dollar amounts 
(that is, $100,000)
 •  Manual entries or those recorded late in the 
quarter-end process
The forensic accountants also may want to review 
and analyze particularly subjective accounts (that 
is, bad debt, inventory obsolescence, and so on.) as 
well as consider a critical review of the internal audit 
function and those internal audit issues previously 
raised. For additional discussion on analyzing evi-
dence, see chapter 7, “Sources of Evidence.”
Evidence Retrieval and 
Reporting: Quantifying the 
Amounts Involved
Errors in prior period financial statements are cor-
rected by restating prior period financial statements. 
FASB Statement No. 154 (FASB ASC 250) speci-
fies the following guidance to correct errors in prior 
period financial statements:
Any error in the financial statements of a prior 
period discovered subsequent to their issuance 
shall be reported as a prior-period adjustment by 
restating the prior-period financial statements. 
Restatement requires that:
 a.  The cumulative effect of the error on pe-
riods prior to those presented shall be re-
flected in the carrying amounts of assets 
and liabilities as of the beginning of the first 
period presented.
 b.  An offsetting adjustment, if any, shall be 
made to the opening balance of retained 
earnings (or other appropriate components 
of equity or net assets in the statement of 
financial position) for that period.
 c.  Financial statements for each individual 
prior period presented shall be adjusted to 
reflect correction of the period-specific ef-
fects of the error.
Consistent with FASB Statement No. 154 (FASB 
ASC 250), IAS No. 8 also requires retrospective 
treatment when correcting accounting errors, except 
to the extent that it is impracticable to determine 
either the period-specific effects or the cumulative 
effect of the error. IAS No. 8 provides the following 
guidance for restating financial statements:
An entity shall correct material prior period 
errors retrospectively in the first set of finan-
cial statements authorised for issue after their 
discovery by:
 a.  restating the comparative amounts for the 
prior period(s) presented in which the er-
ror occurred; or
 b.  if the error occurred before the earliest pri-
or period presented, restating the opening 
balances of assets, liabilities and equity for 
the earliest prior period presented.
For more information on evidence retrieval and 
reporting, see chapter 12, “Reporting on Fraud.”
Quantifying Misstatements
SAB No. 108 describes the SEC’s view on the pro-
cess that should be followed to quantify financial 
statement misstatements. SAB No. 108 proscribes 
the following two approaches for quantifying finan-
cial statement misstatements: the rollover approach 
and the iron curtain approach.
Rollover Approach
The rollover approach quantifies a misstatement 
based on the amount of the error originating in 
the current year income statement. This approach 
ignores the effects of correcting the portion of the 
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current year balance sheet misstatement that origi-
nated in prior years (that is, it ignores the carryover 
impact of prior year misstatements). In SAB No. 
108, the SEC staff indicates that one of the limita-
tions of the rollover approach is that it can result in 
the accumulation of significant misstatements on the 
balance sheet that are deemed immaterial, in part 
because the amount that originates in each year is 
quantitatively small.
Iron Curtain Approach
Alternatively, the iron curtain approach quantifies 
the misstatement based on the effects of correcting 
the misstatements existing in the balance sheet at the 
end of the current year, irrespective of the year of 
origination of the misstatement(s). The limitation of 
the iron curtain approach is that it does not con-
sider the correction of prior year misstatements in 
the current year (that is, reversal of the carryover ef-
fects) to be errors. Correcting any immaterial errors 
that existed in those statements in the current period 
to reflect the “correct” accounting would not be 
considered errors in the current period.
SAB No. 108 proscribes that an entity should 
quantify a misstatement under both the rollover ap-
proach and the iron curtain approach and adjust the 
financial statements if either approach results in a 
material misstatement after considering all relevant 
quantitative and qualitative factors. Additionally, if a 
prior year correction is material to the current year, 
the prior year financial statements should be cor-
rected even if the revision previously was (and con-
tinues to be) immaterial to the prior-year financial 
statements.
Disclosure Requirements
FASB Statement No. 154 (FASB ASC 250) specifies 
the following disclosure requirements when finan-
cial statements are restated to correct an error:
When financial statements are restated to correct 
an error, the entity shall disclose that its previous-
ly issued financial statements have been restated, 
along with a description of the nature of the er-
ror. The entity also shall disclose the following:
 a.  The effect of the correction on each finan-
cial statement line item and any per-share 
amounts affected for each prior period 
presented
 b.  The cumulative effect of the change on 
retained earnings or other appropriate 
components of equity or net assets in the 
statement of financial position, as of the 
beginning of the earliest period presented.
 In addition, the entity shall make the disclo-
sures of prior-period adjustments and restate-
ments required by paragraph 26 of APB Opinion 
No. 9, Reporting the Results of Operations.
Solving the Problem—
Before, During, and After 
the Restatement
One of the key challenges management faces in ad-
dressing allegations of financial statement fraud is the 
twofold challenge that accompanies the allegations: 
how do you ensure the current financial informa-
tion being prepared by the company is accurate 
while at the same time fixing the historical financial 
statements. In our experience, management is best 
served by addressing these two questions simultane-
ously. As facts are determined from the investiga-
tion, immediate implementation of remedial actions 
are required and demonstrate management’s com-
mitment to getting to the right answer. These ac-
tions can include the following:
Personnel Actions
Terminations, warnings, and job changes can all 
play a part in reestablishing an appropriate control 
environment. One of the largest challenges a com-
pany can face is to prove that it has changed the tone 
at the top after allegations of a fraud are proven. 
However, wholesale changes at the most senior lev-
el of the organization can destroy a company’s abil-
ity to function and are only warranted in the most 
extreme situations. Independent investigators often 
recommend a tiered series of actions (ranging from 
termination to compensation adjustments) based on 
the findings related to specific personnel.
New or Improved Internal Controls
In some cases, significant deficiencies are found 
around key accounts that require subjective 
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estimates. These deficiencies may have enabled in-
appropriate adjustments to the estimates to be re-
corded to achieve a particular goal. Management 
can implement immediate control enhancements 
to ensure that unwanted adjustments or adjustments 
without appropriate approval are not recorded. 
The immediate implementation of these controls 
can provide a starting point for confidence in the 
level of controls over current financial information. 
Companies that wait too long to implement needed 
control improvements can find themselves review-
ing massive amounts of historical information, fur-
ther delaying the issuance of financial statements.
Increasing Technical Accounting 
Expertise
A key finding of independent investigators is often 
that there is a lack of awareness of accounting guid-
ance and the correct application of that guidance. 
By increasing a company’s technical resources, ei-
ther through engaging outside advisors or hiring 
additional highly qualified individuals, management 
can again demonstrate its focus on addressing the 
root cause of the historical error. Creating a techni-
cal accounting function that reviews and approves 
significant subjective estimates or key accounting 
decisions provides a level of clarity and additional 
control that can provide further confidence in the 
preparation of financial information.
Employee Education
Highlighting the issues identified by an independent 
review to employees is a useful method to illustrate 
the tone at the top. Often, management will present 
to key employees (sales personnel, legal and com-
pliance officers, accounting and finance personnel, 
and others) the findings of the independent review, 
including key documents that illustrate the nature of 
the issue and the unacceptable behaviors that resulted 
in the investigation and ensuing actions. Regulators 
often look to the robustness of this type of education 
as an illustration of the company’s efforts to imple-
ment remedial actions to address the root causes of 
the restatement. Chapter 14, “Antifraud Programs,” 
goes into greater detail on the types of employee 
education policies that an organization can institute 
to help make employees aware of fraudulent activity 
and the potential consequences of a fraud event.
Document Holds and Preservation
Due to the significant amount of regulatory inquiry 
and litigation that can result from financial statement 
restatements, management must often oversee large 
scale document holds and preservations. Ensuring 
document hold notices are followed can be difficult, 
but the cost and harm that can befall an organization 
without significant focus on this area can be impor-
tant. In addition, the time between the initiation of 
a document hold and the conclusion of regulatory 
inquiry can span more than five years, which is why 
ensuring a reliable and consistent process across that 
length of time is key.
Impact of Financial 
Statement 
Restatements
Financial statement restatements can have significant 
and lasting impacts on employees, shareholders, and 
other corporate stakeholders. The company may 
face financial penalties from regulatory authorities, 
not to mention the significant fees incurred for at-
torneys, accountants, and consultants to quantify 
and effect the restatement. Employees, creditors, 
and shareholders frequently face a financial impact 
through job cuts, reduction in market capitaliza-
tion, and limited and increasingly expensive access 
to the capital markets. Operationally, the efforts re-
quired by the company to address the restatement 
may detract from the company’s strategic initiatives 
and growth imperatives, resulting in a competitive 
disadvantage.
Financial Penalties and 
Related Costs
Fines and penalties that are imposed by govern-
ment authorities related to financial statement re-
statements can be significant. As an example, the 
fines imposed on Fannie Mae10 by the SEC and the 
10		May	23,	2006,	SEC	press	release	titled	SEC and OFHEO Announce Resolution of Investigation and Special Examination of Fannie Mae.
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Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight in 
May 2006 were $400 million. In addition to civil 
and criminal fines, a company may face significant 
administrative, legal, accounting, and staffing costs 
related to financial statement restatements.
As previously mentioned, when faced with a fi-
nancial statement restatement, particularly one 
driven by accounting improprieties, a company will 
typically initiate a formal independent investigation 
at the direction of the audit committee or a smaller 
subset of the board of directors, which is often re-
ferred to as a special committee. These independent 
investigations frequently require the services of out-
side counsel and forensic accountants, at a signifi-
cant cost to the company. Fees for the company’s 
external auditors also will rise as the auditors work 
to understand the work of the independent inves-
tigation and audit the restated financial statements. 
In addition to external resources, restatements 
require considerable internal staffing from the com-
pany to prepare revised financial statements and re-
spond to inquiries from the auditors, external coun-
sel, forensic accountants, creditors, shareholders, 
and regulators.
In recent years, regulators have increased the use 
of deferred prosecution agreements. With deferred 
prosecution agreements, the government will file 
charges against the company but will agree to de-
lay prosecution, pending the company’s successful 
completion of certain remedial actions. Although 
deferred prosecution agreements may delay or oth-
erwise limit the civil and criminal fines previously 
mentioned, the remediation process inherent in de-
ferred prosecution agreements is not without cost. 
Deferred prosecution agreements increase the com-
pany’s costs of regulatory reporting, particularly if 
an independent monitor is appointed to track the 
company’s compliance with the agreed remedial 
actions.
The company also will likely be required to des-
ignate certain internal resources within the com-
pany to meet the demands of the deferred prosecu-
tion agreement and other restatement issues. These 
regulatory demands (and additional costs) also may 
include the replacement of senior company staff if 
they are deemed involved in the intentional mis-
statement of the financial statements.
Reduction in Market 
Capitalization
One of the most obvious impacts of a financial state-
ment restatement is the reduction in the company’s 
market capitalization. Restatements can have a con-
siderable impact on share prices in both the imme-
diate and longer term and can result in significant 
financial losses to investors. A U.S. Treasury report11 
released in April 2008 and covering the period from 
1997 to 2006 noted that the average market reac-
tion to restatement announcements is negative. The 
study also found more severe market reactions in 
cases in which the restatement involved fraud or 
revenue accounting.
The U.S. Treasury study noted the following av-
erage, median, and most negative market returns (in 
percentages) that resulted from fraud restatements:
11		April	2008	U.S.	Treasury	report	titled	The Changing Nature and Consequences of Public Company Financial Restatements: 1997–2006.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Over
Number - 20% -27% -28% -42% -29% -39% -21% -12% -25% -21% -264%
Average –15% –27% –16% –17% –	 6% –13% –10% –	 6% –	 5% –	 8% –	 13%
Median –13% –19% –	 3% –	 8% –	 2% –	 9% –	 5% –	 3% – 4% – 4% –	 	 6%
Most	Negative –59% –92% –76% –79% –70% –93% –75% –53% –64% –28% –	 93%
A weakened market capitalization may have 
broader impacts beyond just the loss in stock value 
to investors. In some cases, a depressed stock price 
may leave the company vulnerable as a takeover 
target, and, in extreme cases, the company’s ability 
to continue as a going concern may be threatened. 
The company may be forced to declare Chapter 11 
and in some cases Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The U.S. 
Treasury report also noted that average debt ratings 
tended to decline significantly around the time of a 
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restatement announcement. Specifically, the study 
found that the average rating decreased 0.59 from 
the preannouncement to the announcement year, 
or slightly more than half a rating category.
Commercial and Operational 
Impacts
Restatements have negative effects on the com-
mercial and operational activities of the company. 
In addition to the financial hardship imposed by 
the financial penalties and the distraction to corpo-
rate staff, companies facing financial restatements 
are typically wrought with considerable negative 
publicity.
The brand name and reputation of the company 
may suffer as a result of the publicity, and the com-
pany may be forced to expend additional costs to 
offset the negative effects of the restatement. Cus-
tomers become more reluctant to enter into trans-
actions and demand better concessions, bankers are 
more reluctant to extend lines of credit, and general 
confidence in the company is shaken.
Operationally, restatements also can result in the 
breach of loan covenants of current loan agreements, 
which could lead to a large loan facility coming due 
immediately, in certain circumstances. Obtaining 
waivers of the loan covenants so operations can be 
continued is extremely expensive and places high 
demands on the time of senior management. Re-
strictions in funding uses limit a company’s ability to 
expand business operations and meet prior commit-
ments. Ultimately, the renegotiation of loan facilities 
may lead to increased rates of interest and difficulty 
in identifying suitable sources of financing.
Personal Effect on 
Employees
Individual employees and executives of the restating 
company can be faced with large personal financial 
exposure through fines, penalties, legal fees, and dis-
gorgement of their compensation for the period of 
the restatement. Many executives’ wealth is tied to 
the value of the company and can be significantly 
diminished as a result of the falling share price.
Employees, officers, and directors may face crimi-
nal and civil actions, in addition to the disciplinary 
actions that may be imposed by the company. The 
SEC and DOJ may commence investigations that 
have the possible result of either enforcement actions 
or criminal charges. Employees also may face civil 
litigation from investors. Consequently, an individ-
ual officer may be left with the considerable finan-
cial burden of defending civil and criminal charges 
using his or her own resources, in addition to any 
penalties, fines, and disgorgement of bonuses.
It should be noted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
increased the number of criminal offenses faced by 
employees as a result of corporate accounting frauds. 
Examples include the whistle-blower retaliation 
laws, increased jail time for certain offenses, and in-
creased criminal sentences of up to 20 years for the 
offenses of mail fraud and wire fraud.
For employees not implicated by the wrongdo-
ing, the impacts of the restatement may be demoral-
izing and also may affect the employees financially 
if the company initiates job layoffs or the employ-
ees’ compensation is tied to the stock price of the 
company.
A rather well-known example is the Computer 
Associates financial restatement case,12 which dem-
onstrates the impact of a company’s restatement. 
The company had been running a company-wide 
scheme to meet market expectations by backdating 
contracts and extending the quarterly close to re-
cord revenue from contracts executed after the end 
of the quarter. In total, the company prematurely 
recognized over $3.4 billion in revenue from Janu-
ary 1, 1998, to September 30, 2000. Three of the 
company’s former top executives also were charged: 
the CEO and chairman, the head of Sales, and the 
general counsel. The outcome for each of the for-
mer top executives looked like this:
 •  The Company agreed to pay $225 million in 
restitution to shareholders to settle a civil case 
brought by the SEC and to defer criminal 
charges by the U.S. Department of Justice.
 •  The CEO and the head of sales were forced to 
resign.
12		SEC	Accounting	and	Auditing	Enforcement	Release	No.	2106	issued	September	22,	2004.
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 •  The General Counsel pleaded guilty to securities 
fraud conspiracy and obstruction of justice and 
agreed to be barred from working as an officer 
or director of a public corporation. 
Conclusion
As previously described, financial statement re-
statements due to fraud are incredibly damaging to 
companies, shareholders, board members, and em-
ployees. Since the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, SEC-registered companies have signifi-
cantly improved their fraud-detection capabilities. 
However, continued vigilance is necessary because 
incentives to commit fraud for personal benefit con-
tinue to exist. Many companies have adopted a best 
practice of annual fraud risk assessments through-
out their businesses, which are designed to identify 
those areas that could be subject to manipulation. 
These assessments, when shared with the internal 
and external audit function, create awareness around 
financial statement fraud risk that can act as both a 
strong deterrent and detection mechanism. Through 
continued vigilance and evolution of their internal 
control structures, corporations will continue to stay 
ahead of potential problems.
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Introduction
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has at-
tracted renewed attention in recent years with an 
increasing number of enforcement actions taken 
against companies and significantly higher penalties 
imposed on them. When FCPA-related allegations 
are raised, investigations and corresponding forensic 
accounting engagements ensue.
Potential FCPA pitfalls can be encountered in the 
day-to-day activities of most companies. Problem 
areas for companies include the following:
	 •		Paying	intermediaries	with	a	vague	business	
purpose or no tangible work performed
	 •		Obtaining	and	retaining	detailed	documentation	
describing the substance, purpose, and approval 
of transactions
	 •		Determining	whether	facilitation	payments	can	
or should be made
	 •		Giving	gifts	and	paying	for	or	reimbursing	lavish	
travel or entertainment expenses
	 •		Making	large	payments	made	in	cash
	 •		Mischaracterizing	payments	in	the	accounting	
records
In this chapter, we will discuss the history and 
provisions of the FCPA, considerations for FCPA 
investigations, examples of FCPA investigations, 
and effective antibribery and corruption compliance 
programs.
History1
The FCPA is not a new law. It was enacted in 1977 
following investigations in the mid-1970s that un-
covered over $300 million of bribes or other ques-
tionable payments to foreign government officials. 
The law was designed to help restore confidence in 
the integrity of U.S. companies and generally pro-
hibited payments to foreign officials for the purpose 
of obtaining or retaining business.
American companies soon complained that the 
law created an uneven playing field when competing 
abroad for business. First, their foreign competitors 
were not subject to the same restrictions. Second, 
the practice of providing money or other benefits to 
government officials was widely accepted in many 
other countries. Finally, some jurisdictions even al-
lowed payments to government officials to qualify as 
tax-deductible expenses. The U.S. government en-
couraged other countries to adopt similar legislation, 
but	it	wasn’t	until	the	late	1990s	that	the	Organiza-
tion	 of	 Economic	Cooperation	 and	Development	
(OECD)	issued	its	Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Trans-
actions.2 Since that time, 37 countries have ratified 
the convention and have begun enacting legislation 
in their countries to implement the convention.3
Passage	 of	 the	 OECD	 convention	 has	 helped	
create a relatively consistent set of rules regarding 
antibribery	 payments	 in	most	 industrialized	 coun-
tries, but many developing countries are not par-
ties to the convention and do not have similar laws. 
Additionally,	 even	 among	 the	OECD	 signatories,	
enforcement efforts vary significantly. The practical 
result for U.S. companies is that they are still held 
to a high standard globally but may be subject to 
local investigations and prosecution efforts in coun-
tries that have enacted legislation in response to the 
OECD	convention.
FCPA Overview
The FCPA has two primary provisions—the anti-
bribery provisions and the books and records provi-
sions. Although the provisions regarding books and 
records may be more closely related to accounting, 
an understanding of the antibribery provisions is im-
portant in determining how to structure and con-
duct an investigation related to FCPA allegations. 
Separately discussed is the provision for facilitating 
1		Helpful	background	and	information	 is	available	 in	the	U.S.	Department	of	Justice’s	(DOJ’s)	Lay-Person’s Guide to FCPA,	available	at	www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html.
2		See	generally	www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/intlagree/	for	the	DOJ	Web	site	that	contains	information	and	links	relating	to	the	Organization	of	Eco-
nomic	Cooperation	and	Development	and	other	international	agreements.
3		See	www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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payments exceptions. Background information con-
siderations in planning an investigation are included 
when appropriate.
Antibribery Provision
At its most simple level, the FCPA makes it unlawful 
to corruptly take action in furtherance of directly or 
indirectly providing anything of value to a foreign 
government official with the intention of obtaining 
or retaining business or an improper advantage. In 
practice, this requires an understanding of each of 
the following specific elements:4
Applicability of the FCPA
The original FCPA applied to issuers of registered 
securities	 businesses	 based	 in	 or	 organized	 within	
the United States; “any officer, director, employ-
ee,	or	agent”	of	those	businesses;	and	U.S.	citizens	
or residents.5 As noted previously, U.S. businesses 
complained that the FCPA did not apply to foreign 
businesses, which created an unfair advantage for 
them. The application of the FCPA was broadened 
in 1998 to also include foreign companies and for-
eign nationals.6
Issuers, U.S. companies, and foreign nationals are 
liable for actions that use U.S. commerce vehicles, 
including written, verbal, and electronic communi-
cations or even international travel. Beyond those 
activities with a domestic nexus, U.S. parent com-
panies also are liable for the activities of their foreign 
subsidiaries. Nonissuer foreign companies or indi-
viduals are liable for furtherance of payment-related 
activities that take place within the United States.
•  What is the organizational structure of 
the legal or operational entity(ies) to 
which the FCPA allegations apply?
•  Are third parties used to effect transac-
tions? Is a background check of third 
parties completed to understand their 
structure and business activities?
•  Are the entities involved controlled by 
an issuer or U.S.-based entity?
•  Are transactions ordered or authorized 
by a U.S-based entity or issuer?
•  Are key individuals citizens or residents 
of the United States?
•  Do transactions with the local country 
make use of U.S. commerce vehicles?
•  Do transactions take place in the United 
States?
Investigative background  
considerations
Corrupt Intent
A corrupt intent in acting in furtherance to a pay-
ment to a foreign official is required by the FCPA, 
however, actual payment is not necessary to estab-
lish a violation because a promise of a benefit may 
be sufficient.7 The Senate and House committees 
that created the FCPA in 1977 defined the word 
corruptly as “having an evil motive or purpose, an 
intent to wrongly influence the recipient.”8 Addi-
tionally, the act must be for the purpose of (1) in-
fluencing the government official or political party 
to sway an official act or decision or (2) inducing an 
official to perform or refrain from performing an act 
4		Detailed	coverage	of	applicability	of	the	Foreign	Corrupt	Practices	Act	(FCPA)	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	A	careful	reading	of	the	statute	and	
consultation	with	legal	counsel	are	recommended	before	commencing	any	FCPA-related	investigation	or	antifraud	compliance	program.	References	to	
key	portions	of	the	statute	are	included	in	footnotes	throughout	this	discussion.
5		15	U.S.C.	§§	78dd-1(a),	77dd-2(a)	and	(h)(1).
6	Id.	§§	77dd-3(a)	and	(f)(1).
7	Id.	§§	78dd-1(a),	78dd-2(a),	78dd-3(a).
8	S.	Rep.	No.	95-114,	at	10	(1977).
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in order to obtain or retain business.9 Corrupt intent 
may be inferred by secretive or surreptitious actions 
in pursuit of a quid pro quo arrangement. Corrupt 
intent is often assumed by enforcement officials if 
other elements are present. The FCPA does include 
an exception for “routine governmental action,”10 
which is discussed in more detail later.
In	 a	 recent	 case,	 a	 naturalized	U.S.	 citizen	was	
charged with violations of the FCPA by bribing, 
offering a bribe, and attempting to bribe a foreign 
government official. While working for a French 
company, the individual attempted to influence 
Chinese government officials to award a substantial 
contract to the individual’s company and also ille-
gally provided technical information and assistance 
about the development of systems at a major facility. 
Although this case has not been tried, it should be 
noted that the charges center around not just pay-
ment of a bribe but also the promise or offer of a 
bribe.11
•  How are government contracts or other 
government business arrangements 
awarded in the local country?
•  Business permits
    –  What business permits are required to 
operate in the local country?
    –  How are they obtained?
    –  Are set fee schedules for the permits 
available?
    –  Which general ledger accounts are 
used to track expenses related to 
government permits?
•  Government or state-owned customers
    –  How does the company pursue con-
tracts or business with government 
entities?
Investigative background  
considerations
 –  How many customers does the local 
company have that are government 
customers?
 –  How many contracts does the company 
have with the local government or its 
agencies?
    –  Who manages those contracts and 
relationships?
    –  Is there a special process for setting 
up a government customer in the 
financial or other systems?
    –  Does the company maintain a list 
of all government or state-owned 
customers and does that list undergo 
periodic review?
    –  Are contracts centrally maintained  
to allow for efficient management  
and oversight of the government 
relationships?
•  Government or state-owned vendors
    –  How many vendors does the local 
company have that are government 
vendors?
    –  Are the government vendors, if any, 
related to utilities or other municipal 
services?
    –  Are payments to utilities made on a 
regularly scheduled basis (monthly, 
quarterly, or annually) or on an ir-
regular schedule?
    –  Are payments to government vendors 
periodically reviewed?
    –  How is business awarded to nonutil-
ity government vendors? Are bids 
solicited? Is there competition for the 
bids?
    –  Does the company maintain a list 
of all government or state-owned 
vendors and does that list undergo 
periodic review?
    –  Are contracts centrally maintained?
	 9	Ibid.
10	Id.	§§	78dd-1(b),	78dd-2(b),	78dd-3(b).
11	DOJ	Release	No.	08-851	issued	September	24,	2008.
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Prohibited Actions
The FCPA also prohibits not only actual payments 
but also acts in furtherance of an “offer, ... promise 
to	pay,	or	authorization	of	the	payment.”12 An actu-
al payment need not be made by the entity or indi-
vidual for a violation of the FCPA to have occurred. 
Potentially violative actions could include approv-
ing a payment, relaying e-mail instructions to make 
the payment, discussing payments via telephone, 
acquiescing in payment, knowingly cooperating in 
payment, covering up the payment, or creating or 
accepting false documentation.
Discussed	 later	 are	 the	 intricacies	 of	 the	 related	
books and records provisions of the FCPA that 
cover how payments are recorded in the account-
ing system.
•  Is there a clearly defined process for 
approval of payments that establishes 
accountability?
•  Is payment approval documented, either 
within the accounting system or sup-
porting documentation?
•  Is payment approval documented by the 
signature of an individual on an autho-
rized signature list?
•  Can payment approval be made via 
e-mail?
•  What policies govern e-mail 
communication
Investigative background  
considerations
A Bribe or Anything of Value
The FCPA further specifies that a payment includes 
not only monetary transfers but also an “offer, gift, 
promise	 to	 give,	 or	 authorization	of	 the	 giving	of	
anything of value.”13 This covers a wide variety of 
items beyond cash, such as lavish gifts or entertain-
ment, lavish travel expenses, improper campaign 
contributions, contributions to charities endorsed 
by a foreign official, scholarships or travel for family 
members of the recipient, overpayment for services 
or underpricing of assets, or excessively “facilitat-
ing payment.” Red flags and other travel and enter-
tainment considerations are discussed in more detail 
later.
In	 a	 recent	 case,	 the	 subsidiary	of	Delta	&	Pine	
Land Company required business permits in order 
to operate within Turkey. To secure the business 
permits,	Turk	Deltapine,	 Inc.,	paid	officials	of	 the	
Turkish	Ministry	of	Agricultural	 and	Rural	Affairs	
over $43,000 in bribes of cash and other forms, in-
cluding travel expenses, hotel expenses, computers, 
office furniture, refrigerators, and air conditioners.14
•  Does the company have policies regard-
ing gift giving or donations? Is training 
provided for those policies? Are compli-
ance audits conducted?
•  What types of gift giving are considered 
reasonable and customary in the local 
country?
•  Based on the economic and political 
environment of the local country, what 
might the threshold be to consider a gift 
or payment of sufficient value to influ-
ence a business decision?
•  What types of gifts does the company 
or its agents in the local country typi-
cally give to customers or others? For 
example, company-branded items or 
gifts for specific occasions (birthdays, 
name days, anniversaries, births, deaths, 
weddings, promotions, and so on). What 
forms do those gifts take?
•  Is authorization required to give gifts 
generally or is it based on the size of the 
gift?
(continued)
Investigative background  
considerations
12 Id.	§§	78dd-1(a),	78dd-2(a),	78dd-3(a).
13	Ibid.
14	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	(SEC)	Administrative	Proceeding	Release	No.	34-56138	issued	July	26,	2007.
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(continued)
•  Does the company sponsor large events 
that are considered prestigious, such 
as golf or sporting events or industry 
conferences? Does the company extend 
complimentary or discounted invitations 
to customers, vendors, or others?
•  How are charitable donations approved 
and tracked? Is due diligence performed 
regarding the legitimacy or control of 
charities?
•  What general ledger accounts are used  
to track expenses related to gifts and 
donations?
•  Can gifts or donations be processed 
through employee expense reports?
Investigative background  
considerations
To a Foreign Official
The FCPA prohibits payments or other benefits to 
“any foreign official,”15 which includes not only 
high-level officials but also traditional government 
employees, persons acting on behalf of a govern-
ment, private advisors to the government, relatives 
of government officials, and political party officials or 
candidates, to name a few.16 Examples of individuals 
who have been considered foreign officials include 
ministry or agency employees; judges; legislators; 
local officials; employees of government-controlled 
companies; employees of state-owned universities; 
private persons acting in an official capacity; officials 
of	public	international	organizations;	candidates	for	
office; political parties or their officials; and spouses, 
dependents, or siblings of an official.
The inclusion of political party officials can be-
come complex in countries where state-owned en-
tities are common. Additionally, when state-owned 
entities	are	privatized,	members	of	management	may	
still have affiliations with political parties that may 
qualify them as foreign officials. Existence of royal 
family members and the extent of their involvement 
in the government or political parties also may war-
rant consideration.
•  What are the structures of the govern-
ment, political parties, and government 
agencies in the local country?
•  Does the company have a policy regard-
ing government interactions?
•  Is there a contact in the local country 
who coordinates government relations 
or regulatory affairs?
•  Do employees or agents interact with 
government employees on a regular 
basis? If so, in what capacities? 
•  Are donations given to local or munici-
pal organizations (for example, schools 
and hospitals)? If so, how are they solic-
ited, approved, and tracked?
•  Is an effort made to determine whether 
customers or vendors are state-owned 
entities or led by individuals who have 
political party affiliations? If so, how 
is that information tracked and main-
tained? Which department is respon-
sible for collecting and maintaining that 
information?
Investigative background  
considerations
Directly or Indirectly
In addition to prohibiting corrupt payments to for-
eign officials that are made directly by entities or 
individuals, the FCPA also prohibits making those 
payments through “any person” knowing that all 
or part of the payment “will be offered, given, or 
promised” to a foreign official with corrupt intent, 
as previously described.17 The term knowing has been 
interpreted to include both conscious disregard as 
well as deliberate ignorance.
In a recent case, the owners of the U.S. company 
Film	Festival	Management,	Inc.,	were	charged	with	
15	Id.	§§	78dd-1(a)(1),	78dd-2(a)(1),	78dd-3(a)(1).
16	Id.	§§	78dd-1(f)(1),	78dd-2(h)(2).
17	78dd-1(a)(3),	78dd-2(a)(3),	78dd-3(a)(3).
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paying bribes both directly and indirectly to foreign 
officials while seeking contracts to run the Bangkok 
International Film Festival (BKKIFF). The BKKIFF 
receives funds from the Tourism Authority of Thai-
land (TAT), a government agency. To secure their 
position in the BKKIFF, the U.S. company paid 
over $900,000 in bribes to the BKKIFF “president” 
who was also a senior government official of the 
TAT. In addition to making cash payments directly 
to the foreign official, the US company made indi-
rect payments to the bank accounts of the daughter 
and a friend of the government official.18 Addition-
ally, the individuals were charged with paying kick-
backs to a former governor of the TAT in order to 
secure additional contracts with the TAT.19
Use of agents, distributors, joint ventures, or oth-
er third parties who may make corrupt payments 
to foreign officials may thus create vicarious liability 
for the entity that allows the third party to act on 
its behalf.
For	 example,	 the	 CEO	 of	 Kellogg,	 Brown,	 &	
Root, Inc., entered into sham contracts with two 
“agents” to funnel money to Nigerian officials 
through “consulting” or “services” agreements. The 
CEO	pled	guilty	to	FCPA	and	mail	and	wire	fraud	
violations related to the sham contracts. He faces 
seven years in prison and payment of $10.8 million 
in restitution.20	Outside	parties	 involved	 in	agency	
agreements, consultant agreements, service agree-
ments, and third-party agreements are all subject to 
review and background investigation.
Contracting third parties requires careful screen-
ing and due diligence procedures to ensure the 
partner is reputable and to avoid potential liability. 
Recent	Department	of	 Justice	Opinion	Procedure	
releases stress the need for in-depth preacquisition 
due diligence and expansive postacquisition training 
and investigations into potential FCPA violations, 
especially in cases in which preacquisition due dili-
gence is limited in scope or timing.21 Although the 
recent opinions do not give a free pass to compa-
nies purchasing foreign operations that have FCPA 
violations, the opinions do provide companies with 
a clear reminder of the importance of due diligence 
in all activities with third parties and acquisitions.
Examples of due diligence procedures are dis-
cussed later in this chapter.
•  What types of third parties are used to 
transact business in a particular country?
    –  Distributors?
    –  Joint venture partners?
    –  Independent contractors?
    –  Others?
•  Is the decision to engage third parties 
made locally or is regional or headquar-
ter approval required?
•  Are due diligence procedures performed 
prior to engaging the third party?
    –  What types of procedures?
    –  Is there standard documentation or 
checklists of procedures to perform?
    –  Who performs the due diligence 
procedures?
    –  Who reviews the due diligence  
results?
•  Are there limits to the duration of con-
tracts with third parties?
•  Is due diligence performed periodically 
after the third party is engaged? How 
often? Only at contract renewal?
•  Is the third party contractually required 
to follow the FCPA and other local coun-
try antibribery or anticorruption laws?
•  Is training on company policies and 
procedures (for example, FCPA and 
corporate code of conduct) provided to 
management or employees of the third 
parties?
Investigative background  
considerations
18	DOJ	Release	No.	08-032	issued	January	17,	2008.
19	DOJ	Release	No.	08-134	issued	October	2,	2008.
20	SEC	Litigation	Release	No.	20700	issued	September	3,	2008.
21	DOJ	Opinion	Procedure	Release	Nos.	2008-01	and	2008-02	issued	January	15,	2008,	and	June	13,	2008,	respectively.
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To Obtain Business or Improper 
Advantage
The purpose of the provision of a bribe or any-
thing of value to an official must be to obtain 
or retain business or an improper advantage. As 
discussed subsequently, there is an affirmative de-
fense for bona fide business expenses and an ex-
ception for payments to expedite nondiscretionary 
government action. It is when payments cross the 
line to being exchanges in return for something to 
which the company is not entitled that the expense 
and related advantage may become improper.
Examples of improper advantage may include the 
following:
	 •		Efforts	to	increase	profits	on	transactions	with	a	
particular entity
	 •		Prevent	adverse	government	action
	 •		Obtain	regulatory	approvals
	 •		Obtain	or	renew	a	contract
	 •		Have	access	to	bids	of	competitors
	 •		Attempt	to	reduce	or	avoid	taxes
•  What is the general process for making 
sales within each business unit or for 
each product line?
•  How are decision makers identified for 
sales?
•  Is training provided to sales or market-
ing employees describing what is appro-
priate or inappropriate in expenditures 
that may influence decision makers?
•  What sales techniques are taught or 
otherwise encouraged during sales  
training?
•  What types of expenditures are explicitly 
allowed for sales and marketing  
purposes?
•  Are budgets set for those categories?
Investigative background  
considerations
•  Are expenditures and comparison to 
budgets monitored?
•  To which general ledger accounts are 
each of these types of expenditures 
booked?
•  Which of those types of expenditures 
may benefit an individual or group 
of individuals rather than the general 
business (for example, entertainment 
expenditures versus printing of product 
brochures)?
•  Do the company’s policies prohibit 
certain types of expenditures that are 
considered inappropriate for sales and 
marketing?
•  For which types of expenditures are 
third parties involved?
Books and Records 
Provision
In addition to the antibribery provisions previously 
described, the FCPA imposes additional require-
ments on Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) registrants related to books and records and 
internal controls. These provisions are designed to 
complement the antibribery portions of the FCPA 
so that it is more difficult for issuers to make or hide 
corrupt payments.
The FCPA requires that books and records be 
kept to, “in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly 
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets 
of the issuer.”22 Further, an internal control system 
must be maintained to provide “reasonable assur-
ance” that transactions are executed and recorded in 
a way to permit preparation of financial statements 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles and that access to assets is permitted only 
in	accordance	with	management	authorization.23
The net results of the books and records and in-
ternal control provisions are that bribes must be 
22	78m(b)(2)(A).
23	78m(b)(2)(B).
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recorded as bribes, not obscured or described as 
something else. The issuer’s management is respon-
sible for ensuring correct classification and account-
ing for all operations of the company, regardless 
of the country in which the books are maintained 
or a transaction occurs. No direct knowledge is 
required of officers of the issuer to hold the issuer 
accountable, which essentially establishes strict li-
ability for inaccurate books and records. Finally, the 
FCPA conspicuously does not define a materiality 
threshold	for	a	violation	so	any	size	payment	or	ob-
ject of value can be violative.
Although	 the	 SEC	 and	 Department	 of	 Justice	
(DOJ)	have	not	provided	direct	guidance	on	how	
bribes or facilitating payments should be recorded, 
many of the charges brought against companies have 
included a violation of the books and records and 
internal control provisions. Because violations under 
this portion of the FCPA can bring criminal fines of 
up to $25 million against the company and indi-
vidual fines of up to $5 million with up to 20 years 
of imprisonment, companies and their executives 
should maintain an awareness of company internal 
controls and develop an accounting policy that spe-
cifically defines how these transactions should be 
recorded.
Recently,	Willbros	Group,	Inc.,	and	several	exec-
utives entered into a judgment agreement with the 
SEC	and	DOJ	for	violations	of	the	FCPA,	including	
a criminal prosecution of the books and records pro-
vision. The company was ordered to disgorge $8.9 
million of profits in addition to prejudgment inter-
est	of	$1.4	million.	 Jason	Steph,	a	 former	 supervi-
sory employee in the Nigerian operations, may pay 
a civil penalty (the amount to be determined in the 
future	by	the	court).	Gerald	Jansen,	a	former	admin-
istrative supervisor in the Nigerian operations, will 
pay	a	civil	penalty	of	$30,000,	and	Carlos	Galvez,	a	
former accounting employee in Bolivia, will pay a 
civil penalty of $35,000.24	One	additional	defendant,	
Jim	Bob	Brown,	settled	criminal	and	civil	charges;	
however, he is awaiting sentencing.
•  Do company policies clearly state how 
expenses should be described in the ac-
counting system and documented with 
support?
•  Is training provided to the accounting 
department on classification of expenses 
for charitable contributions, market-
ing expenses, and other miscellaneous 
expenses?
•  Is training provided to the accounting 
department on the key aspects of the 
FCPA books and records provisions?
•  Is training provided to the sales and 
marketing departments on the key 
aspects of the FCPA books and records 
provisions? Are sales and marketing de-
partment executives familiar with com-
pany policies governing how expenses 
are recorded and required support for 
recorded expenses?
Investigative background  
considerations
Facilitating Payments 
Exception and Affirmative 
Defenses
The FCPA provides an exception for payments 
known as facilitating payments to expedite or obtain 
a routine government action. The FCPA mentions 
specific examples, such as obtaining business permits 
or licenses; processing paperwork, such as visas; pro-
viding general government services related to transit 
of goods within the country; or basic services, such 
as utilities.25 It does not, however, extend to the 
award of new or the extension of existing business 
with the government.26 Further, the official action 
that is being expedited must not be discretionary.
In	the	Turk	Deltapine,	Inc.,	case	discussed	previ-
ously, payments were made to government officials 
to obtain certifications and approvals that officials 
24	SEC	Litigation	Release	No.	20571	issued	May	14,	2008.
25	Id.	§§	78dd-1(f)(3)(A),	78dd-2(h)(4)(A),	78dd-3(f)(4)(A).
26	Id.	§§	78dd-1(f)(3)(B),	78dd-2(h)(4)(B),	78dd-3(f)(4)(B).
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prepared during their standard course of business. 
Issues arise when payments made to an official influ-
ence the official to do something he or she should 
not do beyond the timing of the performance of 
his or her duty. Inspectors who received payments 
from	Turk	Deltapine,	Inc.,	sometimes	failed	to	con-
duct inspections or failed to conduct them properly; 
however, the officials provided paperwork certify-
ing that the inspections had been completed.27
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corpora-
tion, owner of Indian subsidiary Pioneer Friction 
Limited, entered into a nonprosecution agreement 
with	the	DOJ	for	improper	payments	made	and	fa-
cilitated to several railway regulatory boards. The 
payments were made in order to schedule preship-
ping product inspections and obtain the issuance of 
compliance certificates. Payments also were made to 
the Central Board of Excise and Customs to stop 
what the company thought were excessive audits. 
The payments were as small as $67 per product 
inspection and $31.50 per month to decrease the 
audits, but they totaled $40,000 during one year. 
This case highlights one of the main difficulties for 
companies with multinational operations—how the 
corporate office monitors payments, whether illegal 
or potentially legal facilitating payments, made by 
subsidiaries.28
Many	 companies	 ban	 facilitating	 payments	 be-
cause, although they are not FCPA violations, they 
are hard to monitor and may violate local laws.
•  What services does the government 
routinely provide for the company?
•  Does the company make payments to 
government officials related to these 
services?
•  Are facilitating payments or bribes al-
lowed under local law?
Investigative background  
considerations
Local Law
Exempted payments must be permitted under the 
written laws and regulations of the host country. 
General	 practice	 in	 the	 country	 is	 not	 sufficient.	
Where bribery is not prohibited, local law opinion 
can help defeat allegations of corrupt intent; how-
ever, the local law defense has never been applied 
in court.
Promotional Expenditures
Exempted payments must be bona fide, reasonable, 
and directly related to the (a) promotion, demon-
stration, or explanation of products or services or (b) 
execution or performance of a contract with a for-
eign government or an agency of the foreign gov-
ernment. A frequent example used is the provision 
of a trip to the United States for an official govern-
ment customer to visit the plant where a product is 
manufactured or learn more about how to use the 
product. This may be a bona fide expense in certain 
circumstances. However, if the company also pays 
for a family member of the foreign official to visit 
the United States or provides a side trip to Las Ve-
gas, the expenses would not appear to be defensible 
as bona fide promotional expenditures.
A recent settled case against Lucent Technologies 
Inc. brought to light a common business practice of 
providing presale and postsale trips, also known as 
factory inspection trips or training trips, to foreign of-
ficials. Although legitimate trips for customers to 
visit the factories of businesses are common, the 
FCPA prohibits trips with the primary purpose of 
visiting a tourist destination. Lucent Technologies 
Inc. provided over 315 trips to locations such as Ha-
waii,	Las	Vegas,	 the	Grand	Canyon,	Niagara	Falls,	
Disney	World,	Universal	 Studios,	 and	New	York	
City, with very little time spent visiting the Lucent 
Technologies Inc. factory sites. 29 Lucent Technolo-
gies Inc. also was found to have paid for educational 
opportunities, including tuition and living expenses 
27	SEC	Administrative	Proceeding	Release	No.	34-56138	issued	July	26,	2007.
28		DOJ	Release	No.	08-116	issued	February	14,	2008;	SEC	Administrative	Proceeding	Release	No.	34-57333	issued	February	14,	2008;	and	Westinghouse	Air	
Brake	Technologies	Corporation	agreement	with	the	DOJ	issued	February	8,	2008.
29	SEC	Litigation	Release	No.	20414	issued	December	21,	2007.
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of an official attending graduate school and paying 
educational expenses for the child of an official.30
TRACE International, Inc., recently submitted an 
FCPA	Opinion	Procedure	Request	regarding	plans	
to pay certain expenses for 20 journalists employed 
by media outlets in China to attend a press confer-
ence held by TRACE International, Inc., in Shang-
hai. The media outlets are mostly owned by the 
Chinese	government.	The	Opinion	Release	 stated	
that the planned expenses are “reasonable under the 
circumstances and directly relate to ‘the promotion, 
demonstration, or explanation of [TRACE’s] prod-
ucts	or	services.’”	The	DOJ	did	note	that	during	the	
determination of its opinion, it gave no weight to 
the common practice of “companies in the PRC to 
provide such benefits to journalists attending a press 
conference.”31
Penalties and 
Enforcement
The FCPA has both criminal and civil penalties. The 
DOJ	is	the	primary	enforcer	and	handles	all	criminal	
penalties. Enforcement of civil penalties is generally 
performed by the SEC, with some enforcement by 
the	DOJ	in	certain	instances.
The penalties can be severe, ranging from fines 
to jail time. Antibribery provision violations can re-
sult in fines of up to $2 million per occurrence for 
entities and fines of up to $100,000 or five years in 
prison, or both, for individuals. The penalties for 
violation of the books and records and internal con-
trol provisions can be even harsher—fines of up to 
$25 million for entities and fines of up to $5 million 
or 20 years in prison, or both, for individuals. In 
addition, civil penalties also may apply, and compa-
nies are prohibited from indemnifying convicted of-
ficers, employees, or other individuals for payment 
of fines.32
Enforcement of the FCPA has dramatically in-
creased in recent years. Enforcement actions in-
creased from only 15 in 2006 to more than 30 
in both years 2007 and 2008. Recent years have 
shown an increase in the number of voluntary dis-
closures, cooperation among multinational prosecu-
tors, increasing fines and disgorgement payments, 
and higher penalties for companies without effec-
tive compliance programs. The government also 
has been seeking more intrusive remedies, such as 
government-imposed monitors who may be giv-
en access to corporate records, real-time access to 
calendars of top officers, and the ability to impose 
changes to FCPA-related compliance processes. 
The costs of these monitors must be borne by the 
entity and can often be quite costly such as the well-
publicized	fee	between	$28	and	52	million	charged	
by the independent monitor for Zimmer, Inc. 
under its deferred prosecution agreement that ended 
March	2009.33
A few recent examples may serve to illustrate the 
current state of FCPA enforcement:
	 •		Baker	Hughes	Incorporated	agreed	to	pay	a	
total of $44 million in penalties that comprised 
an $11 million civil penalty and disgorgement 
of	approximately	$33	million.	In	Kazakhstan,	
a Baker Hughes Incorporated subsidiary paid 
approximately $4.1 million in commission pay-
ments to a consulting firm for a services contract 
that generated $205 million in business for Baker 
Hughes Incorporated. An additional $1.4 million 
of commission payments were made to another 
agent for the purpose of influencing government 
decision making.34
	 •		The	Titan	Corporation	paid	$3.5	million	over	3	
years to its agent in Africa in an effort to secure a 
telecom contract. The agent was a business advi-
sor to the country’s president, and the payments 
were recorded as consulting services. In 2005, 
The Titan Corporation pled guilty to 3 felonies, 
30	DOJ	Release	No.	07-1028	issued	December	21,	2007,	and	DOJ	Non-Prosecution	Agreement	issued	November	14,	2007.
31	DOJ	Opinion	Procedure	Release	No.	08-03	issued	July	11,	2008.
32	78dd-2(g)(2),	78dd-3(e)(2),	78ff(c)(2).
33		See	Zimmer	Holdings	Inc.	Press	Release	at	http://investor.zimmer.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=950137-07-16322	which	states	a	monthly	monitorship	fee	of	
between	$1,550,000	and	$2,900,000	for	a	period	of	18	months.
34	SEC	Litigation	Release	No.	20094	issued	April	26,	2007,	and	SEC	filing	against	Baker	Hughes	Incorporated	issued	April	26,	2007.
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paid a $13 million fine, entered into an SEC 
consent degree, paid $15.5 million in disgorge-
ment of ill-gotten gains, and was required to 
retain an independent monitor.35
	 •		Four	of	Vetco	International	Ltd.’s	subsidiaries	
authorized	an	agent	to	make	multiple	payments	
totaling $2.1 million to Nigerian Customs Ser-
vices to procure preferential customs treatment 
for deepwater oil drilling equipment. In 2007, 
3 of the subsidiaries pled guilty to antibribery 
violations and conspiracy, resulting in a $26 mil-
lion total fine, which was the largest fine to date 
in	a	DOJ	prosecution.36 A deferred prosecution 
agreement was created for one subsidiary, which 
consented	to	DOJ	preapproval	of	appointments	
of executive chairpersons, majority members 
of the compliance committee, and compliance 
counsel.37
	 •		Baker	Hughes	Incorporated;	Schnitzer	Steel	In-
dustries, Inc.; Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited; 
York	International	Corporation;	Paradigm	B.V.;	
Vetco International Inc.; StatoilHydro; ABB; 
Diagnostic	Products	Corporation;	DPC	(Tianjin)	
Ltd.;	InVision;	Micrus	Corporation;	Monsanto	
Company; and Titan Corporation all have moni-
tors or consultants to ensure FCPA compliance 
as part of their settlement agreement with the 
SEC	and	DOJ.	In	some	cases,	the	monitor	can	
be appointed for a period of up to three years. 
	 •		Siemens	AG	and	certain	of	its	subsidiaries	agreed	
to pay a combined total of $1.6 billion in fines, 
penalties, and disgorgement of profits follow-
ing	investigations	led	by	the	DOJ,	SEC,	and	the	
Munich	Public	Prosecutor’s	office.	It	was	the	
largest monetary sanction imposed related to 
FCPA violations. Close cooperation and interna-
tional mutual legal assistance were cited as keys 
to	the	successful	prosecution.	Over	$800	million	
of	the	fines	related	to	SEC	and	DOJ	charges	re-
lating to violations of the books and records and 
internal control provisions, including criminal 
charges. The global investigation revealed cor-
rupt payments of more than $1.4 billion were 
to government officials in Asia, Africa, America, 
the	Middle	East,	and	Europe.	Siemens	agreed	to	
retain an independent compliance monitor for 4 
years. The SEC noted the “pattern of bribery by 
Simens was unprecedented in scale and geo-
graphic reach.”38
Conducting the 
Investigation
FCPA investigations are in many ways similar to 
other types of forensic accounting investigations. 
However, as previously described, specific legal re-
quirements and cultural considerations often differ-
entiate an FCPA investigation; the manner in which 
it is conducted; the types of procedures that may 
be performed; the types of information gathered 
and	analyzed;	 and	 the	 form	of	 a	 report	 to	 the	cli-
ent, if any. The sections that follow provide addi-
tional details and considerations when planning and 
performing forensic accounting investigations for an 
FCPA matter and help companies proactively de-
velop FCPA policies, procedures, and monitoring 
programs.
When conducting an investigation, the investiga-
tion team should keep the questions outlined in box 
4-1 in mind because they may be asked to provide a 
report to the investigating government.
Box 4-1:  Report Submission Due Diligence 
Considerations
•	What	happened?
•		How	did	it	happen	(for	example,	failure	
of	controls	or	collusion)?
•		Who	was	involved?
•		What	documentation	or	electronic	media	
has	been	preserved	and	is	available?
•		What	subsidiaries	and	jurisdictions	are	
involved?
35	SEC		Litigation	Release	No.	19107	issued	March	1,	2005.
36	DOJ	Release	No.	07-075	issued	February	6,	2007.
37	DOJ	Deferred	Prosecution	Agreement	with	Aibel	Group	(Vetco).
38	DOJ	Release	No.	08-1105	issued	December	15,	2008.
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•		What	disciplinary	actions,	if	any,	have	
been	taken	against	involved	individuals?
•		What	is	the	approximate	value	of	corrupt	
payments?
•		What	procedures	did	you	perform	to	
determine	what	happened?
•		How	do	you	know	this	behavior	is	lim-
ited	to	specific	countries	or	divisions?
•		How	will	the	company	ensure	that	this	
will	not	happen	again?
The general steps in the investigation will be simi-
lar to those described in chapter 1, “Introduction to 
Investigations,”	but	can	be	summarized	as	follows:
 1.  Engagement planning and scope setting
a.  Company, counsel, and forensic accoun-
tants discuss and determine scope
b.		Forensic	 accountants	 organize	 country	
team(s) and issue-specific industry experts
c.	 	Outline	workplan
d.		Discuss	budget
e.  Identify company, counsel, and forensic 
accountant points of contact
 2.  Predeployment team meeting
a. Review current situation
b. Review project management expectations
c. Set expectations and protocols
d.		Discuss	language	needs	across	countries	and	
locations
e.	Discuss	global	issues
 3.  Site visits and data collection
a.  Teams visit site locations
b.		Gather	 hard-copy	 and	 electronic	 docu-
mentation
c.  Constant discussion and communication 
between points of contact on issues and 
difficulties
d.  Establish data review environment
 4.		Document	 review	 and	 analysis	 and	 inter-
views
a.		Document	 review—hard	 copy	 or	 elec-
tronic
b.  Analysis of documentation and accounting 
system detail, including time and expense 
reports, general ledger activity, and so on
c.  Interviews of key company personnel
d.  Constant discussion and communication 
between teams and identified points of 
contact on issues and difficulties
 5.		Discussion	 of	 investigative	 findings	 and	 re-
ports
a.  Combination of analysis from individual 
country teams
b.		Discussion	 of	 findings	 among	 company,	
counsel, and forensic accountants
c.  Communication of findings
 6.  Wrap up and follow up
a.  Follow up on any open issues or points rec-
ognized	through	discussion	of	findings
b.  Wrap up of all remaining items
Industry Considerations
Most	 companies	 have	 some	 interaction	with	 gov-
ernment officials, whether as customers, providers 
of utilities, obtaining business permits, importing 
goods, or other activities. Certain industries, by 
their very nature, tend to have more regular contact 
with government officials and potential incentives 
to develop relationships with government officials 
in order to receive business or preferential treat-
ment. Additionally, industry issues may arise based 
on the industries in which customers and vendors 
operate.
Defense and Construction
In the defense and industrial construction industries, 
companies often are selling large projects to a for-
eign government, such as through defense contracts 
with the military or construction of large power 
plants that may belong to or be run by the local 
government. A contract win often represents a sig-
nificant amount of revenue to the proposing com-
panies, creating incentives to influence government 
officials who may influence the purchasing deci-
sion. The sales pursuit cycle is often very long and 
may involve multiple parties. This can create a large 
amount of expenses related to the pursuit, making 
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it potentially difficult to identify specific payments 
that may be made with corrupt intent. Subcontrac-
tors also may be involved for certain portions of the 
project, creating the potential for indirect payments. 
Finally, because government approval of the con-
tracts is required, there are likely numerous legiti-
mate contacts and business-related expenses, making 
it difficult to determine which expenses are made 
with an intent to improperly influence the decision-
making government official.
The	case	against	Albert	Stanley,	the	CEO	of	Kel-
logg,	 Brown,	 &	 Root,	 Inc.,	 highlights	 not	 only	
the difficulties of operations in Nigeria but also the 
challenges faced by construction companies. Stan-
ley pled guilty to paying bribes to Nigerian gov-
ernment officials to obtain contracts to build natural 
gas facilities and faces a seven-year sentence.39 Con-
struction companies face not only strenuous bidding 
competitions to win a contract but must then obtain 
numerous permits.
Oil and Gas
Oil	and	gas	companies	often	find	themselves	inter-
acting with government officials to negotiate for 
the extraction of oil or natural gas from property 
located within and often owned by the country. 
Negotiations may take place for extraction rights, 
construction of oil rigs or other structures, customs 
on inbound equipment or transport of the gas or 
oil, and general business permits. As with defense 
and industrial construction, these arrangements are 
often the result of months or years of negotiations, 
represent a significant source of revenue both for 
the local country and for the company extracting 
the resources, and may involve the use of agents or 
subcontractors. Additionally, the natural resources 
are often located in underdeveloped countries; it is 
not uncommon for the negotiations and permission 
received to include provisions of capital improve-
ments or infrastructure to the local country, such 
as schools, hospitals, water treatment plants, and 
so on.
The	case	against	Willbros	Group,	Inc.,	discussed	
earlier displays some of the complexities of oper-
ating in the oil and gas industry. This industry is 
heavily	scrutinized	by	the	SEC	and	DOJ	due	to	the	
prevalence of operations by oil and gas companies in 
countries with a high corruption risk.
Logistics
Logistics companies regularly transport goods in 
and out of countries that may be subject to cus-
toms, duties, or other charges. Because a logistics 
company operating in a large number of countries 
will be subject to a complex combination of charges 
and processes that may be difficult to coordinate, it 
may employ freight forwarders and local agents in 
different countries to handle the processing of the 
shipments.
The customs and duties are often assessed and 
collected by low-level government employees. 
Although certainly the legal customs and duties 
must be paid, in some cases additional “grease pay-
ments” may be made to these low-paid employees 
to receive expedited processing. Those payments 
may be legal in the local country and under the 
FCPA, depending on the specific nature of the pay- 
ments. However, the customs official may offer the 
company or the agent (or accept the offer of the 
company or the agent) the ability to process goods 
at a lower tariff rate in exchange for a bribe to the 
government employee, which does not qualify as a 
facilitation payment.
Without careful agreement in advance, there may 
be little visibility to the logistics company on the 
amount and nature of fees that the agent is paying 
on its behalf. For example, an agent may offer a per-
shipment charge and provide the logistics compa-
ny with documentation supporting the number of 
shipments processed. However, if the per-shipment 
charge includes corrupt payments and the logistics 
company booked the entire per-shipment charge as 
a transportation expense, it could be violating the 
books and records provision of the FCPA because it 
did not properly classify the portion of the payment 
related to corrupt payments.
The	Panalpina	Group,	under	investigation	by	the	
DOJ	 for	 violations	 of	 the	 FCPA,	 completed	 the	
withdrawal of operations from the Nigerian mar-
ket.	 Monika	 Ribar,	 the	 Panalpina	 Group	 CEO,	
39	SEC	Litigation	Release	No.	20700	issued	September	3,	2008.
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stated, “Admittedly foreign companies operate in an 
ongoing uncertain and hard to assess legal environ-
ment in Nigeria. This makes it difficult for Panal-
pina to offer both a comprehensive service portfolio 
and at the same time meet the high ethical standards 
as outlined in Panalpina’s Code of Business Con-
duct.”40	Many	other	logistics	companies	face	similar	
challenges operating in countries with a high risk of 
corruption.
Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices
In many countries, health care providers work for 
government health programs or institutions and 
qualify as government officials. Sales representatives 
of pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical de-
vice companies meet with health care providers on a 
regular basis to explain the benefits of their products 
and encourage the health care providers to use or 
prescribe their products. The companies also may 
pay doctors to perform research for clinical trials or 
speak at medical conferences, make donations to the 
hospitals where physicians work, or pay for health 
care providers to attend training sessions. Because 
each of these interactions may be with a govern-
ment official, they may raise the specter of improper 
payments based on the type of payment or benefit 
provided to the health care provider (for example, 
the company may receive valuable services in return 
for the provided payment or the payment may be 
related to genuine exchanges of scientific informa-
tion or to improve patient care).
Some countries or regions have developed health 
care compliance codes that address some of these 
exchanges and indicate what may be appropri-
ate or inappropriate in a certain situation, which 
may be helpful in understanding general practice. 
In addition, most companies have similar internal 
health care compliance policies and procedures and 
may have periodic audits by compliance personnel; 
however, these compliance audits are not always de-
signed to identify potential FCPA violations.
As noted in the Schering-Plough Corporation 
case, payments do not have to be made directly to a 
foreign official or their family. A charitable donation 
by the pharmaceutical company to an established 
charity caused a $500,000 fine because the charitable 
organization	was	found	to	be	heavily	supported	by	
a senior Polish official. The charitable donation of 
approximately $76,000 was made to encourage the 
Polish official to influence the purchase of Schering-
Plough Corporation’s pharmaceutical products. The 
payments were recorded as charitable contributions, 
but the true purpose was concealed in account-
ing records by both false medical justifications and 
through limiting the payments to a dollar limit that 
was able to be paid without additional review or ap-
proval. The Schering-Plough Corporation’s policies 
and procedures were found to be “inadequate in that 
they did not require employees to conduct any due 
diligence prior to making promotional or charitable 
donations to determine whether any government 
officials were affiliated with proposed recipients.”41
Local Business Practices and 
Laws
Understanding the culture of the local country and 
its business practices is critical in conducting an ef-
fective FCPA investigation and identifying potential 
issues that must be investigated. Bribes are not pro-
hibited by law in some countries and may be a part 
of generally accepted business practices. Employees 
in the local countries may not understand, without 
specific FCPA training, that payment of bribes cre-
ates liabilities for the parent company. To get a high-
level understanding of the prevalence of bribes in a 
particular country prior to being in the field, it may 
be helpful to consult resources such as Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index.42 The 
index is widely used and provides an overview of 
how the perceived level of corruption in a particular 
country compares with other countries.
Local laws and practices can create additional 
complexities for an FCPA investigation. For ex-
ample, privacy laws in many countries may prevent 
the investigation team from taking documents (elec-
tronic or hard copy) out of the local country if they 
40	Panalpina	Group	press	release	titled	“Panalpina	reports	dynamic	growth	in	the	first	half	year”	and	issued	July	30,	2008.
41	SEC	Administrative	Proceeding	Release	No.	34-49838	issued	June	9,	2004,	and	SEC	Litigation	Release	No.	18740	issued	June	9,	2004.
42	Information	about	the	index	can	be	obtained	at	www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
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contain personal or private information. This may 
result in the need to perform all procedures within 
the country and redact names and personal informa-
tion from reports that are distributed outside of the 
local country.
In some countries, employees can consent to the 
sharing of their data, such as the information con-
tained in their business files and business computer, 
but knowledge of this consent varies. However, if 
certain employees are not available to provide con-
sent or, in fact, refuse to consent, this may still result 
in at least some documents and procedures needing 
to be performed within the country.
Additionally, some companies are signatories to 
the safe harbor provision of the European Union 
privacy directive, which allows them to share oth-
erwise private or protected information within the 
company. However, even if that allowed the com-
pany to transfer data to the United States, it could 
still not share that data in the United States with 
other entities that are not signatories to the safe har-
bor provision, once again causing the majority of 
procedures and analysis to be performed in the local 
country.
This situation may be further complicated if the 
investigation also is being prosecuted by the local 
government. In that instance, the police may per-
form raids and remove documents from the compa-
ny’s premises before they can be reviewed. Individ-
uals can be arrested or held for questioning, which 
may limit their ability to consent to the review of 
their documents by the company. Additionally, the 
concept of attorney-client privilege and the attorney 
work product doctrine that are ever-present in U.S. 
investigations and legal proceedings may not apply 
to the same extent, if at all, in the local country.
No Materiality Threshold
The FCPA does not establish a materiality thresh-
old for the value of payments or other objects of 
value that are potentially violative. As a result, a 
$5 payment to a low-level customs official may be 
just as illegal as a $100,000 payment to a minister of 
health. An expense for a $30 dinner with a customer 
may not seem extravagant to an auditor from one 
country but may represent a significant amount to 
a low-level government official in an undeveloped 
country.
Paradigm	B.V.,	a	Dutch	company	headquartered	
in Houston, Texas, provides software to the oil and 
gas exploration and production industry. Among 
other violations of the FCPA, during the sale of 
their software to the Zhonghai Petroleum (China) 
Co.,	Ltd.,	a	subsidiary	of	the	China	National	Off-
shore	 Oil	 Corporation,	 Paradigm	 B.V.	 employed	
an agent to make payments of $100–$200 per offi-
cial. Paradigm B.V. voluntarily disclosed the FCPA 
violations and completed an internal investigation. 
Paradigm B.V. has been fined $1 million and is re-
quired to implement rigorous internal controls, re-
tain outside compliance counsel, and fully cooperate 
with	the	DOJ.43
As a practical matter, this makes identifying po-
tentially corrupt payments difficult during an in-
vestigation. Relationships and patterns of payments 
may be more relevant in investigating an FCPA al-
legation than the value or number of payments. For 
example, are there vendors with the same addresses 
as employees or customers of the company who 
might lead to identification of ways of getting funds 
out	of	the	company	for	illicit	purposes?	Are	certain	
individuals mentioned frequently in expense reports 
of	employees?	Are	certain	employees	responsible	for	
interactions with government officials and do their 
expense reports reflect meetings, travel, entertain-
ment,	gifts,	and	meals	with	or	for	foreign	officials?
Cash and Treasury Functions
When many people think of bribes, they may think 
of a suitcase full of cash. As financial institutions and 
services have matured, this scenario is less frequent, 
though instances remain. This results in investigators 
needing to understand a company’s cash manage-
ment and treasury functions in order to identify how 
money could enter or leave the country.
43	DOJ	Release	No.	07-751	issued	September	24,	2007.
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•  How many bank accounts do the local 
country operations have?
•  How often are the accounts reconciled? 
Who performs the reconciliation?
•  What is the primary means of payment in 
the country and for the company’s opera-
tions (for example, wire transfers, checks, 
or cash)?
•  Is there a petty cash fund at the lo-
cal operation? Who is responsible for 
disbursements from petty cash? What 
documentation is required for petty cash 
disbursements? How often is the petty 
cash fund balanced or refunded?
•  Are cash advances made to employees 
for international travel or other purposes? 
How is repayment tracked?
•  Are cash management or other treasury 
functions performed at a regional or 
corporate basis? If so, how are the local 
accounts funded?
•  Do local country banking regulations 
require flagging of disbursements over 
a particular amount? If so, how many 
payments were made in the past year or 
other period that exceeded that amount?
•  Are varying levels of approval required 
depending on the type of disbursement 
authorized, amount to be disbursed, and 
destination of disbursement (for example, 
Isle of Man, Cyprus, or numbered ac-
count)?
•  Were disbursements paid out of an ac-
count that is not on the bank accounts 
included in the general ledger?
•  Does the company review transactions for 
payments to employees outside of stan-
dard payroll and expense reimbursement? 
Are companies listed as vendors for the 
company?
Background considerations
Travel and Entertainment Expenses
Travel and entertainment expenses are generally 
bona fide business expenses but can easily become 
illegitimate benefits when numerous or lavish ex-
penditures are incurred with or on behalf of gov-
ernment officials. An FCPA investigation should 
generally review employee expense reports or any 
reimbursements to customers or others for expenses 
that they incurred that are ostensibly related to com-
pany business. In many companies and countries, 
receipts may not be required for reimbursement of 
small transactions, which can be a way of indirectly 
obtaining funds from the company that can be used 
for corrupt purposes.
•  Business purpose is, or seem to be, inci-
dental to entertainment purpose
•  Official is strategically located to grant 
business or improper business advan-
tage to the company
•  Expenses are lavish or out of line with 
company guidelines and local customs
•  Spouse or children are invited to meals 
or included in travel
•  Expenses are personally paid to the 
official
•  Official is unwilling or unable to get 
written approval for the trip from the 
employing agency
•  Altered receipts or lack of original 
receipts
•  Numerous expenses incurred relating to 
the same government official
•  Payments of large expenses in cash in 
countries where cash is not the primary 
means of payment for such expenses
Background considerations
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Gifts
Gifts	 are	 another	 form	 of	 value	 that	may	 be	 pro-
vided to officials and may not be as easily tracked 
as payments made directly to the official. In many 
countries, gift giving is an expected part of the busi-
ness culture, though certain countries limit the value 
of gifts that can be given to officials. However, to 
be in compliance with the FCPA, gifts must never 
be given in connection with obtaining or retain-
ing business. They should be modest in amount and 
never be cash.
•  Does the expense policy contain provi-
sions on allowed gifts?
•  How are gifts approved?
•  How are gifts reimbursed?
•  Is adequate support maintained for the 
gift, including the business purpose, 
recipient, and organization or affiliation 
of the recipient?
•  Is there a limit for gifts to customers 
and vendors? Are gifts given to foreign 
officials?
•  Are gifts given for local or traditional 
holidays? How are these gifts tracked 
and recorded?
•  Are cash gifts ever given?
Background considerations
Charitable and Social Contributions
Donations	 can	 be	 considered	 “anything	 of	 value”	
even though the donation is not provided directly 
to a government official. If other elements of an 
FCPA violation are established, it is not a defense 
that the charity is legitimate. As noted in the pro-
ceeding against Schering-Plough Corporation, a 
complete understanding of both the reason for the 
donation and the controlling members of the charity 
is required.
•  Do company policies contain provisions 
on allowed charitable contributions?
•  Are employees allowed to make charitable 
contributions through expense reports?
•  Is appropriate support provided for the 
reimbursement of charitable contribu-
tions, including the recipient and purpose 
of the expense?
•  How are charitable and social contribu-
tions approved?
Background considerations
Substantiation and Valuation 
of Services Provided
Documentation	or	other	 evidence	of	 performance	
of services or other value provided in exchange for 
a payment is very important when attempting to 
prove whether a particular transaction was a bona 
fide business expense, as previously outlined regard-
ing affirmative defenses. Valuation of services also 
can be troublesome.
A common trouble area in these respects is pay-
ments	classified	as	consulting	fees.	Often,	there	is	no	
documentation of what consultation was provided 
and there may be claims that the consultation was 
oral. In other cases, a report may be provided but 
the content may not appear relevant to the com-
pany’s business or to have been used.
The following questions should be asked from a 
valuation perspective:
	 •		Does	the	amount	of	the	consulting	payments	to	
a particular vendor appear proportional to the 
value	received?
	 •		Do	the	payments	appear	to	represent	a	large	
proportion	of	the	government	official’s	income?
	 •		If	the	fees	are	based	on	an	hourly	rate,	is	the	
hourly rate consistent with fair market value for 
similar	services?
	 •		Does	the	number	of	hours	charged	over	a	par-
ticular period of time appear excessive for the 
work performed or when compared to the num-
ber of hours available in a day, considering the 
number of hours the government official should 
be	engaged	in	performing	official	duties?
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Although these circumstances do not necessarily 
indicate that the payments were not bona fide ex-
penses, they may be difficult to defend during the 
course of an investigation. To attempt to prevent 
issues in this area, the company should have formal 
contracts in place for each consultant or consult-
ing entity. The contract should specify the precise 
nature of services to be provided, how the fees 
will be calculated, the time frame over which the 
services will be provided, and the report or other 
work product that must be delivered at the end of 
the consulting engagement. The contract should be 
executed in advance of the commencement of the 
services and have appropriate approval based on the 
types of services to be provided and the potential 
aggregate amount of payments.
Use of Third Parties
Although the most common agents may be sales 
representatives, distributors, or consultants, law 
firms, customs agents, and freight forwarders; ac-
counting firms, tax consultants, and advisors; and 
other professional services firms also may serve as 
agents in certain circumstances. Because actions of 
agents can create vicarious liability for the company, 
as previously described, it is important to perform 
due diligence prior to entering into the relationship 
to identify potential unreported relationships, finan-
cial problems, lawsuits or claims against the entity, 
or	 other	 red	 flags.	Due	 diligence	 procedures	may	
include some or all of the items outlined in box 
4-2.
Box 4-2:  Third-Party Due Diligence Procedure 
Considerations
•		Internal	approval	process	with	elevated	
vetting for high-risk agents and 
consultants
•		Questionnaires	for	basic	information
•		Verification	of	information	provided
•		Review	of	ownership	structure
•		Reference	checks	with	external	entities	
(for	example,	Dun	and	Bradstreet,	banks,	
U.S.	Department	of	Commerce,	U.S.	
State	Department,	U.S.	Treasury	De-
partment restricted parties lists, and U.S. 
embassy check)
•		Search	for	government	affiliations,	
political party affiliations, and any other 
relationships with government officials or 
government-affiliated agencies
•		Press	and	public	information	searches
•		Local	law	check
•		Documenting	benchmarking	of 
compensation
•		Investigation	of	specific	red	flags
•		Interviews	and	awareness	training
•		Review	of	the	entity’s	FCPA	compliance	
program and controls
Red flags, such as the following, should be 
considered during due diligence and monitored 
throughout the relationship with the agent:
•  Country has historical bribery problem 
or current political unrest
•  Excessive commissions awarded or 
requested
•  Government customer recommends or 
requires use of an agent
•  Partner or agent related to foreign 
official
•  Suggestions that money is needed to 
“get the business”
•  Partner or agent refuses to agree not to 
violate FCPA or other antibribery and 
anticorruption laws
•  Requests for false invoices or other 
documents
(continued)
Background considerations
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(continued)
•  Invoice or request for payment that is 
unusual or departs from normal practice
•  Offshore payment requests
•  Agent cannot describe the specific ser-
vices performed
•  Agent does not provide requested 
support for the use of cash payments 
disbursements
Background considerations
A contract with the agent should be executed only 
after the performance of due diligence. The con-
tract should clearly specify work to be performed, 
payment terms, invoice requirements, and so on. It 
also should include FCPA language and certifica-
tion, as well as audit rights for potential improper 
payments.
Payments to Third Parties or 
Different Countries
Payments are not always made directly to foreign 
officials. In order to conceal the payment, they may 
be made to third parties, such as a relative of the of-
ficial or a shell company, which then forwards the 
payment to the foreign official.
In order to identify payments to a particular for-
eign official, it may be helpful to perform a pub-
lic records search related to the official in order to 
identify the names and addresses of family members, 
companies in which the official may have an inter-
est, or other entities of interest. Searches of the ven-
dor files can then be made to identify payments to 
vendors with names or addresses in common with 
those individuals or entities identified through the 
public records search.
It also may be helpful to perform a public records 
search for vendors that appear suspicious. Such a 
search may reveal owners who may be of interest 
or suggest the company is a pass-through entity that 
may serve as a tax haven for an entity in another 
country.
Accounting Requirement 
Violations
As previously discussed, the books and records com-
ponent of the FCPA has received renewed attention 
because more companies are being prosecuted for 
records that fail to record improper transactions, are 
falsified to disguise aspects of improper transactions 
that were otherwise recorded correctly, and correct-
ly set forth the quantitative aspects of the transaction 
but fail to record the qualitative aspects that would 
have revealed their illegality or impropriety.
Transactions that are often improperly recorded 
include the following: 
	 •		Bribes	to	foreign	government	officials
	 •		Payments	to	agents
	 •		Commercial	bribes	or	kickbacks
	 •		Expediting	payments	on	imports	or	exports
	 •		Facilitating	payments
	 •		Gifts
	 •		Excessive	entertainment
The following examples of improperly recorded 
transactions, including payment descriptions for 
some of the cases already mentioned, show the ease 
of recording improper payments as routine transac-
tions, the difficulty in detecting violations through 
the review of transaction descriptions, and the need 
for internal controls:
	 •		In	the	case	of	Kellogg,	Brown,	&	Root,	Inc.,	
funds were funneled through agents and record-
ed as payments for “consulting” or “services” 
agreements.
	 •		A	corporation	controlled	by	Baker	Hughes	
Incorporated had their outside auditor make 
a payment to a foreign official. The outside 
auditor then billed and collected an invoice for 
the amount of the services provided and the 
payment to the foreign official as “professional 
services rendered.”
	 •		A	subsidiary	of	a	corporation	owned	by	Baker	
Hughes Incorporated contracted with an agent 
that was supposed to obtain shipping certificates 
for the company. The agent was provided with 
money, and the transaction was recorded as a 
“shipping permit.”
	 •		During	a	reorganization	of	Baker	Hughes	
Incorporated’s	subsidiaries	in	Brazil,	an	agent	
was	hired	to	obtain	the	approval	of	a	Brazilian	
government entity. The agent was provided 
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with money, and the transaction was recorded 
as “advance payment for expenses related to the 
commercial	registry	board	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.”
	 •		An	employee	of	Faro	Technologies	Inc.	made	
payments to foreign officials that were recorded 
as “referral fees.” A higher-level employee 
directed the accounting department to record the 
transactions as “customer referral fees” instead of 
“referral fees” because the employee said in an e-
mail that he did not want to “’end up in jail’ as a 
result of ‘this bribery.’” Payments were recorded 
under the “selling expenses” category.
	 •		In	return	for	a	contract	to	modify	a	pipeline,	
Willbros	Group,	Inc.,	agreed	to	pay	foreign	
officials and recorded the payments as “consult-
ing expenses,” “platform expenses,” or “prepaid 
expenses.”
The preceding examples of FCPA accounting 
violations highlight situations in which the com-
pany knowingly paid bribes, improperly recorded 
or booked the bribes, and falsified documentation. 
Other	examples	of	FCPA	accounting	violations	in-
clude the following:
	 •		Knowingly	paying	false	invoices	and	keeping	the	
invoices in company’s files
	 •		Knowingly	providing	a	false	description	of	
improper payment on executives’ Travel and 
Entertainment report
	 •		Booking	a	bribe	as	a	facilitating	payment
	 •		Booking	a	freight	forwarder’s	bribe	payment	to	a	
customs official as “freight expense”
	 •		Making	an	improper	payment	from	subsidiary	A	
on behalf of subsidiary B and then recording it 
on the books of subsidiary A
Sarbanes-Oxley Related 
Disclosures
The existence of an investigation or potential liabil-
ity from the investigation may need to be disclosed 
in notes to the financial statements of a publicly 
traded company. This is generally handled by the 
company’s disclosure committee or similar body. 
The disclosure committee also can be a source of 
information for the investigation team. The com-
mittee often gathers information on a periodic ba-
sis to determine whether disclosures are necessary. 
Matters	previously	considered	for	disclosure	but	not	
actually disclosed could be relevant to investigations 
or previously known risks.
Similarly, matters reported through the company’s 
internal certification process also may be useful. Sec-
tions	302	and	906	of	the	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act	require	
that	the	CEO	and	CFO	certify	to	the	SEC	that	they	
are “responsible for establishing and maintaining 
internal controls” and “have designed such internal 
controls to ensure that material information relating 
to the company and its consolidated subsidiaries is 
made known to such officers by others within those 
entities, particularly during the period in which the 
periodic reports are being prepared.”44	Most	compa-
nies have an internal certification process in which 
financial and other individuals throughout the com-
pany are asked to provide a similar certification to 
the	CEO	and	CFO	in	order	to	provide	them	with	
some comfort of the accounting and financial infor-
mation and controls system at the lower levels. The 
certifications generally have a section where indi-
viduals can write in concerns or items noted during 
the year that could help the investigation team iden-
tify potential risks that have previously been identi-
fied or other concerns employees have raised.
In addition to the fine levied against Schering-
Plough Corporation, the company was required to 
retain an independent consultant to “review and 
evaluate Schering-Plough’s internal controls, re-
cord-keeping, and financial reporting policies and 
procedures as they relate to Schering-Plough’s com-
pliance with the FCPA.” This penalty was enforced 
against Schering-Plough Corporation due to the 
finding that it violated the internal control provi-
sions of the FCPA.45
The	SEC	and	DOJ	have	 increased	 enforcement	
against	individuals.	David	M.	Pillor,	former	Senior	
Vice	President	for	Sales	and	Marketing	and	member	
of the board of directors of InVision Technologies, 
Inc., was charged with violations of the FCPA and 
agreed to pay a penalty of $65,000 without admit-
ting or denying the allegations against him. Pillor 
was found to have “aided and abetted InVision’s 
44	15	U.S.C.	§	7241(a)(4).
45	SEC	Administrative	Proceeding	Release	No.	34-49838	issued	June	9,	2004.
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failure to establish adequate internal controls.” The 
company was found to provide “only informal 
training about the FCPA to its employees and for-
eign agents” and “failed to monitor its employees 
and foreign agents to ensure that they did not violate 
the requirements of the FCPA.”46
Voluntary Disclosure
Another related disclosure issue is whether the com-
pany should self-report to the government when 
an FCPA issue is identified. Voluntary disclosure 
should be discussed with legal counsel. The FCPA 
itself does not mandate disclosure, though other 
laws, including foreign laws, may require disclosure, 
and	 self-disclosure	 is	 encouraged	 by	 the	DOJ	 and	
SEC.
From a positive perspective, self-disclosure avoids 
the risk of involuntary disclosure by third parties, 
such as government investigations or whistle-blow-
ers. If the government discovers that the company 
knew about the issue and did not raise it with the 
government, the punishment meted out by the 
government could be more severe. If the company 
identifies the issue, there is a general belief that the 
government may be more lenient in punishing the 
company because it shows the company’s willing-
ness to cooperate and that it has an internal control 
structure that was able to identify the behavior so 
the matter could be investigated and corrective ac-
tion	taken.	Neither	the	DOJ	nor	the	SEC	has	quan-
tified the degree of credit or leniency a company 
may receive if it chooses to self-report. However, 
in	the	case	of	BJ	Services	Company,	the	company	
voluntarily disclosed improper payments discovered 
during a routine audit and received a cease and desist 
order but no fines. The SEC noted that the compa-
ny’s remedial actions and cooperation were reasons 
why	fines	were	not	imposed.	Further,	the	McNulty	
memorandum, “Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business	Organizations,”	includes	“the	corporation’s	
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and 
its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of 
its agents” in its factors to consider when charging 
corporations.47
Voluntary disclosure has potential detriments, 
however. First, the risk of the government open-
ing a formal investigation often results in significant 
costs to the company in resolving the investigation. 
It also may involve pressure to waive rights and priv-
ileges to show cooperation with the government, 
although	the	McNulty	memorandum	places	restric-
tions on the government’s right to request a waiver 
of	privilege.	Under	the	McNulty	memorandum,	the	
government may only request a waiver of privilege 
when there is a “legitimate need for the privileged 
information to fulfill their law enforcement ob-
ligations.” A “legitimate need” depends upon the 
likelihood and degree to which the privileged in-
formation will benefit the government’s investiga-
tion, whether the information may be obtained in a 
timely manner through means other than a waiver, 
the completeness of prior voluntary disclosures, and 
the collateral consequences of a waiver to the com-
pany.48 As noted by Alice Fisher, former Assistant 
Attorney	General,	Criminal	Division,	United	States	
DOJ,	“[A]lthough	nothing	is	off	the	table	when	you	
voluntarily disclose, I can tell you in unequivocal 
terms that you will get a real benefit.”49
If the FCPA issue is identified during preacquisi-
tion due diligence, it could result in a delay of the 
transaction. Also, the hoped-for benefits of reduced 
penalties	do	not	always	materialize.	For	example,	in	
the Vetco International Ltd. and Baker Hughes In-
corporated cases described earlier, both companies 
engaged in a large degree of cooperation yet still re-
ceived record fines, in addition to their expenditures 
on the investigation. For more information on how 
voluntary disclosure fits in with a fraud investiga-
tion see Chapter 11, “Working with Regulators and 
Parallel Investigations.”
Whistle-blowers
Following	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 Sarbanes-Oxley	Act,	
publicly traded companies now have whistle-blower 
46	SEC	Litigation	Release	No.	19803	issued	August	15,	2006.
47	Memo	titled	“Principles	of	Federal	Prosecution	of	Business	Organizations”	by	Paul	J.	McNulty,	Deputy	Attorney	General.
48	Page	9	of	the	McNulty	memorandum.
49		“Prepared	Remarks	of	Alice	S.	Fisher,	Assistant	Attorney	General,	United	States	Department	of	Justice,	at	the	American	Bar	Association	National	
Institute	on	the	Foreign	Corrupt	Practices	Act,	Omni	Shoreham	Hotel,	Washington,	D.C.,	October	16,	2006.”
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hotlines or other means available for individuals to 
anonymously report issues. The audit committee is 
tasked with monitoring and addressing issues raised 
through these means but may delegate day-to-day 
tasks to others. The creation of the whistle-blow-
er hotlines has resulted in an increase of reported 
complaints, though few result in specific allegations 
with enough support to warrant a full-scale inves-
tigation. Nevertheless, logs maintained of whistle-
blower complaints and their resolution can be an 
important source of information to the investigation 
team. They can indicate whether a particular issue 
has been reported before, what steps were taken to 
address the complaint, whether control deficiencies 
were noted, and any corrective or remedial actions 
taken as a result.
From an FCPA perspective in which most related 
actions occur outside the United States, it is im-
portant that the whistle-blower hotline be available 
24/7, rather than during business hours of the Unit-
ed States. If the number is not toll-free (and particu-
larly if it is an international phone call), that may be 
a deterrent to individuals. The number should be 
posted so that all employees are aware of the hotline 
and its confidentiality and that making calls will not 
result in retaliation to the employee if they were 
made in good faith. Finally, the hotline should have 
operators available who can speak with the whistle-
blower in his or her local language, rather than only 
taking complaints in English. It also is helpful if the 
hotline	provides	a	call-in	ID	so	that	messages	can	be	
left for the whistle-blower indicating whether the 
matter has been resolved or whether additional in-
formation would be helpful.
Acquisition 
Considerations
Acquisitions of other entities create potential FCPA 
issues in three areas: acquisition by a foreign of-
ficial of a government-owned entity or an entity 
with government ownership interest, the need for 
government approval of the acquisition, and the 
successor liability for past FCPA violations. Thus, 
FCPA-specific procedures should be part of both 
preacquisition and postacquisition due diligence.
Two recent examples underscore the need for due 
diligence. The Titan Corporation issue, described 
earlier,	resulted	in	the	collapse	of	Lockheed	Martin	
Corporation’s proposed $1.6 billion acquisition of 
Titan Corporation. In the case of Syncor Interna-
tional Corporation, it was discovered during pre-
acquisition due diligence that Syncor International 
Corporation had made more than $600,000 in cor-
rupt payments, which resulted in a hefty civil pen-
alty, a cease and desist order, and the hiring of an 
independent consultant to audit and recommend 
corrective compliance programs for the seller.
Due	diligence	procedures	are	somewhat	similar	to	
the due diligence procedures described earlier for 
the engagement of agents and are outlined in box 
4-3.
Because time is often limited when performing 
preacquisition due diligence procedures, some ad-
ditional follow-up procedures may be required after 
the	acquisition.	The	DOJ	provides	substantial	guid-
ance regarding pre- and postacquisition due dili-
gence procedures when preacquisition procedures 
are limited.50	DOJ	Opinion	Procedure	Release	No.	
08-02 stated that Halliburton Company, a U.S. is-
suer, could complete the acquisition of a foreign 
target with potential FCPA violations without ex-
posing itself to FCPA liability immediately upon the 
close	of	 the	deal.	Per	Opinion	Procedure	Release	
No. 08-02, the deal would be subject to a 180-day 
due diligence period and postclosing plan requiring, 
among other things, immediate disclosure to the 
DOJ	 of	 potential	 FCPA	 violations	 of	which	Hal-
liburton	Company	became	aware.	The	DOJ	stated	
that the fact pattern presented by Halliburton Com-
pany was unique because the country of the target 
company has a bidding process that does not allow 
for proper FCPA due diligence prior to acquisition. 
In countries where such restrictions are not present, 
the	DOJ	 stated	 the	 expectation	 is	 for	 a	 thorough	
preacquisition FCPA due diligence to be completed 
by the acquiring company.
50	DOJ	Opinion	Procedure	Release	No.	08-02	issued	June	13,	2008.
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Box 4-3:  Acquisition Due Diligence Procedure 
Considerations
•		Assess	corruption	levels	of	the	countries	
in which the target entity does business, 
either directly or through agents
•		Investigate	the	identity	of	the	target	en-
tity and key individuals
•		Review	the	target	entity’s	existing	FCPA	
compliance program and controls
•		Test	adequacy	of	the	target	entity’s	books	
and records and internal controls
•		Evaluate	the	target	entity’s	risk	profile	
(for example, use of agents and frequent 
interactions with government officials)
•		Identify	prior	instances	of	FCPA	issues	or	
violations
Internal Control and 
Compliance
Before a problem is found or an investigation 
occurs, companies can review their internal con-
trols and compliance programs to verify that the 
FCPA is being considered by the company, perform 
training for company employees and agents, and 
prevent future problems by strengthening existing 
processes. Internal control provisions to be aware of 
include the following:
	 •		Typical	FCPA	internal	control	issues
	 •		Unauthorized	payments	and	off-books	accounts
	 •		Payments	contrary	to	company	policies
	 •		Payments	without	prior	due	diligence
	 •		Payments	just	under	authority	limits
	 •		Payments	without	adequate	documentation
In addition to a strong internal control environ-
ment, it is critical to create a culture of compliance 
through education of all employees, agents, and 
outside consultants on FCPA and antibribery or an-
ticorruption laws. The lack of corporate compliance 
on FCPA and FCPA training has been sited as rea-
sons for stiffer penalties in recent actions. Box 4-4 
outlines the areas where companies should seek to 
institute internal control policies and procedures.
Box 4-4:  Internal Control Best Practice Compliance 
Areas
•		Train	employees	to	recognize	and	report	
red flags with special training for finance 
professionals, senior executives, market-
ing executives, and others in high-risk 
FCPA positions
•		Create	policies,	procedures,	and	finan-
cial controls around high risk areas (for 
example, dealings with governments and 
government-owned entities; dealings 
with customs; and dealings with licensing 
authorities, tax authorities, and regulators)
•		Perform	due	diligence	and	financial	con-
trols over agents, consultants, and other 
high-risk vendors, including counteract-
ing controls and payment review 
processes
•		Enforce	strict	accounting	and	financial	
controls surrounding cash, petty cash, ex-
pense	authorization,	and	reimbursement
•		Enforce	strict	controls	around	gift	giving,	
travel and entertainment of government 
officials, and charitable contributions, 
including a preapproval process and trans-
parency for transactions
•		Create	a	robust	FCPA	compliance	pro-
gram, including clear company policies, 
communication of polices, training and 
education, investigative functions, disci-
pline,	and	zero	tolerance	for	violations
•		Create	an	extensive	FCPA	auditing	pro-
cess for compliance
•		Create	documentation	of	FCPA	internal	
control processes
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Conclusion
There are myriad ways for companies and their em-
ployees and agents to run afoul of the FCPA. The 
risk of investigations and potential costly deferred 
prosecution agreements may continue to increase 
as companies increase their global reach, additional 
countries adopt their own antibribery and corrup-
tion laws, U.S. enforcement agencies increase their 
focus and resources devoted to FCPA enforcement, 
and cooperation increases among enforcement agen-
cies around the world. As discussed in this chapter, 
although the FCPA has not changed significantly 
since its inception, the penalties and enforcement 
have increased significantly. Understanding the el-
ements of the FCPA and issues specific to indus-
tries and business processes will assist the forensic 
accountant in planning and executing engagements, 
as well as help companies develop effective FCPA 
compliance programs.
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The First 48 Hours of an 
Investigation
5
Introduction
Anticipating the Decisions to Be  
Made After an Allegation Arises
Identifying Allegations
Initial Triage
Safeguarding People and Business 
Operations
	 •		Safety	of	Employees	and	Other	 
People
	 •		Securing	Business	Operations	 
and	Assets
	 •	Managing	Corporate	Crises
Reporting Obligations
Organizing Investigations
	 •	Routine	Investigations
	 •	Major	Investigations
	 	 –		Identifying	the	Investigation	
Sponsor
	 	 –	Considering	Legal	Privileges
	 	 –		Determining	Who	Will	Execute	 
the	Investigation
	 	 –	Scope	of	the	Investigation
	 	 –		Organizing	the	Team	and	
Developing	a	Work	Plan
Lynda Schwartz, Partner/Principal
Securing and Gathering Evidence
	 •		Early	Interviews	of	Employees	and	Other	
People
	 •		Document	Preservation	Orders	and	
Similar	Instructions	to	Employees
	 •	What	to	Preserve	or	Collect
	 •	Custodians	From	Whom	to	Collect
	 •		Securing	Paper-Based	Books,	Records,	
and	Documents
	 •	Securing	Electronic	Evidence
After the First 48 Hours
	 •		When	the	Allegation	Is	Found	to	Be	
Without	Merit
	 •		When	the	First	48	Hours	Are	Just	the	
Beginning
Conclusion
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Introduction
The first 48 hours of an investigation are critical. 
Most forensic and investigation professionals have 
heard of an investigation, one that became pro-
tracted or involved rework, wasted time and re-
sources. Others can tell of investigations that failed 
in their objective of uncovering and assembling the 
full, reliable and objective understanding of the facts 
needed for decision making by business executives, 
directors, external auditors, regulators and investors. 
Still others can point to pitfalls, such as those related 
to engagement structure and evidence handling, that 
increased the investigation-related time and cost 
over and above what might have been necessary in 
the circumstances.
Consider the following scenario:
The Grand Forge Company Company CEO Bill 
Peterson, sits in his office, exhausted. Grand Forge 
Company’s Form 10-K has been delayed and cannot 
be filed until the financial statements are finalized and 
the audit completed. The external auditors keep raising 
questions about what started as a small internal inves-
tigation. When the issues initially arose they seemed to 
be simple problems, but the investigation now seems to 
be much more complicated. In an effort to resolve the 
issues quickly, Bill had directed the company’s internal 
people look into all the issues. As more information be-
came known, it was decided that they needed an inde-
pendent investigation conducted by lawyers and forensic 
specialists. These investigators seemed to cover all the 
same ground again, and more.1 
The root causes of such deficient investigations 
usually can be traced to decisions made in the first 
48 hours after the allegations emerged. In those early 
hours, companies and their executives often face a 
crossroads relating to the nature and extent of their 
responses to allegations of impropriety or similar 
issues.
Poor decision making in these first few hours can 
lead to disastrous consequences. If the level and in-
tensity of the response are not appropriate, a com-
pany can miss important issues, delay or frustrate the 
resolution of problems or waste resources. If steps 
are not taken to appropriately preserve and collect 
the evidence that may be needed, it could be ir-
revocably lost or might be retrievable only at great 
cost. Actions that might tamper with the evidence 
or taint the recollections of witnesses can do great 
harm. If the persons executing the work lack the 
competence and objectivity to investigate proper-
ly, their efforts could waste time and resources and 
even spoil the evidence.
Further, when external auditors and regulators 
perceive a company’s investigation was incomplete, 
inadequate, biased, advocacy-oriented, or poorly 
executed; they may find its conclusions and findings 
to be unreliable for their purposes. This, in turn, can 
affect the nature and extent of the inquiries, testing 
and investigative procedures performed by both au-
ditors and regulators, and the time it takes to com-
plete the audit or resolve any regulatory inquiries. 
Finally, if a company is not perceived to be doing 
the right thing in response to an allegation, investors 
and other stakeholders may lose confidence in the 
company, possibly undermining a potential resolu-
tion of the issue and the company’s own reputation 
and brand.
By contrast, a strong, credible, and competent 
response ensures that adequate, relevant and com-
plete information is assembled to support decision 
making, that legal rights and responsibilities are re-
spected, and that any applicable legal privileges are 
preserved. A competent and independent investiga-
tion also may assist the company by reducing the 
need for external auditors and regulators to conduct 
their own inquiries of certain allegations. Finally, a 
well-organized and coordinated response will allow 
the company to not only address any issues with the 
proper intensity, but also to remain focused on its 
core business activities throughout the process.
1	The	reader	is	invited	to	read	the	detailed	case	study	of	Grand	Forge	Company	found	in	the	Introduction	to	this	book.
Chapter 05.indd   78 8/4/09   1:01:22 PM
Chapter	5:	The	First	48	Hours	of	an	Investigation
79
Box 5-1 further illustrates potential differences 
in outcomes flowing from these decisions, many of 
which are faced in the first 48 hours.
Positive Negative
Critical evidence is secured and made acces-
sible. Less critical evidence is preserved for 
later use, if needed.
Evidence is lost, destroyed, or its integrity or 
authenticity is compromised
Investigation is conducted by objective and 
respected persons whose work will be ac-
ceptable to directors, managers, regulators, 
external auditors, and other stakeholders.
Investigation is compromised by involve-
ment of people who lack credibility or are 
perceived to lack objectivity relative to 
the issues, activities, or persons potentially 
involved.
Investigators have the necessary industry, 
business process, accounting, legal, regulatory 
compliance, technology, operations, lan-
guage, or cultural backgrounds that are rel-
evant to the particular issue. Their expertise 
is shared proactively to allow stakeholders to 
make good decisions.
Participants, investigators, and advisors lack 
sufficient competence in critical areas. In-
vestigators and decision makers stumble into 
preventable pitfalls. The potential downsides 
of certain decisions are not understood until 
after the fact.
Activities are timely, reasonably predictable, 
and understandable, evolving as necessary to 
adapt to changes in facts and circumstances.
Insufficient planning and coordination lead 
to delays, conflicting objectives, or rework. 
Activities seem to be out of control or un-
predictable.
The level of resource commitment is un-
derstood and the overall effort has adequate 
sponsorship by those in authority.
The resources devoted to the process seem 
inappropriately high or low, relative to the 
issues at hand.
Roles and responsibilities are understood by 
all participants. Accountability is taken for 
assigned responsibilities. Decisions are made 
by those with the appropriate authority.
It is unclear who is responsible for various 
activities. Poor authority and accountability 
are reflected by poor decision making, inad-
equate or inappropriate responses, or wasted 
resources.
Factual information gathered in the investi-
gation is handed off to those who need it in 
a timely and appropriate manner.
Poor communication among the various 
users of the investigation outputs leads to 
incomplete understanding of the results of 
the investigation or rework.
(continued)
Box 5-1:  Potential Impacts Associated with Decisions in the First 48 Hours
Chapter 05.indd   79 8/4/09   1:01:22 PM
80
The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud
This chapter is intended to prevent unnecessary 
missteps in investigations, especially in the first 48 
hours. It also focuses on helping business profession-
als and the forensic professionals who advise them 
to anticipate the decisions they will face in the very 
earliest hours of their response to the allegations. Al-
though this chapter is not intended as a substitute for 
competent legal advice, it also will identify some of 
the legal issues that may need to be addressed. These 
suggestions and observations will help companies 
achieve the goal of assembling clear, reliable and 
useful information in a way that uses resources ef-
ficiently and supports a company’s long-term needs 
and objectives.
Anticipating the 
Decisions to Be Made 
After an Allegation 
Arises
The path from the initial identification of an allega-
tion of impropriety to a more complete understand-
ing of the facts and an understanding of the evidence 
related to fraud is, and always will be, dependent 
upon the facts and circumstances. The path is of-
ten unfamiliar to business managers and executives 
and frequently requires course changes. Because of 
financial reporting deadlines and the exigencies of 
business, time pressures usually force people to trav-
el this unfamiliar path at a sprint. Anticipating what 
is coming next is a key to successful navigation in 
the first 48 hours.
Returning to our case study of Grand Forge 
Company, let us set aside the picture of a messy, 
protracted investigation outlined at the beginning 
of this chapter. Instead, let us put ourselves back in 
the very first moments when the allegations have 
just arisen. During this chapter, we will assume that 
Grand Forge Company has recently become aware 
of four separate allegations and issues, including the 
following:
 (1)  The controller of one of Grand Forge Com-
pany’s foreign subsidiaries called corporate 
headquarters. The subsidiary held about 
$2 million in cash balances at local banks. 
When the controller had recently followed 
up on vendor complaints of slow payments, 
the controller learned that the actual cash in 
the bank was almost zero. Upon scrutiny, 
the bank statements in the company’s files 
look as if they may be inauthentic. One of 
the subsidiary’s cash clerks admitted to the 
controller that he had taken the cash. The 
controller also said that the clerk sounded 
suicidal over their discovery.
 (2)  A Grand Forge Company employee made 
a report on the company’s whistle-blower 
hotline, alleging that her supervisor had been 
inflating his expense reporting to receive re-
imbursement in excess of the amounts actu-
ally incurred.
 (3)  Grand Forge Company recently received a 
seemingly routine inquiry from the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) which 
suggests some regulatory inquiry or scrutiny 
of the company’s executives trading in stock 
and stock options.
Positive Negative
The transition from crisis response to more 
routine business activities occurs as rapidly as 
possible.
Attention remains focused on investigation 
activities and side issues for a prolonged time, 
as opposed to being focused on the underly-
ing business.
A company is seen by investors, regulators, 
and other third parties to have done the 
right thing in the circumstances and to have 
responded appropriately.
Unresolved uncertainties or perceived defi-
ciencies in a company’s handling of the issue 
have a negative impact on the company’s 
reputation or brand.
Box 5-1:  Potential Impacts Associated with Decisions in the First 48 Hours (continued)
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 (4)  A significant overseas customer called to 
complain about the quality of a large volume 
of product they were recently shipped. They 
stated that the country manager, Mr. Smith, 
routinely pressured them to take product in 
excess of their needs, especially at the end of 
the quarter. Now they allege that the product 
they received is substandard, unusable, and 
outside their contract specifications. They al-
lege damages to their company related to the 
substandard product.
Because there are such a large number of tasks 
and considerations in the first 48 hours of an in-
vestigation, various decision makers can easily over-
look critical decisions or become overwhelmed. To 
streamline the decision process, it is helpful to think 
of the various decision points as being part of sev-
eral stages in the decision making process. Although 
they are presented in discrete stages in this chapter, 
in practice, the issues may be addressed in a different 
sequence, or they may be intertwined. Using our 
case study as an example, each of these stages can be 
considered:
	 •		Identifying and surfacing the allegations. In our case 
study, we will assume that Grand Forge Compa-
ny’s allegations and issues came to light relatively 
quickly. For a variety of organizational, process-
related and behavioral reasons, this is not always 
the case. We will discuss these reasons and some 
of the strategies to ensure that allegations are 
identified, surfaced and raised to the attention of 
the right person or function in the organization.
	 •		Initial triage. When allegations or issues do 
emerge, they should not go without a response. 
To determine the right response with the right 
resources and the right urgency there must be 
some process to evaluate the matter with what-
ever information may be available. 
	 •		Responding to threats to the business, its employees, or 
other people. Sometimes, the nature of the allega-
tion or issue is such that it raises concerns about 
the safety and security of people, whether they 
are employees, customers, or other third parties, 
or the person who is suspected of wrongdo-
ing. Other times, an immediate need exists to 
stabilize or safeguard some aspect of the business. 
These situations require immediate action.
	 •		Consideration of obligations to report the situation 
to third-parties, such as regulatory authorities or the 
investing public. Sometimes, specific external and 
internal reporting obligations emerge within the 
first 48 hours. Companies should consult with 
counsel about whether reportable events have 
occurred, whether public disclosures are required 
and what types of disclosures are appropriate. In 
some situations, it also may be appropriate to re-
port specific issues to the external auditors or in-
surance carriers. Additionally, after initial triage, 
there should be an assessment about whether all 
the appropriate internal reporting has occurred, 
such as whether reporting obligations under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have been consid-
ered. Finally, depending on the situation, it may 
be appropriate to make some communication 
to employees or to halt any insider trading in 
company stock.
	 •		Organizing an investigation. Once it is clear that 
an investigation is warranted, decisions about the 
structure, scope, and execution of the investiga-
tion are very important. Routine matters are 
typically handled by internal resources in the 
ordinary course of business and benefit from 
strong practices and procedures. By contrast, the 
more significant nonroutine investigations often 
need to be structured to fit the unique facts and 
circumstances that the business faces. Among 
the considerations to be addressed in the first 48 
hours is whether the investigation should be led 
by counsel to preserve any legal privileges that 
may be available. Other critical questions that 
may affect the independence and objectivity of 
the investigation include who will oversee and 
be responsible for the investigation and who 
will conduct the various investigation activities, 
considering the skills and resources that will be 
necessary.
	 •		Securing evidence. Lawyers sometimes counsel 
companies to preserve documents and other 
evidence as soon as there is reason to believe 
they might be relevant to an investigation or 
litigation. In the United States, federal law may 
require the retention of records relevant to a 
likely government investigation. Legal require-
ments aside, any investigation is only as good 
as the evidence. Because records are destroyed 
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or altered in the ordinary course of business, 
evidence can be lost through inaction. Further, 
those under investigation sometimes delete or 
destroy evidence out of the fear of what might 
be found, regardless of whether they themselves 
did anything wrong. Companies and investiga-
tors must preserve and secure evidence as early as 
possible in an investigation or risk losing it. The 
first 48 hours may be the best, and sometimes 
the only, chance to secure evidence.
	 •		Transitioning to conclusion or a longer term project, if 
necessary. After the first flurry of activity, most 
investigation engagements are either found to 
be without merit or are found to need a more 
comprehensive assessment. When a full-fledged 
investigation is warranted, the activities in the 
first 48 hours should have set the stage for a 
well-organized, well-managed, and appropriate 
investigation. By then, the scope of the work 
to be performed and a work plan to accomplish 
that scope should be established. After the first 
48 hours, the success of the investigation will 
rely on both legal and forensic skills and strong 
project management.
In our case study, Grand Forge Company’s ex-
ecutives may attempt to shortcut these stages or rush 
to judgment. In our experience, however, a rigor-
ous and thoughtful approach to the early stages of 
an investigation tends to avoid the missteps that can 
be very costly. Avoiding knee-jerk reactions and 
working carefully though the early-stage issues pays 
off in the end because allegations are identified, ad-
dressed, and triaged quickly, without festering into 
larger problems. If a full investigation is warranted, 
the decisions made in the early stages will help en-
sure that the investigation is reliable: that rework by 
the company or third parties is minimized; and that 
the investigation itself does not become a source of 
additional scrutiny, uncertainty, or litigation.
Using our Grand Forge Company case study as 
an illustration, the following sections of this chap-
ter will dissect each of these stages and discuss the 
various considerations for those facing a potential 
investigation.
Identifying Allegations 
Making decisions in the first 48 hours would be 
simpler if allegations of financial impropriety were 
quickly raised in a timely fashion to the general 
counsel, managers, or other persons in authority. In 
practice, many obstacles can inhibit employees from 
recognizing the importance of a claim or allegation 
and reacting appropriately. Three challenges that 
commonly arise are the following:
 1.  Identifying the allegation or issue and recog-
nizing it as a problem
 2.  Elevating the matter appropriately within the 
organization
 3.  Ensuring that those in authority appropriately 
respond to the issue
Employees and outsiders may not recognize par-
ticular events or situations as problematic issues. In 
some situations, employees lack sufficient under-
standing of the issues to identify which transactions 
or issues are problematic. For example, workers 
who have been routinely operating in an improper 
or illegal manner may not recognize their practice as 
improper, especially if that was the way they were 
trained to perform their duties or if the practice is 
long-standing. In another example, employees of 
a non-U.S. company or subsidiary may be subject 
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, yet be un-
aware of the particular requirements of the law or 
that common local practices are violations of U.S. 
law. Even when employees have received training 
or are aware of rules and requirements, they may 
fail to recognize fact patterns that are indicative of 
potential problems.
The second of these challenges is appropriately 
elevating the issue within the organization. Smaller 
issues that might indicate larger problems are some-
times dismissed as unimportant or immaterial and 
are not shared with those in authority. Sometimes 
issues are raised but not shared with people in the 
organization who can or will respond appropriately. 
Other times, employees may fear retribution on 
their own behalf or on behalf of similarly situated 
business colleagues. For these reasons and others, 
employees may keep questions or concerns to them-
selves. Differences of language, business practices, 
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and communication across cultures and time zones 
can exacerbate these challenges. In our preceding 
case study example, if the customer complaints about 
shipping volumes or product specifications are seen 
by employees as merely operational snafus that, if 
reported, would reflect poorly upon the work team, 
then they might not be surfaced to management. 
Even if they are reported, they might not be shared 
outside the sales and operations groups within the 
affected business unit.
When allegations arise, it is important that the in-
formation is shared with those who have both the 
responsibility and skill to fully address the issues. 
Many businesses operate across a variety of business 
units, functional, and geographic boundaries. An 
initial claim or event can emerge from anywhere in 
the organization. Sometimes, those who first learn 
of such a matter may try to handle it themselves and 
avoid reporting it to others in the organization. It 
is human nature to try to address an issue within 
Is Your Whistle-blower Hotline Working?
Mechanisms for anonymous reporting of suspected wrongdoing, including whistle-blower hotlines, are a critical 
antifraud control for many companies. Such mechanisms are required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
are identified as an element of a comprehensive ethics and compliance program by the U.S. Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations. Further, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners has found that organi-
zations with hotlines significantly decrease their fraud losses. Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, many companies have implemented new hotlines.
Some executives may take comfort if their hotlines produce few or no incidents; however, an unused hotline 
should be a cause for concern. Anecdotal evidence from tests of whistle-blowers suggests that such reporting 
mechanisms can fail in a number of ways. Finding the logjams and implementing best practices can yield the 
best results from such hotlines. Several important considerations to take into account when designing a hotline 
include:
•  Is it known? Surveys or inquiries of employees sometimes uncover that employees are unaware of the 
hotline or cannot recall how to access it. Regular messaging in the local language helps ensure that em-
ployees know about the hotline and helps reinforce the perception that the company wants to know about 
suspected wrongdoing.
•  Does it work as designed? Audit testing has sometimes identified mechanical difficulties with the 
hotlines, such as phone numbers that fail to connect or messages that are not routed appropriately. Peri-
odic testing of the system helps identify and correct such difficulties.
•  Is it localized? Global corporations must find ways to implement hotlines that comply with local legal 
requirements and are usable in the various geographies where business is conducted. In some areas, such 
as Europe, strict guidelines exist regarding anonymous reporting mechanisms and the transfer of electronic 
data. Specific consideration should be given about whether the hotline-related communications should be 
provided in local languages. Companies also must be aware of and sensitive to differences in local cus-
toms, particularly those related to loyalties between managers and subordinates and among countrymen.
•  Are hotline reports properly disseminated? Each hotline should be designed with a specific 
reporting of hotline calls to appropriate persons within the organization. Disseminating to multiple 
people, such as the general counsel and audit committee, can help ensure that reports are not lost or that 
allegations of suspected wrongdoing are not sent to only one individual.
•  Is the hotline process monitored? Successful hotlines are managed with the same rigor as 
any other business process: good design, case management processes, testing, analysis, and managerial 
oversight. A reliable reporting tool helps provide the summary data that can identify issues and potential 
improvements to the anonymous reporting process.
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the work group because that approach may limit 
potential embarrassment or managerial displeasure. 
Further, many organizations encourage employees 
to take responsibility for driving solutions to busi-
ness problems and incentivize them to do so. An 
appropriate response needs to balance these business 
drivers with the need for transparency and over-
sight, especially with potential emerging issues or 
allegations. For these reasons, organizations benefit 
by having clear policies and procedures for elevating 
potentially problematic events and issues to the right 
level within the organization. Such policies and 
procedures should be specific regarding the “what,” 
“who,” and “when” of reporting potential allega-
tions of financial impropriety or other matters that 
may significantly affect the company. 
A third challenge is whether the issue, when raised, 
receives an adequate and appropriate response. Even 
matters that are reported to whistle-blower hotlines 
can sometimes fall through the cracks or be dis-
missed as unworthy of follow-up. For example, in 
the first of the allegations in our Grand Forge Com-
pany case study, the local controller may have been 
aware for weeks that there was some sort of snafu in 
the cash disbursements system but might not have 
recognized there was a risk that the cash had been 
misappropriated.
Generally speaking, matters or allegations that 
would affect the safety of employees, customers, or 
the community: would require action to safeguard 
the company’s brand or assets; or would affect the 
company’s regulatory or civil liability should be 
handled fully, competently, and robustly. Other 
matters that do not necessarily have immediate or 
broad-reaching impacts may require a lesser re-
sponse, based on the facts and circumstances. At 
the other end of the spectrum, overblown, incom-
petent, or excessive responses to allegations or fact 
patterns that are clearly insignificant and pose little 
real risk exposure waste resources and time and may 
actually create problems for the company.
To address this challenge, businesses should de-
sign policies, procedures, and processes that allow 
for supervision and oversight of claims, events, alle-
gations, and the company’s response to increase the 
visibility of the decision making process and ensure 
that it is appropriate. Individual employees, even if 
they are based outside the company’s home office, 
should feel that they are adequately supported by a 
network of resources that can be responsive to im-
portant business matters, no matter where he or she 
is located. Similarly, the organization, and specifi-
cally those with corporate governance responsibil-
ity, should feel that they have adequate oversight 
and control over emerging risks and issues.
Initial Triage
Initial triage is the process of making a rapid assess-
ment of the currently available information and crit-
ical initial decisions on the nature and extent of the 
response. Almost always, initial triage is conducted 
Developing Procedures to 
Report Allegations
One organization has developed a policy it calls 
the 60 Minute Rule. This policy stipulates a 
process for dealing with issues by breaking them 
down into two main decision paths: one for Red 
Alerts and another for Yellow Alerts. Red Alerts 
include events that could potentially involve 
significant injury or harm to any person and also 
legal matters requiring prompt attention, such as 
service of process or nonroutine visits by govern-
ment authorities. The 60 Minute Rule requires 
that a Red Alert be reported by telephone within 
60 minutes of its occurrence live to a member of 
the senior management team. Yellow Alerts are 
defined as matters of high importance that are not 
emergencies. Yellow Alerts must be reported 
by e-mail within 24 hours to various designated 
contact people in the home office and followed up 
to ensure receipt of the e-mail. The organization 
acknowledges that no policy can contemplate or 
effectively communicate every possible scenario, 
so employees are frequently reminded, “When in 
doubt, report it!”
(Reprinted with permission courtesy of Block, 
Janice L., “Rules of Responsibility,” Inside 
Counsel Magazine, August 2008.)
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before all or even most of the facts are known. The 
risks of triage comprise two sides of the same coin: 
the risk of over response to an incident and the risk 
of inadequate response.
The starting point for initial triage is to assem-
ble the facts that are known, trying to separate fact 
from assumption. Although information is almost 
always fragmentary, a bullet-point summary or short 
memorandum may be prepared to articulate what is 
known, such as the following:
	 •		The	nature	of	the	issue	or	allegation	and	how	it	
came to light
	 •		Whether	the	matter	relates	to	a	single	event	or	
transaction or might apply to multiple events, 
transactions, or practices
	 •		Whether	the	situation	is	current	or	relates	to	past	
events
	 •		The	number	or	extent	of	people	that	may	be	
involved or affected
	 •		The	likely	dollar	impact,	if	it	can	be	determined
	 •		The	geographies,	business	units,	or	organiza-
tional groups that may be affected
	 •		Whether	the	issue	is	highly	confidential	or	likely	
to be sensitive
	 •		Whether	there	is	a	previous	history	of	similar	
allegations or issues related to this topic or the 
people who are potentially involved
	 •		The	dates	of	any	upcoming	financial	reporting	
deadlines 
	 •		Whether	there	are	any	potential	regulatory	viola-
tions, either related to financial reporting, data 
privacy, or industry-specific regulation.
The goal of the initial triage is to form a prelimi-
nary assessment about whether the allegations raise 
significant concerns, such as the possibility of the 
following:
	 •		Material	impacts	to	current	or	previously-issued	
financial statements or disclosures
	 •		Indications	of	significant	deficiencies	in	either	
the design or operation of internal controls
	 •		Indications	of	lack	of	personal	integrity	of	any	
of a company’s officers or senior executives or 
managers responsible for financial reporting 
functions
	 •		Material	violations	of	laws,	regulations,	or	con-
tractual requirements
	 •		An	operation-	or	product-related	concern	that	
may affect public or employee safety or have a 
significant impact on the business
The purpose of initial triage is not to reach a final 
conclusion but to form a basis for decisions about 
how the company should respond and the speed and 
intensity of that response.
A common reaction is to rush to a preliminary 
judgment about the merits and importance of a 
particular incident. When that preliminary judg-
ment serves to discount the evidence or question 
“Just a Disgruntled 
Employee”
In our experience, a common initial reaction to a 
whistle-blower allegation is to describe the whis-
tle-blower as “just a disgruntled employee.” The 
implication of this epithet is that the whistle-
blower has an ax to grind, may not be credible, 
or may merely be seeking protection under one 
of several legal protections for whistle-blowers 
without an underlying meritorious claim.
Focus on the motives of the whistle-blower 
should not, however, be the first question during 
triage. That might distract from the more criti-
cal question of whether the allegation itself has 
substance.
In some senses, all whistle-blowers are 
“disgruntled employees.” If the whistle-blower 
believed that a concern could have been resolved 
in the ordinary course by openly reporting that 
concern to a member of management, the whistle-
blower probably would have done so. The very 
reason for whistle-blower hotlines is to encourage 
reporting when employees may not be able to 
resolve such concerns in their normal work chan-
nels. Whistle-blowers tend to use anonymous 
hotlines when other avenues of reporting have 
failed or are perceived as risky to the individual.
In triaging allegations, it may be helpful to 
set aside questions related to the motivations of 
the whistle-blower. These questions can be much 
better assessed later when more information is 
known. Rather, ask whether the allegation is 
specific; whether evidence is available that can 
support or refute the alleged facts; and whether 
the existence and nature of the report requires 
further follow-up, based on its substance.
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the credibility of the allegation at the early stages, 
the risk of inadequate response is high. For example, 
it is all too common to describe a whistle-blower 
call to a hotline as a crank and dismiss the report as 
unworthy of follow-up. Similarly, concerns raised 
by a person seen as a “complainer” or not a “team 
player” are sometimes not given credence. 
Other times, the merits of a particular allegation or 
concern are not addressed because the person did not 
raise the issue in a way that was considered appro-
priate. Although some whistle-blowers make clear, 
unambiguous assertions, others may only vaguely 
identify the problem, may make generalized or non-
specific assertions, or might seem overly-emotional 
or biased. Other times, the issue is raised in a way 
that only obliquely asserts a problem. For example, a 
subordinate could ask a manager to “Take a look at 
these documents and see what you think,” without 
clearly saying, “They look like a problem to me.” 
The focus must be on the substance of the issue or 
allegation, not on the perceived attributes of the 
person raising the issue or the form of the report.
Ideally, initial triage and the related decisions 
should be made by a person who is independent of 
the underlying issues or affected business processes. 
An independent person is more likely to see the 
broader issues more clearly than a person who might 
be personally involved in the activities or might 
have a preconceived opinion regarding the situation 
or the people involved. Similarly, those upon whom 
the administrative or resource burden of an inquiry 
might fall may find it more difficult to call for an in-
vestigation. Having an independent decision maker 
reduces the chance of a poor decision and minimizes 
the ability of others to second-guess that judgment.
Companies and those with responsibility for initial 
triage can prepare for these judgments by develop-
ing company-specific risk criteria to assess incoming 
reports of matters potentially requiring investiga-
tion. Objective criteria help in at least two ways. 
First, developing criteria for the initial triage of alle-
gations allows for input from various people within 
the organization well in advance of an event. It may 
be impossible to gather such input on a timely ba-
sis after a particular allegation arises. Second, having 
such criteria clearly articulated enhances the quality 
of decision making during triage. The fragmentary 
nature of some allegations or the “color” around the 
specific facts may make decision making difficult. 
Having a predetermined set of criteria helps decision 
makers sort through the available information in a 
more objective way. Finally, a set of predeveloped 
criteria greatly enhances the consistency and speed 
of the triage process. Box 5-2 indicates a sample set 
of company-specific playbook attributes to assist in 
driving an appropriate response.
Greater Response Lesser Response
Immediate concerns of safety or security of 
employees, customers, or third parties.
No safety or security threats to persons.
Potential financial impact is quantitatively or 
qualitatively material.
Financial impact is of nominal amount.
Issue may impugn the company reputation 
or brand.
Matter has only internal impact or does not 
create reputational risk.
Potentially criminal conduct or government 
enforcement scrutiny.
Relates to individual employees, private con-
duct, or violation of internal policies.
Indications that internal controls and process 
controls may lack integrity or not function as 
expected.
Issue was properly detected by internal con-
trols and processes.
(continued)
Box 5-2:  Company Playbook Response Attribute Drivers
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In conducting initial triage, it also is important to 
think beyond the specific allegation to its broader 
context and potential implications for other pro-
cesses, people, or transactions. One consideration in 
triage might be What if this allegation is true? Con-
siderations might include the following:
	 •		What	else	could	be	wrong?	
	 •		Are	there	indications	that	other	transactions	or	
situations could have similar issues, either cur-
rently or in the past?
	 •		Would	this	indicate	a	failure	of	controls,	and,	if	
so, what other problems might not have been 
detected?
	 •		Could	there	be	similar	claims	by	others?
	 •		Could	this	be	indicative	of	a	regulatory	compli-
ance issue or governmental inquiry?
	 •		Is	there	reason	to	doubt	the	integrity	or	compe-
tence of employees?
During the initial triage, a company should take 
steps to preserve the confidentiality of the process. 
This will include limiting the number of people 
who are privy to the allegations and the facts that 
are currently known. Although information leaks 
are common, a confidential process can help mini-
mize rumors and even external publicity. Impor-
tantly, taking early steps to limit the dissemination 
of information about the issue helps make sure that 
any follow-up investigation interviews are not com-
promised. Sometimes, while an investigation is be-
ing organized, potential subjects of the investigation 
will destroy or alter evidence, cover their tracks, or 
collaborate on a story. Investigations can be tainted 
unintentionally, when “who knew what and when” 
is confused by leaks during triage or later in the in-
vestigation.
Similarly, a company also must take care to pro-
tect the reputations of accused employees. If the al-
legations are found to be without merit, the em-
ployees should be able to continue in their roles and 
careers without the stigma of having been accused 
of wrongdoing.
Leadership in the initial triage stage involves more 
than the right process and decision making. It also 
is about promoting a response that is thoughtful and 
balanced. Reflexive responses are common but do 
little to advance the interests of the organization. 
Because the information available during initial tri-
age is usually incomplete and things may not turn 
out to be as they initially appear, knee-jerk reactions 
often miss the mark. In our experience, when deci-
sion makers work to separate fact from supposition, 
consult with others, reflect on the steps to be taken, 
and come to a reasoned business judgment, the or-
ganization benefits.
Safeguarding 
People and Business 
Operations
Recall that in our case study, the controller of one 
of Grand Forge Company’s foreign subsidiaries 
called corporate headquarters to report an apparent 
Greater Response Lesser Response
Indications that internal controls and process 
controls may lack integrity or not function as 
expected.
Issue was properly detected by internal con-
trols and processes.
Involves high-level employees, officers, 
directors, or persons with fiduciary duties.
Matter involves only low-level employees or 
persons isolated from the financial reporting 
process.
Involves misstatements to auditors or regula-
tors or inaccurate financial reports.
Misstatements, if any, are internal and 
have no affect on external reporting or 
communication.
Box 5-2:  Company Playbook Response Attribute Drivers (continued)
Chapter 05.indd   87 8/4/09   1:01:24 PM
88
The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud
defalcation of $2 million held in non-U.S. banks. 
Although there will be keen interest in what hap-
pened, how it happened, whether anyone was guilty 
of wrongdoing, and whether any recovery is possi-
ble, the situation calls for urgent action to safeguard 
the business and its people. The controller has indi-
cated that the alleged perpetrator is suicidal, suggest-
ing a possible threat to himself and others. Further, 
the company must consider whether any immediate 
steps can be taken to prevent further loss.
Safety of Employees and 
Other People
When an immediate concern is identified (per the 
policy on identifying allegations) regarding the po-
tential safety or security of employees, customers, or 
third parties, immediate action is imperative.
Examples of workplace violence are well docu-
mented. Such violence may sometimes be spurred 
after an allegation of impropriety is made or a fraud 
is discovered. For example, a suspected individual 
might threaten to hurt him or herself or others. De-
pending on the facts and circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to notify law enforcement, restrict ac-
cess of suspected individuals from business locations 
or workplaces, strengthen workplace security, seek 
specialized assistance, or take other actions to pro-
tect others.
Securing Business 
Operations and Assets 
A suspected person also may take action to dam-
age a business or impede its normal operations. 
Sometimes, these actions are provoked by anger and 
reflect an attempt to retaliate after an accusation. 
Other times, attempts by the suspected person to 
frustrate the investigation will include actions that 
result in broader collateral damage. For example, at-
tempts to delete or destroy documents relevant to an 
investigation are relatively common. Other times, a 
suspected person may attempt to modify computer 
programs or systems, damage or destroy operating 
assets, or otherwise impede business activities, either 
to make the investigation more difficult or retaliate 
against the organization.
Depending on the facts and circumstances, it may 
be appropriate to restrict certain employees’ access 
to the workplace, electronic systems, business loca-
tions, resources, and assets. Determining the nature 
of the restrictions and on whom they should be im-
posed is a matter of considerable judgment. On the 
one hand, it may be reasonable to restrict the access 
of any suspected person or other person who might 
be relevant to an investigation. On the other hand, 
businesses usually need their business operations to 
continue without disruption. The nature of the re-
strictions may vary, but it is reasonable to consider all 
types of access to operations and financial and other 
assets, including both physical and electronic access. 
In considering access, do not overlook remote access 
to the company’s computer systems. Remote access 
technologies may be especially prevalent if the com-
pany uses technology to support its employees who 
work from home or travel extensively.
It also may be necessary to transition or limit an 
employee’s job authority or responsibilities pending 
an investigation. For example, treasury employees 
under investigation might have their wire transfer 
authority suspended while the investigation is un-
derway. Similarly, an employee might be placed on 
temporary administrative leave until the facts and 
circumstances surrounding an allegation are better 
understood.
Managing Corporate Crises
Some allegations can be readily identified as cor-
porate crises, such as product liability that threat-
ens the public safety, a significant allegation against 
the company or its senior officers, an issue that may 
cause immediate public outcry, or notice that a gov-
ernment authority is launching an investigation of 
corporate conduct.
Companies facing a corporate crisis will need 
to respond almost immediately. To be effective, 
the company, its executives, and board need to 
be prepared with a plan of action. Crisis manage-
ment preparedness helps ensure that key players are 
coordinated and understand their roles. Company 
executives and board members should have a mul-
tidisciplinary team of advisors available to provide 
the necessary legal, regulatory, public relations, and 
financial skills that may be needed. Although many 
of the tools and approaches described in this chapter 
help to support the management of the crisis, spe-
cific planning for crisis-level events is important. For 
additional information about assembling a multidis-
ciplinary team, see chapter 6, “Roles and Respon-
sibilities: How Different Stakeholders Work During 
Investigations.”
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Special considerations are necessary in the event 
that the company learns that a government regula-
tor or police authority is executing a search warrant, 
including whether to consent to a search, how to 
advise employees, and how to approach the myri-
ad of issues associated with searches and seizures of 
company documents. Legal counsel with specific 
experience should be consulted immediately to assist 
with an appropriate response that will help stabilize 
and secure business operations and determine an ap-
propriate course of action.2
Reporting Obligations 
Suppose that initial triage has been completed and 
the issues that have been identified are potentially 
significant. Even after safety and security issues are 
addressed, there may be other reasons why inter-
nal or external reporting of the issue might be war-
ranted. The company’s evaluation of its obligations 
should begin early on and sometimes will continue 
throughout the investigation process. Specific re-
quirements will greatly depend on the facts and cir-
cumstances, but companies should seek advice and 
counsel about the considerations found in box 5-3
2		Finnegan,	Sheila,	“The	First	72	Hours	of	a	Government	Investigation:	A	Guide	to	Identifying	Issues	and	Avoiding	Mistakes,”	Briefly...Perspectives on 
legislation, regulation and litigation	11,	no.	2	(February	2007).
•		Disclosures to the board of directors. If there are any serious allegations related to a senior executive or 
any matters of corporate significance, it may be appropriate to schedule a meeting of the board or 
the relevant committee to advise the board members of the issue.
•		Regulatory reporting obligations. Certain regulations require reporting almost immediately. For 
example, disclosures are required regarding a company’s inappropriate public release of customer 
credit card data. In another example, certain events or situations might warrant a Form 8-K 
disclosure. After the first 48 hours, there may be other regulatory reporting obligations, such as 
compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
•		Suspension of insider trading of the company’s stock. The company should consider whether it is 
necessary to take action to prevent trading by persons who may be in possession of nonpublic 
information.
•		Consideration of impacts on public financial reports and filings. Although the information may not be 
fully known, the company should consider (1) the impact of any known facts and information 
on the accuracy of any imminent public financial statements or regulatory filings and (2) whether 
there is reason to believe that prior public financial statements or regulatory filings should either 
be amended or should not be relied upon. If the company has a disclosure committee, its mem-
bers should be advised of relevant issues and allegations.
•		Reports to external auditors. Companies generally must disclose any allegations of financial im-
propriety to their external auditors. If the allegations involve a possible accounting impropriety, 
matters relating to internal controls, or the integrity of persons with whom the external auditors 
interact, the auditors will need to understand and evaluate both the allegations and the company’s 
response as part of their audit planning and to determine the impact on the nature and extent of 
their audit procedures. They also will consider whether the information suggests that any prior 
opinion should be withdrawn.
•		Reports to insurance carriers. Applicable insurance policies may require notice of claims or circum-
stances that are likely to result in a claim
Box 5-3:  Fraud Reporting Considerations
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Whether a company has a legal duty to make a 
public disclosure regarding the investigation or un-
derlying issues and the nature and extent of such 
disclosure is a judgment to be made with advice and 
legal counsel, depending on the facts and circum-
stances. Generally speaking, to the extent possible, it 
is often desirable to keep the investigation confiden-
tial and limit the number of people who are privy to 
investigation information.
Many companies respond proactively when faced 
with a significant allegation. For example, they may 
disclose the allegation to enforcement authorities, 
together with their planned investigative response 
and, later, the factual findings because self-disclosure 
and self-policing may reduce the exposure to regu-
latory and legal liability.
Similarly, when allegations are public or widely 
known, there may be reasons that favor some type 
of proactive communication to individual employ-
ees, groups of employees, or the public. Companies 
may be able to communicate about the current situ-
ation, the actions the company is taking, and the 
size of the previously reported transactions at issue, 
even if they cannot quantify the outcome of the in-
vestigation itself. However, public statements early 
in an investigation can be dangerous, especially if 
the company yields to the temptation to downplay 
the issue or overstate the known facts. These types 
of disclosures are almost certainly problematic, espe-
cially if a later investigation exposes them as incom-
plete, inaccurate, or misleading.
Organizing 
Investigations
Routine Investigations
At any given time, companies may have an ongoing 
number of individually minor investigation matters 
ongoing. Often these are handled internally. Some 
are handled by internal counsel, internal audit, com-
pliance officers, or internal security departments.
Consider, for example, the second allegation in 
our Grand Forge Company case study. In this ex-
ample, a report from the whistle-blower hotline 
was from a Grand Forge Company employee who 
alleged that her supervisor had been misstating his 
expense reporting to receive reimbursements in ex-
cess of the amounts actually incurred. For the pur-
poses of the case study, let us further assume that 
the supervisor in question did not have a financial 
reporting role. If initial triage found no other rea-
son to suspect a broader issue, this might reasonably 
be handled as a routine internal investigation. Other 
examples of routine investigations might include the 
following:
	 •		Nonexecutive	employment-related	matters
	 •		Vendor	fraud	that	is	not	likely	to	be	material	to	
the financial statements
	 •		Allegations	of	embezzlement	of	amounts	that	are	
clearly immaterial to the financial reports by per-
sons who are neither executives nor in a financial 
reporting role
	 •		Matters	identified	through	the	operation	of	
internal controls (as opposed to those suggesting 
control deficiencies)
	 •		Violations	of	internal	policies	that	are	not	indica-
tive of illegal conduct
	 •		Allegations	without	indication	of	a	material	vio-
lation of contract
	 •		Allegations	that	are	unrelated	to	matters	of	inter-
est to regulators or outsiders
	 •		Human	resources-related	reports,	such	as	
concerns over drug use, harassment, breaches 
of policies or procedures, and unfair or unsafe 
working conditions
Clear and appropriate policies and procedures 
should be established to ensure that each allegation 
receives an appropriate response and that whistle-
blower allegations are tracked and monitored. Both 
human resources and legal counsel should be in-
volved in the design and oversight of internal inves-
tigation processes to ensure that internal investiga-
tions respect the rights of individuals, comply with 
any legal requirements in the jurisdiction, and help 
to identify issues that may require a more signifi-
cant response. For further information on response 
planning Chapter 14, “Antifraud Programs,” also 
touches on the subject.
Indeed, with respect to accounting and auditing 
matters, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires 
the audit committee of the board of directors to 
“establish procedures for the receipt, retention and 
treatment of complaints received by the Company 
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regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, 
or auditing matters; and confidential, anonymous 
submissions by employees of the Company of con-
cerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing 
matters.” Such policies and procedures may be more 
broadly implemented to cover other types of ethical 
or business-related allegations.
It is clear that not every allegation will require the 
highest levels of attention and resources. Nonethe-
less, those who are overseeing the routine investiga-
tions of a company would do well to at least raise 
and evaluate the same considerations as with the ma-
jor investigations, tailoring their responses and their 
investigation to the specific facts and circumstances.
Major Investigations
No clear boundary exists between a routine and ma-
jor investigation. Nonetheless, when the underlying 
allegations may have a significant effect on the com-
pany or a material effect on its financial reporting or 
when the allegations implicate a senior executive, it 
becomes more critical to explicitly address some of 
the major considerations in organizing an investiga-
tion, including the following:
	 •		Who	will	sponsor	the	investigation	and	take	
responsibility for it?
	 •		Will	the	investigation	be	conducted	under	the	
auspices of attorneys to reduce the likelihood 
that the investigation work product will be  
disclosed to third parties?
	 •		Who	will	conduct	the	investigation?
	 •		What	will	be	the	scope	of	the	investigation?
	 •		What	will	be	the	initial	work	plan?
Chapter 1, “Basics of Investigations,” goes into 
greater detail about the framework that covers these 
considerations.
Identifying the Investigation 
Sponsor
The investigation sponsor is the person or persons 
who will take responsibility for the investigation. 
Although many people may provide recommenda-
tions, counsel, and advice, the investigation sponsor 
takes the oversight and decision making role, with 
respect to the investigation. Although the role of 
investigation sponsors may vary from situation to 
situation, their responsibilities generally include the 
following:
 •		Making	or	concurring	with	the	decision	that	an	
investigation is warranted
	 •		Determining	the	scope	of	the	investigation
	 •		Deciding	who	will	conduct	the	investigation
	 •		Retaining	outside	professionals,	including	legal	
counsel and forensic specialists, as needed 
	 •		Monitoring	the	status	of	the	investigation
	 •		Considering	the	factual	findings	of	the	 
investigation
	 •		Recommending	or	deciding	upon	remedial	 
actions
	 •		Taking	responsibility	for	conducting	the	 
investigation and for its adequacy
The credibility, objectivity and reliability of the 
investigation are important for sound decision mak-
ing and may be important to external auditors, 
governmental authorities, and others. Therefore, 
it is important to consider the independence and 
objectivity of the investigation sponsor. Sponsors 
should be independent of the activities, transactions, 
and people who could potentially be subjects of the 
investigation. Of course, it is difficult at the outset 
to determine who may potentially become subjects 
of an investigation. When making decisions regard-
ing the structure of an investigation, it is wise to 
consider a wider circle of potential subjects at the 
outset and narrow that circle after more information 
is known. In short, the board and audit commit-
tee have responsibility but several other parties may 
have a role in making decisions (see also chapter 6, 
“Roles and Responsibilities: How Different Stake-
holders Work During Investigations”).
Investigation structures that include sponsorship 
by audit committees or special committees of the 
board are routinely employed for significant finan-
cial investigations that might result in a material or 
significant finding related to financial reporting or 
internal control matters. Similarly, they also are used 
for investigations that involve senior executives be-
cause of the perception that it will be difficult for 
any subordinate to be objective regarding those who 
have influence over his or her career.
Using the third of the allegations in our case study 
as an example, Grand Forge Company recently re-
ceived a seemingly routine inquiry from the SEC 
suggesting scrutiny of the company’s executives’ 
trading in stock and stock options. Assuming an 
investigation was warranted, it might not be 
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appropriate to have a member of Grand Forge 
Company’s executive team sponsor an investigation 
of the stock trading of fellow executives. In that in-
stance, it might be appropriate for the audit com-
mittee or special committee of the board of direc-
tors to take responsibility for the investigation. In 
such a case, the board committee would typically 
engage outside professionals to manage the investi-
gation, subject to its oversight and direction. In such 
a case, the Board committee would typically engage 
outside professionals to manage the investigation, 
subject to its oversight and direction. By contrast, in 
more routine investigations, if Grand Forge Com-
pany were to investigate non-executive employee 
expense reporting, a member of management, such 
as the general counsel or internal audit leader, might 
sponsor the investigation.
Ideally, the investigation sponsor will be posi-
tioned with sufficient authority to make all necessary 
decisions. This is especially true of decisions regard-
ing the retention of professionals, the scope of work, 
and the initial work plan. During the first 48 hours, 
there will be little time for debate regarding these 
decisions. Furthermore, sponsors need to have the 
organizational clout to commit necessary resources 
and ensure that critical decisions are implemented.
Considering Legal Privileges
Almost every company undertaking an investiga-
tion hopes for a quick resolution without litigation 
or regulatory scrutiny. In many instances, however, 
the investigation uncovers facts or situations that 
prompt some sort of civil or criminal investigation 
by a government or regulatory authority or some 
sort of legal action by shareholders and outsiders. 
These legal issues sometimes relate directly to the 
initial predicate for the investigation. Other times, 
a business practice or individual employee conduct 
that is tangential or unrelated to the initial allega-
tion is uncovered during the course of the investi-
gation, some of which may expose a potential legal 
liability.
A company’s ability to favorably resolve such legal 
matters may depend on it being able to resist disclos-
ing its investigation work product to third parties. 
In the United States, communications and work 
products that are legally privileged may generally 
be shielded from disclosure to third parties. There 
following two well-recognized privileges are com-
monly asserted:
	 •		The	attorney-client-privilege protects certain private 
communications between attorneys and their 
clients when given in the context of actual or 
threatened litigation. By contrast, in the United 
States, except for certain tax questions, no 
corresponding accountant-client privilege can 
be reliably asserted to restrict the discovery or 
disclosure of a forensic accountant’s investigative 
work product.
	 •		The attorney work product doctrine protects an at-
torney’s internal documentation of the work 
or analyses created in support of the attorney’s 
representation of the client. If accountants or 
other specialists work at the attorney’s direction 
to assist the attorney in providing legal advice, 
their work may be similarly privileged.3
It is important to consider legal privileges at the 
very outset of an investigation, simply because they 
arise due to the structure and objective of the in-
vestigation engagement. If the engagement is struc-
tured in the context of an attorney’s legal counsel, 
privileges may be available. If the attorney’s role is 
an empty formality or if the attorney is not consult-
ed until the end of the investigation, the investiga-
tion work and all communications may potentially 
be discoverable by third parties. Actions taken to 
properly structure the investigation and keep certain 
information confidential will help ensure that any 
legal privileges are available, and a company’s ability 
to resist discovery of an investigation’s work prod-
uct is not compromised.
When there is a major investigation in the United 
States, because of the existence of these legal privi-
leges, an attorney is usually retained by the inves-
tigation sponsor as the lead investigator. Then, the 
3		The	question	of	whether	and	to	what	degree	various	legal	privileges	attach	to	specific	engagements,	documents,	or	communications	is,	in	itself,	a	legal	
judgment	that	is	dependent	on	the	facts	and	circumstances.
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attorney may retain other forensic specialists, such 
as legal technology professionals or forensic accoun-
tants. With this structure, the investigation sponsor 
may shield the work products of the investigation 
and can choose whether to disclose them. The in-
vestigation sponsor and investigation team generally 
cannot be compelled to disclose privileged work 
products.
Even when an attorney is retained as the lead in-
vestigator, the actual work of the investigation can 
be apportioned among the company, attorneys, ac-
countants, and other specialists in any way that is 
appropriate, as long as the attorney directs the work 
and the work is conducted in the context of assisting 
the attorney in rendering legal advice. Chapter 10, 
“Working with Attorneys: The Relationship With 
Counsel,” explores the relationship between coun-
sel and other members of an investigation in greater 
depth.
Determining Who Will Execute the 
Investigation
Identifying the people who will conduct the inves-
tigation is an important decision because the judg-
ment and counsel of the investigators will influence 
the course of the investigation. Their skill will di-
rectly impact the quality and speed of execution. 
Finally, their experience will help the company 
avoid pitfalls and missteps. Chapter 6, “Roles and 
Responsibilities: How Different Stakeholders Work 
During Investigations,” covers all of the interactions 
among stakeholders, but this section focuses on the 
investigation sponsor.
Usually, the investigation sponsor makes the de-
cisions regarding which attorneys and accountants 
will work on an investigation and whether inter-
nal resources will be devoted to the investigation. 
Although the selection and retention of attorneys, 
accountants, and specialists can be revisited, mid-
course changes are rare due to the costs associated 
with bringing a new team up to speed. In any event, 
any professionals who become involved at later dates 
will be affected by the decisions made by the inves-
tigators working in the first 48 hours.
There are a variety of considerations that may be 
relevant in selecting an investigation team, and some 
of the most important are outlined in box 5-4.
In addition to these skills, the company also 
may need to consult with other advisors, some of 
whom may be needed after the first 48 hours. These 
might include counsel with particular regulatory 
expertise, litigation counsel, settlement counsel, 
4		Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	Release	No.	44969,	Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Commission Statement of the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions,	 issued	October	23,	2001,	and	available	at	www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
•		Independence and objectivity. Just as the investigation sponsor should be independent and objective 
regarding the matter being investigated, so should the investigators. Regulators, external auditors, 
and other stakeholders generally find independent investigation by external specialists to be more 
credible than those performed by internal persons because of perceptions regarding independence 
and objectivity. They also may consider the reputation of the law and professional services firms, 
attorneys, and other professionals involved. For example, the SEC has stated that its enforcement 
considerations include factors such as whether the investigation was sponsored by company em-
ployees or outside directors, whether employees or outsiders conducted the review, or whether 
any outside counsel or professionals had previously worked for the company.4 External auditors 
also will consider independence and objectivity in evaluating the reliability of the investiga-
tion work for their purposes, sometimes conducting more testing when necessary to address any 
unresolved risks or conducting more limited testing if a reliable, objective investigation has been 
conducted. By contrast, a biased, advocacy-oriented investigation may be worse than useless 
because it may undermine the company’s credibility and impede the company’s ability to resolve 
any outstanding matters.
(continued)
Box 5-4:  Selecting an Investigation Team
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•		Understanding of the legal requirements in relevant jurisdictions. Sponsors and investigators should be 
advised by legal counsel who have appropriate expertise about each of the localities and jurisdic-
tions that are relevant to the investigation. Ideally, any accountants and specialists also will have 
a working familiarity with those legal requirements. The entire investigative team needs to work 
within the legal requirements for conducting an investigation, must be respectful of the rights of 
those with whom they will interface, and must anticipate the ways the investigation outputs may 
be used.
•	 Competence. Investigators may need a variety of industry, business process, accounting, legal, 
regulatory compliance, technology, and operations expertise. Because it is rare that one indi-
vidual professional possesses all the relevant skills and experience, the overall competence of 
the team and the team leaders is the most appropriate measure. Further, it takes more than an 
understanding of underlying issues to properly conduct an investigation. The investigators also 
need an understanding of the investigation process itself. They should understand the commonly 
performed and generally accepted procedures for gathering and analyzing investigative evidence 
and the strengths and weaknesses to various approaches for addressing the company’s investigation 
needs. They should be able to anticipate preventable pitfalls and be willing and able to provide 
sound advice and counsel to other stakeholders of the potential upside and downside of decisions 
that will need to be made throughout the process. Competent investigators help prevent surprises 
during the work and help ensure that it will be usable for all the different stakeholders who might 
have need of the investigation outputs. In short, this is no time to educate a professional who has 
never previously participated in an investigation.
•		Electronic evidence expertise. Few investigations do not need to consider whether and to what extent 
electronic evidence should be preserved, collected, and analyzed. Therefore, someone on the 
engagement needs this expertise. Because they are involved in security and collecting evidence 
at the very start of engagements, forensic technology specialists are frequently among the first 
professionals retained. Forensic technology specialists may or may not be employed by the same 
company or professional firm as other members of the investigative team. In any event, they 
should be capable and willing to work cooperatively with others on the investigative team.
•		Subject matter expertise. Although some investigations address general or commonly understood 
issues, specialized knowledge may be helpful or even essential to the investigation. For example, 
the matter under investigation may be affected by industry practice; the unique aspects of a par-
ticular company’s business process; or some technical or specialized accounting, tax, or regulatory 
compliance issue. Deep expertise can always be added to the team after the early hours, but it is 
often helpful to have subject matter experts who can help recognize unusual or suspicious fact 
patterns quickly.
•		Language and geographic reach. Geographic reach affects both the quality and speed of an investiga-
tion. Even smaller businesses have global business transactions, and some investigations involve 
interviews of people in areas around the world. Other investigations will need to consider docu-
ments and evidence in languages other than English. Although there are many appropriate ways 
to gather and analyze information from around the world, investigators with deep familiarity with 
local languages, local business customs, and culture are a great asset. For example, interviews in 
the local language can convey rich detail and nuance, whereas interviews conducted through a 
translator may be stilted and slow. Similarly, investigators who are aware of the local laws or busi-
ness practices can ensure that the investigation complies with such requirements. Finally, work-
ing with an investigative firm or team that has adequate geographic reach can be a significant 
timesaver. If skilled resources are readily available where they are needed, the time associated with 
travel and logistics in the early hours of an investigation can be significantly reduced.
Box 5-4:  Selecting an Investigation Team (continued)
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advisors regarding business process improvement 
and internal controls design and implementation, 
tax advisors, and media and public relations special-
ists. Consultation with these experts in these areas is 
a consideration, but may or may not be necessary in 
light of the facts and circumstances.
Scope of the Investigation
The investigation sponsor should articulate the scope 
of the investigation, often with the advice of counsel 
and investigative specialists. Articulating a specific 
scope will focus the work of the investigators and 
avoid unnecessary and costly distractions. Ideally, 
the scope of the investigation should be sufficiently 
broad to answer the likely questions of the various 
stakeholders For example, if there is an allegation 
of a particular type of potentially fraudulent trans-
action, the scope of the investigation might focus 
on the specific transaction in the allegation but also 
might include the question of whether there were 
any other potential frauds of this type in a relevant 
time frame. Generally, it is preferable that the scope 
be slightly broader than the known allegations to 
provide confidence that the investigation has caught 
all the related issues. Although the scope should be 
broad enough to ensure that the investigation is ad-
equate, it also must be sufficiently narrow to permit 
the work to be targeted and timely.
Both the sponsor and team should have a clear 
understanding of the scope of the investigation at 
the outset. Therefore, decisions regarding the scope 
of the investigation are important and should be ad-
dressed in the first 48 hours, even if they are revis-
ited later. As the team and sponsor learn more, the 
scope of the investigation may need to be revised. 
For example, the investigation could be cut short if 
issues are put to bed based on the evidence. Alterna-
tively, it is common that the scope of the investiga-
tion is expanded if the facts lead to new questions 
or concerns.
Although they frequently receive advice and 
counsel, investigative sponsors have the overall re-
sponsibility for setting the scope of the investigation 
and ensuring that the scope is adequate. Because the 
scope guides the team in determining the nature and 
extent of procedures, third parties who may wish to 
consider or rely on the investigation outputs often 
ask for a clear articulation of the investigation scope. 
The SEC, for example, considers the breadth and 
adequacy of an internal investigation’s scope among 
its enforcement considerations. Similarly, the exter-
nal auditors may ask the investigation sponsor to af-
firm responsibility for the investigation scope and its 
adequacy and explain any rationale behind decisions 
about the scope.
Organizing the Team and 
Developing a Work Plan
Time spent addressing the details of team organi-
zation and logistics usually pays off handsomely by 
speeding the execution of the work and ensuring 
that all team members understand their roles, re-
sponsibilities, and expectations. Examples of such 
steps include the following:
	 •		Identifying	the	team	members	and	developing	
contact lists.
	 •		Identifying	the	key	decision	makers	within	the	
team.
	 •		Ensuring	that	all	team	members	understand	the	
investigation scope, any other project objectives, 
and on whose behalf the investigation is being 
conducted.
	 •		Clarifying	whether	there	is	an	intent	to	conduct	
the investigation within any available legal privi-
leges and providing guidance to nonattorneys 
regarding work processes, work paper labeling, 
and communication protocols to avoid inadver-
tent waivers of legal privileges or disclosure of 
confidential information.
	 •		Identifying	any	relevant	laws,	investigative	prac-
tices, or regulatory requirements that may affect 
the conduct of the investigation. For example, in 
the United States, it may be appropriate to pro-
vide so-called Upjohn warnings to people being 
interviewed to ensure that there is no confusion 
regarding whether legal counsel is representing 
those people.
In the same way that the scope of an investigation 
may change as more information is learned, work 
plans tend to evolve during the execution of an in-
vestigation. Although few plans survive contact with 
the evidence, they remain essential to coordinating 
the effort of the team.
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Ideally, a preliminary work plan will set the over-
arching objective and divide the tasks into manage-
able work streams. Engagement planning also re-
quires consideration of any matters on the critical 
path. For example, it may make sense to have brief 
information-gathering interviews to identify the 
sources of evidence and the people most likely to 
have knowledge of the matters at issue. Similarly, it 
may make sense to postpone any analysis of eviden-
tial matter until documents are secured and collec-
tion is underway.
In a major investigation, it is generally desirable to 
have an opportunity to review e-mails, paper-based 
documents, and other evidence prior to conducting 
critical interviews. Rarely is there time to do so in 
the first 48 hours. A preliminary work plan allows 
for planning of the order and objectives of any inter-
views and for beginning the process of considering 
any evidence that should be analyzed prior to the 
interviews.
Project planning, at least in a tentative way, should 
consider the nature of the desired output of the in-
vestigation. For example, the team should ascertain 
whether the investigation sponsor desires a written 
or oral report or specific analyses. In some instances, 
decisions about outputs will be influenced by exter-
nal auditors and regulators. Nonetheless, even a pre-
liminary understanding of the expected outputs can 
help investigators begin to orient their procedures 
toward the desired result.
Because of their oversight role, investigative 
sponsors should approve the preliminary work plan. 
Often, if external auditors and regulators are aware 
of the investigation, they may be willing and able to 
provide input to the work plan. These stakeholders 
will usually not assume the responsibility for the ad-
equacy of the work plan, and their inputs are some-
times characterized as suggestions. Nonetheless, ear-
ly input regarding the work plan can help increase 
the likelihood that the external auditors, regulators, 
and other third parties will look favorably on the 
investigation. This, in turn, may mitigate or reduce 
the likelihood of duplicative audit procedures or in-
vestigation proceedings.
Securing and Gathering 
Evidence
Securing and gathering evidence are among the 
most important tasks in the first 48 hours of an in-
vestigation. Arguably, many other tasks could be 
accomplished or revisited later. By contrast, some 
evidence may be lost or destroyed, if not preserved 
immediately.
Once an allegation is made, there may be little 
time to lose. If a person who has committed wrong-
doing is aware that information is coming to light 
or that the possibility of an investigation looms, that 
person may be powerfully motivated to alter or de-
stroy evidence or make it much more difficult to 
find. Further, if proactive steps are not taken, even 
normal business processes may result in the destruc-
tion of evidence.
Although the process of securing and gathering 
evidence typically swings into full gear when the 
investigation team is assembled, companies can and 
should begin securing and gathering evidence as 
soon as it is clear it will be needed.
The goal in the first 48 hours should be to main-
tain the integrity and completeness of any available 
records, in order to ensure that a complete inves-
tigation can be conducted sometime in the future. 
In addition, companies should consider and address 
any legal or regulatory requirements to preserve or 
gather evidence.
Often, there is a rush to investigate and analyze 
the evidence immediately. In most cases, however, 
it makes sense to secure relevant records first and 
begin the analysis either in a parallel process or after 
the tasks related to securing the evidence are com-
plete. For more information regarding collecting 
and analyzing evidence, see chapters 7 (“Sources of 
Evidence”) and 8 (“Electronic Evidence”).
Early Interviews of 
Employees and Other People
Understandably, obtaining information from knowl-
edgeable people is often among the first steps in an 
investigation. Many good reasons exist to make in-
vestigation inquiries in the first 48 hours, including 
the following:
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	 •		Inquiries of the whistle-blower or first person with 
knowledge of the issue. Often, these inquiries are 
made in the context of initial triage, and have 
the purpose of developing an understanding of 
the nature and details of the allegation. 
	 •	 Inquiries to gather evidence. If the issues are discrete 
and straightforward, inquiries of other knowl-
edgeable people can sometimes uncover infor-
mation directly and efficiently. Even when the 
issues are complex and unlikely to be resolved 
in the first 48 hours, initial inquiries can help 
determine whether the initial allegation has merit 
and can help direct the investigation’s next steps.
	 •		Interviews to establish a working knowledge of relevant 
business processes, sources of information, and likely 
custodians. Many of the interviews in the early 
stages of the investigation lay the foundation for 
evidence gathering and provide the context for 
additional, more comprehensive investigation 
inquiries. Investigators typically must develop a 
baseline understanding of the normal business 
process that will be investigated; how it may 
have evolved over time; the role of individual 
people within that process; which people are 
likely to have relevant paper or electronic 
evidence; and the nature, extent, format, and 
location of the evidence.
Notwithstanding the value and need for early in-
terviews, a number of risks and considerations are 
associated with investigation-related interviews. 
Because early interviews are sometimes conducted 
prior to the retention of counsel and before the 
investigation team and processes are fully in place, 
these risks are worthy of mention.
The company or its investigators should seek 
counsel related to the legalities associated with the 
interviews. First, the company should consider 
whether it should conduct the interviews under 
the purview of an attorney. The company and its 
counsel may wish to rely on legal privileges to limit 
the ways in which the information developed dur-
ing such interviews may be legally shielded from 
external disclosure to permit the company to better 
defend itself against any follow-on litigation related 
to the issues under investigation. Good legal coun-
sel can help address questions about whether legal 
privileges are desirable and how to structure the in-
quiries to best preserve any available privileges.
In addition, a competent attorney can advise re-
garding proper ways to
	 •		obtain	the	cooperation	of	employees.
	 •		limit	exposure	to	wrongful	termination,	defama-
tion, or other claims by employees associated 
with an investigation.
	 •		avoid	confusion	about	whom	any	attorneys	actu-
ally represent.
	 •		advise	employees	about	seeking	their	own	coun-
sel, if appropriate.
	 •		avoid	witness	tampering	or	even	the	appearance	
of it.
	 •		respect	unique	legal	requirements	in	different	
countries or legal jurisdictions.
During investigation inquiries, it is important to 
keep the process confidential, to the extent possible. 
When making inquiries, investigators may ask the 
people with whom they speak to keep the inquiry 
and information gathered confidential. Although 
such requests are not always respected, making this 
expectation explicit may help reduce gossip and 
alarm among employees.
Investigators also should take care to avoid di-
vulging unnecessary information related to the alle-
gation. They should take care to avoid disclosing the 
identity of any confidential whistle-blowers. It may 
be appropriate to put procedures in place to prevent 
employees from being updated or informed about 
emerging investigation outputs. Executives who are 
subjects of the investigation should not be permitted 
to interfere with the investigation or substantively 
discuss the investigation with others who are being 
interviewed. Investigators themselves also should be 
careful not to taint the recollections of those they 
are interviewing by unnecessarily disclosing what 
others have said in interviews or sharing documents 
and other information that are not necessary to the 
interview.
Although time pressures are common during the 
early stages of an investigation, it is important to 
clearly document any interviews. It is generally a 
good practice to memorialize the interview in clear 
notes or a memorandum that documents the state-
ments or assertions made by each person.
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Document Preservation 
Orders and Similar 
Instructions to Employees
Depending on the issue and relevant legal jurisdic-
tion, companies may be required to preserve docu-
ments and evidence related to the matter. Whether 
and to what extent document preservation is re-
quired is a legal judgment. Lawyers sometimes ad-
vise companies to preserve documentation as soon 
as there is reason to believe that such evidence 
may be relevant to an investigation or litigation 
matter. U.S. federal law generally requires the re-
tention of records relevant to a likely government 
investigation.
Working with internal or external counsel, com-
panies typically use a variety of approaches to ensure 
compliance with whatever level of document pres-
ervation is required, including the following:
	 •		Direct	communication	of	requirements	to	indi-
vidual custodians
	 •		Written	document	preservation	and	collection	
orders to individual custodians
	 •		Actions	to	secure,	collect	or	copy	existing	elec-
tronic or paper-based evidence
	 •		Actions	to	secure	existing	archives	or	repositories
Importantly, one aspect of document preservation 
is to halt any regular, ongoing or scheduled destruc-
tion of documents. These can include, among other 
things, the scheduled destruction of records in ar-
chival storage, everyday deletions and discarding of 
documents by employees, or overwriting electroni-
cally stored information.
Commonly, the company’s internal counsel will 
issue a written document preservation or collection 
order to people who are believed to have custody of 
relevant information. Such written orders are usu-
ally drafted broadly to include a very wide range 
of possible documentation, including both paper-
based and electronically stored information. Once 
the need for document preservation becomes ap-
parent, a company should develop a plan for ongo-
ing compliance with those requirements. This may 
include identifying a person to communicate to 
the appropriate employees and disseminate any spe-
cific instructions regarding the order. Once such or-
ders are in place, that person or persons should take 
responsibility for the ongoing management of such 
orders, including updating and monitoring compli-
ance document preservation and collection orders, 
identifying and communicating to employees when 
such orders have been lifted, maintaining whatever 
collections of documents have been gathered, and 
addressing documents retention questions that will 
arise during the pendency of the order.
Another early decision concerns which of the fol-
lowing approaches to document preservation and 
collection will be employed:
 (1)  Instruct the custodians to preserve such evidence 
but leave the evidence in their care and custody. 
This is generally the least costly and disrup-
tive of these approaches. Nevertheless, it re-
lies entirely on the compliance of individual 
custodians, some of whom may have little 
appreciation for the importance of the activ-
ity. Also, some custodians may misunder-
stand or fail to heed the instructions. Even 
these preservation activities can be some-
what disruptive because individual custodi-
ans must change their business practices to 
avoid destruction in the ordinary course. In 
one example of this approach, back-up tapes 
containing electronically stored information 
might merely be secured and preserved. De-
cisions about whether to collect and analyze 
such evidence can be postponed until more 
information is known.
 (2)  Instruct the custodians to preserve and produce the 
evidence (self-collection). This middle-ground 
approach asks employees to produce copies of 
the evidence to a designated person who will 
take responsibility for the documents and ad-
dressing any litigation- or investigation-relat-
ed document requests. This approach can be 
costly because the employees will necessar-
ily bear the time burden and inconvenience 
associated with collecting and transmitting 
the evidence. It also can be cumbersome, in-
complete, and unreliable, to the extent that 
employees are unable or unwilling to com-
ply with the requirements. For certain types 
of electronically stored information, this col-
lection responsibility may be delegated to 
IT personnel who may copy and set aside 
information that is accessible on servers 
or other centralized storage media. This 
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approach also carries with it the cost as-
sociated with maintaining a repository of 
documentation for as long as needed for the 
investigative or litigation purpose. Once col-
lected, however, the chain of custody and 
the risk that evidence will be altered or cor-
rupted is greatly mitigated. This approach 
might be used, for example, if investigators 
want to secure, as of a particular date, cer-
tain records that are amended frequently in 
the course of day-to-day operations. In that 
instance, it might be easier and more cost-
effective to have the custodians copy and 
produce the relevant documents. Then they 
might be able to continue to use the docu-
ments in the ordinary course.
 (3)  Collection by investigators or forensic special-
ists. When performed by competent foren-
sic professionals, this approach provides the 
highest degree of comfort that the evidential 
matter as of a given time is preserved with 
integrity and that a chain of custody can be 
established. It is used most commonly when 
the matters at issue may be litigated or scruti-
nized by regulators or third parties; when the 
risk of loss due to tampering, destruction, or 
inadvertent deletion is high; or when there is 
a technical challenge to the collection. Some-
times investigators perform the collection of 
evidence out of the sheer need for speed and 
the desire to avoid burdening the company’s 
regular staff. For example, this approach is 
frequently used for the preservation of evi-
dence on employee laptops and server-based 
e-mail. Outside specialists frequently collect 
forensic images of laptops to ensure that the 
collection is of high quality and could later 
be used in court. A forensic copy, if properly 
taken, is as useful as the original. By contrast, 
a copy made by the internal IT staff who are 
not familiar with forensic requirements may 
lack metadata or other attributes that can 
be useful to investigators. Once a forensic 
copy is taken, regular business processes can 
continue unchanged, with employees using 
their laptops and e-mail in the same way as 
before.
In any investigation, multiple approaches can be 
used. Indeed, the approaches may change during the 
course of the investigation as more information be-
comes known.
Decisions about the need, nature, extent, and ap-
proach to document preservation and collection are 
always based on the unique facts and circumstances 
of each situation. A key consideration in determin-
ing which approach to take for each kind of evi-
dence available is the current assessment of whether 
the custodian is likely to be implicated in the matters 
to be investigated, whether suspected people might 
have access to the evidence, and whether the re-
cords may be altered or changed as a result of nor-
mal business processes. Other considerations include 
the cost, the potential for burden on the company 
and its employees, the relative importance of the is-
sue at hand, and whether third-party litigation or 
regulatory scrutiny is likely. As discussed in chapter 
7, “Sources of Evidence,” the form and format of 
the evidence, whether it is easily changed or altered, 
and whether the documents or data are needed in 
everyday operations also can weigh heavily in this 
decision.
Chain of Custody
Chain of custody refers to the chronology of 
who has had possession of physical evidence and 
where that evidence was stored. Providing a clear 
account of the chain of custody can be important 
when litigation matters go to trial. Then, inves-
tigators may need to show that there has been no 
tampering of the evidence.
When transferring, moving, or securing 
evidence, it may be appropriate to document the 
chain of custody. For example, work papers can 
document the capture and handling of forensic 
images of electronically stored information to 
provide support for an assertion that the evidence 
is unaltered from the version that was initially 
collected. Similarly, documentation regarding 
the chain of custody of physical evidence could 
include contemporaneous cover letters, transmittal 
documentation, or memorandums.
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What to Preserve or Collect
In the first 48 hours, investigators develop and be-
gin to document an understanding of the type of 
evidence that is available, where it is, who is respon-
sible for it, and whether any steps must be taken to 
preserve or secure it. Oftentimes, early interviews 
will provide this information.
An investigation team’s understanding of the na-
ture and extent of evidence can evolve considerably 
during the course of an investigation. Documenta-
tion of the initial assessment of the nature and extent 
of the evidence and the initial steps taken to pre-
serve and gather that information are very helpful 
in the long run because they assist those who use 
the outputs of the investigation in understanding the 
decisions made at the outset when knowledge was 
incomplete.
Custodians From Whom to 
Collect
Often, as suggested earlier, initial inquiries help iden-
tify which custodians should receive a document 
preservation order and which might be the most 
fruitful sources of needed information. Investigators 
often think first of current employees, including any 
suspects; any persons who are involved in the specif-
ic business process under scrutiny; administrative as-
sistants; direct managers; and direct subordinates. It 
helps to think broadly about others who also might 
have custody of relevant information, such as former 
employees, officers and directors, vendors, profes-
sional services firms, and customers, if appropriate.
Although it might be reasonable to ask all cus-
todians to preserve or produce the same types of 
evidence, situations may exist when such requests 
can be tailored so that some custodians are only 
asked to provide specific information. For example, 
certain IT professionals might be asked to provide 
system-wide data but those responsible for a particu-
lar business process might be asked for procedural 
documentation.
Preparing in advance for 
document preservation 
and collection
An effective records management program not 
only reduces costs in the long run but also sup-
ports more effective preservation and collection of 
electronic and paper-based information when such 
litigation and investigation needs arise. Advance 
preparation helps ensure that information is 
present and readily obtainable when needed. To 
prepare, companies should consider the following:
(1)  Developing policies and creating time-
tables for the disposal of records, including 
electronic and paper records, once they 
have reached the end of the applicable 
business, legal, and regulatory retention 
period. Special consideration must be 
given to areas of the company that are 
highly regulated or more susceptible to 
litigation.
(2)  Creating formalized plans for responding 
to discovery requests. Such plans may in-
clude appointing the person(s) responsible, 
establishing processes to identify relevant 
information, and developing templates 
for preservation orders and instructions to 
employees.
(3)  Monitoring compliance with records 
retention policies and procedures. Con-
trols could include testing a sample of 
documents against a department’s records 
retention policy or evaluating the activities 
and documentation related to outstanding 
preservation orders. Monitoring activities 
will support an assessment of whether 
retention policies and procedures are 
functioning as designed, where practices 
are strong, and where there is need for 
improvement.
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Securing Paper-Based 
Books, Records, and 
Documents
Although the overall philosophy and goal of docu-
ment preservation are generally the same, regardless 
of the form or format of the information, different 
practical considerations exist depending on whether 
the information is paper based or electronic.
One way to approach the process of securing and 
gathering paper-based records and documents is to 
think through the issue in terms of which custodians 
have the records and the relative security of the lo-
cation where the documents are stored.
As with the decision about whether to preserve 
or collect evidence, the key considerations in secur-
ing paper-based evidence revolve around a current 
assessment of whether the custodian is likely to be 
implicated in the matters to be investigated, whether 
suspected people might have access to the evidence, 
and whether the records may be altered or changed 
as a result of normal business processes. Using the 
third allegation in our Grand Forge Company case 
study as an example, suppose the investigation was 
focused on the seemingly routine SEC inquiry re-
lated to executives’ trading in company stock and 
stock options. If records related to these trades were 
maintained by the corporate secretary and if there 
was no reason to believe that the corporate secre-
tary’s conduct or responsibilities were related to the 
inquiry, it might be reasonable to ask that person to 
preserve the relevant documents and take no further 
action to secure or collect them.
By contrast, a different response might be appro-
priate for the fourth allegation in the Grand Forge 
Company case study, arising from complaints by 
overseas customers that the country manager had 
pressured them to take product in excess of their 
needs and below contract specifications. For the 
investigation of that fourth allegation, it might be 
reasonable to evaluate whether the country man-
ager’s paper-based records could reasonably be con-
sidered secure in his own custody or the custody of 
his subordinates while an investigation was pending. 
In that case, Grand Forge Company might conclude 
that additional steps to physically secure or copy the 
relevant documents are necessary to maintain the in-
tegrity of the paper-based evidence.
Additional considerations, based on the custo-
dian and location of the evidence, may include the 
following:
	 •		Documentation in the suspected persons’ offices or work 
spaces. Depending on the nature of the allegation 
and the facts and circumstances, materials under 
the control of suspected persons are sometimes 
secured by changing locks on the office door, 
copying and moving the copies of the relevant 
documentation to a secure location, or moving 
the original records to a secure location. Initially, 
the goal may be to secure the documents and 
maintain the integrity and chain of custody of 
the data set. Later, it is helpful to inventory the 
collected evidence, evaluate the nature of it, 
determine whether continued preservation of 
the documentation is warranted or necessary for 
ongoing operations, and make a plan to balance 
any litigation or regulatory preservation require-
ments with the needs of the investigation and the 
ongoing needs of the business.
	 •		Documentation maintained by other employees at the 
work site. In the first 48 hours, it is helpful to 
develop at least a rough inventory of the relevant 
books, records, and documentary evidence that 
are available at the company’s work sites and 
the people who are responsible for the custody 
of that evidence. A rough inventory can be 
helpful to ensure that all the relevant evidence 
is preserved and, if necessary, secured. Often, 
the rough inventory is an evolving working 
document because the types, nature, and extent 
of evidence may need to be updated, revised, or 
expanded as the investigation team learns more 
and clarifies its understanding.
	 •		Documentation retained in long-term storage areas or 
in off site storage. In the first 48 hours, consider-
ation should be given to securing and preserving 
any records in long-term storage. For example, it 
may be appropriate to suspend regular document 
destruction if potentially relevant documents  
may be lost. Some companies have routine off-
site and on-site document destruction processes, 
such as standing orders with off-site storage  
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providers to destroy documents over a certain 
age or arrangements for on-site shredding with 
a third-party document-shredding vendor. In 
those instances, it may be necessary to take affir-
mative steps to prevent the destruction of docu-
ments. Similarly, it may be appropriate to change 
the locks or otherwise secure storage areas that 
might have valuable but vulnerable archival 
records or other documents.
	 •		Documentation related to the initial allegation or early 
interviews. Some whistle-blowers provide a sheaf 
of supporting documents for their allegations. 
Other times, even very early interviews can 
result in a collection of documents. For example, 
employees responding to an inquiry about a 
problematic business transaction may provide the 
relevant documents as part of their responses.
	 •		Documents maintained by non-employees and third 
parties. Sometimes, documentation from public 
sources or in the private hands of nonemployees 
and third parties can be highly relevant. Usu-
ally, investigators must obtain this information 
through voluntary compliance with a document 
request.
Securing Electronic 
Evidence
Electronic data on live computers are extremely 
volatile and are readily susceptible to updates, modi-
fications, and deletion. To preserve the data, elec-
tronic information must be in the control of people 
who understand its volatility and are committed to 
protecting the data. Often, in the context of an in-
vestigation, that commitment means that the inves-
tigation team makes a forensic copy of the evidence 
and retains the copy, taking care to preserve the 
chain of custody. In certain situations, it also may 
be reasonable to have individual employees preserve 
their own electronic information.
Any decisions regarding electronic evidence will 
be informed by an understanding of the nature, 
breadth, and depth of the information that has been 
stored electronically. Often times, companies are 
surprised to find that their knowledge of their for-
mal systems for storing electronic information is in-
complete or outdated. There may be both formal 
data systems and informal data processes. Companies 
may have multiple work sites and external locations 
with electronically stored information. In addition, 
employees and work groups may have retained 
a wide variety of electronic information in web-
based repositories, informal storage arrangements, 
personal electronic devices, portable media, home 
computers or other places, some of which may not 
be within a company’s control. Companies can be 
prepared well in advance of an actual allegation by 
developing an understanding of the electronic data 
environment, key systems and sources of electronic 
evidence. A broad discussion of litigation technolo-
gy and electronic evidence preservation, collection, 
and processing is found in chapter 8, “Electronic 
Evidence.”
A key objective in the first 48 hours is to iden-
tify the systems and data that may be relevant to the 
allegation, including a broad array of the potential 
sources and types of data. During this phase, it is 
helpful to think expansively, even if the investiga-
tion scope is later narrowed. Typically, the risk of 
The following are possible sources of paper-based 
evidence:
•  General ledgers, subsidiary ledgers, and 
other financial reports
•  Personnel files
•  Nonfinancial corporate records, such as 
operational statistics, production records, and 
customer relationship management records
•  Payroll reports and subsidiary documentation
•  Employee desk files
•  Records in off-site archives and long-term 
storage locations
•  Customer files
•  Publicly-available documents
•  Documents at employees’ homes
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identifying too much data is low becausethe cost or 
impact can be mitigated at any time by narrowing 
the investigation. By contrast, the risk of failing to 
identify relevant data can be high because data can 
be lost forever if it is not properly secured. Data loss 
may, in turn, irrevocably jeopardize the quality and 
results of the investigation. 
Typically, the work will start with an interview of 
the IT points of contact for the relevant information 
systems. This interview, and any follow-up inqui-
ries, could focus on the following:
	 •		An	overview	of	the	current	IT	systems	and	data
	 •		The	history	of	any	past	changes	or	pending	up-
dates to hardware, software, or processes
	 •		How	particular	IT	systems	relate	to	company	
processes
	 •		The	physical	and	logical	locations	for	hardware	
and data, including any systems or software used
	 •		Backup	protocols	and	schedules	and	tools	for	
relevant systems
	 •		Any	inventories	of	relevant	IT	hardware
	 •		Available	data	repositories,	including	both	on-
line and off-line data
Even when a company has a well-established base-
line understanding of its systems, interviews in the 
first 48 hours can assist in updating and confirming 
current understandings by identifying any additional 
elements of electronic evidence that should be con-
sidered and helping understand any unique aspects 
relevant to the particular systems in question or time 
frame of the allegation.
In addition to understanding the overall elec-
tronic environment, the preservation of electroni-
cally stored information also should address the 
following:
	 •		Backup tapes. Almost every IT environment has 
a backup protocol, which usually includes some 
method of backing up live electronic data and 
software onto tapes or other media. These tapes 
are primarily used for restoring data and systems 
that may be inadvertently lost due to disaster 
or some disruption in the IT environment. For 
this reason, they are often kept only as long as 
needed, and older backup tapes are frequently 
deleted or overwritten on an established rotation 
schedule. Considered in the context of litigation 
or investigation, these tapes are a valuable source 
The following are possible sources of electronically 
stored evidence:
•  Archived e-mail.
•  Server e-mail.
•  Employees’ hard drives (including both lap-
top and desktop and both present and past 
employees, if available).
•  Employees’ laptops, desktops, and personal 
computers, if used for work purposes. (This 
may be particularly relevant when remote 
connection is possible.)
•  Private network file shares, including depart-
mental shares and home drives.
•  Public network file shares.
•  Network devices and records, such as VPN 
logs; firewall logs; and desktop, laptop, and 
server system logs.
•  Knowledge bases, such as eRoom, Lotus 
Notes repositories, virtual work and col-
laboration rooms, and chat rooms provided 
by the company.
•  Financial systems.
•  Back-up tapes.
•  Instant messaging.
•  Voicemail.
•  Fax machines and copiers with resident 
electronic memory.
•  Disks and other media, including CDs and 
DVDs.
•  Electronic document retention and archival 
systems.
•  Portable hard drives, including USB devices, 
data sticks, and flash or thumb drives.
•  Personal mobile devices, including cell 
phones, personal digital assistants, Black-
Berrys, iPhones, and other smart phones.
•  Digitized voicemail.
•  Electronic data hosted by third parties.
•  Transactional systems, such as general 
ledger, human resources, payroll, financial 
reporting, accounting, customer relationship 
management, enterprise resource planning, 
accounts payable, and accounts receivable 
systems and subsystems.
•  Backups of any of these sources.
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of evidence because the backups may include 
e-mails or other data as it existed at histori-
cal dates. When restored, backup tapes provide 
historical evidence and help fill in gaps, especially 
with respect to deleted information. Because 
they are so important, one of the first steps in 
electronic evidence preservation is the suspen-
sion of any normal destruction of backup tapes. 
Theoretically, this preservation order could be 
sent to the IT professionals almost at the very 
first indication that preservation will be needed, 
and it could be lifted or modified as needed after 
more information becomes known.
	 •		Prior litigation repositories. Because litigation and 
investigation are now more common, it is in-
creasingly likely that companies may have previ-
ously preserved electronically stored information 
related to some prior matter, even if that matter 
is entirely unrelated. During the process of 
preserving and collecting information, the team 
should consider an inventory of any previously 
preserved document and electronic data reposi-
tories to determine whether the collection con-
tains copies of potentially relevant data sources.
	 •		Differences in privacy and electronic evidence laws in 
other jurisdictions. In the United States, inves-
tigators may usually gain access to employees’ 
e-mails and other electronically stored informa-
tion on company computers. In other jurisdic-
tions, there may be restrictions on the collection 
and analysis of this information, such as those 
imposed by the European Union’s Directive 
95/46/EC on data protection. Investigators 
should seek competent counsel to understand the 
requirements of all the localities in which they 
are working.
	 •		Employees’ personal computers and stored data. 
Employees may have stored relevant company 
records on their own personal computers or on 
web-based storage, either for personal conve-
nience or to preserve a collection of evidence 
regarding some matter about which they had 
some concern. During investigative interviews, 
it is helpful to ask whether individuals have any 
relevant information in their personal custody 
and to ask for it to be produced to the team.  
Although the company or team may not be 
able to compel someone to produce evidence, 
individuals sometimes do so voluntarily. Even if 
they do not, asking the question may be good 
investigative diligence.
The goal of securing electronic evidence is to pre-
serve and make accessible authentic copies of the 
electronic evidence. Electronic data is fragile and 
can be manipulated or spoiled, even unintention-
ally. Metadata, the embedded electronic data about 
the data, are even more fragile. All of this informa-
tion can be highly relevant in certain investigations. 
Investigative specialists take care to make forensic 
copies, which can be demonstrated to be exact cop-
ies of the evidence, not mere logical copies. It is 
incredibly easy to make unintentional modifications 
to the data and metadata of electronic files. Many 
stories exist of the eager investigator or IT profes-
sional who scanned or reviewed the electronic data 
prior to forensic preservation and unintentionally 
destroyed metadata or corrupted the integrity of 
the files. In one example, simply using Microsoft’s 
Windows Explorer to look at the properties of a 
Microsoft Word document changed the metadata 
about that document. It is a best practice to secure 
and preserve the relevant data before any analysis or 
work is performed on it.
Notwithstanding this, forensic specialists can use 
a variety of techniques to analyze large populations 
of electronic evidence. Although it is rare that any 
investigator will have a full grasp of the electronic 
evidence in the first few days of an investigation, a 
number of tools and techniques give a proper early 
view of the issues by using electronic evidence.
As with the paper-based evidence and informa-
tion gathered from interviews, an understanding of 
the nature and extent of the evidence may evolve 
over time. Although the collection and analysis of 
electronically stored information will continue well 
after the first 48 hours, the team should begin its 
documentation of its electronic evidence preserva-
tion steps immediately. The investigation also should 
consider preserving electronic data that serve as a 
record of the document preservation and collection 
efforts. For instance, the team could preserve reports 
from the company’s asset tracking system to dem-
onstrate that all the computers for each custodian 
were preserved and collected. Preservation of the 
reports from the technology help desk or “trouble 
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ticket” system related to the custodians’ computers 
may help demonstrate whether custodians had a re-
cent hard drive replacement and whether the team 
searched for any old computers. For more informa-
tion regarding collecting and analyzing evidence, 
see chapters 7 (“Sources of Evidence”) and 8 (“Elec-
tronic Evidence”).
After the First 48 Hours
When the Allegation Is 
Found to Be Without Merit
Thankfully, many instances are found in which the 
issues and allegations have little merit. In some cas-
es, an allegation may be found to be unworthy of 
follow-up after an assessment during initial triage. In 
others, the allegation is investigated, and an assess-
ment to close the investigation is made after some 
evidence gathering and analysis. In both cases, the 
critical element is a thoughtful assessment based on 
the information available.
The company can reasonably anticipate that it will 
be asked to defend its conclusion. For example, an 
external auditor could ask about the resolution of 
any matters reported on the whistle-blower hotline. 
In another example, a whistle-blower could go to 
a regulator and cause an inquiry to be opened. The 
company can anticipate and mitigate this by articu-
lating and documenting its resolutions. Documenta-
tion of the assessment and basis for the conclusions 
will vary, based on the facts and circumstances.
Among the elements of such an assessment is the 
consideration of the evidence and a determination 
of whether that evidence is an adequate basis for 
the conclusion. When evidence is found, assessing 
its adequacy is relatively straightforward. It is much 
more difficult to reach that conclusion when little 
or no evidence is found. The critical question is 
whether there truly is no evidence or whether rel-
evant evidence exists but was not found.
The corollary to this question is whether the in-
vestigators have done enough work to find and con-
sider all the relevant evidence. The logic of this type 
of assessment flows deductively from the adequacy 
of the procedures to the gaps or absence of evidence 
despite adequate procedures, the nature of what is 
known, and the conclusion itself.
Consider, for example, the fourth allegation in 
our Grand Forge Company case study related to 
the overseas customer who complained of being 
pressured to take goods in excess of their needs and 
receiving poor quality goods. Assume that Grand 
Forge Company conducted an initial investigation 
that was perfunctory, consisting only of a limited 
inquiry of the country manager and his subordinates 
and a scan of recent invoices gathered in the corpo-
rate headquarters. Assume further that these proce-
dures identified no evidence that would support the 
allegation. In this example, it might not be reason-
able for Grand Forge Company to conclude that the 
allegations lacked merit because the investigation 
failed to gather and consider critical information.
Now, assume an alternate scenario in which 
Grand Forge Company conducted adequate investi-
gation procedures. Assume that Grand Forge Com-
pany secured and gathered paper and electronic 
evidence; interviewed the customer, the country 
manager, and others with knowledge of the custom-
er relationship; and considered the information in 
the company’s possession, including the records in 
the subsidiary’s local office. If these types of proce-
dures were determined to be adequate in light of the 
facts and circumstances and Grand Forge Company 
found nothing that would reasonably support the al-
legation, the conclusion to close the investigation is 
much better supported and reasonable.
In addition, before closing a matter, it is reasonable 
to ask whether the company has identified the un-
derlying reason for the allegation or issue. Whistle-
blowers rarely come forward without any reason, al-
though their motivations can be varied. Oftentimes, 
employees have a genuine concern or workplace 
grievance that should be addressed. Other times, the 
employee’s concern is real, but the report is based 
on a misunderstanding or partial understanding of 
the facts. In a number of situations, whistle-blow-
ers may be acting based on a personal grudge, may 
seek to gain personally from their reports, or may be 
seeking employment protections through a variety 
of laws and rules that protect whistle-blowers. Re-
gardless of the motivation, understanding the rea-
son for the allegation, if it can be determined, can 
help give comfort that the right disposition has been 
made.
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When the First 48 Hours are 
Just the Beginning
For investigations with more significant issues, the 
first 48 hours may be just the beginning. Even 
though the steps outlined in this chapter may seem 
onerous and shortcuts may be tempting, in our ex-
perience, a rigorous and thoughtful approach in 
the early hours of the investigation pays off in the 
end. Processes that quickly identify and raise allega-
tions help ensure that underlying issues do not fester 
to larger, harder-to-manage problems. Sound and 
thoughtful initial triage helps channel allegations to 
the appropriate response, neither ignoring issues nor 
overreacting.
When issues require an investigation, the deci-
sions in the first 48 hours regarding how to structure 
the investigation, who will investigate, and what 
they will do form a basis to move forward. Further, 
the actions taken to preserve and collect evidence 
lay the foundation for the analytical and investiga-
tive work to follow. A well-organized and thought-
fully structured investigation can be executed more 
swiftly, is much less likely to waste resources on un-
necessary digressions and rework, and will serve as a 
basis for sound decision making. A sound, indepen-
dent investigation also tends to reduce the time and 
expense of expanded external audit procedures and 
costly responses to regulatory inquiries.
If litigation follows, a properly-structured investi-
gation may put the company in the best position to 
determine whether any legal remedies may mitigate 
any damages experienced. Furthermore, prompt le-
gal advice and attention to the preservation of any 
legal privileges that may attach to the work of the 
investigators may minimize unnecessary disclosures 
to third parties who may seek to sue the company.
Conclusion 
Allegations of fraud, issues regarding regulatory 
compliance and other possible improprieties can and 
do occur in almost all types of businesses. Given hu-
man nature, it is inevitable that every business will 
experience some sort of financial or workplace im-
propriety. Although business executives can remain 
hopeful that allegations and investigations will be 
nonroutine in nature, such challenges should take 
no executive or company by surprise.
Because such challenges are almost unavoidable, 
companies need to have business processes in place 
to identify, raise, and triage allegations and reports 
of possible wrongdoing. Companies should be pre-
pared to respond to a range of potential issues. To 
the degree possible, they should try to anticipate 
the challenging sprint that is the first 48 hours of an 
investigation.
At the outset of this chapter, we described a CEO 
in the throes of a prolonged and expensive investi-
gation that seemed out of control. This chapter has 
highlighted the ways to prevent this outcome by fo-
cusing their processes on the steps outlined in this 
chapter: quickly identifying allegations and issues, 
objectively triaging them, responding to threats, ap-
propriately reporting the situation and mobilizing 
resources to properly investigate. No process can 
fully anticipate all the different issues and allegations 
they will face, but advance planning can reduce the 
uncertainties associated with these stressful situations. 
These steps will promote thoughtful responses and 
will, ultimately, help a company to respond appro-
priately to allegations, while maintaining its focus on 
the long-term success of the underlying business.
Chapter 05.indd   106 8/4/09   1:01:30 PM
Chapter	5:	The	First	48	Hours	of	an	Investigation
107
Bibliography
	 1.	——,	Anonymous Submission of Suspected Wrongdo-
ing (Whistleblowers)—Issues for Audit Committees to 
Consider,	AICPA	Antifraud	Programs	and	Controls	Task	
Force,	2005.
	 2.	——,	“Best	Practices	in	Global	Ethics	Hotlines:	A	Guide	
to	Navigating	Hotline	Compliance	Guidelines	World-
wide,”	Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners	Web	
site.
	 3.	——,	“Eighteen	Safeguards	To	Corporate	Self-Investiga-
tion,”	The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel	(December	
2004).
	 4.	Bennett,	Robert	S.,	Alan	Kriegel,	Carl	S.	Rauh,	and	Charles	
F.	Walker,	“Internal	Investigations	and	the	Defense	of	
Corporations	in	the	Sarbanes-Oxley	Era,”	The Business 
Lawyer	62,	no.	1	(November	2006):	55–88.
	 5.	Block,	Janice	L.,	“Rules	of	Responsibility,”	Inside Counsel 
Magazine	(August	2008).
	 6.	Dougherty,	Thomas	J.,	The Directors’ Handbook, 2008 
edition.	Corporation	Service	Company,	2008.
	 7.	Exall,	Marian	and	Joh	D.	“Jack”	Capers,	“Audit	Commit-
tees	under	the	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act:	Establishing	the	
New	Complaint	Procedures,”	ACCA Docket	(July/August	
2003):	102–110.	
	 8.	Finegan,	Sheila,	“The	First	72	Hours	of	a	Government	
Investigation:	A	Guide	to	Identifying	Issues	and	Avoiding	
Mistakes,”	Briefly...Perspectives on legislation, regula-
tion and litigation	11,	no.	2	(February	2007).
	 9.	Johnson,	Mary	Jo,	Peter	J.	Kolovos,	Lynda	Schwartz,	and	
Carol	Palmer	Wining,	“Responding	to	a	Corporate	Crisis:	
Ten	Initial	Steps	to	Consider	When	a	Corporate	Crisis	
Emerges,”	January	15,	2009.
10.	Malone,	Tony	and	Ralph	Childs,	“Best	Practices	in	Ethics	
Hotlines:	A	framework	for	creating	an	effective	anony-
mous	reporting	program,”	Association	of	Certified	Fraud	
Examiners	Web	site.
11.	Slovin,	David,	“Blowing	the	Whistle,”	Internal Auditor 
(June	2006):	45–49.
12.	Young,	Michael	R.,	Accounting Irregularities and Financial 
Fraud, A Corporate Governance Guide,	3rd	ed.	CCH	
Company,	2001.
Chapter 05.indd   107 8/4/09   1:01:30 PM
Chapter 05.indd   108 8/4/09   1:01:30 PM
109
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How Different Stakeholders 
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Introduction
During every fraud investigation, different internal 
and external stakeholders and advisors take on im-
portant roles and responsibilities; for the investiga-
tion to succeed, all must clearly understand those 
responsibilities. Necessarily, the roles vary greatly 
due to the interests of various stakeholders and the 
fiduciary duties they must perform. Each group of-
ten will make important contributions to assist the 
investigation in achieving thorough, complete, and 
accurate results while maintaining their integrity.
Internal stakeholders who typically play an impor-
tant role during an investigation include the board 
of directors, the audit committee, executive man-
agement of the company, the general counsel, and 
internal auditors. External stakeholders and advisors 
include legal counsel, forensic accountants, external 
auditors, and regulators.
Although the roles and responsibilities of differ-
ent stakeholders can be fairly constant throughout 
investigations, each investigation is unique, and the 
various roles can change substantively depending on 
the uniqueness of each case. Variables include the 
size of the company being investigated, the relative 
complexity of its business structure, and the charac-
ter of the allegation of misconduct, the scope of the 
investigation, and the specific technical accounting 
or legal aspects of the issues being investigated.
The recent criticisms of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) over the handling of the 
Bernard Madoff matter have increased the pressure 
on financial regulators and law enforcement to de-
liver results. Therefore, management, audit com-
mittees, and special committees of the boards of 
directors of public and privately held entities could 
potentially be faced with intensified scrutiny of is-
sues involving complex financial transactions, cor-
porate misconduct, fiduciary and officer responsi-
bilities, and related matters.
Accordingly, companies will need all stakeholders 
to work together effectively to develop and imple-
ment effective investigations.
This chapter takes a close look at the various 
stakeholders and advisors during an investigation 
and explores their unique roles and responsibili-
ties. For each of the internal stakeholders previously 
introduced, their typical role within the company 
is summarized and then how that role may change 
during an investigation is examined. After reviewing 
the respective roles and responsibilities of internal 
stakeholders, we address those of external stakehold-
ers and advisors.
Figure 6-1 illustrates, as is discussed throughout 
this chapter, how the roles of the various stakehold-
ers and advisors inter-relate, during an independent 
external investigation and/or during an internal in-
vestigation conducted by management.
Internal Stakeholders
How we govern our corporations plays a central 
role in the health of our global economy. Risk man-
agement, especially in times of crisis arising from 
wrongdoing or impropriety, requires that an effec-
tive process be in place to investigate fraud and take 
corrective action.
The board of directors and its special committees, 
audit committees, and management of public and 
privately held entities will need assistance in devel-
oping and implementing effective investigations to 
address certain regulatory and voluntary demands 
brought about by alleged improper actions.
At an introductory meeting, Grand Forge’s1 se-
nior executives explain the circumstances around 
the allegations of abusive accounting practices from 
employees in its operations in the Shanghai office. 
They identify their pressing objectives: to investigate 
the allegations of wrongdoing, examine accounting 
procedures in the Shanghai office, and assess the risk 
that similar activities could be occurring elsewhere 
in the organization. Management asks Perusi & Bi-
lanz LLP how the accounting firm can help. 
First, says the accounting firm, senior management 
at Grand Forge should advise the board of directors, 
audit committee, and the company’s counsel of the 
circumstances, if they haven’t done so already. They 
should also apprise both of their meeting with Perusi 
& Bilanz LLP.
1	The	reader	is	invited	to	read	the	detailed	case	study	of	Grand	Forge	Company	found	in	the	Introduction	to	this	book.
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Second, mindful that few facts are yet known 
about the alleged activity, Perusi & Bilanz suggest 
that they perform an investigation of the allegations 
and provide a confidential report directly to board 
of directors, management and the audit commit-
tee. Emphasizing that it is premature to determine if 
their work will uncover actual fraud and with man-
agement’s understanding that no assurance is imme-
diately required, Perusi & Bilanz explain that their 
work will be conducted as a consulting engagement, 
not as attest services. Perusi & Bilanz LLP will work 
under the direction of external counsel retained by 
the special committee of the board of directors or 
the audit committee. They suggest that their work 
will result in recommendations and advice on the 
accounting issues to Grand Forge’s management.
Now let’s consider the various roles and responsi-
bilities taking this scenario.
Board of Directors
A company’s board of directors is obligated, as fi-
duciaries, to act in good faith to promote the best 
interests of the company; its key function is to pro-
tect the investment of shareholders. The board does 
this by overseeing management, operations, and 
financial reporting of the company to ensure that 
management is working in the best interest of the 
company and its shareholders by enhancing com-
pany value. Correspondingly, the board must ensure 
that management has the qualifications and compe-
tence to perform their specific roles and also must 
review the company’s operational performance and 
compare it against set financial objectives, budgets, 
and other key measures. All significant business de-
cisions must be presented to and reviewed by the 
board for approval.
Equally important, the board works with manage-
ment to uphold corporate, legal, and ethical com-
pliance by enforcing sound accounting policies and 
ensuring that internal controls exist that are suffi-
cient to “deter fraud, anticipate financial risks, and 
promote accurate, high quality and timely disclo-
sure of financial and other material information to 
the board, to the public markets, and to sharehold-
ers.”2 The tone set by the board usually influences 
the behavior of others within the company (for an 
expanded discussion of tone, see chapter 14, “Anti-
fraud Programs”).
When confronted with allegations of fraud or 
misconduct, board members must act to investigate 
the facts surrounding the allegations and agree to a 
course of action that is in the best interest of the 
company. During an investigation into any such al-
legations, directors must consider all of the relevant 
facts, and once the facts are known, they must act to 
end the misconduct and prevent its recurrence.3
The senior executive of our hypothetical Grand 
Forge Company should inform the board of direc-
tors of the allegations and consult with them prior to 
meeting with the independent accounting firm, or 
at least as soon as practical. The board will consider, 
in consultation with management, whether an in-
ternal or external independent investigation is in the 
best interest of the company. Additionally, Grand 
Forge’s board will consider the timing, scope of the 
investigation, and resources required.
As a result, Grand Forge’s board should ensure 
the organization develops a system of prompt, com-
petent, and confidential review, investigation, and 
resolution of the allegations of abusive accounting 
practices. The board also should define its own role 
in the investigation process. Grand Forge can im-
prove its chances of loss recovery, minimize expo-
sure to litigation, and protect its reputation by estab-
lishing and adequately planning an investigation and 
corrective action processes.
Typically, boards comprise independent directors; 
however, some also include select internal execu-
tives, which may present the appearance of or create 
an actual conflict of interest.
Maintaining credibility is the key to success in 
these situations. For example, the allegations in the 
Grand Forge scenario are serious. Having complete 
and total transparency with all members of the board 
is key to maintaining credibility, both with the ul-
timate decision makers within the company as well 
as with any government officials. Therefore, the 
2		John	C.	Whitehead	and	Ira	M.	Millstein,	Co-Chairs,	Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Report on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate 
Audit Committees.	A	publication	of	the	New	York	Stock	Exchange	and	the	National	Association	of	Securities	Dealers	1999,	20.
3 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.	188	A.2d	125.	130	(Del	1963).
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composition of the board becomes especially impor-
tant during an investigation because the company 
will want to protect itself against any allegations of 
bias or, worse, a “whitewash” investigation, due to 
the presence of company executives on the board. 
Grand Forge must conduct a thorough and indepen-
dent investigation of the allegations to determine if 
they have merit. If the allegations have merit, what 
needs to be determined is who was responsible and 
what consequences will result from internal remedi-
al measures to external reporting disclosures, includ-
ing a possible restatement. A board can be rendered 
ineffective when management overrides the board’s 
monitoring responsibility, influences the selection 
of outside directors, controls meetings and agendas, 
and delivers inside information to certain members.
For this reason, a board facing the need to initiate 
an investigation often creates a special committee 
comprised entirely of independent directors (with 
no management influence) to lead the investigation 
or instead allows the audit committee, also com-
prised of independent directors, to do so.
Absent subpoenas from government regulators, 
the board also needs to decide on how it will re-
port the corporate misconduct, if it reports it at all. 
In accordance with policies approved by the board, 
Grand Forge’s investigation team should report its 
findings to the appropriate party, such as directors, 
legal counsel, and oversight bodies. Public disclosure 
may need to be made to law enforcement, regula-
tory bodies, investors, shareholders, the media, and 
others. Although the board generally does not have 
a duty to report corporate misconduct to govern-
ment regulators, self-reporting to regulators may be 
in the company’s best interests. Additionally, the 
board must consider the strict SEC reporting rules 
mandating the disclosure of any facts that are mate-
rial to the company, such as reportable transactions 
and material weaknesses that require disclosure.
The Audit Committee 
Alongside the board of directors, the audit commit-
tee (which usually comprises nonexecutive and in-
dependent board members) plays an important part 
in upholding the oversight and integrity of a com-
pany’s external audit, as well as its management, op-
erations, and financial reporting. The audit commit-
tee and the board are integrally linked, as they are 
responsible for corporate governance and have vital 
oversight responsibilities. This vital role includes 
overseeing the financial reporting system with at-
tention to any weakness or vulnerabilities and the 
need for identifying “red flags” should the risk of 
financial misreporting take place. The success of the 
audit committee depends on its working relation-
ships with other corporate participants.
The audit committee must ensure that the parties 
responsible for internal controls and the financial 
reporting process, including the company’s man-
agement, internal auditors, and external auditors, 
understand their roles in the process and are held 
accountable.
Surprisingly enough, historical records indicate 
that most major frauds are perpetrated by senior 
management in collusion with other employees. 
Vigilant handling of fraud cases within an organiza-
tion sends clear signals to the public, stakeholders, 
and regulators about the attitude of those at the top 
(management and the board) toward fraud risks.
Insofar as the audit committee must hold com-
pany’s management accountable, independence 
from the company is an important aspect of audit 
committee membership. Regulations require that 
the audit committee solely comprises independent 
directors. No member may be an employee of the 
company, nor may any member receive any type 
of advisory or consulting fees. The audit committee 
also must have at least one financial expert, defined 
as a person knowledgeable in U.S. generally accept-
ed accounting principles, financial statements, inter-
nal controls, and overall audit committee functions. 
Its independence from the company allows the audit 
committee and its individual members the objectiv-
ity to oversee an investigation.
Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) amended Section 10A of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding additional require-
ments for the audit committee. Specifically relat- 
ing to any complaints or so-called “whistleblower” 
allegations, the committee needs to have established 
procedures for “the receipt, retention, and treat-
ments of complaints received by the issuer regard-
ing accounting, internal accounting controls, or 
auditing matters; and the confidential, anonymous 
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submission by employees of the issuer of concerns 
regarding questionable accounting or auditing 
matters.”4 The act also gives the audit committee 
the authority to engage and fund the payment of 
independent counsel or advisors if they deem 
necessary.5
Precisely because of its independence from the 
company, the audit committee should be responsible 
for handling any anonymous allegations of impropri-
ety received by the company, including allegations 
of fraud or of a lack of integrity on the part of com-
pany management. It also is responsible for ensuring 
an investigation takes place if fraud is revealed. “If 
fraud or improprieties are asserted or discovered, the 
audit committee—through the external auditors, in-
ternal auditors, or forensic accounting consultants, 
as appropriate—should investigate, and, if necessary, 
retain legal counsel to assert claims on the organi-
zation’s behalf. Forensic accounting consultants, in 
particular, may be needed to provide the depth of 
skills necessary to conduct a fraud investigation, and 
if it is desirable to get an independent assessment.”6
As discussed earlier, the only way to assess risk 
is to have a thorough independent investigation. In 
some situations, the audit committee will insist on 
having its own counsel conduct the investigation.
In most investigations, the audit committee re-
tains external legal counsel to investigate allegations 
of fraud or impropriety. Sometimes the audit com-
mittee will allow in-house counsel to hire outside 
counsel to conduct the investigation. In most situa-
tions, external counsel also retains forensic accoun-
tants to act as fact gatherers on behalf of counsel 
and the audit committee. Periodically during the in-
vestigation, external counsel and often the forensic 
accountants report to the audit committee on the 
investigation’s progress. External counsel often as-
sists the audit committee in its communications with 
regulators, as well as the company’s external audi-
tors. At the conclusion of the investigation, exter-
nal counsel report to the audit committee their final 
observations and conclusions and provide advice re-
garding necessary steps, including remedial actions.
Whatever the scenario, it is imperative that the in-
vestigation is conducted in an efficient and effective 
manner and is not criticized later. This is a difficult 
balance to achieve, but total transparency between 
the board of directors and its special committee and 
the audit committee is critical. Often, the indepen-
dent investigation is conducted in a very short time 
frame because the company has to meet its reporting 
requirements; therefore, open and regular commu-
nication is key.
Company Management
Although management’s roles and daily tasks may 
vary during an investigation, their fundamental 
obligations and responsibilities do not. During an 
internal investigation, management maintains and 
controls information and coordinates the resources 
needed; therefore, it plays a critical role in the inves-
tigation’s development and success. Management’s 
attitude toward the investigation also largely deter-
mines how outside stakeholders and advisors plan 
and perform their own respective tasks and roles in 
order to achieve the investigation’s objective.
The board of directors and the audit committee 
play an oversight role, and management is respon-
sible not only for the company’s operations but also 
for maintaining its internal controls, recordkeeping, 
and financial reporting processes. Management’s re-
sponsibility also includes preparing the company’s 
financial statements.
Generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) 
specifically state that “[m]anagement is responsible 
for adopting sound accounting policies and for es-
tablishing and maintaining internal controls that 
will, among other things, record, process, summa-
rize, and report transactions (as well as events and 
conditions) consistent with management’s assertions 
embodied in the financial statements.”7
The company’s transactions and related assets, li-
abilities, and equity are within the direct knowledge 
and control of management.8
4	The	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act	of	2002	(SOX),	Pub	L.	107-204,	116	Stat.	745.	Section	301.
5	Ibid.
6	The AICPA Audit Committee Toolkit.	A	publication	of	the	American	Institute	of	Certified	Public	Accountants,	Inc.	New	York,	2004.
7	Au	Section	110.03	Responsibilities	and	Functions	of	Independent	Auditor.
8	Au	Section	110.03	Responsibilities	and	Functions	of	Independent	Auditor.
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Management has the paramount responsibility for 
all of the financial and operational activities of the 
company and is rightly required to be extremely fa-
miliar with those activities. In particular, a key play-
er of the management is the Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO). The CFO’s primary responsibility is to run a 
good financial reporting system. Although manage-
ment’s roles within different departments, such as 
accounting, finance, sales, and operations, can vary 
greatly, they also are interconnected; for example, 
accounting personnel must understand the opera-
tional and sales aspects of a transaction in order to 
determine the proper accounting to reflect the na-
ture of the transaction. Although the fundamentals 
of the entire business must be understood by all of 
the different departments of management, it is ex-
tremely important for the investigative team to have 
access to people in these different functional roles 
during an investigation because each person knows 
their own roles and responsibilities in great detail.
The investigative team, which generally compris-
es independent forensic accountants working under 
the direction of outside counsel, relies on manage-
ment, especially the CFO for the speedy and effec-
tive conduct of its investigative processes.
In our hypothetical Grand Forge scenario, the 
independent forensic accountant Perusi & Bilanz 
LLP will depend on management to provide the 
following:
 1.  The type of accounting system used by the 
company in Shanghai and at corporate head-
quarters
 2.  The document retention policy
 3.  The location of electronic files on servers
 4.  The location of selected hardcopy files
 5.  The e-mail servers’ backup protocols
 6.  A list of key people in the accounting, finance, 
internal audit, and IT groups who can provide 
immediate, needed assistance in these types of 
investigations
Given the tight timeline, the success of the 
investigation will depend on the level of coopera-
tion from the company’s senior management and 
local management in Shanghai. Access to relevant 
documentation and personnel also will be crucial 
to the speedy and efficient completion of the 
investigation.
Everyone in senior management will have a pretty 
good understanding, in short order, that something 
is going on in Shanghai. Document preservation or-
ders, computer imaging, and general “water cooler 
talk” will lead to information and misinformation 
being disseminated. To ward off the spread of mis-
information and control the dissemination of infor-
mation that could undermine the objectives of the 
investigation that is taking place, it is important for 
senior management to communicate certain key 
points to management and other employees as soon 
as possible. These key points include, but are not 
limited to, the following:
 1.  The existence of an investigation and the 
general nature of the allegations being 
investigated
 2.   The authority of the entity (for example, the 
audit committee or special committee of the 
board) conducting the investigation
 3.   The rationale for having the investigation 
conducted under the auspices of an indepen-
dent body
 4.   The absolute necessity for relevant document 
preservation and collection
 5.   The absolute need for total confidentiality
As previously stated, the financial statements of a 
company are the responsibility of management, and 
it is the audit firm who is attesting to the informa-
tion stated in the financial statements. The final re-
port of an audit firm is issued after its audit of the 
company’s financial statements. The knowledge ob-
tained through the audit and used to issue the report 
is limited to that acquired through inquiry of man-
agement and the testing of accounting records pro-
vided by management. “Thus, the fair presentation 
of financial statements in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles is an implicit and in-
tegral part of management’s responsibility.... [Con-
versely], the auditor’s responsibility for the financial 
statements he or she has audited is confined to the 
expression of his or her opinion on them.”9
9	Au	Section	110.03	Responsibilities	and	Functions	of	Independent	Auditor.
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As the success of an audit depends on the reliabil-
ity and credibility of management and the quality of 
the documentation provided, an effective investiga-
tion also relies on the same.
Commonly, a point person, usually the general 
counsel who is a member of management, facilitates 
the requests of all stakeholders during an investiga-
tion. Due to his or her intimate knowledge of the 
company’s business, the general counsel typically as-
sists external legal counsel, the forensic accountants, 
internal auditors, the board of directors, the audit 
committee, and management.
This point person’s cooperation is vital because 
he or she determines to whom the investigative 
team has access and what information is provided. 
An open and trustworthy point person helps cre-
ate an environment in which the investigation can 
proceed efficiently and effectively; one who is dif-
ficult and creates a barrier around critical employees 
can severely limit an investigation’s scope and hin-
der the investigative team’s ability to achieve their 
objectives.
Based on the type of investigation being per-
formed, management may play either a supporting 
role or a more substantial role. When management 
initiates the investigation and retains both counsel 
and a forensic team to perform it, then management 
will be presumed not only to support and facilitate 
the investigators’ work but also will evaluate the 
findings that result. Because management is ulti-
mately accountable for financial data, it also must 
determine whether those findings are material or 
consequential to the reliability of the financial state-
ments as a whole.
Adequate communication between all stakehold-
ers during an investigation is key to the investigation 
running smoothly and, thus, is very important. In 
many circumstances, it is management’s role to fos-
ter such communication. Because management is a 
nexus for all the information crucial to the investiga-
tion, it should ensure that all parties know the back-
ground of its business, performance, and operations. 
In addition, properly communicating to the investi-
gative team any concerns not being addressed with-
in the company is extremely important in bringing 
to light issues outside of the investigation’s focus. It 
is not uncommon for new issues, unrelated to the 
initial scope, to emerge during an investigation; 
these issues ultimately can lead to separate investiga-
tions of their own.
General Counsel
Responsible for the day-to-day legal affairs of a 
company, the general counsel provides management 
with guidance on the regulatory and legal issues that 
affect business operations. He or she also ensures 
that the company’s activities are in compliance with 
all applicable laws and that corporate compliance 
programs reinforce appropriate legal conduct.
Allegations of misconduct often are reported di-
rectly to the general counsel’s office. When allega-
tions of fraud arise or questions surface related to 
management’s integrity, the general counsel’s office 
usually is involved immediately. Faced with any of 
these situations, the general counsel needs to quickly 
determine if the potential issues can be investigated 
internally or instead need to be raised to the au-
dit committee and possibly investigated by external 
counsel. An investigation carried out in-house gen-
erally incurs a lower cost to the company (by saving 
fees that would otherwise be paid to external coun-
sel or forensic accountants) and offers the important 
additional benefit of the investigative team having a 
better understanding of the company, including its 
corporate structure, operations, and culture. If the 
issue is to be handled internally, the general coun-
sel’s office usually investigates, with the assistance of 
internal auditors.
For many reasons, however, an internal investiga-
tion may not be the best course because of:
	 •		an	insufficient	understanding	of	the	technical	
legal or accounting issues at stake. 
	 •		management’s	and	the	general	counsel’s	concern	
about the perception of the investigation not be-
ing completely independent and objective.
	 •		a	lack	of	significant	investigative	experience	on	
the part of the internal auditors or general  
counsel.
	 •		a	lack	of	adequate	resources	for	a	full-scale	inves-
tigation, in terms of personnel or available time.
When making this determination, the gen- 
eral counsel should keep in mind that regulators 
often scrutinize the company’s response to alle-
ga-tions of improper conduct and typically insist 
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on objectivity and independence from the com- 
pany. In many cases, if material improprieties are 
alleged, retaining external legal counsel and forensic 
accountants who are independent of the company 
is critical.
If the general counsel elects to notify the audit 
committee, which leads to the commencement of 
an investigation, the general counsel most likely will 
assist in the investigation’s execution, monitor its 
progress, and assist in communications with regula-
tors. Even if not leading the investigation, in certain 
instances, the general counsel takes responsibility for 
specific tasks.
Internal Auditors
The purpose of the internal audit function, accord-
ing to the Institute of Internal Auditors, is to conduct 
“an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an or-
ganization’s operations.” Further, internal audit “...
helps an organization accomplish its objectives by 
bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evalu-
ate and improve the effectiveness of risk manage-
ment, control and governance processes.”10
Internal auditors can play an integral role in de-
terring fraud by examining and evaluating the ad-
equacy and effectiveness of the company’s internal 
control structure and establishing control measures 
to reduce the company’s risk. Effective internal con-
trols and processes help mitigate the risk that a mis-
statement is not prevented or detected by the inter-
nal control system and that such misstatement is not 
corrected in an acceptable way and on a timely basis. 
However, internal auditors are not under the same 
requirements as external auditors to detect material 
fraud because, typically, they are not experts in fraud 
detection and investigation.
Despite their important duties surrounding a com-
pany’s internal control environment, internal audi-
tors should not assume the responsibility of manage-
ment. Instead, they must remain objective in their 
assessment of evidence in order to provide an opin-
ion or conclusion regarding a process, system, or 
other subject matter. Internal auditors’ independence 
from the company’s management is structurally re-
inforced by a direct reporting line to the audit com-
mittee or the company’s internal counsel, allowing 
them to express any concerns about management’s 
attention to internal controls or report suspicions of 
fraud involving management.
It is critical that the internal audit activity be po-
sitioned well within the organization so that the 
internal auditors are not limited in what they can 
review and that both they and their proposed rec-
ommendations are respected by line management. 
However, the accountability for and ownership of 
good internal controls is the responsibility of man-
agement, not the internal auditors.
The internal auditors play a unique and vital role 
in the organization. The internal audit activity is 
motivated by a sense of mission, due to (1) its com-
mitment to the organization and management and 
(2) its commitment to independence in allegiance to 
the board and the organization’s stakeholders.
If an internal auditor detects a suspicious event or 
an indication of a possible fraud, he or she is ethical-
ly bound by the rules of the profession to respond. 
The first step is to investigate further until he or 
she can reasonably ascertain if a fraudulent or illegal 
act occurred. If so, the internal auditor is obligated 
to report the occurrence on a timely basis, either 
to senior management or the audit committee, de-
pending on the nature and significance of the event. 
If the internal auditor notifies senior management 
of suspected fraud and senior management does not 
take the proper corrective actions, the internal audi-
tor should report the matter to the audit committee. 
Any fraudulent behavior involving senior manage-
ment should be reported directly to the audit com-
mittee or, if the company does not have an audit 
committee, the board of directors. In many cases, 
the company establishes in its code of conduct11 or 
other policies the party to which the audit com-
mittee must disclose reportable events. In the case 
of evidence of fraudulent financial reporting by 
a company with publicly traded securities regis- 
tered with the SEC, the audit committee or board 
10	From	the	introduction	to	the	Code of Ethics	of	the	Institute	of	Internal	Auditors.	Available	for	viewing	at	www.theiia.org.
11		Code	of	conduct	is	an	organization’s	clear	statement	of	management	philosophy,	which	includes	concise	compliance	standards.	The	standards	are	
consistent	with	management’s	ethics	policy	relevant	to	business	operations.
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of directors must be immediately informed, even if 
senior management is aware of the misstatement and 
in agreement with the internal auditors on the nec-
essary actions.
As previously mentioned, if the board of directors 
or general counsel determine the cause and effect of 
the suspected act to be de minimis, internal auditors 
may conduct the investigation themselves without 
engaging outside experts. However, this alterna-
tive should be carefully considered because inter-
nal auditors do not have the specialized knowledge 
equivalent to someone whose primary responsibility 
is detecting and investigating fraud. Also, regulators 
may later determine that the company’s internal au-
dit function not only lacked appropriate expertise 
but was not objective in the testing it performed 
or in investigating deficiencies in a control environ-
ment that it had helped create.
If charged with a primary role in an investigation, 
internal auditors should, at the investigation’s con-
clusion, assess the facts and circumstances uncovered 
to improve the company’s internal control and an-
tifraud measures. Specifically, internal auditors may 
assess what controls need to be implemented or 
enhanced to reduce control weaknesses; they also 
may design procedures or tests to help detect similar 
frauds. If specific remedial actions are recommended 
by the investigative team, management may dele-
gate to internal auditors the responsibility for imple-
menting and monitoring such new measures.
In sum, the board of directors or other stake-
holders overseeing the internal investigation should 
determine how much involvement internal au-
dit-ors should have in the investigation. Even if 
charged with a secondary role, internal auditors can 
greatly aid forensic accountants in an investigation 
because of the former’s extensive knowledge of the 
organization’s routine processes and controls. Inter-
nal auditors also may liaise between management 
and the investigative team, performing functions 
such as scheduling meetings and interviews and 
obtaining documents and financial records. Using 
internal auditors may be an efficient means of re-
ducing the costs incurred by hiring forensic accoun-
tants, but their use must be kept at an appropriate 
level to ensure the integrity and competency of the 
investigation.
External Stakeholders 
and Advisors
Having reviewed the roles and responsibilities that 
can accrue to some of the more common internal 
stakeholders during an investigation, we now shift 
our focus onto the typical roles and responsibilities 
of external stakeholders and professional advisors.
External Legal Counsel
As previously noted, external legal counsel is typi-
cally retained by the special committee of the board 
of directors or audit committee to investigate allega-
tions of fraud or the lack of management integrity. 
Depending on the circumstances, a company’s ex-
ternal legal counsel can be charged with a number 
of responsibilities. In most investigations, external 
counsel plays a pivotal role.
When an audit committee decides to hire external 
counsel, they need to carefully consider which law 
firm to hire. A number of factors are important, in-
cluding the following:
 1.  Whether the firm has a reputation that will 
stand up to the scrutiny of all parties involved 
in an investigation, including the bench in a 
possible civil proceeding
 2.  Whether the law firm has significant business 
and industry experience and, in particular, 
whether it has significant prior investigative 
experience and expertise
 3.  Independence from the company being inves-
tigated and the ability of the firm to be flexible 
in the face of changing demands throughout 
the lifecycle of the investigation
 4.  The company’s specific investigative needs 
and the external counsel’s ability to not only 
conduct the internal investigation but also 
represent the company in front of regulators
Once retained, external counsel takes a leading 
role, managing the various facets of the investigation 
as well as the many parties involved. Initially, exter-
nal counsel often works with the general counsel’s 
office as well as the audit committee to define the 
scope of the investigation. Prior to the investigation 
commencing, external counsel needs to develop 
and implement an execution strategy, which often 
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is done in concert with the company. In some in-
vestigations, this strategy needs to be updated based 
on new facts, which can often significantly expand 
the scope of the investigation.
Once the investigation starts, the company is re-
sponsible for collecting and retaining all relevant 
documents, which should be secured immediately. 
External counsel is likely to manage this critical 
process to ensure it is thorough and complete and 
then, in conjunction with forensic accountants, is 
responsible for piecing together the factual record 
of events surrounding the misconduct. This usually 
entails a detailed review of all relevant documents 
as well as interviews with employees. This review 
can be daunting because certain large-scale investi-
gations occur in companies with multiple business 
units around the world.
During the review, external counsel and the other 
members of the investigative team should be able to 
identify the parties responsible for the misconduct as 
well as its duration, nature, extent, and financial im-
pact. As the investigation is being executed, exter-
nal counsel periodically updates the audit commit-
tee about the investigation’s status. Throughout this 
process, external counsel must be cognizant of their 
objectivity in handling the facts and must often rely 
on the forensic accountants they retained for the in-
vestigation. Upon having completed their investiga-
tion, external counsel then reports its findings to the 
audit committee in writing or verbally and will most 
likely share these findings with regulators as well, at 
the request of the company. External legal coun-
sel also typically reports on remedial and preventive 
measures the company has previously undertaken or 
will take to ensure the same issues do not recur.
Forensic Accountants
In most investigations, external counsel retains fo-
rensic accountants to act as fact gatherers and in-
vestigate allegations of fraud or the lack of man-
agement integrity. Trained specifically in fraud 
prevention, deterrence, data collection and analysis, 
interviewing, investigation, and detection, forensic 
accountants provide significantly important exper-
tise; many of the same considerations that apply to 
external legal counsel’s hiring of such investigative 
specialists apply to the audit committee’s hiring of 
the law firm itself. In particular, it is important to 
establish whether the accountants have a respected 
reputation, are known for high-quality work, have 
significant prior investigative experience, and have 
the necessary business and industry experience and 
expertise. As with external legal counsel, indepen-
dence from the company is extremely important; 
the forensic accountants should not have any ex-
isting working relationships with the company that 
could cause a conflict of interest.
During the investigation, forensic accountants 
work with counsel, in-house or external, to create 
and implement the strategy to execute all phases of 
the investigation, including retaining and collect-
ing documents, reviewing and analyzing all relevant 
documents, analyzing evidence, interviewing em-
ployees, and helping report to the audit committee 
and regulators.
The forensic accountant provides services that in-
volve “the application of special skills in account-
ing, auditing, finance, quantitative methods, certain 
areas of the law, research, and investigative skills 
to collect, analyze, and evaluate evidential matter 
and to interpret and communicate findings, and 
may involve either an attest or consulting engage-
ment. Forensic accounting services consist of two 
major subcategories: (1) Litigation services; provid-
ing assistance for actual, pending, or potential legal 
or regulatory proceedings before a trier of fact in 
connection with the resolution of disputes between 
parties and (2) Investigative services or nonlitigation 
services; including all forensic services not involving 
actual or threatened litigation, such as performing 
analyses or investigations, that may require the same 
skills as used in litigation services, but do not involve 
the litigation process.”12
A forensic accountant provides a number of ad-
vantages. First, he or she can take an objective look 
at the records of the company with the goal of an-
swering the following very straightforward ques-
tions: What happened? Who was responsible? Why 
did this happen?
12	AICPA,	Special	Report	08-1,	Independence and Integrity and Objectivity in Performing Forensic and Valuation Services.
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Second, as highlighted in the hypothetical Grand 
Forge scenario, a number of allegations concerning 
financial improprieties exist. The forensic account-
ing firm Perusi & Bilanz LLP can help assess the 
scope of work to be done and also provide an early 
assessment of the time necessary to complete the 
task. That assessment will inform what counsel, in-
house or external, reports to the board of directors 
or a special committee thereof when this situation 
is reported.
Finally, hiring a forensic accountant early also can 
help establish the credibility of the investigation, 
which is a critical factor in situations like this one 
in which there are allegations of improper conduct 
by senior level management who are members of 
the board of directors. To the extent that the audit 
committee has its own counsel, the forensic accoun-
tant should be included at this initial meeting and 
he or she should be acceptable to the audit com-
mittee council because this investigation will need 
complete independence, given the level of people 
targeted by the allegations.
For the investigation conducted at Grand Forge, 
the initial scope should be jointly determined by the 
company’s general counsel, outside counsel, and the 
forensic accountants, with input from the company’s 
director of internal audit. These parties also should 
obtain the external auditors’ thoughts to ensure that 
the scope and procedures of the investigation will 
provide sufficient comfort for the external audit 
firm to sign off on the financial statements.
It is important for the forensic accounting firm to 
assist the investigation team in answering the fol-
lowing questions during the initial meeting(s):
	 •		What	is	the	nature	of	the	alleged	fraud	and	how	
far back does it go?
	 •		Which	locations	to	visit?
	 •		What	are	the	necessary	resources	required,	 
including knowledge of local language and  
applicable laws?
	 •		What	types	of	computer	forensics	will	be	used,	
and what types of data protection will be  
considered?
In addition, a list of general questions for the initial 
meeting should be prepared in order to obtain rele-
vant information, such as the type of accounting sys-
tem used by the company, the document retention 
policy, the location of electronic files on servers, the 
location of selected hardcopy files, and the e-mail 
servers’ backup protocols. Chapters 7 (“Sources of 
Evidence”) and 8 (“Electronic Evidence”) discuss in 
detail the considerations that a forensic accounting 
firm should address for evidence collection.
Forensic accountants need to formulate and com-
municate a work plan and budget as soon as rea-
sonably practicable. They also will need to notify 
in-house and external counsel if they determine that 
they will need more time or go over budget. Com-
munication is key, but they also should have ex-
tremely good explanations and justifications for any 
variances from the original plan. On that same note, 
forensic accountants need to provide in- house or 
external counsel with a list of their requirements in 
order to do their jobs effectively.
This list should include, at a minimum, a point 
of contact (likely general counsel), an organizational 
chart, a request for access to the general ledger, and 
an introduction from a trusted person within the or-
ganization to those whose help is required for the 
forensic examiners to do their jobs effectively. Fo-
rensic accountants also would do well to insist on a 
regularly scheduled call with in-house or external 
counsel to discuss progress, obstacles, and projec-
tions so that there are no surprises that could have 
been avoided.
Because most high-profile fraud investigations in-
volve financial reporting or accounting issues, the 
technical accounting expertise of the forensic ac-
countant is often crucial. The role of the forensic 
accountant differs greatly from that of the external 
auditors, and a fraud examination involves signifi-
cantly different goals and execution than a financial 
statement audit.
A financial statement audit is performed specifical-
ly on behalf of the client, but the auditor’s opinion 
is examined by a much larger audience, including 
investors, shareholders, and the regulatory com-
munity. It also is typically performed on a regularly 
recurring basis throughout the fiscal year. Addition-
ally, by design, a financial audit utilizes sampling 
to test various accounts in the company’s financial 
systems and focuses on the underlying accounting 
data supporting management’s proposed financial 
statements. Whereas a financial statement audit 
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begins with the premise that books and records need 
to corroborate what appears in the financial state-
ments, the purpose of a fraud investigation almost 
always involves a suspicion that something may be 
amiss, and the forensic accountant is seeking to con-
firm whether fraudulent accounting, reporting, or 
the misappropriation of assets has occurred. Gener-
ally, too, the forensic accountant also seeks to assign 
accountability for the fraud by determining which 
party is responsible for the wrongdoing. Therefore, 
fraud examinations are performed irregularly and 
only when there is sufficient basis for supposing that 
a fraud may have occurred. Importantly, too, rather 
than simply sampling to test various accounts, foren-
sic accountants look at every single piece of relevant 
evidence available to them.
In his book Accounting Irregularities and Finan-
cial Fraud: A Corporate Governance Guide, Michael 
Young summarizes the main difference between the 
role of an auditor providing a financial statement 
audit and that of a forensic accountant engaged in 
an investigation: 
In a normal GAAS audit, the predicate is that, 
absent evidence to the contrary, everyone is gen-
erally trying to tell the truth. This is not to say 
that an auditor is entitled to accept everything at 
face value. That is certainly not the case. Howev-
er, a normal auditor under GAAS—again, absent 
evidence to the contrary—is entitled in the first 
instance to believe that documents have not been 
forged, that books and records have not been de-
liberately manipulated, and that management’s 
representations to the auditors are true.... In a 
forensic investigation, that predicate changes to 
the complete opposite. Once it has been estab-
lished that the bookkeeping has been infected by 
defrauders, the issue for the forensic accountant 
is: How deep and widespread does it go?13
As previously mentioned, forensic accountants 
attempt to identify the parties responsible for mis-
conduct, as well as the duration, nature, extent, and 
financial impact of such misconduct. A significant 
portion of this work typically contains e-mail and 
document review. At the onset of the investigation, 
all company employees who potentially participated 
in the alleged misconduct will have their desk files 
copied and computer files scanned and copied. Fo-
rensic investigators then typically load these elec-
tronic documents into a software review platform 
and filter documents by key words applicable to the 
issues at hand. As more documents relevant to the 
investigation are identified, the forensic accountants 
review them in an attempt to further establish the 
fact pattern. Depending on the investigation’s scope 
and the size of the company, this electronic review 
can vary from including only a few hundred docu-
ments to including hundreds of thousands of docu-
ments, and in some cases, the review scope includes 
millions of documents.
Although the primary focus of many investiga-
tions is to understand the potentially fraudulent 
transactions and their financial impact, it is equal-
ly important to establish facts around who, what, 
when, where, how, and why. It is not uncommon 
to find that many potentially fraudulent practices or 
transactions were approved by the fraudsters’ superi-
ors or senior executives but only because the fraud-
sters omitted critically important facts about which 
those superiors never knew. As such, they had no 
reason to believe the practices or transactions were 
anything but completely legitimate.
Armed with information from the document re-
view, forensic accountants and external counsel of-
ten interview select employees to further amplify the 
fact pattern established from the document review 
process. Frequently, this increases the investigation’s 
scope because answers to questions often lead to 
additional questions, identify new custodians of in-
formation or additional documents needing review, 
or highlight other previously unidentified issues. 
Forensic accountants also typically perform high-
level analysis of the underlying detailed accounting 
records, supporting information, or financial state-
ment balances to identify other areas requiring fur-
ther investigation. Throughout this process, the fo-
rensic accountant continues to act as a fact gatherer 
13		Michael	R.	Young	and	Jack	H.	Nusbaum,	eds.	Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud: A Corporate Governance Guide,	2nd	ed.	(Chicago,	IL:	CCH,	
Inc.,	2001),	103.
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and provide accounting advice and expertise to the 
external legal counsel and other stakeholders.
As the investigation is executed, forensic accoun-
tants also team with external counsel to periodically 
update the audit committee about its status. Once 
the execution phase of the investigation is com-
plete, they work with external counsel to report 
findings to the committee, either through a written 
or oral report. At times, the forensic accountant’s 
team will, with external counsel, share findings with 
regulators.
External Auditors
Users of audited financial statements typically ex-
pect external auditors to detect fraud and irregulari-
ties, but external auditors don’t certify a clean bill of 
health for the audited company.
The responsibility of the external audit firm dur-
ing the normal course of its work is to plan and per-
form an audit that provides company management 
and shareholders with reasonable assurance about 
whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether caused by error, fraud, or il-
legal act. Although preparing the financial statements 
is management’s responsibility, it is the responsibil-
ity of the auditor to express an opinion on them. To 
obtain reasonable assurance in order to express that 
opinion, the audit team has many responsibilities it 
must fulfill. In every audit, it is important for the au-
ditor to remain completely independent of the cli-
ent so that he or she can attest to the reliability of the 
financial statements, absent any conflicts of interest.
External auditors play a very important role in the 
lifecycle of a fraud investigation for a number of rea-
sons. If and when fraud is detected, the auditor is re-
quired to report it to company management and its 
audit committee, as well as determine whether any 
illegal act actually occurred and its possible effect 
on the financial statements. Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit, speaks to the auditor’s re-
sponsibility for fraud detection. It enjoins auditors to 
develop an increased professional skepticism when 
conducting the audit: “The auditor should conduct 
the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the 
possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud 
could be present, regardless of any past experience 
with the entity and regardless of the auditor’s belief 
about management’s honesty and integrity.”14
The auditor also is required to perform prelimi-
nary procedures to identify all the risks of material 
misstatement due to fraud. These procedures in-
clude, but are not limited to, inquiries of manage-
ment, analytical procedures, and the consideration 
of whether the three fraud risk factors—incentive, 
opportunity, and rationalization—are present at the 
company.
All publicly traded companies also are subject to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and must con-
form to the rules of Section 404 of SOX, which de-
scribes management’s required assessment of internal 
controls. Specifically, Section 404 states that a com-
pany’s annual report must contain an internal con-
trol report stating (1) that it is management’s respon-
sibility to establish and maintain an adequate internal 
control structure and (2) the company’s procedures 
for financial reporting. That internal control report 
also should include an assessment of the effective-
ness of the internal control structure and the issuer’s 
procedures for financial reporting as of the most re-
cent year-end.15 Section 404 also requires that any 
“registered public accounting firm that prepares or 
issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, 
and report on, the assessment made by management 
of the issuer.”
If during the course of an audit, the external audi-
tor discovers or suspects an illegal or fraudulent act, 
he or she should investigate to determine its nature 
and extent. The external auditor should consider its 
potential materiality, the possible effect on the fi-
nancial statements, and whether any possible fines, 
penalties, or damages could result.16 If the illegal act 
is clearly inconsequential to the financial statements, 
no communication is necessary. On the other hand, 
14		AICPA	Statement	on	Auditing	Standards	No.	99,	Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit	(AICPA,	Professional Standards,	vol.	1,	AU	sec.	
316	par.	13).
15	SOX,	Pub	L.	107-204,	116	Stat.	745.	Section	404.
16	The	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934,	Section	10A:	Audit	Requirements.
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findings of material acts should be communicated to 
management or the audit committee, whichever is a 
more suitable option. In the compressed time frame 
of reporting in the current accounting environment, 
speedy communication of any findings is the key to 
resolving the issue.
The auditor also must pay close attention to how 
the issue is dealt with by management. If the latter 
does not quickly and adequately respond to the au-
ditor’s concerns and does not seek to remediate the 
issue, and if the issue would cause a departure from a 
standard audit opinion or precipitate the resignation 
of the audit firm, then the audit firm must report 
its conclusions to the board of directors. If a report 
has to be furnished to the board, the company must 
inform the SEC no later than one day after receiving 
the report and also must furnish the audit firm with 
a copy of the notice furnished to the SEC. If the au-
dit firm fails to receive this notice, they need to ei-
ther resign from the engagement or furnish the SEC 
with a copy of its report no later than one business 
day following such failure to receive the notice.17
When fraud is uncovered and an investigation 
does ensue, the external auditor plays a peripheral 
role. Because the burden most often shifts to the 
company to investigate, auditors are not typically 
involved in the day-to-day operations of the in-
vestigation. However, because the audit firm is still 
responsible for issuing an opinion on the financial 
statements of the company, it has a vested interest to 
maintain involvement in the investigation.
Keeping external auditors involved also helps in-
vestigators because the auditors have key information 
about the company obtained through their financial 
statement audits and SOX Section 404 compliance 
testing. It also is important for the company to keep 
the auditor informed of the scope, progress, find-
ings, and recommendations of the investigation on 
a timely basis because, in order for the audit firm to 
issue an unqualified opinion, it must accept that the 
company has thoroughly investigated and remedi-
ated the issues. In the Grand Forge example , there-
fore, the external auditors Handel & Smith LLP 
would communicate regularly with in-house and 
external counsel and the forensic accountants Perusi 
& Bilanz LLP. Handel & Smith would be interest-
ed in understanding the scope of the investigation 
and its progress and findings. For this reason, the 
forensic accountant and external auditor have regu-
lar communications during an investigation. Many 
audit firms also find it useful to conduct a “shadow 
investigation” to independently assess whether the 
audit committee’s findings, actions, and recom-
mendations are appropriate. Once the investigation 
concludes, if the external auditor does not feel that 
senior management took appropriate and timely re-
medial actions related to the fraud or misconduct, 
the auditor could depart from a standard unqualified 
opinion or resign from the engagement altogether. 
Either action would undoubtedly have severe nega-
tive implications for the company.
As mentioned in earlier paragraphs, obtaining in-
put from the external auditor at the onset of the 
investigation, especially as the scope of the investi-
gation is being determined, is of critical importance. 
The external auditor needs to have comfort in man-
agement and its integrity and assurance it can rely on 
the representations made by management.
The forensic team determines the scope of the in-
vestigation without guidance from the external au-
ditor. However, if they were not going to investi-
gate an area or issue that the external auditor would 
like to be investigated, the external auditor would 
suggest that, based upon the facts and circumstances 
in this case, the concerned issue should be investi-
gated because it may be an area of risk that deserves 
further in-depth investigation, regardless of what the 
auditor did or did not do during his or her audit.
Typically, the auditors do not make their working 
papers available unless they are subpoenaed; how-
ever, this does not mean that the outside auditor 
does not share pertinent information that might be 
helpful to the investigating team in conducting their 
investigation. For instance, providing information 
about the structure and management of the opera-
tions involved is oftentimes provided.
Cooperation and ongoing communication among 
all the parties will facilitate an effective and efficient 
process.
17	Ibid.
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Regulators
Regulators typically involved in internal investiga-
tions include the SEC; the Department of Justice 
(DOJ); the IRS; the stock exchanges, including the 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ; and 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB). The SEC and DOJ are the most often 
dealt with regulators. The SEC’s mission is to pro-
tect investors, and the DOJ plays an important role 
in fighting economic crimes and investigating pos-
sible frauds.
As previously noted, absent subpoenas from gov-
ernment regulators, the board of directors needs to 
decide how it will report the corporate misconduct, 
if at all. The board generally does not have a duty to 
report corporate misconduct to government regula-
tors, although self-reporting to regulators may be in 
the company’s best interests. Strict SEC reporting 
rules insist upon disclosing any facts that are material 
to the company’s financial statements.
Once a company has reported misconduct, either 
through self-reporting or disclosure in regulatory 
filings, regulators want to ensure that the ongoing 
investigation is thorough, complete, and adequately 
scoped. They will typically monitor the investiga-
tion by maintaining periodic contact with the com-
pany’s audit committee, external counsel, or even 
forensic accountants. Status reports are provided by 
the company to the regulators. Moreover, it is not 
uncommon for regulators to request the auditor’s 
working papers and, at times, to inquire about other 
potential issues not specific to the current investi-
gation. Regulators often look for prompt report-
ing on potential exposures to fraud, from the initial 
discovery of the issue to its elevation to the board 
of directors. Regulators also expect the company 
to hire external legal counsel and forensic accoun-
tants to conduct the investigation. When necessary, 
they also may inquire about the removal from office 
of responsible employees, including those with an 
oversight role.
Conclusion
The answers to the tough questions conveyed in this 
chapter boil down to two issues:
	 •		First,	a	company	needs	to	be	proactive	and	
prepared. A company’s audit committee or the 
board of directors should consider prescreening 
external law firms and forensic accounting firms 
it is considering so that they will be ready to 
hit the ground running (for example, knowing 
information about a company in advance and 
being ready to assign personnel as best they can). 
This is similar to a disaster recovery plan for 
information technology that asks the question: 
What are you going to do when the crisis  
occurs?
	 •		Second,	the	spirit	of	“teamwork”	is	required	
throughout the process. Someone has to be in 
charge, but all of the players have to be flexible 
and allow each of the stakeholders to do their 
job in a credible way.
In the high-stakes world of company investiga-
tions and prosecutions, it is critically important to 
have successful investigations that are properly per-
formed and that are thorough and complete. For 
an investigation to succeed, all stakeholders must 
clearly understand their responsibilities and per-
form their fiduciary responsibilities to the fullest. 
The interrelationships among internal, external, and 
independent counsel and outside auditors, forensic 
accountants, and other consultants can often mean 
the difference between a satisfactory conclusion of a 
matter and one that is not properly performed. The 
monetary and reputational costs of an unsuccessful 
investigation can be significant and detrimental. For 
a successful investigation, each stakeholder has to 
understand what the issues are, what must be done, 
and how their own efforts and work product fit into 
the grand anthology that is the investigation. It is 
therefore vital to understand the different roles and 
responsibilities of the various stakeholders who are 
accountable for how an investigation is ultimately 
conducted.
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Introduction
Numerous sources of evidence must be considered 
by a forensic accountant when conducting a fraud 
investigation. The primary source typically con-
sidered is the financial and accounting records of a 
company. Until relatively recently, reviewing finan-
cial and accounting records meant diligently perus-
ing stacks and boxes of paper documents, along with 
ledgers and reports on computers. Although relevant 
to an investigation, the days of poring over paper 
ledgers and processing reams of physical documents 
are gone. In today’s business environment, a major 
portion of a fraud investigation can be conducted 
through analyzing a company’s electronic data, in 
addition to the review of hard copy documents. The 
process of preserving, collecting, processing, and 
analyzing the electronic data is of significant impor-
tance in an investigation and involves many complex 
processes that must be carefully undertaken. These 
processes, along with a discussion of standards for 
electronic evidence management, will be covered in 
chapter 8, “Electronic Evidence.”
This chapter, however, focuses on the uses of a 
company’s internal electronic evidence as a source 
of evidence in a fraud investigation once it has been 
processed and made ready for analysis by the foren-
sic accountant. In addition to electronic evidence, 
this chapter addresses the importance of reviewing 
hard copy evidence in an investigation, including 
the various types of internal company hard copy 
documentation that should be considered. Finally, 
this chapter explores several other important types 
of evidence beyond internal company documenta-
tion, including oral evidence, publicly available evi-
dence, and evidence from other third parties.
Electronic Evidence
When initially retained to assist in an investigation, 
typically one of the first steps undertaken by the 
forensic accountants is to identify and gather cer-
tain key pieces of electronic evidence relative to the 
case. Depending on the particular circumstances of 
an investigation, two types of electronic evidence 
commonly analyzed include e-mail correspondence 
of key individuals and financial records of the com-
pany. Because this data can be obtained in electronic 
format, the review can begin prior to commencing 
any fieldwork or site visits to client locations. For 
a discussion of methods for identifying, preserving, 
and collecting electronic evidence see “The Elec-
tronic Evidence Review Process” section in chapter 
8, “Electronic Evidence.”
E-mail Correspondence
Based upon initial information known or obtained 
from counsel or the client, key individuals should 
be identified who could have knowledge relevant 
to the investigation.
Once these individuals are identified, electronic 
data can be collected. Sources of this data could in-
clude the following: 
	 •		Individual	company	e-mail	accounts,	including	
attachments
	 •		Company	server	data
	 •		Individual	company	hard	drives
	 •		Personal	e-mail	accounts,	especially	when	 
accessed from a company computer
	 •		Instant	messaging	conversations
	 •		Handheld	personal	devices
For a discussion of various categories of electronic 
evidence see the “Sources of Electronic Evidence” 
section in chapter 8, “Electronic Evidence.”
Once the data is obtained and has been uploaded 
into a review tool, a team of forensic accountants 
will typically establish a review protocol to identify 
“Whoever corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a 
record ... with the intent to impair the object’s integrity ... shall be
imprisoned for not more than 20 years.”
Section 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
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key e-mails and associated documents of interest in 
the	investigation.	Creating	a	robust	review	protocol	
ensures that the review team is reviewing e-mails 
consistently and that they are familiar with key is-
sues	 in	 the	 investigation.	 Chapter	 8,	 “Electronic	
Evidence,” includes a discussion of review team 
training in the “Review” section.
One of the first steps in this process will be es-
tablishing keywords that are relevant to the inves-
tigation and based upon known information. For 
example, in the context of a revenue recognition 
review, keywords could include accelerate, big bath, 
cookie jar, stretch, gap, pull-in, close the gap, and 
so on. When the keywords have been identified, 
keyword searches can be run on the data to iden-
tify e-mails and other documents containing these 
words or phrases.
The next step in the process is to educate the team 
conducting the e-mail review on the topics relevant 
to the investigation. Typically, a memo detailing 
information known about a particular business or 
subject relevant to the e-mail review will be drafted 
and shared with the review team. Alternatively, and 
potentially in addition to the written memo, this in-
formation can be shared with the review team in a 
live discussion to give the reviewers the opportunity 
to ask questions.
The e-mail review protocol also should include 
establishing annotation codes to be included in the 
e-mail review tool so that the e-mail review team 
can code the documents as they review them. An-
notation codes will typically be established for two 
reasons: first, to indicate the level of relevancy of a 
particular e-mail and, second, to put e-mails into 
meaningful categories. The forensic accountants 
should consider creating themes or categories for 
the e-mails to be grouped into, based upon informa-
tion relevant to the investigation. These categories 
can be updated based upon new information ob-
tained as the e-mail review is carried out, but estab-
lishing these categories from the outset will benefit 
the team in the long run. In addition, levels of rel-
evancy	could	include	“Hot,”	“Relevant,”	or	“Not	
Relevant.”
During the review process, the e-mail review 
team can use the annotations included in the tool 
to indicate the level of relevancy of the document as 
well as the preestablished category, when applicable. 
These categories will be useful to the forensic ac-
countants when creating a summary of findings for 
the e-mail review portion of the investigation. It is 
important to note that because e-mail review is of-
ten one of the most crucial steps in the investigation, 
proper levels of quality review of the results and 
findings of e-mails identified is essential and should 
be considered part of the e-mail review protocol.
Creating	a	robust	review	protocol,	as	previously	
discussed, ensures that the team is reviewing e-mails 
consistently and that they are familiar with key is-
sues of the investigation. Oftentimes, information 
highly relevant to the investigation is obtained from 
e-mails and documents identified during the review. 
This information can allow the forensic accounting 
team to identify key transactions, general ledger ac-
counts, or payments to relevant parties that unveil 
schemes, which begin to tell a story. In addition, 
key individuals, perhaps not initially considered as 
important in the investigation, could be identified as 
potential	targets	as	schemes	are	uncovered.	Chapter	
8, “Electronic Evidence,” includes a section on fo-
rensic analysis and structured and unstructured data 
analysis for further information.
Also note that information relevant to the in-
vestigation can be obtained from other electronic 
sources, including personal e-mail accounts, espe-
cially when accessed on a company computer; in-
stant messaging conversations; and blackberries and 
other handheld personal devices. It is important to 
identify all potential sources of key data for collec-
tion purposes. 
Electronic Financial and 
Accounting Records
The second key type of electronic evidence typi-
cally analyzed in a fraud investigation is the financial 
and accounting records of a company. As an inves-
tigation begins, the forensic accountants submit a 
“request list” to the client asking for certain types 
of information and documentation believed to be 
relevant to the investigation, based upon informa-
tion known at that time. Often, the majority of this 
information can be provided to the accountants 
electronically. Depending on the type of investiga-
tion, the request list would include different items, 
as described subsequently.
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When conducting an investigation, obtaining the 
client’s chart of accounts for the general ledger and 
the general ledger itself (depending on the size) are 
the two foundational pieces of evidence. The chart 
of accounts allows the accountants the ability to 
identify relevant general ledger accounts requiring 
further analysis, based upon account name, account 
number, and a description of items recorded in the 
account. When accounts are identified that appear 
to be relevant, details of transactions recorded in 
these accounts can be obtained from the general 
ledger itself. Performing an analysis of general led-
ger accounts allows the accountants to identify key 
transactions or patterns that will potentially require 
further analysis. These patterns, for example, could 
include transactions with repeating amounts, large 
amounts in comparison to other amounts, round 
amounts, or transactions made at regular intervals. 
In many ways, electronic general ledger data forms 
the cornerstone and serves a key starting point when 
conducting a fraud investigation.
In addition, other types of electronic reports con-
taining financial and accounting data can be request-
ed and obtained from the client. Examples include 
the following:
	 •		Customer	master	file
	 •		Vendor	master	file
	 •		Employee	authorization	and	approval	levels
	 •		Expense	report	databases
	 •		Contract	databases	(typically	maintained	by	 
in-house legal department)
These documents supplement the general led-
ger by allowing the forensic accountants to iden-
tify transactions with key vendors and customers 
or transactions approved by individuals of interest, 
all of which can be critical to the next steps in an 
investigation.
Hard Copy Evidence
Although obtaining and reviewing data in an elec-
tronic format has simplified the job of a forensic ac-
countant in certain ways, the review of hard copy 
documentation is equally as significant when con-
ducting an investigation. Typically, to gain access to 
hard copy and all relevant documents, the forensic 
accountants must conduct a site visit to certain loca-
tions of a company’s operations. Being on-site at a 
client location affords numerous advantages to the 
forensic accountants. Among other reasons, such as 
being able to see that the location exists and to hold 
conversations with key individuals, reviewing doc-
uments in hard copy format is very advantageous. 
Seeing the documents in person allows the accoun-
tants to clarify information that is unclear by asking 
questions and gain useful information in person that 
would not be obtained if the accountants were not 
on-site.
The forensic accountant would typically request 
access to several categories of hard copy evidence, 
including (1) financial and accounting records; (2) 
contracts and other operational records; and (3) 
other documentation, including desk files and hand-
written notes.
Hard Copy Financial and 
Accounting Records
For fraud investigators, the ability to see documents 
in person often affords the accountants the ability to 
identify key items that would not have been observ-
able otherwise.
In addition to the general ledger, which can be 
obtained in electronic format, many other types of 
financial records of a company are critical to include 
for review in a fraud investigation. This documenta-
tion could include the following:
	 •		Invoices	for	specific	transactions	to	identify	 
potentially fake invoices or vendors
	 •		Company	bank	statements	to	review	detailed	
cash inflows and outflows
	 •		Copies	of	cancelled	checks	that	identify	the	
location where check was deposited or who 
endorsed the check
	 •		Support	for	accrual	journal	entries	to	identify	
explanations for manual journal entries and     
authorizations
Contracts and Other 
Operational Records
In addition to financial and accounting hard copy 
documents, reviewing actual copies of contracts and 
other operational records is a key source of evidence 
to be considered. In particular, review of actual 
contracts affords the forensic accountants the abil-
ity to identify key pieces of information that might 
not otherwise have been identified. For example, 
reviewing draft versions of the contracts in compari-
son to final versions could lead to the identification 
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of	relevant	information.	Handwritten	notes	on	the	
documents could also be relevant, in addition to 
written or oral side agreements and amendments to 
the contracts, which could potentially be identified.
For example, a contract could be amended to re-
flect changes in the timing of title transfer or risk 
of loss transfer. Depending on the revenue recogni-
tion accounting guidance a particular business has 
adopted, changes in the timing of title transfer and 
risk of loss could allow for revenue to be recognized 
earlier for a particular contract. Forensic accountants 
must therefore be aware of all amendments and ad-
dendums, in the context of this example, to under-
stand if revenue is being recognized appropriately. 
In addition, a side agreement to an existing contract 
could provide an opportunity for an entity to re-
ceive	bribes	or	kickbacks	from	a	third	party.	Hav-
ing knowledge of these side agreements, therefore, 
would be necessary for the forensic accountants, in 
the context of investigating fraud or alleged wrong-
doing.
Operational records, including shipping docu-
ments, such as packing slips, bills of lading, and other 
key signatory documents, are typically maintained at 
a client location in hard copy form. Other types of 
operational records that could be obtained are out-
lined in box 7-1.
Box 7-1:  Types of Operational Records
•		Compliance	materials,	which	detail	com-
pany compliance policies and procedures.  
Examples of policies include T&E poli-
cies,	FCPA	policies,	accounting	policies,	
and policies related to regulatory bodies.
•		Employee	training	materials.
•		Ethics	materials,	including	the	code	of	
conduct and whistle-blower or ethics 
violations reports. These reports could 
help the forensic accountants understand 
areas of past violations and others issues 
reported internally.
•		Organizational	charts,	including	both	
historic and current, which detail seg-
regation of duties, titles, and reporting 
structure.
Example: FCPA 
Investigation
When conducting a Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (FCPA) investigation (see chapter 4, “For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations”), a 
trip to certain client locations is typically required 
by the forensic accountants to review key hard 
copy documentation maintained only at those 
locations.
In particular, receipts and invoices support-
ing payments made to certain parties could be 
reviewed. In many countries, a large number 
of transactions take place in cash. To review 
support for outgoing cash payments, typically 
these receipts or supporting documentation would 
be kept on-site at the company’s local office. 
On certain occasions, key information for cash 
payments can be determined by looking at actual 
receipts or invoices that would not be identi-
fied solely based upon analysis of a company’s 
general ledger system. For example, in reviewing 
invoices maintained in a company’s accounts 
payable files, a similar invoice template could be 
used numerous times to support payments made 
from petty cash to different parties. Reviewing 
copies of these invoices could lead the forensic 
accountant to the identification of fake vendors 
or falsified payments. In addition, information 
could be recorded on a receipt that is not recorded 
in the general ledger.
Also, documents that support travel and 
entertainment (T&E) reports could be an area of 
focus in this type of investigation. Of particu-
lar interest would be reviewing details of T&E 
reports and supporting receipts. For example, if 
a company officer took a government official to 
dinner, the general ledger would typically only 
capture that the expenditure was for dinner. It is 
possible that the company employee could have 
handwritten on the receipt that the meal was for 
him or herself and the name of the government 
official. This information would be uncovered 
only if the actual receipt itself was reviewed by 
the forensic accountants.
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Other Hard Copy  
Documents
Although collecting and reviewing financial and 
operational records of an entity being investigated 
is customary, other types of evidence to consider 
includes personal desk files of key individuals as well 
as handwritten notes. As with e-mail and electronic 
evidence review, the investigating team should de-
velop protocols for hard copy documents. The re-
view protocol assists the team with an understanding 
of the issues important to the investigation and gives 
guidance to the review team about what to look for, 
how to record the findings of its review, and how 
to clear any queries that arise for the review. Again, 
proper protocol must be followed in obtaining these 
documents, but they can often contain information 
highly relevant to the case.
Working papers of the internal audit group of a 
company could also be relevant to a fraud investiga-
tion. Many large organizations have robust internal 
audit functions. Depending on the company, the 
role of this group could include documenting key 
processes and conducting analysis related to high-
risk areas of a company.
Depending on the type of investigation, docu-
mentation and analysis performed by the internal 
auditors could be relevant to the investigation. Of-
ten, this documentation could reduce the work re-
quired in the investigation because it already exists. 
Internal audit findings and reports could include is-
sues relevant to the investigation at hand, particu-
larly accounting issues, such as revenue recognition. 
Furthermore, these reports could allow the forensic 
accountants to determine patterns of activity with-
in business units or regions in which the company 
operates. The investigation can then be focused on 
those areas.
Other Sources of 
Evidence
In addition to electronic and hard copy evidence, 
several other key types of evidence need to be con-
sidered in a fraud investigation, including oral evi-
dence, publically available information, and infor-
mation from other third parties.
Oral Evidence
Because fraudulent activity involves deception, 
documents may be altered or falsified to cover the 
wrongdoing. Therefore, it is often difficult to iden-
tify which documents are fraudulent without gath-
ering information through interviews of individuals 
possibly having knowledge about the fraud.
Therefore, an important step in conducting a 
fraud investigation is obtaining information in an 
oral form, including formal interviews as well as in-
formal meetings of key parties. In many investiga-
tions, formal interviews are conducted in conjunc-
tion with in-house or external counsel and involve 
significant preparation. These interviews are con-
ducted with individuals believed to be key to the 
investigation because they may have knowledge of 
the fraudulent activities or its perpetrators. Two or 
more interviewers are typically present during a for-
mal interview and detailed notes are taken.
By comparison, informal meetings are often held 
with individuals not believed to be as central to the 
investigation at hand and take the form of common 
inquiries, such as discussing the controls and pro-
cesses involved in a financial statement cycle, the 
reasons for unexpected fluctuations noted when 
performing analytical review procedures, manage-
ment philosophies, or the understanding of the or-
ganization’s accounting structure. These meetings 
could be one-on-one meetings between a forensic 
accountant and the individual and detailed notes 
may or may not be taken.
Formal Interviews
Interviews seek to (1) obtain information regard-
ing various areas, including an individual’s cur-
rent and past roles at the company and his or her 
knowledge of certain business practices (particularly 
those at issue in the investigation), and (2) identify 
other areas for consideration in the investigation. 
Formal interviews of employees significant to an 
investigation should be conducted at the outset of 
the investigation to gather information and relevant 
facts. Follow-up interviews of these individuals can 
be conducted as needed, based upon new informa-
tion	obtained	further	into	the	investigation.	Counsel	
typically prepares a formal interview memorandum, 
which could become part of the written record in 
an investigation.
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Information obtained from formal interviews can 
be vital to the investigation and, therefore, prepa-
ration is critical. Forensic accountants and counsel 
want to gain as much relevant information as pos-
sible from the interview subject, and depending on 
the circumstances and timing of a particular investi-
gation, a single interview might be the only chance 
to speak with this person.
In addition to conducting formal interviews of 
current and former employees of a company, inter-
views can be conducted of parties closely affiliated 
with the company, including board members and 
officers of the organization. As discussed previous-
ly, interviews are typically conducted in conjunc-
tion with in-house or external counsel assisting in 
the investigation. Forensic accountants are typically 
asked to assist counsel in preparing interview ques-
tions. Specific questions regarding documents or 
e-mails obtained at a certain point in an investigation 
can be posed to the interview subject. Identifying 
specific documents for questioning often allows for 
key information to be obtained from the intervie-
wee. Typically, forensic accountants will be asked 
to attend interviews involving accounting or finance 
personnel and counsel will often give the forensic 
accountants the opportunity to ask questions dur-
ing the interviews to ensure all relevant information 
is	obtained.	Chapter	10,	“Working	with	Attorneys:	
The	Relationship	With	Counsel,”	covers	aspects	of	
working with counsel in greater depth. 
Informal Meetings with Employees
In addition to formal interviews, key information 
can be obtained by forensic accountants from indi-
viduals at a company in informal meetings. Similar 
to more formal interviews, the purpose of informal 
meetings	is	information	gathering.	Counsel	may	or	
may not be present for these meetings and meeting 
notes might be recorded but are not required. In-
formal meetings are typically held between forensic 
accountants and employees for a particular purpose, 
potentially to gain information regarding a certain 
document or transaction at hand. Relevant informa-
tion obtained from these meetings would be cap-
tured in the forensic accountants’ working papers, 
as deemed necessary.
Oral Evidence from Other Parties
In addition to conducting interviews and holding 
informal meetings with current and former employ-
ees of a company, information can be obtained from 
conversations with other key stakeholders affiliated 
with a company. These parties could include board 
members, officers of an organization, vendors, cus-
tomers, consultants, brokers, agents, or external or 
internal auditors. Depending on the circumstances 
of a specific investigation, all relevant parties should 
be considered for collecting oral evidence.
For example, obtaining information from consul-
tants, brokers, and agents could be highly relevant 
to	an	FCPA	investigation.	Understanding	these	par-
ties’ roles in business activities could be useful in 
understanding certain processes. For example, un-
derstanding the role of a customs broker and his or 
her interactions with customs officials could have 
an impact on the investigation. Understanding the 
sales process from the perspective of the sales agents 
could also be important to identify suspicious trans-
actions or related parties.
Furthermore, conversations with both internal and 
external auditors could be important in conducting a 
financial fraud investigation. Typically, the external 
auditors would have knowledge regarding manage-
ment’s compliance culture or tone at the top. For 
example, external auditors could provide insight on 
management’s willingness to make changes to the 
financial statements based upon audit findings.
The internal auditors, alternatively, would have 
knowledge regarding key internal processes of the 
business. In numerous fraud investigations, the fo-
rensic accountants work alongside the internal audit 
group to assist in the workload and also to ensure 
that information and resources are available to the 
forensic accountants, as needed. Often, if conduct-
ing site visits to client locations, the internal auditors 
accompany the forensic accountants to assist in the 
investigation.
Publicly Available 
Information
In conducting a fraud investigation, forensic ac-
countants also can rely on another source for evi-
dence and information that is complementary to the 
various internal records of an entity: public records. 
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A governmental unit is required by law to keep 
numerous records and make them available to the 
public. Although the Internet has made some pub-
lic records more readily available, the application of 
such records’ use in fraud investigations requires an 
in-depth understanding of a myriad of all available 
information.
Using Public Record Information in 
Fraud Investigations
Public records can provide forensic accountants and 
their clients with a broader overview of the enti-
ties and subjects under investigation. They provide 
evidence not typically available in the internal books 
and records of a company. Often, such supplemental 
information can improve, enhance, and give clarity 
to other aspects of the investigation. By researching, 
compiling, and analyzing such records, the accoun-
tant can establish a more comprehensive picture of 
the scenario in which a particular act or set of acts 
occurred. Particularly of value in a fraud investiga-
tion is that most public record retrieval leaves no 
“trail.” The subject of the investigation and research 
has no knowledge that the online research is being 
conducted because he or she is not notified about 
the search.1 Inquiries remain largely confidential, 
discreet, and nonintrusive. As such, they can provide 
strategically important information. Although such 
research can be as comprehensive as circumstances 
dictate, the investigative scope can be customized to 
target information specific to the case.2
Public information builds a more complete pic-
ture of its subject and allows for better profiles of 
what has occurred and what could have occurred. 
If retained to investigate one or more individuals, 
the investigator can begin to appreciate important 
aspects of an individual’s life, including where he 
or she has lived and worked, what he or she has 
chosen to purchase, with what activities and orga-
nizations the subject is or has been involved in their 
communities, and legal actions (either as the subject 
defendant or claimant). Searches will help establish 
whether the subject has faced difficult personal is-
sues in his or her life, especially those like divorce or 
alcohol abuse (for example, through DUI convic-
tions), which can create financial stress and could 
have precipitated fraudulent activity; who their rela-
tives are; what home and property he or she owns 
or has owned; what kind of cars he or she owns and 
has owned; what companies have employed him or 
her as officers; and more.
In some cases, assets identified in these investi-
gations reveal indications of financial worth or a 
standard of living out-of-line with expectations. 
This information may provide indication of misap-
propriation of funds or other financial misconduct. 
When a known amount of funds are missing, asset 
tracing can be a key tool for tabulating specific assets 
in relation to the monetary loss. Other information, 
such as financial stressors, may indicate a motive for 
misconduct for fraud. A history of financial troubles, 
such as liens, judgments, bankruptcies, divorce, or 
litigation, would be typical indicators of financial 
stress.
Public record sources and investigations can pro-
vide useful information to prepare strategically for 
interviews of company officers or other individu-
als who may be suspected of committing fraudulent 
acts; such interviews are often part of a forensic ac-
counting investigation. Background research pro-
vides historical insight and supplementary informa-
tion that can sharpen the interview approach by not 
only saving time or helping clarify information but 
also by testing the veracity of the interviewee.
Similarly, publicly available information is appli-
cable for investigating companies. It can substantiate 
the existence of vendors or demonstrate certain ven-
dors to be a fraudulent (that is, a “ghost company”). 
Research can include information about officers, es-
tablish company sales and revenues, and identify as-
sets like land, warehouses, aircraft, and vehicles. For 
companies publicly traded in the United States, all 
Securities	 and	 Exchange	Commission	 (SEC)	 pub-
lic filings are available, including not only quarterly, 
annual, and other required filings but enforcement 
actions	 and	 any	 other	 comments	 from	 the	 SEC.	
1		The	exceptions	to	this	are	when	a	person	is	asked	for	written	consent	for	a	credit	report	request	and	when	a	Dun	&	Bradstreet	business	report	is	
requested	for	a	company	that	has	no	existing	report	or	is	requested	for	an	update	on	an	existing	report,	in	which	case	Dun	&	Bradstreet	requests	infor-
mation	from	the	company	and	can	inform	them	that	a	request	for	information	has	been	made.
2	See	also	appendix	B	for	a	more	comprehensive	listing.
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Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement actions 
and civil criminal court filings also can be identified, 
from	the	U.S.	District	Court	level	down	to	the	state	
or county court level.
What Are Public Records?
Traditionally defined, public records include any 
document that has been filed or recorded by a pub-
lic agency in a public office that the general public 
has	 a	 right	 to	examine.	Historically	 stored	 in	hard	
copy, public record information now is widely 
available on searchable computer databases. Numer-
ous governmental sources can provide information 
relevant to investigations, including federal, state, or 
local government records and disclosures made to 
the general public as required by federal, state, or 
local law.
What records qualify as public varies depending 
on state and federal law. Examples include govern-
ment contracts with businesses; birth, marriage, and 
death records; court dockets and litigation filings; 
arrest records; property ownership and tax assess-
ment information; regulatory filings; driver’s license 
information;	 occupational	 licenses;	 and	 SEC	 en-
forcement actions and filings, including annual and 
quarterly audited financial statements of publicly 
traded entities.3	Counties	and	states	vary	in	their	fil-
ing requirements, and federal regulatory agencies are 
required by law to provide some records publicly 
but others are not subject to disclosure. What infor-
mation is rightfully public varies between jurisdic-
tions and regulatory bodies, and care should be tak-
en to understand the coverage, in particular when 
retrieving online public records whose jurisdictional 
coverage can be far more variable depending on the 
type of record.
Physical records are readily available and inex-
pensive; for U.S. entities and persons, such records 
are comprehensive and available nationwide. U.S. 
privacy laws are relatively limited in their purview, 
meaning a vast amount of information is readily 
available. Access to information about persons or 
entities outside the United States is more limited, 
but with the expansion of Internet sites and widely 
available electronic and online media, the sources 
and searchable information are rapidly expanding.
Many local, state, and federal agencies are upgrad-
ing their records systems to electronic format, estab-
lishing and maintaining searchable Web sites. For 
example, many U.S. counties maintain searchable 
Web pages that allow searches for property owner-
ship by name, address, or other information, such as 
the parcel number of the property. When the prop-
erty is identified, the researcher may find informa-
tion about sales and purchases; improvements to the 
property; property descriptions; tax assessment re-
cords; land plots; and, in some cases, aerial or street 
view photographs of the property, or both. If the 
agency does not maintain records online, they usu-
ally provide information about who to contact to 
obtain the information offline, which is generally a 
clerk of the agency or office.
Open access to public record information pro-
vided by governmental sites, such as those for the 
SEC	 and	 DOJ,	 allows	 searches	 of	 enforcement 
actions and other documentation. In the rush to 
transparency, regulatory bodies, government agen-
cies, and corporations and businesses worldwide 
have developed sophisticated Web sites with pub-
licly available information.
Other Publicly Available Information
The breadth of publicly available information is 
not limited to the formal and legally kept public 
records held by federal, state, and local authorities. 
The world of publicly available information also 
now includes the enormous and growing repository 
of online data, including search engines, Web logs 
(blogs), and Web sites. Although this form of in-
formation may be useful in providing intelligence, 
such information requires utmost discretion in its 
use and application in a fraud investigation. Profes-
sional skepticism should be applied in determining 
how this open-sourced information fits in with the 
other facts and circumstances relevant to the in-
vestigation.	Collaboration	with	 other	 professionals	
should be considered, especially in light of the fact 
that the information uncovered may not be admis-
sible as evidence and its integrity can be laid open to 
questions by interested parties. Furthermore, the de-
cision to discuss information obtained through these 
3	See	also	appendix	A:	Examples	of	Sources	of	Public	Information.
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sources with the client and attorneys or to include 
the information in client reports should be carefully 
weighed.
How to Get the Data
Forensic accountants generally work with investiga-
tive public record researchers who are familiar with 
all aspects of public records, including knowledge 
of sources and proper protocol in obtaining the in-
formation. These individuals can assist forensic ac-
countants in managing all aspects of identifying the 
various sources of information, the jurisdictions in 
which they reside, and the process of record re-
trieval. When more detailed information is required 
and the investigator cannot easily reach the location 
where the records are being kept, paid researchers 
and investigators can conduct the research on your 
behalf and forward you the findings. Investigators 
also can call or write to many libraries, courts, and 
records offices to request specific searches and re-
cords; however, there can be wait times for the in-
formation because the clerk or librarian will have to 
identify the records, make copies, and either fax or 
mail them to you. These searches generally involve 
a modest fee. Be aware that in many smaller jurisdic-
tions, an inquiry into any public record by an out-
side party can arouse suspicion or prompt gossip or 
discussion that may compromise an investigation.
In some investigations, hand searches (often called 
field searches) of public records may be required, 
involving the examination of original, hard copy, 
or	 source	 records.	 Various	 factors	 can	 trigger	 this	
requirement, such as a jurisdiction may not have re-
cords available online, the online information may 
be incomplete, more detail or absolute verification 
of the original document is required, or older re-
cords or information may not be archived. Often, 
such information can be located in reference librar-
ies of governmental agencies. Most governmental 
reference library information is far more expansive 
than online information, and many libraries are lo-
cated in the headquarter locations of the agencies 
in	Washington,	 D.C.	 In-depth	 hand	 searching	 of	
public records is now rare and is usually secondary 
to online research in the follow-up identification of 
relevant source and jurisdictional information.
Types of Information That Are Not 
Publicly Available
The following types of information could potential-
ly be mistaken as being publicly available, but they 
are not:
	 •		Banking	records	and	other	privately	held	ac-
counts,	such	as	401(k),	mutual	funds,	money	
market accounts, stock in privately held compa-
nies, and stock holdings of less than five percent 
majority ownership in public companies.
	 •		Salary	or	income	information,	except	for	corpo-
rate officer salary disclosures in annual reports of 
publicly traded companies.
	 •		Family	trust	and	other	trust	records.
	 •		Telephone	call	information,	such	as	date,	time,	
and origin of calls.
	 •		Passenger	lists	and	flight	logs.
	 •		Visa	information.
	 •		Privately	held	corporate	records.
	 •		Sealed	court	records.
	 •		Credit	reports.	(Note:	Can	be	obtained	if	the	
individual gives formal written consent.)
	 •		Credit	card	information.	(Note: Payment history 
on credit cards would be contained in a credit 
report.)
International Public Record 
Resources
It is important to note that privacy laws differ great-
ly	outside	the	United	States.	The	European	Com-
mission’s Directive on Data Protection (Directive 
95/46/EC)4 applies to all businesses that collect 
personal data on European Union (EU) residents 
and includes all employee data in phone directories 
or accounting systems, as well as customer and pa-
tient data. Any record containing personal informa-
tion also is protected under the same privacy law in 
Canada	and	in	many	other	areas	of	the	world.	Even	
when in an overseas location, public record aspects 
of an investigation can be curtailed not only be-
cause privacy laws limit the availability of public re-
cord information but also because they regulate the 
4	See	http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/privacy/law/index_en.htm.
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transfer of this information outside the EU. Many 
U.S. companies operating within the EU therefore 
abide	by	Directive	95/46/EC.
Some online record information is available from 
U.S.	 sources.	Companies	House	records,	a	United	
Kingdom equivalent of corporate filings, can be 
found in LexisNexis. Dun & Bradstreet provides re-
ports on many companies. Industry and peer analy-
sis	sources,	such	as	OneSource	and	Primark	Corp.,	
also provide summary information about compa-
nies, including financial and officer information and 
general information about the business itself. Many 
companies have Internet sites that provide informa-
tion about the company and its operations, and they 
sometimes also offer annual reports, sales contacts, 
office locations, lists of subcontractors, and other 
information. The Internet also can identify informa-
tion about individuals. As always, media and trade 
publications can provide information about a com-
pany or individuals who have a presence outside the 
United States.
Other Third Parties
In addition to providing oral evidence, third parties 
affiliated with a company can provide information 
essential to a fraud investigation. Oftentimes, these 
third parties hold information vital to putting to-
gether all the pieces of the puzzle when trying to 
redesign a fraud scheme. 
For example, confirmations can be sent to ven-
dors	and	customers.	Contracts	with	customers	could	
also be obtained. Information from third parties can 
be obtained only after the company gives consent to 
approach a third party. Once consent is obtained, 
appropriate personnel at the third party may be in-
terviewed. This would enable clarity on any side 
agreements, verbal arrangements, and other non-
contractual obligations. This additional informa-
tion is often critical in understanding the complete 
picture in an investigation of alleged wrongdoing, 
kickback schemes, and the like.
In addition, external auditors’ working papers 
could be considered in the investigation. Examples 
of sections of the audit working papers that could be 
of relevance include the following:
	 •		Control testing. Identification of control weak-
nesses documented during previous years. Also, 
a documented understanding of controls in place 
related to certain processes and areas of the  
entity.
	 •		Summary of audit adjustments. Identification of 
areas of the financial statements requiring the 
company to adjust the balances during previous 
periods.
	 •	 Contingent liabilities. If contingent liabilities are 
disclosed in the financial statements, the working 
papers would include documentation on how 
the auditors determined that the liabilities were 
probable or measurable.
For more information about third parties see 
Chapter	6,	“Roles	and	Responsibilities:	How	Dif-
ferent Stakeholders Work During Investigations.”
Access to Documents
What records are accessed and how they are ac-
cessed is determined in large part by the purpose 
of the investigation (whether it is internal or exter-
nal) and who requests it. As discussed in chapter 6, 
“Roles and Responsibilities,” a number of different 
entities may hire the accounting firm to investigate a 
company, including the audit committee, the board 
of directors or a special committee of the board, or 
the	 company	 itself,	 which	 may	 include	 its	 CEO,	
COO,	 or	 CFO.	 Occasionally,	 an	 outside	 party,	
which is usually a law firm representing persons or 
other companies with an interest in the company or 
alleged issue, may hire the forensic accountant for an 
internal investigation.
Although a complete review of all books and 
records would likely be unnecessary and, in most 
cases, would in practice be impossible, the best-case 
scenario for an investigation of any type would be to 
have ready access to all available books and records. 
The accessibility of records can vary from case to 
case, however, and can depend upon who hired the 
forensic accountant, the specific scope and require-
ments that the hiring party places on the investiga-
tion, and the situation and type of case.
In some instances, at the discretion of the attor-
neys involved in the matter and very likely with the 
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input and recommendations of a forensic accoun-
tant or other investigative professional, a legal hold 
or preservation notice (in effect, a “do not destroy” 
order) is issued. Such an order of course seeks to 
ensure the preservation of any and all documents 
presumed to be pertinent to any given investigation. 
The order is issued to all employees of the company 
whose records are being reviewed and employees 
are bound to adhere to it. (See the “Preservation and 
Collection”	 section	 in	Chapter	 8:	 Electronic	 Evi-
dence for a discussion on legal holds.) Typically, it is 
the investigating party’s attorneys who issue formal 
requests for access to the documents presumed to 
fall within the scope of the investigation, in some 
combination with their own required documents. 
Accountants provide guidance to the attorneys in 
developing the scope and substance of such a re-
quest, but document request and retrieval is not a 
formal discovery process.
If the forensic investigator is hired directly by a 
company, it is expected to have more access and bet-
ter direct communication in making determinations 
about document access. In reality, such access can 
vary: the owner of a midsize company, for example, 
may prove hesitant to reveal possible mismanage-
ment and may not want to grant open access to a 
team of accountants for fear of undermining morale. 
In another case, however, an owner may give an ac-
counting team carte blanche to access all documents 
in order to aggressively ferret out a perpetrator. 
Once document requests are issued, the forensic ac-
countant may travel to the client site or some other 
site where the documents are stored, depending on 
the logistics of the fraud investigation; alternatively, 
the client may send boxes of documents to the ac-
countant’s office.
Legal Considerations
A forensic accountant can request documents and 
offer recommendations on what should fall within 
an	investigation’s	scope.	However,	it	is	important	to	
note that accountants have no legal standing in this 
regard, cannot represent themselves as legal experts, 
and cannot provide legal advice to their client for 
issues relating to documents. If approached by a cli-
ent or a client’s attorney for advice on the purview 
of a legal hold, a “do not destroy” order, or some 
other matter relating to the scope of a document 
request, the accountant’s advice and recommenda-
tions should be issued strictly in accordance with 
that request and perhaps in consultation with their 
own attorneys.
In important legal matters, the client should 
have recourse to legal counsel to assist in making 
decisions regarding discovery issues (that is, when 
documents are discoverable by opposing counsel or 
an investigating or regulatory body) and to advise 
about what falls within or outside attorney-client 
privilege and strategic legal issues in criminal and 
civil	 litigation.	 However,	 the	 accountant	 can	 and	
should work with both the client and the law firm 
in decision-making and strategy regarding requests 
for documents. If the client is an external party, the 
accountant should emphasize to the client that the 
production of documents is usually an ongoing pro-
cess. The accountant can further point out that if 
a law firm is involved, requests for hard copy and 
paper records differ from the traditional discovery 
process in being a cooperative exchange of informa-
tion, rather than a response to a more formal legal 
document production request.
Any investigator should keep in mind that the 
findings of an investigation may be subject in the 
future to a subpoena or regulatory inquiries and re-
quests prompted by litigation.
Correspondingly,	the	investigator’s	drafts,	mem-
os, notes, interview memoranda, reports, team 
communications, e-mails, and other information 
produced in the course of the investigation may 
be	subject	to	a	future	request	and	review.	Clearly,	
this suggests strongly that the investigator use dis-
cretion and forethought during the course of his 
or her work. Documents that may or will be used 
as part of the ongoing investigation as supporting 
information for a report, supporting evidence for 
testimony, or any other form of evidence should 
be carefully documented so they may be properly 
referenced (see chapter 8, “Electronic Evidence”). 
Original documents should be properly identified 
and retained for future reference. This also serves 
to maintain supporting evidence for any further 
inquiries.
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Conclusion
The identification, gathering, and analysis of all 
sources of evidence form the foundation for con-
ducting a fraud investigation. Despite the growing 
preponderance of electronically stored data, hard 
copy documents (the so-called “paper trail”) remain 
an important factor and source of information in 
fraud investigations. In addition, evidence obtained 
orally through public sources and parties outside the 
entity under investigation are important information 
sources. Gaining access to relevant data and the vari-
ous legal issues surrounding the use and application 
of that data also must be considered in an investi-
gation. Ultimately, the success of any investigation 
relies on the various sources of evidence identified 
and the analysis performed thereof. Ensuring that all 
relevant sources of evidence have been considered 
and analyzed is crucial in determining the business 
and compliance risks the entity of interest may face.
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•	 U.S. District Court civil and criminal filings, as well as 
bankruptcy court, tax court, and most state civil and 
criminal litigation proceedings.*	Online	databases,	such	
as	CourtLink,	CourtExpress,	and	Pacer,	are	the	leading	
providers	of	these	filings,	providing	complete	coverage	
of	District	Court	filings	and	fairly	comprehensive	filings	
on	dockets	at	the	state	and	county	levels.	In	some	cases,	
specific	case	filings	are	available,	but	in	many	cases,	fil-
ings	should	be	ordered	online	or	by	phone.	All	searches	
are	transactional.
•		Uniform Commercial Code filings.*	Best	obtained	online	
because	different	jurisdictions	have	different	filing	re-
quirements	and	locations.	Can	be	searched	on	transac-
tional	public	record	databases.
•	 Lien and judgment filings for many jurisdictions.*	Best	
obtained	through	a	transactional	public	record	or	a	
specific	online	court	record	database.
•		Secretary of state corporation and other business 
filings.*	Most	readily	available	through	online	trans-
actional	databases,	although	many	departments	are	
upgrading	systems	to	make	these	records	available.	At	
present,	many	remain	rudimentary	and	information	on	
the	Internet	is	limited.
•		Nongovernmental, governmental, and regulatory agency 
investigation reports or information (that is, United Na-
tions, U.S. DOJ, offices of different U.S. states’ attorneys 
general, Senatorial investigative committees, and so on). 
Many	readily	available	online	and	most	directly	through	
the	entity	or	agency	Web	site;	all	have	internal	search	
engines	that	make	them	relatively	easy	to	navigate.	For	
a	specific	report	or	piece	of	information,	Google	may	be	
easier.
•	 Business and professional licenses.*	Most	readily	
available	through	online	transactional	accounts	but	also	
available	on	state	and	county	Internet	sites.
•		Property, tax assessment, and limited mortgage re-
cords.*	Available	through	transactional	online	data-
bases,	on	some	county	Web	sites,	and	at	county	records	
repositories.
•	 Vehicle ownership records.*	If	available	online,	may	
require	a	fee.	Not	available	for	all	states.
•		Worldwide media and trade publications.	Available	
from	numerous	sources.	Search	engines	(for	example,	
Google)	will	identify	publications	and	information	from	
articles,	research	papers,	and	Web	sites	but	narrow-
ing	the	search	can	be	difficult.	Yahoo	News	and	similar	
sites	provide	AP	coverage	and	other	newswire	services	
but	tend	to	expire	quickly.	Sites	of	companies	like	CNN,	
Fox,	and	the	New York Times	provide	current	informa-
tion	but	are	difficult	to	search	for	historical	information.	
Vendor	media	and	trade	publication	sources	like	Factiva	
and	LexisNexis	carry	worldwide	coverage	and	their	
searches	are	readily	modifiable,	but	they	charge	a	fee	
for	searches	and	downloads	of	articles.
•		Address history information.*	Can	be	a	lodestone	for	
learning	more	about	a	person,	such	as	where	they	live	
and	for	how	long,	comparing	their	addresses	to	their	
property	ownership	(own	or	rent),	and	identifying	where	
to	look	for	more	information	about	where	they	have	lived	
or	worked.	All	can	enhance	the	investigation,	allowing	
associations,	improving	fact-finding,	and	knowing	which	
jurisdictions	you	should	focus	on	for	more	public	record	
information	about	the	person.
•		Telephone information from reverse lookup telephone 
directories and Internet sites.*	Can	be	more	difficult	to	
identify,	particularly	when	cell	phones	are	the	rule	rather	
than	the	exception.	Cell	phones	are	not	included	in	
reverse	directory	sources.
•	 International tax haven corporate filings.	Usually 
contain	limited	information.	Generally	filed	in	the	country	
Appendix A
Examples of Sources of Public Information
*	Not	available	internationally.
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providing	the	tax	haven,	although	the	company	is	usually	
located	elsewhere.	Can	provide	information	about	the	
officers	and	dates	of	incorporation.
•		Global business registrations and reports.	Contained	in	
a	variety	of	sources.	These	provide	information	about	
the	location,	officers,	financial	information	(in	some	
instances),	and	other	information	about	companies.
•		SEC corporate and business filings.	Include	annual	and	
quarterly	reports	and	enforcement	filings	for	publicly	
traded	companies,	along	with	financial	information,	com-
pany	activities	and	holdings,	information	about	corporate	
officers	and	directors	and	their	compensation,	litigation	
activity,	and	corporate	projections.	Enforcement	filings	
contain	reviews	conducted	by	the	SEC	of	alleged	or	
actual	violations	of	regulatory	law	and	SEC	findings	or	
decisions	in	the	same.
•		International regulatory filings and enforcement news 
for companies traded on many foreign or international 
exchanges.	Available	primarily	through	Internet	sites	
for	the	exchanges.	Challenges	include	language	and	
understanding	the	regulatory	rules	and	structure	of	other	
countries.	Information	can	be	outdated	or	incomplete,	
or	both.	Can	include	a	surprising	amount	of	information	
available	about	companies	that	are	listed	on	foreign	
exchanges,	and	more	exchanges	now	offer	English	
translation.
•		Marriage and divorce filings for some states.*	Online	
access	limited	to	a	handful	of	states,	and	information	
limited	to	the	jurisdiction	of	filing,	date	of	filing,	date	of	
final	order,	and	parties	involved.	However,	investigators	
can	visit	the	jurisdiction	and	retrieve,	for	instance,	a	
divorce	filing	to	learn	if	there	was	a	property	settlement,	
but	often	this	information	is	not	disclosed	in	the	final	
order.	In	larger	settlements,	this	information	is	some-
times	sealed.
•		Aviation ownership, pilot licenses, and water vessel reg-
istries.*	Found	in	transactional	databases	and	Federal	
Aviation	Administration	databases.	These	show	who	
owns	the	aircraft	or	water	vessel,	the	type	of	craft,	and	
registration	dates.
•		Educational credential verification.*	Limited	to	verifica-
tion	of	degree	earned	and	date	of	matriculation	when	
information	is	provided	to	college	or	university.	Infre-
quently	used	in	fraud	investigations.	Sometimes	useful	
when	a	person	is	found	to	be	misrepresenting	their	
qualifications.
*	Not	available	internationally.
Chapter 07.indd   139 8/4/09   1:03:18 PM
140
The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud
•		Current	and	historical	asset	information
•		Corporate	and	executive	affiliations	and	associates	for	
private	and	publicly	held	companies
•		Civil	and	criminal	litigation	history
•		Debt,	lien,	judgment,	or	bankruptcy	history
•		Company	existence	or	nonexistence
•		Enforcement	proceedings	or	actions	taken	by	govern-
mental	agencies
•		Lifestyle	or	general	background	information
•		Government	contracts	and	awards	issued	to	companies	
and	individuals
•		Information	that	can	be	used	in	preparation	for	 
interviews
•		Information	that	may	develop	leads	or	supplement	infor-
mation	identified	from	forensic	accounting	findings
•		Financial	or	tax	liabilities
•		Related	events,	transactions,	involved	individual	or	busi-
ness	information,	or	other	targeting	information	during	
time	periods	in	which	fraud	may	have	occurred
•		Current	and	historical	address	information	allowing	the	
investigator	to	assess	locales	that	may	be	inclusive	in	
the	investigation
•		General	intelligence	regarding	the	activities	of	a	busi-
ness	or	individual
•		Organizational	relationships
	 –		Individuals	related	to	subsidiaries	or	affiliates
	 –		Affiliated	and	related	companies
	 –		Complex	business	structures	or	unusual	or	numer-
ous	subsidiary	or	affiliated	companies
•		Lifestyle	symptoms	or	conspicuous	consumption	of	
suspected	perpetrators
	 –		Ownership	of	assets
  n		Value	of	home	or	multiple	property	ownership
  n		Vehicle	ownership	information
  n	Water	vessel	ownership	and	registration
  n	Aircraft	ownership
	 –		Financial	pressures	that	might	prompt	or	foster	
fraud
  n	Divorce
  n	Failed	or	failing	business	ventures
  n	Bankruptcy
  n	Liens	or	judgments
  n		Loans	of	lines	of	credit	outweighing	value	of	
property
•	Financial	profiles	of	suspects
	 –		Personal	assets
  n	Real	estate	holdings
  n	Vehicles,	watercraft,	aircraft
  n	Significant	shareholder	ownership
Appendix B
Examples of Public Records 
Relevant to Investigations
The	following	information	is	readily	available	to	the	persistent	and	thorough	investigator	and	can	be	helpful	in	
investigations:
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Introduction
Sources of Electronic Evidence
	 •	Categories
	 •	Location	and	Storage
	 •	The	IT	Function
	 •	Privacy	and	Confidentiality
Professional Standards
	 •	Professional	Competence
	 •	Due	Professional	Care
	 •	Planning	and	Supervision
	 •	Sufficient	Relevant	Data
The Electronic Evidence Review  
Process
	 •	Identification
	 •	Preservation	and	Collection
	 	 –	Legal	Hold
	 	 –	Preservation
	 	 –	Collection
   n	Computer	Forensics
   n	Forensic	Tools
   n	Remote	Collection	Tools
   n		Collecting	Structured	and	 
Unstructured	Data
   n	Collecting	Other	ESI
   n		Leveraging	Company	 
Resources
Ben Hawksworth, Senior Manager
Jennifer Hadsell, Senior Manager
	 •	Process	and	Analyze
	 	 –	Structured	Data	Analysis
	 	 –	Unstructured	Data	Analysis
	 	 –	Forensic	Analysis
	 •	Search
	 •	Review
	 •	Production
Conclusion
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Introduction
Many sources of evidence relevant to a fraud inves-
tigation may be stored in electronic form. This elec-
tronically stored information (ESI) is everywhere 
in today’s corporate environment, and, frequently, 
the course of an investigation will turn on an un-
derstanding gained from the review and analysis of 
electronic evidence identified within a body of ESI. 
That evidence may take the form of information 
stored on backup tapes, in e-mail messages, and in 
trace remnants of deleted electronic files on a laptop. 
Investigators will often rely on technology profes-
sionals to assist in the collection and management 
of ESI during a fraud investigation. These profes-
sionals will employ tools and techniques designed 
to collect and manage ESI in a manner that sup-
ports the submission of relevant ESI as electronic 
evidence in a court of law or hearing. The corporate 
computing environment is ever-changing, and fraud 
investigators must be prepared to employ emerging 
advanced approaches to gain insights from this im-
portant source of evidence.
Sources of Electronic 
Evidence
An accountant investigating a fraud allegation will 
frequently review financial records, such as income 
statements, balance sheets, general ledgers, and cash 
flows. Until relatively recently, a large proportion 
of this information was maintained in paper form. 
Today, approximately 93 percent of new data is cre-
ated electronically, of which 70 percent will never 
be printed. Seventy percent of companies’ digital as-
sets are now contained in e-mail form. Currently, 
2.2 billion instant messages are sent each day, and 
the average user may send and receive 15.8 mega-
bytes of e-mail each day.1
ESI can be stored on a range of computing devic-
es, from laptops and desktop computers to powerful 
network computer servers and handheld person- 
al digital assistants. Sources of electronic evidence 
in investigations can include the general ledger, 
accounts payable, and payroll, as well as documents, 
such as Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 
files; Adobe Acrobat PDF files; internal corporate 
and personal e-mails; instant messaging logs; voice-
mail; and proprietary systems and software.
Categories
Many potential sources of electronic evidence are 
contained within the modern corporate computing 
environment. An investigator should consider each 
type of ESI that is available, the systems and reposi-
tories in which ESI may reside, and the location and 
storage of the data. In order to simplify and organize 
the process of preserving and collecting ESI, sources 
of ESI are typically broken down into categories. 
Figure 8-1 represents an approach to the categoriza-
tion of ESI sources.
Categories of ESI may include the following:
	 •		Category 1: Corporate e-mail servers and archive 
and journaling systems. The servers that process 
e-mail for individuals, business units, or geogra-
phies should be identified. Most e-mail systems, 
including Microsoft Exchange and Lotus Notes, 
keep both a server and local copy of e-mail. 
Most e-mail systems also have multiple e-mail 
servers to serve specific geographies or business 
units or to serve as redundant sites. The e-mail 
server hosting each custodian’s e-mail needs to 
be identified, and the overall e-mail architecture 
should be discussed, so those responsible for 
collecting electronic evidence can determine if 
custodians’ e-mail may exist on multiple servers.
   E-mail archiving systems enable companies 
to archive e-mail to a central repository separate 
from their active e-mail servers. The custodian 
may have the ability to selectively add and re-
move e-mail from the archive. E-mail archiving 
systems are frequently used to alleviate space 
issues on the active e-mail servers.
   Journaling systems capture all incoming and 
outgoing e-mail for particular custodians to a 
central repository, and the custodian has no 
control over the journaling system. Journal-
ing systems tend to be used in highly regulated 
industries and may only capture the e-mail of 
senior employees, such as officers. Although 
1	Seward,	Brian	E.	“Email	Discovery:	Tape	Is	Not	Enough”	Infonomics,	September/October	2005.
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the developers of these systems do sometimes 
provide companion tools to search and retrieve 
discoverable e-mail from the archive or jour-
nal, their functionality is frequently limited. For 
example, these tools may not permit searching of 
the message body using Boolean operators (and, 
or, not), thereby limiting accurate and targeted 
retrieval. It may not be possible to search or 
export e-mail from the journal by custodian 
because e-mail from multiple custodians may be 
intermingled.
	 •		Category 2: Collaborative systems. These systems 
allow users to collectively share and search a 
body of information typically related to a single 
project. They may include Lotus Notes da-
tabases, EMC Documentum eRooms, Lotus 
Notes QuickPlace, Microsoft SharePoint, or 
Microsoft Groove, as well as other formats. The 
storage location of the data is dependent on the 
individual program; therefore, the investigator 
should gain an understanding of the architecture 
to determine how to collect electronic evidence 
from these systems.
	 •		Category 3: Corporate file servers. Companies often 
make extensive use of personal and departmental 
shares on file servers as repositories for user-
created documents. A share is a portion of the 
file server’s disk storage that has been allocated 
for file storage. A personal share or “home 
directory” is used by a specific custodian, and 
a departmental share may be used by multiple 
custodians. File server shares may contain ad-hoc 
databases (for example, Microsoft Access) that 
can contain key transactional information, and it 
also is fairly common for shares on corporate file 
servers to contain archives of employee e-mail 
databases.
	 •		Category 4: Individual data and documents stored 
on personal and local systems. This includes any 
desktops, laptops, personal data assistants (for 
example, BlackBerry or Palm), cell phones, flash 
or thumb drives, CDs, DVDs, or other stor-
age devices assigned to, or in the possession of, 
individuals employed by the company. These 
devices typically will contain user-created docu-
ments, as well as corporate and personal e-mail. 
Figure 8-1: Electronically Stored Information Sources
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These assets often are leased from two to three 
years; therefore, it is possible that an employee 
may have been assigned multiple systems during 
the relevant time period. Each of these systems 
should be identified and preserved.
	 •		Category 5: Business applications and data. Busi-
ness and transactional systems contain the online 
financial and operational transaction records for a 
company. These systems may be multitiered with 
a presentation layer running on one computer 
system, a database layer on another system, and a 
business logic layer on yet another system. The 
key to collecting the business data is to discuss 
the architecture of the business system with the 
system owner to determine which layers contain 
business data and how best to collect the data.
	 •		Category 6: Other Sources of ESI. In addition to 
the preceding categories, other sources of ESI 
may be relevant to the fraud investigator. The 
following sources should be considered carefully 
when setting the scope of the hold:
  –  Electronic fax. These systems may contain a 
record of faxes sent and received by indi-
viduals or departments. The fax data may be 
centralized (stored on a server) or decentral-
ized (stored on individual workstations or file 
shares). Both stored images of the actual faxes 
and logs of fax activity may exist.
  –  Voicemail and PBX. Private branch exchange 
(PBX) phone systems and voicemail may 
contain call logs, recordings of voicemail, 
and other activity. Voice systems may not be 
homogeneous, due to growth or acquisitions. 
In addition, management of voicemail and 
PBX systems may be decentralized to multiple 
geographic locations.
  –  Instant messaging. This may include corporate 
instant messaging systems, such as Lotus Notes 
Sametime, as well as personal-use programs, 
such as AOL Instant Messenger and Yahoo! 
Messenger. Storage of data may be centralized, 
local, or both. Those responsible for the col-
lection of electronic evidence should inquire 
into and consider any additional logging or 
archiving capabilities the company may have 
established. To the extent that an organization 
supports an enterprise instant messaging  
program that has centralized logging and stor-
age capability, consideration should be given to 
collection of this ESI. Regulators may expect 
this data to be preserved in the normal course 
of business.
  –  Network and security monitoring. Various types of 
physical or network security device logs also 
may be collected if the investigation seeks to 
determine whether the actions of individuals 
were logged. These may include card swipe 
logs, closed-circuit video, Internet logs, remote 
access logs, and intrusion detection server logs. 
The configuration of these systems and the 
availability of log information vary widely, and 
a discussion is best held up-front to determine 
whether these items should be collected.
  –  Residual data. Whole files that have been 
deleted may be recoverable intact. Even if 
a deleted file has been partially overwritten, 
some parts or “fragments” of the file may be 
recoverable. Residual data may be identified in 
unexpected locations. For example, documents 
may be recovered from a hard drive stored in a 
networked office printer.
Location and Storage
Potential electronic evidence may be stored on a 
range of media during its lifecycle. For example, the 
evidence may be considered to be active and online 
when it is created and stored on a hard drive. It may 
be archived to backup tape periodically. When it is 
deleted, fragments of the deleted file may remain 
on the hard drive. The investigator should consider 
where the electronic evidence may be stored based 
on where it is in its lifecycle. The data may exist in 
any of these states during its lifespan:
	 •		Active online. Stored on magnetic disks, such as 
hard drives, attached to a computer or server.
	 •		Near-line. Stored on removable media, such as 
optical discs, that can be made available by a 
device, such as an optical “jukebox.”
	 •		Offline storage. Used for disaster recovery or 
archiving that must be made available through 
human intervention. Backup tapes are typically 
used for offline storage.
	 •		Erased, fragmented, or damaged data. Retrievable 
only by using sophisticated forensic tools.
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The IT Function
Most modern organizations have a dedicated Infor-
mation Technology (IT) department. Larger com-
panies may have a corporate IT department and IT 
departments within each business unit. In smaller 
companies, IT may only consist of one or two in-
dividuals. Regardless, key personnel will have op-
erational knowledge of systems maintained by IT. 
The investigator will identify and contact personnel 
from these departments in order to better assess and 
understand the IT organization and the systems it 
operates or for which it is responsible.
The investigator must understand the organization 
and flow of information across a company’s IT sys-
tems. Depending on the type of investigation, elec-
tronic evidence may be obtained from a variety of 
sources. The investigator needs to understand what 
data is available and must be obtained in order to 
support the requirements of the investigation. Typi-
cally, a company maintains specifications and other 
documentation describing internal systems and may 
maintain data flow diagrams that describe informa-
tion flow, providing a better understanding of how 
the systems interact.
Identifying potentially relevant sources of elec-
tronic evidence may require an understanding of 
how IT governance is implemented in the organiza-
tion. The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) describes 
IT governance as “the leadership and organizational 
structures and processes that ensure that the organi-
zation’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s 
strategies and objectives.”2 IT governance supports 
a focus on performance and risk management and 
has increased in importance since the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). IT governance 
supports the documentation of strategies, policies, 
and organizational structures that can provide useful 
information to fraud investigators who must iden-
tify systems and data that may contain electronic 
evidence.
A number of frameworks have been developed 
that support the implementation of IT governance, 
as well as control and mitigate the risks associated 
with IT. The two most prominent are the Commit-
tee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) and the Control Objectives 
for Information and Related Technology (COBIT). 
The COSO framework provides guidance to assess 
and improve internal control systems. Moreover, 
this framework can be used to describe and analyze 
the internal control structure implemented within 
an organization. The COSO framework has been 
specifically identified by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as a methodology for achieving com-
pliance with SOX regulations. COBIT is an open 
standard published by the ITGI and the Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association that specifi-
cally focuses on IT processes and controls.
Depending on the type of investigation and the 
maturity of the IT governance of the organization, 
the business may have documented risk assessments 
and risk mitigation plans available for review. These 
plans may contain information about the systems, as 
well as their constraints and controls, that is useful 
to the investigator. Furthermore, if the organization 
must comply with SOX, additional documentation 
may be available for financial reporting systems. At 
the very least, the IT organization should be able 
to describe the control policies and procedures sur-
rounding relevant systems. This information can 
help the investigator determine what electronic evi-
dence to collect for analysis.
Privacy and Confidentiality
Many companies based in the United States will 
have international subsidiaries, operations, or im-
portant third-party relationships with suppliers, 
contractors, or other key intermediaries. As a result, 
non-U.S. laws and regulations may come into play 
during an investigation when data must be retrieved 
from a location outside the United States, and it is 
important to consider the possible implications for 
privacy and confidentiality. Readers are advised to 
seek guidance from counsel prior to collecting em-
ployee data. The following information is intended 
as an overview of global privacy regulations and 
should not be a substitute for advice of counsel. For 
a broader discussion of global privacy regulations, 
see chapter 9, “Cross-Jurisdictional Issues in the 
Global Environment.”
2	IT	Governance	Institute.	Board	Briefing	on	IT	Governance,	2nd	Edition,	2003.
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The United States uses an approach to the protec-
tion of personal data based on legislation, regulation, 
and organizational self-regulation. In response to 
restrictions imposed by the European Union (EU) 
on the transfer of data from the EU to countries 
with weaker data privacy laws, the U.S. Department 
of Commerce developed a safe harbor framework. 
This framework allows U.S. organizations to evalu-
ate their policies and procedures related to the use 
of personal data and then self-certify that the or-
ganization provides adequate privacy protection, as 
defined by the EU.
The United States and Switzerland also have 
established a safe harbor framework that “will 
simplify the transfer of personal data by Swiss firms 
to American companies certified by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce.”3 Organizations that wish 
to self-certify to the U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frame-
work will follow an identical process to that of self-
certifying to the U.S.-European Union Safe Harbor 
Framework.
U.S. organizations that wish to self-certify must 
either become a member of a self-regulatory privacy 
program or form their own self-regulatory privacy 
policy, both of which must follow safe harbor re-
quirements. Organizations also must comply with 
the principles found in box 8-1.4
3	See	http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018244.asp.
4	See	www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018236.asp.
Notice Organizations must notify individuals about the purposes for 
which they collect and use information about them. They must 
provide information about how individuals can contact the or-
ganization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third 
parties to which it discloses the information, and the choices 
and means the organization offers for limiting the information’s 
use and disclosure.
Choice Organizations must give individuals the opportunity to choose 
(opt out) whether their personal information will be disclosed 
to a third party or used for a purpose incompatible with the 
purpose for which it was originally collected or subsequently 
authorized by the individual. For sensitive information, an 
affirmative or explicit (opt in) choice must be given if the 
information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a pur-
pose other than its original purpose or the purpose authorized 
subsequently by the individual.
Onward Transfer  
(Transfers to Third Parties)
To disclose information to a third party, organizations must 
apply the notice and choice principles. When an organization 
wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting 
as an agent, it may do so if it makes sure that the third party 
subscribes to the safe harbor principles or is subject to Direc-
tive 95/46/EC or another adequacy finding. As an alternative, 
the organization can enter into a written agreement with such 
third party requiring that the third party provide at least the 
same level of privacy protection that is required by the relevant 
principles.
(continued)
Box 8-1:  Privacy Regulatory Policy Principles
Chapter 08.indd   146 8/4/09   1:04:04 PM
Chapter	8:	Electronic	Evidence
147
The EU relies on a body of comprehensive and 
highly restrictive legislation that “requires creation 
of government data protection agencies, registra-
tion of databases with those agencies, and in some 
instances prior approval before personal data pro-
cessing may begin.”5 The European Commission’s 
Directive on Data Protection (Directive 95/46/EC) 
became effective in 1998 and prohibits “the trans-
fer of personal data to non-European Union nations 
that do not meet the European ‘adequacy’ standard 
for privacy protection.”6
The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development has developed widely accepted 
guidelines related to privacy protection and the 
transborder flow of personal data. These guidelines 
set forth fair information practice principles that 
form the basis of many privacy regulations and laws 
in the United States, Canada, Europe, and other 
countries that have enacted specific privacy protec-
tion regimens.
Other regulations and local country laws may af-
fect the collection of data outside the United States. 
Investigators should consult with counsel who have 
expertise in data privacy prior to proceeding with 
such collections.
5	Ibid.
6	Ibid.
Access Individuals must have access to personal information about 
them that an organization holds and be able to correct, amend, 
or delete that information when it is inaccurate, except when 
the burden or expense of providing access would be dispro-
portionate to the risks to the individual’s privacy in the case in 
question or when the rights of persons other than the individu-
al would be violated.
Security Organizations must take reasonable precautions to protect per-
sonal information from loss; misuse; and unauthorized access, 
disclosure, alteration, and destruction.
Data Integrity Personal information must be relevant to the purposes for 
which it is to be used. An organization should take reasonable 
steps to ensure that data is accurate, complete, current, and 
reliable for its intended use.
Enforcement In order to ensure compliance with the safe harbor principles, 
there must be (a) readily available and affordable independent 
recourse mechanisms, so that each individual’s complaints and 
disputes can be investigated and resolved and damages awarded 
when the applicable law or private sector initiatives so provide; 
(b) procedures for verifying that the commitments compa-
nies make to adhere to the safe harbor principles have been 
implemented; and (c) obligations to remedy problems arising 
out of a failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions must 
be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by the organiza-
tion. Organizations that fail to provide annual self-certification 
letters will no longer appear in the list of participants, and safe 
harbor benefits will no longer be assured.
Box 8-1:  Privacy Regulatory Policy Principles (continued)
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Professional Standards
Investigators and their clients are under increasing 
pressure to manage the preservation and collection 
of electronic evidence in an effective and defensible 
manner, consistent with professional standards, fed-
eral and state rules of evidence, and applicable na-
tional and international regulations. Because many 
investigators do not possess expertise in the techni-
cal skills and concepts necessary to manage electron-
ic evidence effectively, they must rely on technical 
advisors who have this experience and expertise.
This reliance can be worrisome for the investiga-
tor. Given that the investigator may not fully under-
stand how the corporate systems managing the evi-
dence operate or where various sources of electronic 
evidence are located within the system, how can an 
investigator feel confident that the evidence the 
technical advisors are collecting reflects the scope 
identified by counsel and the investigators and that 
the advisors are conducting collection activities in a 
rigorous, sound, and defensible manner, according 
to applicable professional standards?
It is the responsibility of the client’s in-house 
and outside legal counsel to identify the sources of 
evidence that are potentially relevant to the inves-
tigation (see chapter 6, “Roles and Responsibilities: 
How Different Stakeholders Work During Inves-
tigations”). Counsel and investigators should work 
closely with their technical advisors to define the 
universe of potentially relevant evidence that should 
be collected and processed for review and analysis. 
All potentially relevant sources of electronic evidence 
should be considered, but it is not necessarily the 
case that the same types of evidence will be collected 
for every investigation. The scope of the investiga- 
tion, the nature of the alleged fraud, and the cus-
todians involved will be important considerations 
in determining what electronic evidence should be 
collected.
Investigators and their technical advisors should 
document the processes used to collect and manage 
electronic evidence in an investigation. Interviews 
that seek information about the corporate technol-
ogy infrastructure, data sources to which custodians 
have access, data destruction processes, and process-
es and procedures related to the management of data 
should be documented and reviewed. Understand-
ing the capabilities and limitations of systems, pro-
cesses, and procedures allows counsel and the inves-
tigator to tailor the review strategy to the key risks 
that are likely to affect the project, understand the 
nature and potential impact of the risks, and mini-
mize the likelihood of unpleasant surprises.
Today’s emerging technologies and global business 
market have tremendously affected the role of the 
accountant. Because accounting firms now provide 
a variety of consulting services, including advisory, 
implementation, transaction, and product services, 
they must continue to adhere to the guidelines set 
forth by the AICPA. Rule 201, General Standards 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 200), 
of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct states 
the following general standards of the profession:
	 •		Professional	competence
	 •		Due	professional	care
	 •		Planning	and	supervision
	 •		Sufficient	relevant	data
Forensic accountants and investigators must “pro-
vide valuable services in the highest professional 
manner to benefit the public as well as employers 
and clients.”7 The AICPA Code of Professional 
Conduct, as it relates to the collection and manage-
ment of electronic evidence, is described in more 
detail subsequently.
Professional Competence
Undertake only those professional services that the 
member or the member’s firm can reasonably expect to 
be completed with professional competence.8
When working with electronic evidence, investiga-
tors should consider retaining qualified and experi-
enced technical advisors to assist with the collection 
and management of electronic evidence. Investi-
gators should consider relevant experience, indus-
try and subject matter publications demonstrating 
thought leadership, as well as professional certifi-
cations when choosing a technical advisor to assist 
7	See	the	AICPA	Mission	at	www.aicpa.org/About+the+AICPA/AICPA+Mission/.
8	See	www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_200.html.
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with the management of electronic evidence dur-
ing an investigation. Box 8-2 provides some sample 
professional certifications that may demonstrate that 
the advisor has relevant skills.
Box 8-2:  Professional Certifications
Professional Certifications
CCE Certified Computer Examiner
CFCE Certified Forensic Computer 
Examiner
CFE Certified Fraud Examiner
CISA Certified Information Systems 
Auditor
CISM Certified Information Security 
Manager
CISSP Certified Information Systems 
Security Professional
CITP Certified Information  
Technology Professional
CPP Certified Protection  
Professional
CRM Certified Records Manager
EnCE EnCase Certified Examiner
PMP Project Management  
Professional
SCERS Seized Computer Evidence 
Recovery Specialist
It may be prudent to consider the credibility, rep-
utation, experience, and relevance of the technical 
advisor. These factors are significant, particularly if 
the technical advisor must testify regarding the qual-
ity of the data acquisition and processing. Addition-
ally, technical advisors often have to respond to the 
inquiries of regulators, law enforcement officials, 
or the client’s auditors regarding the accuracy and 
completeness of their work.
Due Professional Care
Exercise due professional care in the performance of pro-
fessional services.9 
Technical advisors who have helped manage elec-
tronic evidence for a large litigation or investiga-
tion understand the importance of documenting 
the processes used to manage evidence. When data 
collection occurs in multiple locations around the 
world, when the list of key custodians changes 
frequently over the course of the investigation, or 
when the client’s systems and technologies have in-
herent associated risks, due professional care can be 
difficult to demonstrate if the proper documenta-
tion is not maintained throughout the life cycle of 
the investigation.
Demonstrating the accuracy and completeness of 
the process used to collect and manage electronic 
data is critical to any investigation. Regulators, law 
enforcement officials, courts, and auditors have an 
increasingly sophisticated understanding and expec-
tation of the technologies and systems used to col-
lect and store electronic evidence, and investigators 
and technical advisors must demonstrate the pro-
fessional care necessary to meet those expectations. 
Parties must be able to account adequately for all 
the data collected as it is prepared for review and 
analysis. All decisions related to deduplicating, fil-
tering, rendering, displaying, and exporting the data 
should be documented. Further, investigators must 
be prepared to defend against challenges related to 
the procedures and technologies described in their 
reports.
Planning and Supervision
Adequately plan and supervise the performance of pro-
fessional services.10
Adequate planning and supervision is necessary 
to demonstrate due professional care. During the 
planning process, investigators and their technical 
advisors should establish goals and objectives and 
the activities necessary to achieve them. Successful 
9	Ibid.
10	Ibid.
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planning includes regular communication among 
counsel, the investigators, and technical advisors 
in order to keep all parties well informed of cur-
rent activities, observations, and potential changes 
in scope.
Project planning encompasses a range of planning 
activities related to scope, schedule, cost, quality, 
staffing, communication, risk, and procurement that 
are used to develop a project management plan and 
manage the project. The plans generated by these 
planning activities will together constitute the over-
all project plan that the project management team 
will execute to achieve the objectives of the project. 
According to the Project Management Institute, “[t]
he project management plan, developed as an out-
put of the Planning Process Group, will have an em-
phasis on exploring all aspects of the scope, technol-
ogy, risks, and costs.”11 Effective planning will take 
into account all phases of evidence management for 
a fraud investigation. The planning phase also is it-
erative, so plans will tend to be revised as new infor-
mation is learned.
It is very important that the project team involve 
all appropriate stakeholders in the planning processes, 
in order to benefit from their skills and knowledge. 
The collection and review of electronic evidence 
may involve a number of stakeholders. Techni-
cal advisors, investigators, the company’s in-house 
counsel, the company’s internal computer forensics 
team, IT, outside counsel, and outside counsel’s liti-
gation support team, among others, could all be in-
volved. In practice, some of these stakeholders may 
be excluded from some or all of the planning process 
because they are not involved in the investigation 
for reasons of privilege or other reasons. However, 
it is a leading practice to involve all stakeholders to 
the degree practical and advisable.
Some project managers may be tempted to ex-
clude some stakeholders from communications 
because they think it too time consuming or not 
necessary. Communication represents, by some 
calculations, 80 percent of a project manager’s ac-
tivities. Without effective communication to stake-
holders, project managers (1) may not benefit from 
the skills, knowledge, and input of the stakeholders; 
(2) may find that an issue has not been identified, 
thereby creating a risk; or (3) may find that the lack 
of communication has created conflict. Of course, 
if there is any suspicion that an individual could be 
involved in the fraud, he or she should not be a 
stakeholder in the project.
The level of detail and the number of areas to be 
covered by the project plan must be commensurate 
with the scope of the project. Although larger, more 
complex projects may require a very detailed plan 
in several documents, projects with a limited scope 
might require only a single document at a reduced 
level of detail.
Supervision is critical to ensuring compliance 
with the project plan and associated protocols, pro-
cedures, and activities. Without adequate manage-
ment of compliance, participants may fail to act in a 
manner that supports the defensibility of the inves-
tigation processes and that demonstrates due profes-
sional care.
Sufficient Relevant Data
Obtain sufficient relevant data to afford a reasonable 
basis for conclusions or recommendations in relation to 
any professional services performed.12
With the ever-increasing volume of ESI that must 
be preserved, collected, and reviewed during an in-
vestigation, there comes a fundamental challenge: 
Have we applied our search and review processes, 
our tools, and our professional judgment to the right 
body of evidence? While no legal principle requires 
perfection in collection, review, and disclosures, 
counsel and investigators do have obligations to per-
form these processes reasonably and ethically, dem-
onstrating due professional care and judgment.
Quality control processes employed prior to the 
review of electronic information are an essential el-
ement of demonstrating the “reasonableness” of a 
party’s evidence management processes; they also 
support chain of custody documentation. Parties us-
ing well-designed evidence management processes 
are able to account for 100 percent of the electronic 
11	Project	Management	Institute.	A	Guide	to	the	Project	Management	Body	of	Knowledge,	Third	Edition	(PMBOK	Guides),	2004.
12	See	www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_200.html.
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information they collect, even though they may 
review and produce only a small portion of that 
information.
The complexity associated with multilocation 
collection, large numbers of custodians, different 
sources of live systems, archives, and forensic im-
ages makes effective quality control processes essen-
tial. Without them, parties are more vulnerable to 
potential challenges related to omission of poten-
tially relevant data, spoliation, conversion of data, 
or productions.
Quality control procedures have two main pur-
poses: data accountability and anomaly detection. 
In general, quality control steps and reports should 
be in place for each major phase of discovery pro-
cessing, including data collection, data extraction 
and conversion (which may include elimination of 
system files or other high-level culling techniques), 
deduplication, data culling or searching, and data 
review.
Leading practices call for maintaining the relation-
ship between the data, original source media, and 
custodian throughout each processing stage. A party 
can then report both the contents and file counts 
at each stage of processing for each piece of media 
(such as a hard drive), as well as the contents and file 
counts for each unique source for each custodian. 
Clear documentation of what was done and not 
done should be maintained. If Internet e-mail is not 
processed for review, that should be documented. If 
a party uses forensic tools to recover deleted e-mails 
from a custodian’s mailbox, that should be docu-
mented, including the tool used and the result.
A cornerstone of data accountability is establish-
ing the counts of files on media before processing 
begins. From this defined starting point, the party 
should make adjustments to file counts postexpan-
sion of the original documents, reflecting processing 
results for each source:13
	 •		Elimination	of	system	files	(for	example,	based	
on the National Software Reference Library 
filter)
	 •		Deductions	for	certain	file	types	not	processed	
(such as databases)
	 •		Deductions	for	items	that	could	not	be	processed	
(for example, corrupt files)
	 •		Deductions	for	duplicates	not	processed
	 •		Deductions	for	items	not	selected	by	filters
These files may be accounted for as shown in fig-
ure 8-2.
Figure 8-2: Indexed Media File Count Processing
  Num. 
# Category Items
1 # Original items 64,748
2 Total files expanded 131,128
3 # of items filtered
    a     # System Files 12,721
    b     # File types not processed 47
    c     # Corrupt or Damaged files 7,548
    d     # Duplicates 18,745
    e     # Items not selected by filter 38,748
     Total Filtered 77,809
Initial population
Elimination of system files
File types not processed
Corrupt or damaged files not
processed
Duplicate files not
processed
Unfiltered files
Review
13	Documents	such	as	Zip	archives	may	expand	to	two	or	more	documents	and	should	be	expanded	prior	to	the	application	of	filters.
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In addition, it also is important to note files pro-
cessed but not indexed, such as encrypted files. Fig-
ure 8-3 demonstrates an approach to accounting for 
these files.
Figure 8-3: Unindexed Media File Count Processing
# Category Num. Items 
4 Total files processed 53,319
5 Error
   a    # Encrypted files 6,784
   b    # Empty files 1,274
   c    # File type unsupported 26,728
    Total 34,786
 
 
Encrypted files 
Total files after processing 
Files available for review 
Empty files 
File type unsupported 
# Category Num. Items 
4 Total files processed 53,319
5 Error
   a    # Encrypted files 6,784
   b    # Empty files 1,274
   c    # File type unsupported 26,728
    Total 34,786
 
 
Encrypted files 
Total files after processing 
Files available for review 
Empty files 
File type unsupported 
Using this approach, it will be possible to report 
the total number of items from all sources for each 
custodian, such as the server e-mail, e-mail archives, 
hard drives, network shares, and removable media. 
Searching the review database for all items associated 
with a custodian should yield a result that matches 
the total items reported for the custodian after the 
media has been processed. This enables a party to 
account for all the data that it collected for a mat-
ter. Subjected to the scrutiny of an independent or 
adversarial party, the evidence management process 
is transparent and can be defended as thorough and 
diligent.
The raw data regarding the electronic informa-
tion that this approach generates also is useful for 
identifying anomalies in the evidence. Investigating 
and resolving anomalies and exceptions in the data 
serves as an additional quality control check that 
may discover errors or omissions in the collection 
process. At a minimum, investigating anomalies will 
answer questions that other parties may have about 
the collection process. Indexing exceptions that are 
not documented are of particular concern because 
the items are loaded into the database and appear 
to be available for searching, analysis, and review. 
Because they are not indexed, any keyword searches 
performed against the data will not include those 
items. Therefore, a review that is based at least in 
part on the results of keyword searches may over-
look these items. Figure 8-4 demonstrates an ap-
proach to tracking data anomalies.
The quality control processes that enable data ac-
countability must be incorporated into the overall 
evidence management process; late implementation 
of these processes will require a historical reconcili-
ation of the data sources through each phase of the 
electronic evidence review process and will be both 
difficult and costly.
The Electronic Evidence 
Review Process
The review of electronic evidence is the process 
by which electronic documents are collected, pro-
cessed, analyzed, and reviewed. Subjective and ob-
jective decisions about each document are recorded 
by reviewers, helping to paint a picture of fraud ac-
tivities that may have occurred. Ultimately, docu-
ments that are not subject to a legal privilege are 
provided or “produced” to the government agency, 
auditor, or opposing party that requested them. The 
electronic evidence review process is described in 
figure 8-5.
Identification
Identification is the process of determining which 
data sources are in the scope of the investigation and 
should be preserved, collected, and processed for 
review.
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In order to establish the scope of the collection, 
outside counsel, the company, and its advisors will 
typically identify custodians who may have custody 
or control of relevant ESI, based on currently known 
information, as well as custodians whose work in-
volves business processes relevant to the matter. The 
advisors, working with the company, will identify 
the business systems that support those processes and 
the data sources related to those systems.
One key tool in identifying potential evidence is a 
company’s asset management system. These systems 
track and maintain a history of IT assets. An asset 
management system will help in determining what 
systems a custodian has access to now or had ac-
cess to in the past. As an example, if a custodian has 
recently received a new laptop, important evidence 
may be on the old laptop as well. The asset man-
agement system will be essential in identifying what 
has happened to the old laptop. It may have been 
assigned to someone new, or it may be in storage. 
By using the asset management system, investigators 
can more thoroughly identify evidence that may be 
obtained.
Preservation and Collection
In many cases, it will not be feasible to collect all po-
tentially relevant ESI as soon as it is identified. As a 
result, that ESI must be preserved from alteration or 
deletion (known as spoliation) until such time that 
it can be collected. ESI may be deliberately or inad-
vertently altered by a human action or an automated 
system process, such as scheduled purging or ar-
chiving of e-mail or documents by a computer sys-
tem. Investigators and counsel must therefore alert 
custodians of potentially relevant ESI that they must 
Figure 8-4: Data Anomaly Tracking
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refrain from altering or deleting it, or they must take 
specific action to prevent such activities, such as by 
deactivating a rule in their mailbox that deletes older 
documents. Preservation begins with notification to 
custodians that they must preserve ESI in their cus-
tody or control, which is a process known as a legal 
hold. As a part of the legal hold process, custodians 
will generally be issued written preservation notices 
informing them of the actions they must take or not 
take to preserve the ESI in their custody or control. 
The collection of ESI may take place at any time 
while data is under a legal hold, though it is advis-
able to collect data as soon as possible. The legal 
hold and collection processes are discussed in more 
detail subsequently.
Legal Hold
When ESI must be preserved, custodians should 
generally be notified that they must avoid deleting 
or changing potentially relevant electronic evidence. 
An organization’s counsel should notify custodians 
of their duty to preserve potentially relevant ESI in 
their custody or control. Custodians also may be 
informed of their duty to preserve potentially rele-
vant information created in the future, if applicable. 
The preservation notice should be understandable 
to custodians, actionable, and sufficiently detailed. 
Depending on the needs of the matter, counsel also 
may follow up to verify that the requirements of 
the legal hold are understood and honored by all 
custodians. The notification process should clearly 
establish procedures for the following:
 (1)  Notifying custodians of potentially relevant 
ESI of the need to preserve that information
 (2)  Tracking acknowledgements by custodians 
of these obligations
 (3)  Reminding custodians of their continuing 
obligations to preserve ESI
 (4)  Monitoring compliance with the notifica-
tions
It is important to note that one size does not nec-
essarily fit all; the level of communication, tracking, 
and monitoring will tend to be defined by the scope 
and nature of the investigation triggering the hold.
The most effective method for communicating a 
preservation requirement to custodians is a written 
preservation notice. This may not always be neces-
sary, and, on occasion, no notification may be re-
quired. For example, if the relevant ESI is retained 
forever as a matter of policy and practice, if the ESI 
can be collected immediately, or if there is a suspi-
cion that a custodian might delete ESI should he or 
she receive a notice, it may not be necessary or even 
judicious to provide notification.
Preservation notices will generally be issued from 
the office of the general counsel or some other de-
partment charged with responsibility for preserving 
records of the organization. If the company has im-
plemented a legal hold management system capable 
of transmitting preservation notices by e-mail or an-
other mechanism, then the notice may be transmit-
ted by outside counsel or a technical advisor who 
manages the system. The e-mail should be format-
ted consistently with the company’s internal e-mail 
system and indicate that it was sent from the general 
counsel’s office, so that recipients do not consider 
the e-mail spam. The company’s spam filtering sys-
tems also should be evaluated to ensure they do not 
block preservation notices originating from outside 
counsel or technical advisors.
The effectiveness of the notification process will 
depend, in part, on accurate identification of current 
and former business, IT, and records management 
personnel who have custody or control of informa-
tion potentially relevant to the investigation. Non-
employees also may be within the scope of a legal 
hold. For example, individual contractors may be in 
possession of potentially relevant information that is 
within the organization’s custody and control. The 
company should consider such persons who have e-
mail or other user accounts on the company’s systems 
because they may possess information within the 
scope of the hold. Additionally, third parties, such 
as application service providers, may have physical 
custody of information that is within the organiza-
tion’s control and relevant to the legal hold.
Thorough documentation of the legal hold is nec-
essary to demonstrate that reasonable efforts were 
made to comply with applicable rules and regula-
tions. The following items should be documented:
	 •		The	hold	trigger	and	date	and	personnel	 
involved
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	 •		Scope	and	scope	changes,	including	custodian	
lists, systems, and sources of ESI
	 •		Systems	inventory
	 •		Preservation	plan	and	protocol	for	custodians,	
systems, and repositories of ESI
	 •		Record	of	notice	and	updated	notices	to	 
custodians
	 •		Custodians’	acknowledgement	of	their	obligation	
to preserve ESI
	 •		Copies	of	the	preservation	notices
	 •		Interview	notes	and	memoranda
	 •		Preservation	questions	and	answers
The company should issue periodic reminders of 
the hold if it is of extended duration. Too frequent-
ly, a legal hold is treated as a one-time communi-
cation. Considering that legal matters often last for 
years, it becomes instantly clear how even the most 
diligent custodian could fail to remember the details 
of a legal hold notice sent months or years earlier. 
Thus, it is recommended that the legal department 
issue quarterly reminders to all affected custodians 
reminding them to continue to preserve documents 
as required by the hold.
Legal holds are iterative; the hold may be both re-
fined and expanded as facts and information come to 
light. Those responsible for the hold should consider 
whether preservation notices should be updated and 
reissued as the litigation evolves. Furthermore, steps 
should be taken to ensure that new employees re-
ceive any notices obligating them to comply with a 
preexisting hold. Updated notices should take into 
account any sources of ESI that have emerged since 
the original notice was issued.
Depending on the scope and nature of the hold, it 
may be advisable to audit custodians’ efforts to com-
ply with the hold in order to demonstrate compli-
ance and for the person responsible for the hold to 
document and certify ongoing compliance. The legal 
hold team will follow up with custodians through-
out the process to verify compliance. A team of legal 
and IT personnel should be identified who can assist 
custodians who have legal or IT-related questions 
associated with the hold.
Advisors involved in a legal hold also should re-
port regularly to the company and its outside coun-
sel on the progress of the hold. Reporting typically 
includes status reports, formal meeting minutes, and 
regularly scheduled meetings to discuss the status of 
notice and preservation efforts. Summary documen-
tation for each custodian or business unit should be 
prepared to provide a clear record of the represen-
tations the custodians made regarding ESI within 
their control and the actions they took to preserve 
ESI in response to counsel instruction. The sum-
mary typically includes a confirming signature by 
the custodian.
Timely and accurate reporting of holds is an im-
portant aspect of a well-designed, well-planned, and 
defensible hold. Depending on the nature of the 
legal hold, a standardized report template may be 
developed and reports regularly circulated to stake-
holders that identify progress made on the imple-
mentation of the hold. Such reports might include 
the following:
	 •		The	number	of	preservation	notices	transmitted	
overall and by business unit
	 •		The	number	of	acknowledgements	received	
overall and by business unit
	 •		The	number	of	unacknowledged	notices	overall	
and by business unit
	 •		Data	sources	preserved	overall	and	by	business	
unit, data source, and type of preservation
	 •		Noticing	and	preservation	activities	on	an	actual	
schedule versus planned schedule basis
The office responsible for transmitting the noti-
fication should define escalation procedures in the 
event that a custodian fails to respond to the pres-
ervation notice. Generally, in those circumstances, 
notifications should be sent to the recipient’s super-
visor advising the supervisor of the recipient’s in-
action and urgent need for compliance. This com-
munication also should be tracked, recording the 
date the supervisor was notified and the date of that 
individual’s response. Organizations should clearly 
establish the responsibilities of employee and super-
visor in this process, and the results of noncompli-
ance should be clearly communicated. For monitor-
ing purposes, a report should be created detailing 
the delinquent recipients and the level of escalation 
implemented for the recipients, and it should be re-
viewed for appropriate action by the office respon-
sible for the hold.
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Preservation
An effective legal hold will help a company pre-
serve ESI necessary for the investigation and as little 
unnecessary ESI as possible. It is not a requirement 
to maintain every e-mail or document in a com-
pany’s possession when a legal hold is triggered, only 
those potentially relevant to the investigation. An 
effective preservation plan and process is not overly 
inclusive but preserves only relevant ESI, as far as 
possible. Companies can preserve ESI by more than 
one method. The following three methods tend to 
be used most commonly:
	 •		Preserve on tape. The ESI is preserved by segrega-
tion of backup tapes from the disaster recovery 
or archival system.
	 •		Preserve in place. This form of preservation relies 
entirely upon compliance by custodians with 
the preservation notice. It should not be used 
to preserve data in the custody or control of a 
suspected fraudster or coconspirators.
	 •		Preserve by collection. Various methods are em-
ployed to create identical copies of the relevant 
data.
The facts of the specific investigation will influ-
ence the approach that the company takes to pres-
ervation. For instance, in an on-going preservation 
obligation (the legal hold is applied to information 
created or received today and in the future), some 
aspect of “preserve in place” will need to be incor-
porated into the preservation plan. Generally, col-
lection should take place as soon as possible after the 
ESI is preserved, regardless of the method of pres-
ervation, though this may not be feasible depend-
ing on the number of custodians involved and the 
overall scope of the hold. Many methods of collec-
tion exist. Most importantly, the method of collec-
tion should capture the ESI in a forensically sound 
manner. It should not damage, modify, delete, or 
alter either the original ESI or the copy made for 
collection.
It may be necessary to design and perform a 
“sweep” for off-line media, such as backup tapes 
pulled out of rotation, hard drives, and other mag-
netic media. A sweep may require the develop-
ment of a questionnaire that the company imple-
ments on its own regarding these media, or it may 
involve technology advisors performing a physical 
sweep (walk-through and collection of media) with 
counsel. A sweep should include thorough docu-
mentation of how the sweep was performed and 
the geographic, departmental, and physical (within 
a building or offices) locations that were searched. 
It also should result in a searchable inventory that 
categorizes, quantifies, and describes the materials 
found during the sweep.
Collection
Appropriate protocols are required during collec-
tion, preservation, and analysis of electronic evi-
dence, if evidentiary integrity and value are to be 
preserved. Maintaining a chain of custody log will 
enable evidence to be traced from the point and 
time of original collection to the point and time 
when it is presented in a proceeding. Creating a 
clear and comprehensive chain of custody docu-
mentation is particularly critical, given the length of 
time that may elapse between data collection and 
the presentation of the results of a forensic analysis 
of the data.
Fundamentally, investigators need to be aware of 
the need to
	 •		understand	the	physical	environment	within	
which the electronic evidence is located and 
document observations, interviews, and actions 
taken with respect to the data collection. For 
example, if it is believed that relevant data may 
be stored on an active e-mail server, it will be 
necessary to take appropriate steps to understand 
how data is stored on that server and if any auto-
matic deletion policies are implemented on users’ 
mailboxes. If interviews of IT personnel are 
conducted, the date, time, location, and inter-
viewee names should be documented for future 
reference, along with the substantive information 
gathered.
	 •		control	the	physical	environment	once	it	is	un-
derstood. In the prior example, if e-mail of inter-
est is located on a server, creating a forensic copy 
of user mailboxes can be undertaken by qualified 
personnel using appropriate tools and techniques. 
The copy can then be verified to ensure that it 
is an exact copy of the data required, and the 
verification procedures can be documented.
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	 •		log	all	detail	pertaining	to	the	handling	of	foren-
sic copies. Continuing the example, the media 
used to store the e-mail copies should be clearly 
identified (for example, by bar coding), and the 
movement of that media to secure storage and in 
and out of storage during analysis must be docu-
mented. A chain of custody log will then present 
a chronological history of each time the media is 
physically touched, including where, when, by 
whom, and for what purpose.
Computer Forensics
The field of computer forensics encompasses a range 
of activities, from relatively straightforward tasks, 
such as searching a single computer system for evi-
dence of unauthorized use, to searching for deleted 
e-mail messages that might remain on a computer 
network.
Computer forensics in the context of evidence 
gathering and electronic evidence review relates to 
the application of investigative processes and tech-
nical skills to find, secure, replicate or preserve, and 
chronicle or examine data within computers, elec-
tronic devices, and storage media, so that it can be-
come admissible evidence in court proceedings.
Forensic Tools
Forensic tools capture a forensic or “mirror” image 
of the original evidence media. This “mirror” image 
is a bit-by-bit copy and will contain the active files 
found on the media along with the unallocated stor-
age space, which is the location on the hard drive 
where erased or deleted files may be found. Forensic 
tools must not change either the content of the data 
or information used by the computer to classify a 
file or directory, such as the date and time the file 
or directory was created. This information is known 
as metadata.
Other data on a disk can include file slack, which 
is the remaining part of a deleted file after a smaller 
file is written over it, and unallocated space, which 
is space on the hard drive not currently allocated to 
a file and possibly containing a deleted file or frag-
ments of a deleted file. These types of electronic 
information are frequently important to investi-
gations. The forensic disk image may include the 
following:
	 •		Files	visible	in	Windows	Explorer
	 •		Deleted	files
	 •		File	slack
	 •		Unallocated	space
	 •		Metadata	(both	from	the	file	system	and	specific	
applications)
	 •		Operating	system	information
The tool used to create this forensic image should 
be able to verify that the output image matches the 
input media by using a verification hash compari-
son. A hash value is a “digital fingerprint” of a file or 
media. During the imaging process, the application 
will generate a hash value for the entire suspect me-
dia. Once the image is created, the application will 
then generate a hash for the forensic image and the 
two will be compared. If they match, the tool suc-
cessfully created a duplicate. It is important to note 
that the tool selected to create a forensic image must 
not affect the original data.
Remote Collection Tools
Remote collection tools are enterprise applications 
that are permitted unrestricted access to most net-
work machines. These tools can allow a company 
to seamlessly collect potentially relevant data, often 
without a custodian’s knowledge. The key differ-
ence between these tools and other forensic tools is 
that a forensics professional does not need to physi-
cally be at the location of the machine to collect the 
data. An administrator can schedule a collection at a 
specific time or as a result of questionable activity on 
the network. The administrator also can preview a 
network machine before collection without altering 
any of the active file metadata, keeping the eviden-
tiary integrity of the image.
Collecting Structured and  
Unstructured Data
Electronic evidence may be divided into two broad 
categories: (1) structured ESI and (2) unstructured 
ESI. Structured ESI is typically contained in data-
bases, such as financial or accounting databases (that 
is, general ledger, accounts payable, and payroll) 
and other databases, such as customer relationship 
management, shipping, or inventory databases. Un-
structured ESI includes e-mails, documents (that 
is, Word and Excel), instant messaging logs, and 
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voicemail. The investigator will work with counsel 
to determine what type of electronic data should be 
obtained.
Structured data is stored in a highly efficient and 
organized form, such as a database or spreadsheet. 
Structured data is typically collected using function-
ality available in the application managing the data 
or by using other utilities. Once the data is exported 
from the application, it can be analyzed using spe-
cialized tools.
Unstructured data includes e-mail messages, let-
ters, and memoranda. Unstructured data lacks a 
highly efficient and organized data structure and 
is most typically collected using forensic tools de-
signed for this purpose. In some cases, unstructured 
data also can be collected using the application that 
manages it. For example, ExMerge, the Microsoft 
Exchange Server Mailbox Merge Wizard, is a utility 
that allows trained personnel to extract e-mail data 
from one or several server-based mailboxes. The ex-
tracted e-mail messages retain all of their metadata 
and are identical to the e-mail messages found in a 
user’s mailbox.
Collecting Other ESI
ESI may be automatically created as the result of a 
particular activity. For example, when a computer 
user visits a Web site, the computer operating system 
will temporarily store some Web site information in 
the computer’s memory and in temporary space on 
the computer’s hard drive. These data fragments of-
ten can be observed with specialized forensic analysis 
software tools, but the fragments do not live on the 
hard drive as intact, complete documents, such as a 
letter, memo, spreadsheet, or e-mail message. They 
may contain some data from a specific Web site, but 
there will typically not be any discernable begin-
ning or ending point to the data that is present. This 
data may be of interest to investigators and it is only 
through the use of specialized tools, techniques, and 
training that the data can be reviewed once it has 
been forensically preserved.
Leveraging Company Resources
Most organizations have systems administrators (for 
example, database server administrators, e-mail serv-
er administrators, network specialists, and desktop 
application support personnel) who have a specific 
expertise but are typically not trained in forensic dis-
ciplines. IT departments use hardware and software 
tools to support the business needs of the organiza-
tion, such as to recover lost data. These tools may 
alter the data being copied, compromising the evi-
dentiary value of the data.
Specialists in computer forensics have developed 
investigative methodologies and software tools to 
collect and analyze electronic information in a man-
ner that is technically and legally consistent with its 
use for evidentiary purposes. Internal IT departments 
may not have personnel with the appropriate back-
grounds, and they may not have the budgets to pur-
chase, update, and provide ongoing training in the 
use of specialized tools. If an organization chooses 
to use its own personnel and tools, the organization 
runs the risk that evidence may be altered, damaged, 
or lost. The use of internal IT personnel in an inves-
tigation, for purposes other than support roles, also 
can compromise an organization’s independence in 
an investigation. Box 8-3 identifies company re-
sources that may provide critical assistance to inves-
tigative personnel.
Process and Analyze
Processing data for electronic evidence review has 
evolved over the past decade as the volume of data 
to review has increased and the tools that support 
it have become more sophisticated. Data processing 
includes all the steps necessary to prepare data to be 
loaded for review and analysis. Electronic evidence 
processing must accommodate a wide variety of 
unstructured data types (for example, e-mail, docu-
ments, presentations, and so on) as well as structured 
data types, such as databases and financial systems, 
if appropriate. Processing must always consider the 
review software that will be used because the re-
view platform will generally have specific format-
ting requirements. Processing systems must be able 
to handle foreign languages, so they must be Uni-
code compliant.
Processing is the stage at which data may be fil-
tered for content. For example, counsel may decide 
that duplicates should be removed, files that are not 
likely to contain useful data (such as system files) 
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should be eliminated, and data that is outside the 
relevant date range should be removed from the 
collection. The investigator must be able to account 
for all data dropped from review because of filtering 
decisions and should be prepared to defend those 
decisions. Additionally, some data may be corrupt 
or encrypted and may not be loaded, or if it can 
be loaded, may not be properly searched. That data 
should be listed on an “exception list” and may be 
subject to further review and analysis.
The analysis of both structured and unstructured 
data may provide insights and understanding to an 
investigator. Because of the inherent differences be-
tween them, structured and unstructured data may 
require different analytic techniques. An investiga-
tor should consider each of these types of data and 
should be familiar with the tools and techniques 
necessary to analyze them. Frequently, the greatest 
value can be had by comparing information con-
tained in structured data (such as questionable trans-
actions) to that contained in unstructured data (such 
as oblique references to transactions in e-mail).
Structured Data Analysis
Because structured data is highly ordered and orga-
nized for efficient computing, it can be readily ana-
lyzed. Even though structured data comprises only 
approximately 20 percent of organizational data, it 
has historically been a prime focus of investigations. 
Because the majority of data is not structured, in-
vestigations that focus solely on structured data may 
omit relevant evidence. Nevertheless, very useful 
information can be discovered by analyzing struc-
tured data.
Although each investigation is unique, many dif-
ferent techniques and methodologies can be applied 
to structured data to obtain useful results. First, be-
cause most organizations have some form of business 
intelligence (BI) system implemented, an investiga-
tor may be able to use the existing infrastructure to 
gather information pertinent to the investigation. 
Some BI systems that might be encountered during 
an investigation include Hyperion, Crystal Reports, 
Business Objects, and Cognos.
Data mining is an analytic technique that involves 
searching through large amounts of data to identify 
relevant information, patterns, trends, and differenc-
es indicative of fraud. Another useful data analysis 
technique is clustering or grouping data with similar 
properties. Clustering data can help uncover pat-
terns that can identify fraud. Perhaps the most valu-
able analytic tool for structured data is the relational 
database, which is a type of database that supports 
very efficient analysis of structured data.
In a typical investigation, structured data is load-
ed into a relational database. Once data is available 
within the database, many advanced analytic tech-
niques, such as data mining and cluster analysis, 
•		Describe	the	technical	infrastructure	within	a	company,	the	location	of	specific	hardware,	and	the	
function of various hardware devices.
•		Describe	the	flow	of	data	within	the	organization.
•		Assist	with	the	collection	of	structured	and	unstructured	data	from	common	applications	and	
proprietary or legacy data systems.
•		Describe	specific	application	software	policies	and	administrative	procedures,	such	as	tape	backup	
cycles, data retention practices, and acceptable use (code of conduct) policies.
•		Share	information	about	user	IDs,	passwords,	and	rights	and	credentials	on	IT	systems.
•		Provide	information	regarding	the	timeframe	in	which	applications	were	migrated	(for	example,	
when the company changed from one e-mail system to another).
•		Provide	information	regarding	the	transition	of	computer	equipment	from	one	employee	to	
another over time.
Box 8-3:  Shared Organizational Resources for Personnel Investigation
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become practical. Relational databases provide pow-
erful query capabilities that can help an investigator 
locate and focus on key information. Additionally, 
most of these databases support numerous report-
ing and export facilities that can help an investigator 
compile and present the relevant information. The 
most prominent database systems include Micro- 
soft SQL Server, Oracle Database, IBM DB2, and 
PostgreSQL.
Several other software tools are available to assist 
the investigator with structured data analysis. Audit 
command language (ACL) software is one such tool 
that has many uses, including data extraction and 
transformation, statistical analysis, and identification 
of exceptions and irregularities. ACL also may be 
used to prepare data for analysis by other programs, 
such as statistical analysis products developed by SAS 
Institute Inc. and SPSS Inc., which can help analyze 
statistical trends in large data sets.
Unstructured Data Analysis
Leading electronic evidence review systems have 
evolved from tools that support queries using Bool-
ean logic (such as term 1 and term 2) keyword 
searching to include technologies that categorize 
documents into groups without human interven-
tion. As the amount of data collected in an investiga-
tion continues to increase rapidly, today’s electronic 
evidence review systems must allow an investigator 
to find and review relevant documents faster and 
with higher precision.
Typically, 80 percent of data collected during an 
investigation is e-mail and other unstructured data. 
Investigators should consider the use of alternative 
search methods, such as concept clustering, social 
network analysis, and thread analysis, in order to fa-
cilitate the discovery of important evidence. Con-
cept clustering groups data into sets with similar 
themes. Social network analysis captures the pattern 
and frequency of communications between custodi-
ans, and thread analysis groups together e-mails that 
are part of a chain, so that the investigator can more 
easily understand the entire “conversation.”
Forensic Analysis
A variety of analytic methods can be employed with 
electronic information that has been collected in 
a forensically sound manner. A frequent question 
asked in many investigations is, who knew? A forensic 
analysis of data obtained from a specific person can 
ascertain if he or she possessed a certain electronic 
document, even if it has been deleted. Most com-
puter operating systems do not actually erase data 
files when they are deleted. The operating system 
simply alters an entry in a table that points to that 
file’s location on the hard drive. The space is then 
free to be used by other files. If no other file has yet 
been written to that particular space on the disk, the 
original file contents remain. A forensic analysis can 
recover the contents of the file. If another file has 
been written to that space, other indirect traces may 
still remain. For instance, if a document was printed, 
temporary files that contain portions of the docu-
ment may be on the disk.
Another question frequently addressed by com-
puter forensic analysis is, when? Computer systems 
create and maintain a number of logs during their 
operation. A time stamp on a file will indicate 
when it was created, last accessed, and last modified, 
though this information can be altered by other ac-
tivities. System logs can indicate when a system was 
last turned on and when various forms of network 
activity occurred, and provide many other indica-
tors of how a computer was used. Internet brows-
ing history is typically of great interest not only for 
its content (what was looked at) but for its timing 
(When did he or she read the article about Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act crackdowns, for example?). A 
forensic analysis can piece together a detailed time 
line of events using these clues found in the data.
Lastly, forensic examiners are often asked, what 
did they do? For example, a user may have utilized 
a commercial tool to “wipe” their drive (that is, 
overwrite all areas of the disk). A forensic analysis 
can very easily spot this activity. Establishing the fact 
that the custodian wiped his or her drive and how 
he or she did it may be of substantial evidentiary 
value.
Search
Recently, advances in e-mail and document analysis 
technology have allowed the electronic evidence re-
view process to incorporate more advanced text an-
alytics, in addition to simple Boolean logic keyword 
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searching. These advances have given rise to the in-
creased popularity of early case assessments (ECAs) 
prior to traditional keyword filtering and searching. 
ECA involves an analysis conducted soon after data 
is first loaded to the review platform, for the purpose 
of evaluating the collection of electronic evidence 
to determine potentially relevant information that 
may drive case strategy, such as key topics or themes 
of the case, dates and amounts, specific vocabulary 
and jargon, and people.
Performing early case assessments using advanced 
text analytics can assist the investigator in finding 
useful information quickly without having to sift 
through large volumes of documents. Having an un-
derstanding of the data before developing an exten-
sive list of keywords can help minimize the number 
of “false positives” (or nonrelevant documents that 
contained keyword hits), which can significantly 
slow the investigation and increase review costs.
Once an early assessment of the matter has been 
completed and information has been gathered from 
interviews, documents, and other sources, a list of 
key words can be developed to search the data set. 
These key words may be developed by counsel, fo-
rensic accountants, and other consultants, and the 
syntax of the phrases may be refined by technical 
advisors, so that they can be executed within the 
review platform. Should the investigation come un-
der review by a government regulator or shadow 
investigator, the final key word list and analysis logic 
applied will certainly be requested.
Review
The document review is the stage at which at-
torneys, forensic accountants, and other specialists 
review documents in order to determine whether 
they are potentially relevant to the investigation. 
Attorneys also will make a determination regarding 
whether a document is legally privileged and so may 
be withheld from production to a requesting party 
on that basis. The reviewer can usually categorize 
documents based on a predefined set of criteria, 
such as the issues to which they relate. Reviewers 
may review each document returned by searches for 
key terms or may review documents that have been 
identified by a system capable of grouping docu-
ments together that have a common theme.
More complex investigations have a greater need 
for effective project management of the review. The 
review team should be briefed on the background 
of the investigation, the types of documents in the 
collection, and the review protocol outlined for the 
case. It also is important for the review team to have 
an understanding of the taxonomy or “ontology” of 
related words or terms referenced in the evidence 
collection.
The review training will typically include a mock 
exercise in categorizing documents. The team will 
receive a sample set of documents from the evidence 
collection and discuss them as a group. After review-
ing the material, the investigators apply the proposed 
categories to each document and discuss their selec-
tions as a group. The review facilitator will provide 
clarification and direction for the review team be-
fore moving forward with the review. Conducting 
an open dialog with the investigation team regard-
ing the different types of categories available for re-
view, the types of documents in the collection, and 
key case terminology will help ensure consistency 
and efficiency during the review process.
Production
Once data has been reviewed, it may be provided to 
a government agency, shadow investigator, or other 
party. The data will be exported from the system 
and produced in an agreed-upon format. The form 
of production will drive the choice of review plat-
form. For example, if documents must be produced 
in their native format, a review platform that re-
quires conversion of all documents to tagged image 
file format (TIFF) images would be entirely unsuit-
able. It is important that the investigators understand 
the ultimate specifications for the production and 
consider the ramifications of those specifications at 
the beginning of the process, not the end.
Conclusion
The review and analysis of electronic evidence is a 
critical component of a fraud investigation. Yet, just 
as the ability to derive meaning from electronic evi-
dence has become an important tool in the arsenal 
of fraud investigators, the complexity of identifying, 
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preserving, collecting, reviewing, and analyzing that 
data has greatly increased. The investigator needs to 
consider all potentially relevant sources of electron-
ic evidence at the onset of the investigation. Once 
all sources have been identified, the investigator 
may want to consult a technology professional who 
possesses the expertise and tools to collect the elec-
tronic evidence without affecting the evidentiary 
value of the data. The investigator also should con-
sider whether he or she possesses the expertise and 
tools to review, analyze, and gain an understanding 
of the story that properly understood evidence may 
tell.
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Introduction
The globalization of business has increased the ex-
tent to which investigations are likely to be affected 
by legal requirements from more than one jurisdic-
tion. In addition, fraudsters have long known that 
moving their assets (and themselves) to a different 
location and beyond reach of the “long arm of the 
law” is an effective strategy; for ease of reference, 
we’ll call these cross-jurisdictional investigations. 
Differences and variations in laws, governing and 
regulatory bodies, accounting standards, business 
practices, governmental policies, litigation forums, 
and even languages can make cross-jurisdictional in-
vestigations quite complex.
Regulators and law enforcement bodies from 
countries around the world have responded to these 
complexities with commitments to shared law-
making initiatives on issues such as anticorruption 
and anti-money laundering (AML), as well as en-
couragement of cross-border cooperation between 
enforcement agencies.
Multinational corporations also have had to re-
spond to these complexities. Challenges exist in 
applying a corporate policy on a consistent global 
framework even, for instance, when acquisitions 
are effectively integrated. Companies are aware that 
damage is done when a news headline focuses on the 
multinational brand name and are concerned with 
reputation risk, which is the fear of global damage 
to their corporate reputation. This and many other 
factors drive many companies to consistent global 
compliance in preference to varying local standards.
Many investigations are precipitated by unex-
pected crises and are necessarily planned and imple-
mented in a very short time frame. Contingency 
planning can significantly improve response time 
and effectiveness, enabling early escalation within 
management and allowing the investigative team to 
mobilize quickly to implement measures to preserve 
evidence and secure assets.
Cross-jurisdictional investigations can differ sub-
stantially from traditional domestic ones in a number 
of ways, including how and by whom the investiga-
tion will be conducted, the nature and sequence in 
which procedures are executed, the legal orders uti-
lized, and the investigation objectives. For example, 
local resources may be required when the issue re-
quires competency in a different language or when 
privacy legislation limits the movement of personal 
information out of the jurisdiction. Although com-
pany staff will usually be available for an interview 
in the United States, in some cases and jurisdictions, 
trade union agreements or labor laws may allow em-
ployees to refuse to submit to such questioning.
The more common cross-jurisdictional consider-
ations include the following topics:
	 •		The	global	environment	and	issues
	 •		Monetary	judgments,	arbitral	awards,	and	 
restitution orders
	 •		The	differences	in	foreign	countries’	legal	 
systems and the legal orders available
	 •		Coordinating	with	government	or	local	 
authorities
	 •		Effective	utilization	of	resources
The Global Environment 
and Issues
Over the past several decades, there has been in-
creasing consensus and awareness that in order for 
there to be global prosperity and economic growth, 
business should be conducted on a level playing 
field, free from the damaging effects of fraud and 
corruption. This recognition has been an incentive 
for the development of regulatory systems that have 
moved toward more effective criminalization of 
fraud, particularly in areas such as money launder-
ing and corruption. The leadership of governmental 
and nongovernmental institutions and their thought 
leadership have further bolstered and driven move-
ment toward global consensus in assuring that fraud, 
which can cause damage on the larger economic 
scale, is reduced whenever possible and punished 
under the law.
The global economy has rapidly evolved over the 
past three decades. The evolution of regional mar-
kets,	such	as	the	EU;	the	emergence	of	new	econo-
mies; and the urgency of the need for stabilization of 
markets worldwide in an increasingly interdependent 
business marketplace have created a need for con-
sensus. Governmental and nongovernmental bodies 
have moved to meet that need with the creation 
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of cross-jurisdictional conventions, agreements, and 
recognition of common laws and standards. How-
ever, challenges still remain as public policy, legal 
systems, and stages of progress toward convention 
and alliance in standards continue to evolve toward 
a common standard.
Countries and organizations worldwide have 
agreed to adopt a more comprehensive and inte-
grated approach to compliance with international 
standards	 for	fighting	fraud	and	corruption.	Efforts	
and focus have been increased on those countries 
whose financial systems are most at risk. More and 
more of these high-risk countries and regions are 
reaching ratification, agreement, and compliance, 
making the world a smaller place in which to hide 
assets or escape from the consequences of fraud.
However, areas of risks remain and businesses, 
and corporations with international or multina-
tional operations fall victim to fraud. Conducting 
investigations for businesses with global operations 
or in multiple jurisdictions requires a broad under-
standing of the numerous governmental and legal 
systems, policies, and procedures. In an effective 
investigation, an understanding and knowledge of 
the regulatory and legal variances across jurisdictions 
must be utilized to effectively uncover the facts.
For example, in our case study1, Grand Forge 
Company experienced a need for this broad under-
standing of global issues that are faced when con-
ducting an investigation, which ultimately led Grand 
Forge Company to select Perusi & Bilanz LLP to 
conduct the investigation. What helped make the 
investigation more effective was when Perusi & Bi-
lanz LLP allocated local resources from their Asia of-
fice to conduct the investigation in the Philippines, 
which led to a more comprehensive understanding 
and knowledge of local regulatory and jurisdictional 
issues. This allowed the investigative team to con-
duct, and Grand Forge Company to receive, a more 
effective and efficient investigation.
In many regions, law enforcement and regulators 
have strengthened their international cooperation. 
For	example,	INTERPOL,	created	in	1923	and	the	
world’s largest international police organization, 
operates in 187 member countries. With this broad 
geographic enforcement authority, it facilitates 
cross-border police cooperation and supports and as-
sists all organizations, authorities, and services whose 
mission is to prevent or combat international crime. 
Many countries have gone a step further and imple-
mented mutual legal assistance treaty agreements, 
creating alliances between two foreign countries for 
the purpose of gathering and exchanging informa-
tion in an effort to enforce criminal laws. However, 
the enforcement powers of these agreements are 
typically available only to prosecutors from the re-
spective criminal justice departments, not to private 
sector investigators. As a consequence, information 
gathered by the police may only become available to 
investigators in the course of a public trial.
Because of these international alignments, when 
dealing with an investigation, a team might easily 
find itself dealing with parallel investigations not 
only by securities regulators and criminal justice 
prosecutors within a specific country but also by 
their counterparts in other countries.
It also must be taken into consideration that there 
may be differences in accounting standards. For ex-
ample International Financial Reporting Standards 
are accounting standards that may differ from the 
standards applicable under U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles. The correct accounting treat-
ment of a particular transaction may differ, depend-
ing on the standard adopted for the accounting re-
cords under investigation. In many countries, the 
accounting standards have the force of law, and a 
difference in the standard could be a cross-jurisdic-
tional issue that will require an understanding of 
those differences.
In addition, the number of formal internation-
al agreements or conventions by which different 
countries align themselves toward a common stan-
dard are increasing. Not all countries have adopted 
all or, in some instances, any of the conventions. 
Even	 when	 they	 have	 adopted	 the	 convention,	
the statute to bring the countries into compliance 
with the broad principles of the convention may 
vary between countries. As a result, rarely is a single 
1	The	reader	is	invited	to	read	the	detailed	case	study	of	Grand	Forge	Company	earlier	in	the	Introduction	to	this	book.
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over-arching convention or statute applicable in 
every jurisdiction. The United States is, however, 
a party to a number of key conventions, and the 
growing global acceptance of these is driving regu-
latory convergence. Many of the more important 
global conventions relevant to fraud investiga-
tions are those governing data privacy, corruption, 
and money laundering, as discussed in more detail 
subsequently.
Data Privacy and Moving 
Data Across Jurisdictions
Investigators frequently review data that includes 
personal information, such as e-mails or customer 
account information, to establish facts. The require-
ments for working with personal information can 
be different and much more restrictive in foreign 
jurisdictions than in the United States, and differ-
ing data privacy legislation can directly affect the 
investigation.
As an example and as was the case in the Grand 
Forge case study example, an investigator work-
ing	with	personal	information	in	the	EU	should	be	
aware	that	the	EU	considers	the	right	to	protection	
of	personal	data	 a	 fundamental	 right.	 In	1995,	 the	
EU	issued	Directive	95/46/EC	on	data	protection,	
which	governs	all	countries	in	the	EU.	The	EU	di-
rective not only broadly limits the scope of data and 
information on individuals that may be processed, it 
also restricts the terms and conditions under which 
transfers	 of	 data	 to	 locations	 outside	 the	 EU	may	
occur unless there are adequate safeguards for the 
protection	of	the	personal	information.	Article	25	of	
the directive states, “The Member States shall pro-
vide that the transfer to a third country of personal 
data ... may take place only if ... the third country in 
question ensures an adequate level of protection.”2 
The requirements for an adequate level of protec-
tion are quite formal and can significantly limit the 
transfer of data to the United States unless there is a 
“safe harbor” certification ensuring the privacy pro-
tections	would	be	ensured	as	would	be	in	the	EU.
Other regions have their own privacy frame-
works, and, in many instances, member countries 
have adopted privacy legislation to conform to those 
frameworks. For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework3 includes the 
following principles:
	 •		Preventing	harm
	 •		Integrity	of	personal	information
	 •		Notice
	 •		Security	safeguards
	 •		Collection	limitations
	 •		Access	and	correction
	 •		Uses	of	personal	information
	 •		Accountability
	 •		Choice
A common issue in investigations is that many 
statutes reflect a general principle that notice and 
consent of the individual is required before use of 
their personal data. More specifically, the trend is to 
require the following regarding notice and consent:
	 •	 Notice. Organizations must notify individuals 
about the purposes for which they collect and 
use information about them. They must provide 
information about how individuals can contact 
the organization with any inquiries or com-
plaints, the types of third parties to which the 
organization discloses the information, and the 
choices and means the organization offers for 
limiting its use and disclosure.
	 •	 Consent. Organizations must give individuals the 
opportunity to choose whether their personal 
information will be disclosed to a third party or 
used for a purpose incompatible with the pur-
pose for which it was originally collected or sub-
sequently authorized by the individual (opt out). 
For sensitive information, affirmative or explicit 
choice must be given if the information is to be 
disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose 
incompatible with the purpose for which it was 
originally collected or subsequently authorized 
by the individual (opt in).
Because the preceding principles are not un-
common and have growing acceptance in the 
2	See	http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf.
3		See	www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA2645824B)~APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf/$file/APEC+Privacy+	 
Framework.pdf.
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international community and newer regulations, in-
vestigators using information collected from other 
jurisdictions should be aware of the privacy legisla-
tion applicable in those countries. These laws can 
affect an investigation in terms of what data can be 
reviewed, whether the individual whose data is be-
ing reviewed must be notified, whether the data can 
be moved to another jurisdiction, and what can be 
done with the result.
Because personal data may be broadly defined in 
these statutes and can include any data associated 
with identified or identifiable natural persons, it may 
be impractical or difficult for the company to notify 
the individuals and secure their consent before using 
the information in an investigation. Seeking consent 
might even defeat the purposes of the investigation. 
In some countries, specific exemptions exist in the 
privacy statutes when information is being collected 
for the prevention and detection of fraud.
Please note that additional information on the 
management and transfer of personal data can be 
referenced	in	chapter	8,	“Electronic	Evidence.”
Anticorruption
Corruption generally refers to a payment or offer of a 
bribe or anything of value to obtain or retain busi-
ness or improper advantage. When the payment or 
offer is to a government official, the act is gener-
ally referred to as public corruption, which is distinct 
from private or commercial corruption. Anticorrup-
tion legislation can be both relevant and helpful to a 
fraud investigator. Many frauds include corrupt acts, 
particularly in jurisdictions where the government 
has a large role in the economy, either through 
state-owned enterprises or extensive regulations.
When undertaking an investigation, investigators 
and forensic accountants should understand the in-
ternational or regional agreements and conventions 
that impacted the legal framework of the involved 
jurisdictions, be it one or many countries or re-
gions. An awareness of the relevant law is helpful 
in understanding the country-specific enforcement 
frameworks and the resulting consequences for 
cross-border investigations.
For example, with respect to the Grand Forge 
Company case study, Jacob was familiar with the 
complicated intricacies of investigations and, there-
fore, knew he needed investigators who understood 
international and regional agreements and the im-
pact they might have on the investigation being 
conducted in the Philippines. Jacob felt more com-
fortable when Perusi & Bilanz LLP constructed the 
team that would conduct the investigation, which 
consisted primarily of experienced experts in inter-
national investigations, including individuals who 
have conducted investigations in Asia, with resources 
added to the team from the local and regional offices 
of Perusi & Bilanz LLP to assist in the investigation. 
These included individuals who spoke Filipino and 
were familiar with local accounting regulations.
International Conventions and 
Organizations
On a global scale, countries are now collaborating 
on their responses to corruption and have conven-
tions seeking to align standards and practices across 
jurisdictions. These conventions seek to be more 
effective in repatriating the proceeds of corrup-
tion and extraditing the offenders when they flee to 
another jurisdiction or remit the proceeds of their 
crime to a different jurisdiction. In addition, these 
conventional standards and practices often provide 
the framework for anticorruption legislation within 
the signatory countries themselves.
In a similar manner, other important nongov-
ernmental or industry-specific organizations have 
collaborated to focus on corruption across jurisdic-
tions. These include Transparency International, 
the World Bank Group, the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). These organizations have pub-
licly available information and insights that are often 
relevant to investigations in other jurisdictions.
Because of the influence of these organizations and 
the broad acceptance of the conventions put forth 
by them, two of the most influential and important 
international conventions that are focused on com-
bating global corruption and bribery are the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions. Several other important government-
sponsored initiatives, including the African Union 
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Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 
continue to gain influence.
Other organizational initiatives also are working 
to align anticorruption conventions and standards 
globally,	 such	as	 the	 initiatives	of	APEC.	Many	of	
these monitor the progress of a country’s adherence 
to their agreements to conventions or produce re-
ports and studies on issues, developments, or statisti-
cal information that can be useful in the planning of 
forensic investigations.
The most influential of the conventions and orga-
nizations and their objectives and roles in the global 
fight against fraud and corruption are summarized 
subsequently. A more complete listing of conven-
tions	can	be	referenced	in	box	9-1	at	the	end	of	this	
section.
4	See	www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html.
United Nations Convention against Corruption4
•		Membership	of	over	113	countries.
•		Adopted	on	October	31,	2003.
•		Requires	members	to	establish	criminal	and	other	offenses	for	specific	actions,	if	such	actions	are	
not already crimes under that jurisdiction’s own domestic law.
•		Member	countries	agree	to	cooperate	with	one	another	in	every	aspect	of	the	fight	against	cor-
ruption, including prevention, investigation, and the prosecution of offenders.
•		Encompasses	not	only	basic	forms	of	corruption,	such	as	bribery	and	the	embezzlement	of	public	
funds, but also trading in influence, the concealment of corruption, laundering of the proceeds of 
corruption, and offenses committed in support of corruption.
•		Members	bound	by	the	convention	to	render	specific	forms	of	mutual	legal	assistance	in	gathering	
and transferring evidence for use in court and to extradite offenders.
•		Members	required	to	take	measures	to	support	tracing,	freezing,	seizing,	and	confiscating	the	
proceeds of corruption.
•		Provides	agreement	on	asset-recovery	procedures.
•		Several	provisions	of	the	convention	specify	how	cooperation	and	assistance	will	be	rendered,	
and, in particular, how embezzled public funds can be returned to the country requesting them.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
•		Ratified	by	37	countries
•		Adopted	on	November	21,	1997
•		Commonly	referred	to	as	the	OECD	convention
•		Includes	commitments	from	signatory	countries	to	put	national	anticorruption	laws	in	place
•		Focuses	on	the	global	fight	against	bribery	and	corruption	and	the	combating	of	bribery	of	for-
eign public officials in international business transactions
•		Makes	recommendations	on	the	tax	deductibility	of	bribes	to	foreign	public	officials
Conventions
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Organizations
5	See	www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf.
6	See	www.transparency.org/publications/publications/ti_pp_01_08_uncac.
7	See	www.transparency.org/publications/publications/3rd_oecd_progress_report.
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
•		53	members	(but	as	yet	only	ratified	by	24	members)
•		Agreed	by	the	African	Union	in	July	20035
•		Commonly	referred	to	as	the	African	Union	convention
•		Focuses	on	measures	for	prevention,	criminalization,	and	prosecution	in	the	fight	against	private-	
and public-sector corruption and bribery
•		Provides	consensus	and	guidance	in	international	cooperation	and	asset	recovery
•		Provides	a	regional	cooperative	framework	and	covers	an	extensive	range	of	anticorruption	provi-
sions, including prevention, education, enforcement, sanctions, criminalization, and mutual law 
enforcement assistance
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
•		A	forum	for	facilitating	economic	growth,	cooperation,	trade,	and	investment	in	the	Asia-Pacific	
region.
•		Principally	from	Asia	but	also	includes	the	United	States,	Canada,	and	Australia.
•		In	2007,	the	Anti-Corruption	and	Transparency	Experts	Task	Force	deliverables	were	adopted	
and	approved	by	APEC	leaders	and	ministers	in	Sydney.
•		In	2004,	APEC	issued	a	document	titled	APEC Course Of Action On Fighting Corruption And 
Ensuring Transparency.
Transparency International
•		A	civil	organization	that	seeks	to	fight	corruption.
•		Provides	country-level	information	useful	to	the	planning	of	investigations,	including	its	Global 
Corruption Report, Corruption Perceptions Index, and Global Corruption Barometer.
•		Produces	a	range	of	studies	and	reports	on	corruption,	including	reports	on	monitoring	the	
implementation of international conventions, such as the following:
    –  Effectively Monitoring the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)6
    –  TI Progress Report 2007: Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials7
     For example and with respect to the Grand Forge Company case study, as Perusi & Bilanz LLP 
prepared to conduct the investigation, the members of the team gathered information from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in order to educate themselves and gain 
an understanding of the local cultural issues in the Philippines This was deemed a tremendous 
asset to the team.
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8	See	www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm.
World Bank
•		One	hundred	eighty-five	member	countries	
•		An	international	financial	lending	institution	that	provides	financial	and	technical	assistance	to	
developing countries for infrastructure and development programs with the objective of reducing 
poverty.
•		Views	good	governance	and	anticorruption,	with	a	particular	focus	on	emerging	markets	that	are	
at higher risk for fraud, as centrally tied to its mission to alleviate poverty and establish healthy 
economic development
•		Established	the	Department	of	Institutional	Integrity	with	a	mandate	to	investigate	allegations	of	
fraud and corruption in all World Bank Group operations and funding, assist in preventative ef-
forts to protect World Bank Group funds and those funds entrusted to it from misuse, and deter 
fraud and corruption in World Bank Group’s operations.
International Monetary Fund
•		One	hundred	eighty-five	member	countries.
•		Monitors	global	economic	and	financial	developments,	provides	policy	advice,	and	provides	
financing and loans to countries in crisis or with low income.
•		Considers	corruption	and	governance	issues	a	part	of	its	overall	focus	and	monitors	all	lending	
programs.8
•		Advocates	policies	and	develops	institutions	and	administrative	systems	that	eliminate	opportuni-
ties for bribery, corruption, and fraud in the management of public resources.
•		In	growing	recognition	of	the	adverse	impact	of	poor	governance	(and	the	resulting	corruption)	
on economic efficiency and growth, the IMF has turned its attention to a broader range of insti-
tutional reforms and governance issues in the reform programs it supports.
•		Contributes	to	the	international	efforts	to	combat	money	laundering	and	the	financing	of	ter-
rorism by assessing its members’ legal and regulatory frameworks, providing technical assistance to 
address shortcomings, and conducting policy-oriented research.
•		To	reduce	the	risk	of	IMF	resources	being	misused	by	countries,	the	IMF	executive	board	
strengthened	the	IMF’s	existing	safeguards	on	funding	in	March	2000	by	specifying	new	require-
ments that each borrower’s central bank publish annual financial statements audited to international 
standards by outside experts. The IMF will be able to carry out on-site checks by IMF staff, experts 
from other central banks, and accounting firms.
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In	2005,	the	ICC’s	Anti-Corruption	Commission	
issued revised rules of conduct and recommenda-
tions on anticorruption for business and issued a 
supporting manual for companies titled Combat-
ing Extortion and Bribery: ICC Rules of Conduct and 
Recommendations.9 The ICC’s rules outline the basic 
measures companies should take to prevent corrup-
tion. Though without direct legal effect, these rules 
and recommendations are intended as a method of 
self-regulation and constitute what is considered 
good commercial practice in the matters to which 
they relate. The manual include nine rules or “ar-
ticles” that cover bribery and extortion; political and 
charitable contributions; gifts, such as hospitality and 
expenses; facilitation payments; corporate policies; 
financial recording and auditing; and board of di-
rectors’ responsibilities in ensuring compliance with 
anticorruption policies. The rules also include en-
suring that all agents, intermediaries, joint ventures, 
and outsourcing agreements comply with compa-
nies’ antibribery policies.
It is noteworthy that the anticorruption activities 
of the ICC can be particularly helpful to investi-
gators in determining policy deficiencies and mak-
ing recommendations aligned to practices in many 
jurisdictions.
9	See	www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption/id870/index.html.
International Chamber of Commerce
•		Hundreds	of	thousands	of	member	companies	in	over	130	countries.
•		Three	main	activities	are	rules	setting,	arbitration,	and	policy.
•		Close	working	relationship	with	the	UN,	the	World	Trade	Organization,	and	other	intergovern-
mental and global forums.
•		ICC’s	International	Court	of	Arbitration	(ICC	court)	is	an	internationally	trusted	system	of	com-
mercial	arbitration	with	86	member	countries.
•		ICC’s	Commercial	Crime	Services	provides	the	world	business	community	with	a	centralized	
crime-fighting body that
    –  operates according to two basic precepts: to prevent commercial crime and to investigate and 
help prosecute commercial criminals.
    –  works closely with international law enforcement officials, including 
INTERPOL.
    –  includes the Financial Investigation Bureau, which focuses on detecting financial fraud before 
it is perpetrated.
    –  provides banks and other financial institution members access to a vast database of shared in-
formation to assist in fraud-prevention measures.
•		Established	the	Anti-Corruption	Commission,	which	focuses	on	developing	self-regulation	by	
enterprises in prevention of extortion, bribery, and corruption and provides business input into 
these initiatives on a global scale.
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Anti-Money Laundering
Perpetrators of frauds may well utilize different ju-
risdictions to their advantage in their attempts to 
mask their crime. For example, corrupt officials may 
remit the proceeds of their crime to a different ju-
risdiction because local deposits are more likely to 
lead to questions by bankers more familiar with the 
officials’ public role.
Money laundering is not just about drugs and 
terrorism; it also extends to the proceeds of fraud. 
Tracing the proceeds of fraud may well take the in-
vestigation into the ambit of the money-laundering 
statutes.
This has implications for the cross-jurisdiction 
fraud investigation. For example, some people are 
required to report suspicious transactions under the 
money-laundering regulations. In some jurisdic-
tions, these may include local professionals on the 
investigation team.
Money laundering encompasses any financial 
transaction that conceals the identity, source, or 
destination of money and generates an asset or value 
Global and interregional
•  United Nations Convention against Corruption
•  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
•  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions
•  Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions
Africa
•  African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
•  Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption
•  Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against Corruption
Americas
•  Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
Asia and Pacific region
•  ADB OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific
Europe
•		Council	of	Europe	Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
•		Council	of	Europe	Civil Law Convention on Corruption
•		Resolution	(99)	5	of	the	Committee	of	Ministers	of	the	Council	of	Europe:	Agreement Establishing 
the Group of States against Corruption
•		Resolution	(97)	24	of	the	Committee	of	Ministers	of	the	Council	of	Europe:	Twenty Guiding 
Principles for the Fight against Corruption
•		Treaty of the European Union on the Protection of Financial Interests of the Communities and two 
protocols
•		European	Union	Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union
Box 9-1:  Key Anticorruption Conventions and Instruments
(Source: http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/conventions_instruments) 
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as the result of an illegal act. International conven-
tions on money laundering are often integrated into 
agreements in relation to the fight against organized 
crime and terrorism.
Fraudsters profit financially from their criminal 
activities, and the pursuit and recovery of the pro-
ceeds of the crime are considered the standard for 
effective deterrence and sanctioning of those activi-
ties. AML targets the proceeds of crime and can be 
relevant to investigators, particularly as a tool to se-
cure and recover assets.
Money Laundering Conventions
Two important historical conventions have affected 
and given force to the investigation of money laun-
dering. Although they have broad missions in other 
areas, their provisions in the areas of the investiga-
tion and the seizure of assets related to money laun-
dering deems mention.
Entered	into	force	in	November	1990,	the	Unit-
ed Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances focuses on provid-
ing comprehensive measures against drug trafficking 
but includes provisions against money laundering 
and provides for international cooperation, includ-
ing aspects of the transfer of proceedings of profits. 
It requires parties to empower its courts or other 
competent authorities to order that bank, financial, 
or commercial records be made available or seized. 
The convention further states that a party may not 
decline to act on this provision on the ground of 
bank secrecy.
Adopted	 in	November	of	 2000,	 the	United Na-
tions Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
also took a series of measures against transnational 
organized crime, including the creation of domes-
tic criminal offenses (participation in an organized 
criminal group, money laundering, corruption, and 
obstruction of justice).
Both have been useful in the movement toward 
sanctions and deterrence against money laundering 
on a global scale.
The USA PATRIOT Act
A more recent and powerful tool in the investiga-
tion and sanctioning of money laundering is the 
USA PATRIOT Act, which was passed into law 
in	2001.	The	USA	PATRIOT	act	 is	an	enhanced	
law enforcement investigatory tool for responding 
to terrorist financing that has provided significant 
impetus to global AML initiatives. This has result-
ed in better client-level information collection and 
retention by financial institutions and more effec-
tive cross-jurisdictional cooperation between law 
enforcement and regulators. For instance, the USA 
PATRIOT Act provides for the facilitation of the 
government’s ability to seize illicit funds located in 
foreign countries, the issuance of subpoenas or sum-
monses to foreign banks with relationships to U.S. 
banks, the reporting of suspicious activities, and 
special due diligence efforts. As a result, institutions 
put into place reasonable steps to identify beneficial 
owners of bank accounts and those who are autho-
rized to use or route funds through payable-through 
accounts. It also is now necessary that financial in-
stitutions must undertake enhanced scrutiny of any 
account that is owned by, or is being maintained on 
behalf of, any senior political figure (often referred 
to as a politically exposed person).
The Financial Action Task Force
In response to mounting concerns over money 
laundering, the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF) was created by the G-7 
member	 states,	 the	 European	 Commission,	 and	
eight other countries. Since its inception, the FATF 
has spearheaded the effort to adopt and implement 
measures designed to counter the use of financial 
systems by criminals. The FATF has now expanded 
to	33	members.
In	1990,	the	organization	established	a	task	force	
and issued a list titled The Forty Recommendations that 
detailed specific measures to be taken by financial 
service and banking entities worldwide to assist in 
the	fight	against	financial	corruption.	 In	2001,	 the	
FATF issued a list titled Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing, which included eight recommen-
dations	on	the	topic.	In	2004,	a	ninth	recommenda-
tion was added. The recommendations strengthened 
AML and counter-terrorism funding standards and 
are now commonly referred to as the 40+9 Recom-
mendations. Compliance with these principles, or at 
least the movement toward such compliance, is now 
generally seen as a requirement of an internationally 
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active bank or other financial-service entity. The 
FATF	 40+9	Recommendations	 have	 been	 recog-
nized, endorsed, or adopted by many international 
bodies, including the IMF and the World Bank.
The	40+9	Recommendations	provide	for	the	in-
stitution of financial reporting systems that are now 
providing the basic framework for AML efforts and 
are intended to be of universal application. Rec-
ommendations include the institution of standards 
and practices of due diligence and record keeping; 
reporting of suspicious transactions; provisions for 
criminalization of money laundering activity; rec-
ommendations for measures that should be set in 
place to limit money laundering activity, including 
the sharing of information; requirements for ongo-
ing scrutiny of financial business relationships and 
due diligence in “knowing your customer” when 
establishing accounts and transactions; and records 
keeping, records maintenance, and five-year mini-
mum data storage requirements.
A major provision is the recommendation that fi-
nancial institutions monitor, investigate, and report 
transactions of a suspicious nature, as well as large 
cash transactions, to the governing financial intelli-
gence unit in their respective country. In the United 
States, for instance, financial institutions must report 
suspicious	transactions	to	the	Financial	Crimes	En-
forcement Network, a division of the Department 
of the Treasury. The United Kingdom has its Seri-
ous Organised Crime Agency with a financial in-
telligence unit responsible for dealing with financial 
information concerning suspected proceeds of crime 
in order to counter money laundering.
Although financial intelligence units might refer 
these reports to government agencies for investi-
gation, the reports may not be directly available to 
corporate financial investigators. The prime method 
of fighting money laundering is the requirement 
on financial intermediaries to know their custom-
ers and document that knowledge. In practice, the 
reporting institution is likely to have done reason-
able diligence on clients giving rise to suspicious 
transaction reports, and the client file may well be 
relevant to the investigation and accessible through 
legal procedures in the course of following the trail 
of misappropriated assets.
In	some	jurisdictions	within	the	EU,	for	example,	
the reporting requirements for suspicious transac-
tions might extend beyond financial institutions and 
include “gatekeepers,” such as accountants, lawyers, 
or others who may be involved in business transac-
tions involving financial transactions or instruments. 
For instance, accountants managing securities or 
other assets involving financial institutions or law-
yers involved in legal transactions involving the cre-
ation or selling of a business entity involving assets 
reaching threshold amounts of money may be re-
quired to report suspicious transactions or activities. 
When forming an investigative team or conduct-
ing an investigation, care should be taken to manage 
any risk that an investigator may come across. As a 
possible “gatekeeper,” a member of the team may 
be required to separately file a suspicious transaction 
report to his or her countries’ financial intelligence 
unit.
Police Cooperation: Anticorruption 
and Anti-Money Laundering
INTERPOL	 allows	 the	 police	 forces	 in	 member	
countries to assist each other. The organization al-
lows for the facilitation of international police co-
operation even when diplomatic relations do not 
exist	between	particular	countries.	In	1998,	Interpol	
established	 the	 INTERPOL	Group	 of	 Experts	 on	
Corruption, and it is currently in the process of de-
veloping	the	INTERPOL	Anti-Corruption	Office	
and	 the	 INTERPOL	 and	 United	 Nations	 Office	
on Drugs and Crime Anti-Corruption Academy. 
These components support anticorruption activities 
by establishing policies and standards, as well as con-
ducting or assisting with education, research, train-
ing, investigations, and asset-recovery operations.10 
AML	is	an	important	priority	for	INTERPOL,	and	
the organization includes corruption as one of its six 
priority crime areas. Individual countries also have 
strengthened their police forces’ international coop-
eration. The UK Serious Fraud Office, for example, 
has produced a “Guide to obtaining evidence from 
the UK” and works to actively cooperate in the in-
vestigative process.11
10	See	www.interpol.int/.
11	See	www.sfo.gov.uk/international/evidence_uk.asp.
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Although it may well result in delays and loss of 
control of the investigation, in some situations, it 
may be appropriate for the victim organization to 
lodge a criminal complaint and rely on the police 
criminal investigation to collect information from 
other jurisdictions that may ultimately become ac-
cessible through the criminal trial.
For example, as noted previously in the Grand 
Forge Company case study, it was determined that 
it was in the best interest of Grand Forge Company 
to	notify	INTERPOL	of	the	crimes	so	it	could	as-
sist in the investigation of the theft of assets. Jacob 
and Perusi & Bilanz LLP weighed the pros and cons 
of making this decision, and, in the end, the ben-
efits far outweighed the potential for delays and loss 
of control of the investigation. Grand Forge Com-
pany was able to mitigate these potential concerns 
by having investigators on the team from Perusi & 
Bilanz LLP who had experience in working with 
INTERPOL.
Monetary Judgments, 
Arbitral Awards, and 
Restitution Orders
Financial recovery is an important investigation ob-
jective and may be achieved through several avail-
able avenues of legal recourse.
Several outcomes may ultimately lead to an op-
portunity for financial recovery or recourse. Civil 
courts provide a monetary judgment, arbitrations 
provide an arbitral award, and criminal courts pro-
vide a restitution order. Significant differences exist 
among these forums, including the degree of con-
trol over the process, the burden of proof, and the 
degree of publicity. In cross-jurisdictional investiga-
tions, a further difference is that the forum may not 
be located in the same jurisdiction as the asset and 
securing the judgment, award, or order is a com-
pletely separate matter from enforcing it. The type 
of proceeding under which the award is made can 
make a difference to how the financial recovery of 
the asset is enforced.
Monetary Judgments
Enforcing	a	monetary	judgment	granted	by	a	court	in	
a different jurisdiction is not necessarily a formality. 
To enforce monetary judgments, some U.S. states 
have implemented the Uniform Foreign-Coun-
try Money Judgments Recognition Act. Passed in 
2005,	 this	 act	 updates	 the	 1962	Uniform	 Foreign	
Money-Judgments Recognition Act previously 
implemented in some U.S. states and was recom-
mended for adoption by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The con-
ference recognized the strong need for uniformity 
between U.S. states with respect to enforcement of 
foreign country judgments and encouraged all states 
to adopt the act.12
Similarly, relying on a monetary judgment grant-
ed by a U.S. court to collect money in a foreign 
jurisdiction might have some challenges resulting 
from issues, such as differing cooperational agree-
ments, international laws, differing treaty agree-
ments, or even the current public policy concerns. 
Common obstacles to recognition and enforce-
ment	of	U.S.	judgments	can	be	found	in	box	9-2.	
A number of other existing conventions may apply 
to enforcements of certain monetary judgments and 
can be useful to investigations.13 These include the 
following:
 •		The	Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters,	which	is	recognized	by	the	EU	and	the	
European	Free	Trade	Association	(EFTA)
	 •		The	Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters,	which	is	recognized	by	the	EU	and	EFTA
	 •		The	United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention), which is a widely recognized 
foundation instrument of international arbitra-
tion, addresses arbitral awards and enforces them 
in accordance with specific procedural rules in 
international commercial disputes, and is recog-
nized by most major trading nations
	 •		The	Inter-American Convention on the Extrater-
ritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, which is recognized by the Organization 
of American States
12	See	www.nccusl.org/.
13	See	http://lectlaw.com/files/bul12.htm.
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Arbitral Awards
Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution process 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The 
outcome of arbitration is an arbitral award, typically 
a monetary amount. Arbitral awards are enforceable 
through the civil court system.
Many frauds ultimately result in a breach of con-
tract, and, in cases in which the contract includes an 
arbitration clause, the investigation objective might 
include an arbitral award.
Arbitral awards enjoy greater international rec-
ognition than judgments of national courts. One 
reason may be that both parties have contractual-
ly consented to abide by the final outcome of the 
arbitration.
Most	countries	have	signed	the	1958	New	York	
Convention, facilitating enforcement of such 
awards.	Under	the	New	York	Convention,	the	144	
participating states are required to recognize arbi-
tral awards and enforce them, in accordance with 
specific procedural rules in international commercial 
disputes. As previously noted, most major trading 
nations, as well as many other countries, have rati-
fied the New York Convention, giving the conven-
tion broad acceptance and making this an effective 
proceeding for financial recovery.
As previously noted, the ICC maintains the ICC 
court, a highly facilitated and endorsed arbitration 
forum	 with	 86	 member	 countries.	 In	 2004,	 561	 
requests for arbitration were filed with the ICC 
court	 concerning	 1,682	 parties	 from	116	 different	
countries and independent territories. The court 
also has received new cases at a rate of more than 
500	per	year	since	1999.14
Restitution Orders
Restitution orders are remedies intended to reverse 
unjust enrichment and prevent a wrongdoer from 
profiting from the crime. These remedies and prin-
ciples are broadly accepted, and, therefore, most 
countries have some restitution mechanism in their 
criminal justice system. Restitution orders can be 
used in recovering assets.
All U.S. states allow for orders of restitution, but 
the processes for enforcement may vary. Restitution 
in the United States is normally a provision of sen-
tencing in a financial fraud prosecution and can have 
an effect on other sentencing conditions, such as im-
prisonment, probation, or parole for the defendant. 
Similar provisions exist in many other countries.
In real practice, one of the most common ob-
stacles to recovery is the time taken to effectively 
secure a criminal fraud conviction, which often al-
lows the fraudster to dissipate or exhaust any assets 
before any restitution order is granted. It is because 
of this reason that recoveries from these orders may 
not be substantial.
14	See	http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html.
•		Lack of jurisdiction. Some countries (for example, Brazil, Switzerland, and France) will refuse to en-
force a judgment against their nationals unless there is a clear indication that the national intended 
to submit to the foreign court’s jurisdiction.
•		Special notice procedures. Some recognizing countries require that the foreign litigant serve the local 
defendant party, in accordance with procedures not commonly employed in the United States.
•		Treaty requirements. Several jurisdictions, including most of the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, 
and Saudi Arabia, will refuse to recognize a foreign judgment unless there is the specific existence 
of a judgments convention between the rendering and recognizing jurisdictions.
•		Confusion over the lack of uniformity of U.S. law. Foreign courts often cannot discern a clear U.S. 
policy on recognition and enforcement because of the range of case laws.
•		Public policy concerns. Foreign courts may view the public policy aspects of U.S. law, such as un-
restricted jury awards, punitive and treble damages actions, and the use of long-arm statutes, as 
contrary to their own public policy.
*	See	www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/refmj.htm.
Box 9-2:  Judgment Recognition and Enforcement Obstacles*
Chapter 09.indd   176 8/4/09   1:04:59 PM
Chapter	9:	Cross-Jurisdictional	Issues	in	the	Global	Environment
177
This was the concern in the Grand Forge Com-
pany case study. The company’s concerns were due 
to the fact that the primary suspect was now living 
in Manila; had a luxury yacht and a residence in 
France, which is listed for sale; and may well seek to 
relocate his assets.
The company determines that an Anton Pillar 
and a Norwhich Pharmacal order should be issued 
in order to preserve documents necessary for fur-
ther investigation and ensure that assets, such as the 
yacht, are not removed to an unknown location. 
The forensic accountants from Perusi & Bilanz LLP 
provide the accounting support and documentation 
for the company’s legal representatives to support 
the issuance of both.
The Differences in 
Foreign Countries’ Legal 
Systems and the Legal 
Orders Available
Set against the global environment and the variety 
of applicable U.S. and international laws and regu-
lations, each cross-jurisdictional investigation offers 
a different scenario from its own facts and circum-
stances. Awareness of these differences and their 
implications on issues, such as how to discover evi-
dence; how to trace, freeze, and recover assets; and 
when to sue, become critical.
Some more important differences and impli- 
cations discussed subsequently include legal privi-
lege, letters rogatory, insolvency, orders generally 
available in the Commonwealth, and alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR).
Legal Privilege
In conducting investigations, legal privilege is an 
important consideration. Legal privilege is intended 
to protect an individual’s ability to access the justice 
system by encouraging complete disclosure to legal 
advisers without the fear that any disclosure of those 
communications may prejudice the client in the fu-
ture. Investigative findings commissioned by legal 
advisors to provide advice to their clients also may 
well be legally privileged.
In the United States, communications between 
client and counsel are frequently privileged. Al-
though the concept of privilege also exists in most 
international jurisdictions, the types and nature of 
such privilege may vary from the precedents set in 
the United States and due care should be taken by 
investigators to preserve legal privilege when pos-
sible and appropriate.
Letters Rogatory
Letters rogatory are a formal request from a court to 
a foreign court for assistance. Letters rogatory can 
be used to obtain evidence from a witness. Letters 
rogatory are utilized as a request from a court in the 
United States to the appropriate judicial authorities 
in another country to obtain evidence from a wit-
ness, either through testimony to answer questions 
or through the production of documents. The letters 
are used when the assistance of foreign authorities is 
required to compel a witness who is not willing to 
testify or produce evidence voluntarily.
Although the process can be very useful for com-
pelling evidence in a cross-jurisdictional investiga-
tion, the process of letters rogatory is long and com-
plex and delays of up to one year are common.
Insolvency and Receivership
Often, the financial stresses of a fraud can cause 
enough damage to a business or company that the 
fraud precipitates insolvency or receivership. For 
example, the fraud may have caused or concealed 
insolvency. Similarly, a fraud might give rise to a 
claim against a business. In some instances, an inves-
tigation or discovery of fraud may trigger financier 
covenants, leaving the entity unable to pay its debts 
in the ordinary course of business.
If the business is unable to pay the claim in the 
ordinary course of business or its liabilities exceed 
its assets, it becomes insolvent. If this is a result of 
the claim against the business, the victim (as credi-
tor) may be able to use the insolvency to secure and 
appoint a trustee or liquidator to take control of the 
business. A receivership is a court action that places 
property under the control of a receiver during liti-
gation so that it can be preserved for the benefit of 
all. When a trustee or liquidator has been appoint-
ed, he or she has the legal authority to further the 
investigation by recovering assets or compelling 
witnesses to provide information. Trustees, liquida-
tors, or receivers also have broad powers to control 
the business; investigate missing assets; and, ulti-
mately, distribute the assets.
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Antigua and Barbuda
Australia
The Bahamas
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Botswana
Brunei Darussalam
Cameroon
Canada
Cyprus
Dominica
Fiji Islands=
The Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guyana
India
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Lesotho
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Nauru==
New Zealand
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St	Vincent	and	the	Grenadines
Samoa
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tuvalu
Uganda
United Kingdom
United Republic of Tanzania
Vanuatu
Zambia
*Gibraltar
Box 9-3:  Commonwealth Countries
(Italics	indicate	countries	which	are	not	currently	members	of	the	Commonwealth	Foundation.)
(*	Gibraltar	is	an	associated	member)
=	Per	the	Commonwealth	Web	site,	Fiji	was	suspended	from	the	Commonwealth	following	a	December	2006	military	coup
==	Per	the	Commonwealth	Web	site,	Nauru	is	a	member	in	arrears
Orders Generally Available 
in the Commonwealth
Many	jurisdictions	have	legal	systems	based	on	Eng-
lish	common	law,	including	the	53	countries	of	the	
Commonwealth. These include countries such as 
Canada, the United Kingdom, India, and Austra-
lia. A complete list of Commonwealth countries is 
available	in	box	9-3.	The	common	law	offers	some	
investigative options not ordinarily available to in-
vestigations in the United States If the facts and 
circumstances allow, there may be an advantage to 
commencing proceedings in one of these jurisdic-
tions (such as Canada) to benefit from some of these 
options.
15	Rubin,	Sandy.	“Competition	and	change:	The	Canadian	legal	landscape.”	Managing Partner,	February	2006.
16	Caylor,	Lincoln,	Jim	Patterson,	and	Maureen	Ward.	“Canada	country	focus:	Fighting	fraud	across	borders.”	Managing Partner,	February	2006.
In jurisdictions that function under Common-
wealth law, an investigative team could utilize a 
number of different types of orders to obtain bank 
account information or preserve and seize evidence 
and freeze assets.15,16 Some orders can be secured 
without prior notice to the other party (referred to 
as ex parte orders). These orders are often referred 
to by the common law case in which the underlying 
concept was established (for example, Mareva in-
junctions, Anton Piller orders, and Norwich Phar-
macol orders). Other orders relate to the recovery of 
stolen property.
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In brief Without the other party
About Ex	parte	proceedings	are	brought	from,	by,	or	for	one	party	
in the absence of, and without the representation or notifica-
tion of, other parties. An ex parte decision is one decided by a 
judge without requiring all of the parties to the controversy to 
be present.
Purpose Ex	parte	proceedings	are	utilized	very	practically	in	cases	in	
which a plaintiff has reason to believe that notification of the 
defendant may cause significant risk to the plaintiff’s interests. 
For example, if a defendant knew that the plaintiff was going 
to file legal proceedings, the defendant could have the oppor-
tunity	to	move	or	liquidate	recoverable	assets.	Ex	parte	pro-
ceedings would, in this case, grant the plaintiff some protection 
of his or her interests during court proceedings.
Risks and other Courts are generally reluctant to grant orders because it is un-
fair to not hear from the other party.
As a result, specific conditions are required and safeguards 
are built into the process to discourage abuse. These conditions 
generally include a strong case, significant urgency, undertak-
ings concerning damages, and requirements for full disclosure 
of all relevant information.
Orders discussed subsequently, such as the Mareva injunc-
tion, Anton Piller order, and Norwich Pharmacol order 
require an element of surprise to be effective. For this reason 
they are frequently requested on an ex parte basis.
Ex Parte Order
In brief Freeze the asset
Case Named for the precedent case Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. 
International Bulk Carriers SA,	which	was	decided	in	1975.
About A Mareva injunction is a court order that freezes assets so that a 
defendant cannot frustrate a judgment by dissipating his or her 
assets from beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Purpose The purpose of a Mareva injunction is to restrain the defendant 
from disposing of his or her assets from the jurisdiction of the 
court and thereby protect the interests of the plaintiff until the 
trial ends and judgment is passed.
Risks and other It is important to demonstrate that there would be a real risk of 
the assets being removed or dissipated before the due process 
can run its course.
The order can be effective worldwide and often can include 
an ancillary disclosure order mandating that the defendants 
disclose the nature and location of their assets.
Mareva Injunction
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Stolen Property
Stolen property is recoverable by the true owner 
under	English	common	law	and	applies	in	cases	in	
which the property can be traced and returned to 
the true owner.
A constructive trust may exist when a party has 
been wrongfully deprived of its rights due to unjust 
enrichment or interference by another person. When 
the assets have been transferred to a third party, that 
third party may be deemed to hold those assets for 
the benefit of the rightful owner under a construc-
tive trust. Under a constructive trust, the third party 
becomes a trustee whose sole duty is to transfer the 
title and possession to the rightful owner.
A constructive trust claim can be established, for 
example, when the third party has been unjustly 
In brief Evidence	preservation
Case Named for the precedent case Anton Piller K.G. v. Manufactur-
ing Processes Ltd.,	which	was	decided	in	1976.
Purpose The purpose of the order is to secure and preserve documents 
or other evidence that might otherwise be disposed of by the 
defendant.
About The order allows for the applicant to enter the respondent’s 
premises and search for, inspect, seize, or make copies of 
documents or other evidence. This includes information on 
computers.
Risks and other It is important to demonstrate the existence of incriminating 
documents or other evidence and that a real risk exists that the 
evidence might otherwise be destroyed.
A safeguard that may be included is a requirement that the 
evidence seized be held by a neutral party until the plaintiff has 
had an opportunity to take legal advice on whether to contest 
the order.
Anton Piller Order
In brief Discovery from third parties
Case Named for the Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. The Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise,	which	was	decided	in	1974.
Purpose The purpose of the order is to allow for the discovery of evi-
dence from innocent third parties, such as financial institutions.
About The principle underlying the order is that if, through no fault 
of his or her own, a person facilitates the wrongdoing of oth-
ers, then that person comes under a duty to assist the victim. 
He or she can assist by giving the victim full information and 
disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers.
Risks and other The financial institution incurs no liability for violating its cli-
ent’s confidences because it is complying with a court order.
The financial institution may be ordered to not notify its cli-
ent that the information has been provided.
Norwich Pharmacal Order
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enriched by receiving funds fraudulently obtained 
or if the constructive trustee is recklessly or willfully 
blind to the conduct of the party that provided him 
or her with those funds.
It may be possible to effectively freeze property 
by notifying a third party (such as a land registry or 
financial institution) of the disputed ownership.
Alternative Dispute 
Resolution
ADR is relevant to the investigation process in many 
jurisdictions.	Examples	of	ADR	include	arbitration,	
mediation, and negotiated settlements. Issues under 
investigation are not always resolved in public court. 
ADR may even be preferred to the court system in 
some cases, particularly when the parties have on-
going relationships or the issues are complex. For 
example, there may be insufficient evidence to sup-
port a claim but sufficient evidence to support a ne-
gotiated settlement, or the issues may be technically 
complex and better suited to determination by an 
arbitration tribunal with relevant expertise than a lo-
cal court.
In some jurisdictions, ADR may be required as 
part of the due process for disciplinary hearings. For 
example, some jurisdictions require a specific ADR 
process to be followed when terminating an em-
ployee and failure to follow the process can result 
in procedurally unfair dismissal, irrespective of the 
merits of the case established by the investigation.
Financial recoveries might be possible on fraudu-
lent transactions governed by contracts with arbitra-
tion clauses, particularly in jurisdictions in which the 
legal system is unfamiliar or inefficient.
In considering whether to use arbitration, some 
factors to be considered include the following:
	 •	 Enforceability. Arbitral awards rendered in one 
country can be relatively easily enforced in 
another country, allowing the successful party to 
pursue foreign assets.
	 •	 Confidentiality. The dispute and its resolution are 
confidential.
	 •		Choice of arbitrators. It is possible to appoint 
available and suitably experienced specialists as 
arbitrators.
	 •		Final binding decisions. Appeals or judicial reviews 
of arbitral awards are limited to very narrow 
circumstances and are generally not possible.
	 •		Flexibility in selecting place, language, and process. 
The location, language, applicable law, and pro-
cedural rules (such as discovery) can be selected, 
if not already specified in the contract.
Arbitral institutions have tried and tested arbitra-
tion rules and can assist with administration of the 
arbitral process. Two prominent institutions are the 
ICC court previously mentioned and the American 
Arbitration Association. Both organizations do not 
arbitrate disputes, but they provide administrative 
support to the arbitration process.
Coordinating With 
Government or Local 
Authorities
The timing and extent of disclosures to regulators 
and law enforcement are an important consideration 
during an investigation. The priorities of regulators 
and law enforcement may not match the priorities 
of the business investigating the fraud. For example, 
although financial recovery of the financial losses 
may be the primary objective for the business, civ-
il procedures for recovery may be placed on hold 
pending resolution of a criminal procedure initi-
ated	by	law	enforcement.	Early	disclosure	may	lead	
to premature allegations, a loss of control over an 
investigation, or delays in resolution of an internal 
investigation.
Generally, investigators prefer to complete their 
investigation of the facts before making disclosures 
to the U.S. government because it allows for an un-
impeded investigation with the most complete and 
accurate disclosure of the facts and findings. When 
early disclosure is required or is chosen as an ave-
nue to gain credit for voluntary cooperation, it may 
be possible to agree with the government that the 
internal investigation can run its course before the 
respective government agency takes a more active 
role, as discussed under the “Parallel Investigations” 
section in chapter 11, “Working with Regulators 
and Parallel Investigations.”
When investigations cross jurisdictions, thought-
ful consideration should be given to the need for the 
timing of disclosures to, and inclusion of, the for-
eign authorities who have applicable jurisdiction. If 
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foreign authorities initiate an investigation on their 
own, they may view the investigation team as inter-
fering with or even obstructing their work.
Effective Utilization of 
Resources
By their very nature, investigations are often per-
ceived as crises. They can arise suddenly, preempt 
other activities, and place a significant burden on 
management. Generally, when a fraud or allegation 
of fraud arises, a company must respond immediate-
ly in order to minimize financial and legal damage 
to the company. The company should utilize inter-
nal resources, most importantly their internal legal, 
accounting, and auditing resources, as appropriate, 
and take advantage of their proximity and familiarity 
with the systems, processes, and issues.
In many cross-jurisdictional investigations, it may 
be necessary to balance the investigative team with 
external resources, particularly when objectivity is 
required for the integrity and credibility of the in-
vestigation or when specialist skills are not locally 
available. Coordination to a consistent standard and 
project plan across multiple locations can be a com-
plex undertaking in and of itself. It may require that 
further resources be considered to assist in cases of 
international and cross-jurisdictional investigations, 
such as the following:
	 •		Local	legal	counsel	who	may	be	able	to	take	
advantage of locally available court orders or 
prevent inadvertent breach of local statutes in the 
course of the investigation
	 •		Local	industry	experts	who	are	familiar	with	
customary business practices normally conducted 
in the industry and region
	 •		Local	technical	experts,	such	as	computer	foren-
sics practitioners or investigative accountants, 
who could read documents and hold interviews 
more effectively than a translator
These resources should be selected based on cri-
teria such as their competency and experience with 
the local language, customs, traditions, and laws. 
Further discussion on third party roles and re-
sponsibilities in a cross-jurisdictional investigation 
can	be	 found	 in	 chapter	6,	 “Roles	 and	Responsi-
bilities: How Different Stakeholders Work During 
Investigations.”
Conclusion
In the current global environment, awareness and 
focus has increased on the need for attention to the 
adherence to high ethical and practicing standards in 
the	fight	against	fraud	and	corruption.	Even	now,	as	
the global economy seeks to converge to a common 
forum in the fight toward stabilization in difficult 
economic times, the need for guidelines in the fi-
nancial and banking sectors that prevent fraud and 
increase transparency in transactions to limit and 
prevent the possibility for fraud are at the forefront 
in global economic policy.
In an increasingly global and connected busi-
ness economy, business transactions will increas-
ingly cross borders and jurisdictions. Investigations 
of those transactions will follow accordingly. The 
alignment of governments and regulators continues 
to develop in the fight against fraud, bribery, and 
corruption of all types and, in so doing, lends direc-
tion; assistance; and, in some cases, support to the 
work of the fraud investigation.
A current understanding and awareness of the ju-
risdictional and cross-border issues will lead to more 
successful investigation outcomes.
Although risks are inherent to investigations in 
different and unfamiliar jurisdictions, opportunities 
also are provided to use tools not domestically avail-
able. The pursuit of offshore assets is no longer as 
difficult a task as it once was. Increasing cooperation 
and accountability now exist in the transparency of 
financial and business transactions. Businesses and 
financial institutions worldwide are increasingly fo-
cused on identifying and preventing fraud, bribery, 
and corruption. The world no longer has as many 
options for the fraudster seeking to escape account-
ability. Indeed, the “long arm of the law” is likely to 
get even longer.
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Introduction
Grand Forge1 has recently learned about a series of 
separate allegations and issues that raise a variety of 
intertwined business, legal, and financial reporting 
challenges. Among Grand Forge’s issues are a series 
of whistle-blower reports of improper accounting 
practices, inflated expense reporting, and a com-
plaint and claim for damages from a significant over-
seas customer. As Grand Forge begins to grapple 
with these issues, it is likely that they will draw on 
the skills of both forensic accountants and attorneys. 
Whistle-blower allegations with more complex fact 
patterns and those involving legal or regulatory mat-
ters are usually addressed by a team of experts with 
financial, accounting, internal controls, and legal 
expertise, often working side-by-side to address all 
aspects of the problem. Typically, these professionals 
coordinate their efforts to investigate facts, analyze 
issues, advise their clients about potential courses of 
action, make recommendations, and assist their cli-
ents in implementing decisions.
For many litigation and investigation matters, it 
is essential to have both the legal and accounting 
perspectives to achieve the best possible outcome. 
Accounting, auditing, and finance skills are needed 
to help gather and develop an understanding of the 
underlying facts and determine the best course of 
action from a business and financial perspective. At 
the same time, companies need sound legal advice. 
Consider, for example, that one of Grand Forge’s 
significant overseas customers has called to complain 
about the quality of a large volume of product that 
had been recently shipped. The customer states that 
Grand Forge’s country manager has routinely pres-
sured the customer to take product in excess of their 
needs, especially at the end of the quarter. The cus-
tomer is now alleging that the product they received 
is substandard, unusable and outside the contract 
specifications and is claiming damages related to the 
substandard product. To address these issues, Grand 
Forge will need to gather the accounting books and 
records related to these allegations. It may also need 
a wealth of information that accountants are highly 
skilled in gathering including:
	 •		a	detailed	understanding	of	the	company’s	inter-
nal controls around production,
	 •		order	management,
	 •		fulfillment,
	 •		inventory	management,
	 •		revenue	recognition,
	 •		and	analysis	of	the	customer’s	financial	situation.
At the same time, it will also need legal advice 
on conducting an investigation of possible channel 
stuffing, an assessment of the strength of the con-
tract claims, and the possible approaches to resolving 
claims within that overseas jurisdiction.  
This chapter focuses on the close and integrated 
working relationship between accountants and at-
torneys. It addresses the intersecting roles of ac-
countants and attorneys in the investigation setting, 
including the typical structure of the engagement 
and the roles taken by these professionals during in-
vestigations. The chapter also touches on the vari-
ous aspects of working with attorneys in a litigation 
setting. Using the Grand Forge scenario, the chap-
ter articulates ways that practitioners can work most 
successfully together.
Working Together
Attorneys and accountants can both bring deep skills 
and training to bear, although their contributions 
differ widely depending on the individuals and is-
sues involved. Both professions claim investigations, 
fact gathering, and the synthesis of data to be among 
their strong suits. Depending on the investigation, 
dispute, or business challenge, each offers unique 
strengths, but each may focus on different aspects of 
the problem.
In general, a team that comprises both accoun-
tants and attorneys will generate a better outcome, 
precisely because of the differences in the skills, 
training, experience, and responsibilities of the re-
spective professionals. By working together on in-
vestigations, an integrated team of accountants and 
attorneys often develops a more well-rounded view 
of the issues at hand. For example, at the outset of 
an investigation, attorneys and accountants may 
influence the structure, scope and timing of an 
1		The	reader	is	invited	to	read	the	detailed	case	study	of	Grand	Forge	Company	found	in	the	Introduction	to	this	book.
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investigation. In Grand Forge’s example, the com-
pany needs an investigation that will collect the data 
necessary for its decision making and will need to 
address the legal, accounting, and practice implica-
tions of a broad range of potential outcomes. An ac-
countant might suggest a scope that includes a vari-
ety of business, financial and accounting procedures 
related to the allegations of channel stuffing and the 
financial analyses related to the potential extent of 
damages, if any. An accountant might also encour-
age the investigation team to think about the time 
that the company and its external auditors will need 
to consider and test any outputs of the investigation. 
Grand Forge’s attorney will likely be attentive to the 
ways in which the information developed during 
the investigation may be legally shielded from ex-
ternal disclosure, permitting the company to better 
defend against litigation spawned by the underlying 
issues or investigation. Attorneys may also suggest 
scope and timing to ensure that contract and regula-
tory requirements are fully addressed. In situations 
like these, an integrated team of attorneys and ac-
countants brings diversity of thought and approach 
and helps ensure that multiple avenues are explored, 
many sides of the issue are addressed, and the needs 
of a variety of stakeholders are considered.
Both attorneys and accountants also contribute 
during the fact-gathering stage. Usually, fact-gather-
ing interviews are more fruitful when the interview-
er’s questions incorporate the approach of both the 
accountants and attorneys. During such interviews, 
attorneys help ensure that the rights of the company 
and those being interviewed are respected and of-
ten have a well-honed sense of how to fully ex-
haust a witness’s recollection of a particular subject. 
The analytical strengths of attorneys and accountants 
tend to complement each other during fact gath-
ering. For example, an attorney’s line of question-
ing might gravitate to the contractual, transactional, 
and regulatory aspects of a problem. By contrast, 
an accountant might focus on (1) inconsistencies 
between a witness’s description of events and the 
investigator’s understanding of the business controls 
and processes or (2) the specific details of account-
ing records or financial reports. Although attorneys 
often take the lead, interviews by accountants can 
be highly fruitful, particularly during questioning 
related to accounting books and records, financial 
transactions, or processes. Interviews by accountants 
can sometimes be disarming, compared to those 
conducted by an attorney, because they have the 
tone of the normal audit or advisory-related inquiry 
with which many business people are familiar. Be-
cause the people interviewed in business-related in-
vestigations often have some financial, control, or 
business-process responsibility, it is helpful that the 
accountant speaks the same language. Accountant-
to-accountant interviews often yield specific and 
content-rich information.
In gathering documentation, attorneys and ac-
countants also reach for evidence that is familiar 
in their lines of work. Attorneys tend to focus on 
words and narrative evidence, such as e-mails, con-
tracts, regulatory filings, and the records in the cor-
porate secretary’s office. By contrast, accountants 
tend to be more comfortable with quantitative data 
and often reach for transaction paperwork, book-
keeping records, and accounting books and records. 
The auditing skills of testing, vouching, and trac-
ing are second nature to accountants but may be 
less familiar to attorneys. Bringing together both the 
attorneys’ and accountants’ skills helps identify and 
gather all relevant documents and, therefore, per-
mits better probing for inconsistencies. This helps 
develop a more complete picture of the situation.
In investigations of business transactions, the ap-
plication of generally accepted accounting principles 
and generally accepted auditing standards may be as 
relevant as any legal principle. For example, if the 
investigation in our scenario is focused on wheth-
er the seller has breached its warranties to Grand 
Forge, a legal interpretation of the contract may set 
the framework for fact gathering. However, if an in-
vestigation is focused on whether a transaction was 
properly reported in the subject company’s books, 
records, and financial filings or on whether such 
information would be relevant to the company’s 
independent accountants, the accounting and audit-
ing standards set that framework. In many investiga-
tions, as in our scenario, such issues intersect.
As the facts become known, legal and accounting 
analyses tend to diverge, but the work of accoun-
tants and attorneys remains intertwined. Along with 
financial reporting and related advice, accountants 
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may be asked to analyze the underlying data, con-
sidering a variety of business-oriented metrics, dam-
ages, and other calculations. Attorneys may handle 
all aspects of the legal analysis. Accountants can pro-
vide attorneys with the facts that are needed to make 
good legal conclusions, including a nuanced view of 
the accounting and financial implications of various 
courses of action. By contrast, attorneys often help 
accountants understand the aspects of the attorneys’ 
work that might be confusing and can provide valu-
able insights on the application of rules and standards 
to particular fact patterns.
By identifying issues that can affect financial state-
ments or financial reporting and assessing the risk 
of misstatement, forensic accountants also may help 
the attorneys ensure that the attorneys’ communica-
tions with external auditors regarding an investiga-
tion are appropriate and complete. Box 10-1 out-
lines the differences between attorney and forensic 
accountant roles and responsibilities during a fraud 
investigation case.
Accountants are usually well qualified to quantify 
damages or prepare financial models in litigation or 
in the context of efforts to resolve disputes.2
The structure and specialized skills of accounting 
and law firms provide the following additional rea-
sons for successful working relationships:
Subject matter expertise and a cross-disciplinary team. 
Typically, a company such as Grand Forge that 
is addressing the various challenges of investiga-
tions and disputes rarely has expertise in all of the 
accounting, legal, and operational areas necessary 
to fully address the matters it faces. Companies 
facing such challenges deserve good advice and 
the best thinking of professionals with experience 
in addressing similar issues. They can benefit 
equally from the personal expertise or experience 
of an individual professional and from the ability 
of a large firm to draw on the skills of a group of 
specialists within a firm or professional network. 
Similarly, large firms can deliver teams of pro-
fessionals to help expand a company’s ability to 
Forensic Accountant’s Role Attorneys’ Role
•		Participate	in	discussions	concerning	in-
vestigation scope, data resources, and data 
retention
•		Perform	data	acquisition,	processing,	re-
view, and analysis
•		Conduct	interviews,	with	special	focus	on	
financial reporting, control environment, 
transactions, and their context
•		Assist	company	and	external	auditors	with	
understanding and considering facts
•		Quantify	damages	or	prepare	financial	
models for different scenarios
•		Participate	in	discussions	concerning	in-
vestigation scope, data resources, and data 
retention
•		Perform	data	acquisition,	processing,	re-
view, and analysis
•		Conduct	interviews,	with	special	focus	on	
chronologies, accuracy of assertions, and 
assembling of relevant facts
•		Assist	company	and	external	auditors	with	
understanding and considering facts
•		Provide	legal	advice	regarding	legal	rights	
and obligations
•	Defend	regulatory	proceedings
•	Bring	claims	on	behalf	of	clients
Box 10-1:  An Overview of the Possible Roles for Forensic Accountants and Attorneys
2		For	a	listing	of	typical	litigation	services	provided	by	accounting	and	forensic	practitioners,	see	the	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	Report	03-1,	
Litigation Services and Applicable Professional Standards,	New	York:	AIPCA,	2003,	app.	A.
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staff large or complex projects with independent, 
objective, and skilled resources.
Global reach. The largest accounting firms have 
global reach and can typically provide qualified 
professionals who are both fluent in the local lan-
guages and familiar with the business practices of 
almost any locality or specialized industry. Some 
of the large law firms have similar reach. Collab-
oration between the accounting and legal firms 
can ensure that an adequately staffed and well-
integrated team balances the needs for various 
skills, expertise, language, nationality, or ethnic-
ity.	Particularly	in	investigations,	it	is	helpful	to	
have professionals who can empathize and com-
municate with interview subjects, identify the 
patterns unique to specific localities, and put the 
facts into context. Global reach also helps bring 
to light the unique legal and operational aspects 
of executing an investigation in various localities, 
including the requirements for employee rights 
and handling evidence.
Legal technology. It is becoming common practice 
to gather electronic evidence, such as e-mail and 
computer-based files, as part of investigations and 
business litigation. Legal technology professionals 
are now essential in the majority of such assign-
ments, and most large accounting and legal firms 
have such experts in their organizations. They 
also are found at boutique professional services 
firms. Often, gathering electronic evidence is a 
first and critical step in the investigation. Having 
a legal technology team that is well integrated 
with the core investigation team is an increas-
ingly important asset. For more information on 
electronic evidence, including discussion of types 
of evidence, please refer to chapter 8, “Electronic 
Evidence.”
Roles and Engagement 
Structure
Let us return to Grand Forge’s issue with alleged 
channel stuffing and a related claim for damages by 
its customer. Mindful of the need to explore and 
resolve these issues prior to submitting its financial 
filings, Grand Forge may press its forensic and legal 
professionals to get started on any necessary investi-
gation activities as soon as possible. Although Grand 
Forge may hope for the best, it must recognize that 
an investigation of the issues in the scenario may 
prompt a civil or criminal investigation by govern-
ment or regulatory authorities or may lead to legal 
action by shareholders or outsiders. Grand Forge’s 
ability to conclude such legal matters successfully 
may depend on its ability to resist disclosing to fu-
ture adversaries the work products of its investiga-
tion. Similarly, Grand Forge’s ability to demonstrate 
that its investigation was led by competent people 
who were sufficiently independent of those who 
may have committed wrongdoing may affect the 
degree to which the investigation is reliable and 
whether regulators and auditors will consider it to 
be reliable for their purposes. That, in turn, may 
affect how quickly any external audits or regulatory 
inquiries can be resolved.
For these reasons, a first question for those struc-
turing the investigation is how the engagement 
should be structured. The forensic accountant will 
want to ensure that professional responsibilities are 
met and that any investigation work with the attor-
neys is competent, objective, and well coordinated. 
Attorneys will want to ensure that any legal privi-
leges are available and that their client’s ability to 
resist discovery of the investigation’s work product 
is not compromised.
Another critical consideration is whether the in-
vestigation team is sufficiently competent, indepen-
dent, and credible. For example, when it is reason-
able to believe that an investigation may cast doubt 
on the integrity of a senior manager within a com-
pany, it also is reasonable to question whether that 
company’s ordinary counsel or an attorney that has 
previously represented that senior manager should 
lead the investigation. Sometimes, the participation 
of a forensic accounting team that is truly indepen-
dent may make others more comfortable with pro-
ceeding with ordinary counsel, particularly when 
the risk of an adverse finding against the senior man-
ager seems remote. Similarly, investigations focus-
ing on potential improprieties in the revenue rec-
ognized in a company’s financial statements might 
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be staffed differently than investigations focusing on 
tax reporting.
The credibility, objectivity, and reliability of the 
investigation are important to the company. They 
also are important to possible external parties, such 
as auditors and regulators who may wish to rely on 
portions of the investigation team’s work in the 
context of their responsibilities. Having competent, 
credible, and independent investigations may reduce 
the overall time necessary to bring the matters to 
conclusion.
Early decisions related to whether to preserve and 
gather evidence, whether specific individuals will 
participate in the investigation, and whether man-
agement can influence the scope of the investiga-
tion may, in some instances, taint relevant data or 
witnesses and permanently impair the quality of an 
investigation.
Thus, early decisions regarding engagement struc-
ture are more than “who does what.” They have 
significant ongoing ramifications because early deci-
sions regarding roles and responsibilities also affect 
who is in charge, the viability of any claim of le-
gal privilege, and the extent to which the output of 
the investigation is as valuable to the company as it 
can be. A well-structured investigation also helps to 
ensure that roles are clear, that team members are 
accountable for their work and responsibilities, and 
that work is efficiently conducted.
In investigative settings, attorneys and accoun-
tants work together in several different ways, with 
the accountant retained either directly by the same 
client as the attorney (usually a company, but some-
times an individual) or indirectly by the attorney in 
connection with the attorney’s legal advice to the 
client. Functionally, the two professional firms can 
work in a variety of ways. Oftentimes, in the United 
States, the attorney is retained as a lead investigator 
by the client that is often a company, committee of 
a board, or individual. Then, the attorney retains 
the accountant as a coinvestigator or technical ex-
pert. The reason is that, in the United States, except 
for certain tax questions, no accountant-client priv-
ilege can be reliably asserted to prevent discovery 
of investigative work product by the government 
or litigants. Although some jurisdictions recognize 
such privileges, they are not generally respected in 
federal court, where much enforcement activity 
takes place.
The formal structure of the retention arrangement 
between the attorney and accountant says little or 
nothing about the overall allocation of work steps 
among the team. For example, an attorney can be 
retained to direct an investigation into the propri-
ety of accounting determinations that will require 
that the bulk of the work be done by the accoun-
tant. Even when the attorney is retained directly by 
a client and the forensic accountant is retained by 
the attorney, the forensic accountant often works 
closely with both of them. For example, even when 
retained by an attorney, the forensic accountant 
may be instructed to work directly with company 
representatives. That said, in order to preserve the 
viability of any assertion of a legal privilege, it can-
not be the case that the attorney’s role is an empty 
formality.
In adversarial proceedings or dispute settings, in-
cluding litigation, arbitration, mediation, presenta-
tions to regulators about controversies or adversarial 
matters, and other such situations, the accountant’s 
role may vary. Sometimes, the accountant plays a 
role in assisting the attorneys and their clients in in-
vestigating, analyzing, and communicating the fac-
tual matters relating to the litigation. Often, such 
work includes understanding and assembling the 
information gathered during the litigation, assisting 
in the discovery process, analyzing fact patterns, cal-
culating damages, and developing presentation ma-
terials. At other times, the accountant testifies about 
facts or expert opinions about that work to a judge, 
jury, or another fact finder.
In litigation settings, the accountant also may help 
in gathering information and considering, critiqu-
ing, and rebutting opposing analyses. In such situ-
ations, the accountant is usually retained indirectly 
by the attorney in connection with the attorney’s 
provision of legal counsel to the client, but this is 
not always the case. Usually, in such situations, the 
attorney is a litigator and the accountant may act as 
a forensic specialist, consulting expert, or testifying 
expert witness.
The accountant should consider the following 
critical questions before evaluating the structure of 
the engagement and accepting the engagement. It is 
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helpful to document the answers as part of under-
standings reached with the client.
Who is the client? Accountants have particular 
professional responsibilities to their clients. These 
include, among other things, maintaining client 
confidentiality. Therefore, determining exact-
ly which entity is the client of the accountant 
is essential to meeting one’s obligations. At the 
outset, the parties should define the client and 
develop and document an understanding with 
that client. Even when the accountant has co-
ordination, administrative, or other engagement-
oriented communications with both the attorney 
and company representatives, defining the cli-
ent at the outset clarifies the accountant’s role 
and professional responsibilities. It is reasonable 
to anticipate that the accountant will develop 
professional relationships with both the client 
and any other stakeholders. Those professional 
relationships will be built on understanding and 
addressing the needs of the various stakeholders 
consistent with their roles and responsibilities in 
the engagement.
What is the arrangement, and how should it be docu-
mented?3 Accountants establish a written or oral 
understanding with the client (who may be an 
attorney representing a litigant) about the re-
sponsibilities of the parties and the nature, scope, 
and limitations of services to be performed, and 
modify the understanding if circumstances require  
a significant change during the engagement.4 
Usually, such understandings are documented in 
a formal engagement letter. Because an investiga-
tion or litigation assignment can evolve as the ac-
countants, attorneys, and their clients learn more 
about the issues, the scope is usually defined 
in terms of the issue, topic, or question to be 
analyzed. 
 When the company may desire to assert a legal 
privilege regarding communications with the ac-
countant or investigative work product, the en-
gagement letter should clearly identify the client 
and the relationship among the client, attorney, 
and forensic accountant. Without documenta-
tion of such relationships, legal privileges may 
not be available and work products may be sub-
ject to discovery. Even when an attorney will not 
be involved and no claim of legal privilege is ad-
vanced, an engagement letter will articulate the 
terms and conditions of the retention, set expec-
tations, and memorialize understandings relating 
to timing, efforts, expected outputs, and costs.
Does the retention create a conflict of interest? A con-
flict of interest may occur if a significant previous 
or current accountant-client relationship could 
be viewed as impairing the accountant’s objec-
tivity in the performance of an engagement.5 
Therefore, prior to accepting an engagement, 
accountants should evaluate any previous or 
current relationships with parties in connection 
with an investigation or litigation matter, tak-
ing care to consider whether prior engagements 
with litigants represent a conflict. If there are po-
tential conflicts, the accountant should take care 
to avoid an improper disclosure of confidential 
information gleaned from another engagement. 
In certain cases, the accountant may choose to 
decline the engagement.6
Is the proposed retention compliant with professional 
standards and regulatory requirements? Before ac-
cepting an engagement, the accountant should 
understand the pertinent professional standards. 
These standards are affected by the nature and 
scope of the engagement and its structure.7 If the 
accountant or that accountant’s firm provides as-
surance services to one or more parties involved 
3		For	a	further	discussion	of	engagement	letters	and	other	matters	related	to	documenting	the	scope	of	work,	see	the	AICPA	Forensic	and	Valuation	
Services	Practice	Aid	04-01,	Engagement Letters for Litigation Services,	New	York:	AIPCA,	2004.
4		CS	section	100,	Consulting	Services	Definitions	and	Standards	(AICPA,	Professional	Standards,	vol.	2,	par.	07).
5		AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	Report	03-1,	Litigation Services and Applicable Professional Standards,	New	York:	AIPCA,	2003,	par.	38.
6		For	a	further	discussion	of	conflicts,	see	the	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	Report	93-2,	Conflicts of Interest in Litigation Services Engagements,	
New	York:	AIPCA,	1993.
7		For	a	decision	tree	to	determine	the	application	of	professional	standards,	see	the	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	Report	03-1,	Litigation Services 
and Applicable Professional Standards,	New	York:	AIPCA,	2003,	app.	B.
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in the matter, the accountant should give special 
consideration to independence requirements and 
whether the service would be prohibited under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or other profes-
sional standards or regulatory requirements.
What are the anticipated outputs of the work, and who 
will use them? Ideally, the intended outputs of the 
engagement and its intended users will be identi-
fied in advance. Doing so within the engagement 
letter is sound practice.
The accountant’s consideration of the investiga-
tion outputs and the intended use of those outputs 
should be more expansive than a mere discussion of 
the distribution of whatever written report might be 
generated. It is helpful to think ahead about the pos-
sible ways the investigation or dispute could evolve 
and, in particular, about (1) whether such evolution 
would change any assessment, (2) whether the ac-
countant had a conflict, (3) how different stakehold-
ers might seek to use or rely on the output of the 
engagement for decision making, and (4) whether 
those situations would be acceptable if they were to 
occur. For example, when it is likely that a regulator 
will be interested in the results of an investigation, 
the independence of the investigation team may 
be more important than those instances in which 
the more probable result of the investigation is pri-
vate civil litigation by the client against a former 
employee.
Considerations in 
Working With Attorneys
It is important for accountants to appreciate that 
their role differs in substance and responsibility from 
that of an attorney.
Attorneys are agents of their client. When they 
appear before a court, they have ethical responsi-
bilities to that court. They have a professional re-
sponsibility to act with integrity and be consistent 
with the rules of the court or jurisdiction in which 
they represent their clients. For example, attorneys 
generally are required to take steps to prevent wit-
nesses in an investigation from proceeding based on 
a misunderstanding that the investigating attorney 
represents them, and failure to do so can severely 
compromise their client’s ability to use information 
obtained from the witness in any action against the 
witness. Attorneys who are acting as advocates also 
may have a responsibility to advocate zealously on 
behalf of their clients.
Generally speaking, attorneys are conscious of the 
tension between ethical conduct and zealous advoca-
cy and take care to do all that such advocacy requires, 
without stepping over the line to unethical conduct. 
Whether their approach is low-key or adversarial, 
cajoling or more calmly persuasive, attorneys strive 
to advance their clients’ interests within the bounds 
of professional ethics and the law. Depending on the 
jurisdiction and the setting, attorneys may be limited 
in their ability to resign from representing a client, 
even when the client fails to pay.
By contrast, accountants are neither professional 
advocates nor agents for their clients. For certain 
types of engagements, they must be independent of 
their clients, consistent with professional standards 
and regulatory requirements. In all engagements, 
they should maintain professional objectivity. Un-
like attorneys, accountants may be obliged to resign 
in certain circumstances and they have more free-
dom to do so, especially if that right is articulated in 
the engagement letter.
This distinction between being an advocate, 
which is the attorney’s role, and being an objec-
tive advisor, which the accountant strives to be, 
is	 an	 important	 one.	As	 articulated	 in	 the	AICPA	
Consulting Services Special Report 03-1, Litiga-
tion Services and Applicable Professional Standards, all 
litigation	services	provided	by	AICPA	members	are	
classified as consulting services. Therefore, in such 
engagements, their adherence to the Statements on 
Standards	for	Consulting	Services	is	required.	CPAs	
engaged in litigation services also must comply with 
the	general	standards	of	the	AICPA	Code	of	Profes-
sional Conduct; they also must obey the relevant 
standards established by various state boards of ac-
countancy, the professional standards of any other 
organizations to which they may belong, and any 
other licensing requirements to which they may be 
subject.	Specifically,	AICPA	members	must	comply	
with the rules of professional conduct set out below 
in box 10-2.
Chapter 10.indd   190 8/4/09   1:05:43 PM
Chapter	10:	Working	With	Attorneys
191
•		Rule	102,	Integrity and Objectivity (AIC-
PA,	Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 
102, par. .01).
•		Rule	201,	General Standards	(AICPA,	
Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 201 
par. .01). Such general standards include 
requirements related to professional com-
petence, due professional care, planning 
and supervision, sufficient relevant data, 
assumptions, and documentation.
•		Rule	202,	Compliance With Standards 
(AICPA,	Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET 
sec. 202 par. .01).
•		Rule	301,	Confidential Client Information 
(AICPA,	Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET 
sec. 301 par. .01).
•		Rule	302,	Contingent Fees	(AICPA,	Profes-
sional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 302 par. 
.01).
•		Rule	501,	Acts Discreditable	(AICPA,	
Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 501 
par. .01).
In certain circumstances, the following also 
may apply:
•		Rule	101,	Independence	(AICPA,	Profes-
sional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 101 par. 
.01)
•		Rule	203,	Accounting Principles	(AICPA,	
Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 201 
par. .01)
Box 10-2:  AICPA Rules of Professional Conduct 
Relevant to Working with Attorneys
(Source: AICPA’s Consulting Services Special Report 
03-1, Litigation Services and Applicable Professional 
Standards, New York: AIPCA, 2003.)
In the context of litigation or an investigation as-
signment, the accountant’s responsibility for objec-
tivity may exist in tension with the attorney’s re-
sponsibility to represent client interests and advocate 
for the client. Although an attorney may advocate 
the outermost interpretation of what can be argued, 
accountants consider whether such a position is 
consistent with their objective professional opinion, 
based on the available information.
The Investigation 
Setting
To return to our Grand Forge scenario, although 
the customers’ allegations and claims raise immedi-
ate questions, management’s response to those ques-
tions depends largely on their understanding of the 
facts. Focusing on the channel-stuffing allegation, 
the relevant facts might include:
	 •		the	circumstances	surrounding	the	customer’s	
orders,
	 •		any	contractual	agreements	and	relevant	local	
laws or business practices,
	 •		any	evidence	regarding	whether	the	goods	
shipped were in excess of the customer’s needs,
	 •		revenue	recognition	policies	and	practices,
	 •		whether	the	goods	in	question	were	of	adequate	
quality,
	 •		the	impact	of	any	substandard	goods	on	Grand	
Forge and on its customer’s business,
	 •		and	whether	there	are	any	other	related	regula-
tory issues or violations. 
Whether internal or independent, formal or in-
formal, Grand Forge will need an investigation of 
those facts.
In order to uncover and understand the facts, 
Grand Forge and, in some instances, its audit com-
mittee or a special committee of the board of direc-
tors should answer the following questions at the 
start of the investigation:
	 •		What	facts	are	known?
	 •		Is	an	investigation	warranted?
	 •		What	will	be	investigated?
	 •		Who	will	sponsor	and	be	responsible	for	the	
investigation?
	 •		Who	will	investigate?
	 •		What	types	of	information	will	be	preserved,	
gathered,	and	considered	and	from	whom?
Evaluating Known Facts
The root allegation or concern prompting an inves-
tigation is sometimes called the predicate of an investi-
gation.	Plainly,	someone	at	Grand	Forge	must	decide	
whether an investigation is necessary. In the case of 
Grand Forge’s prospective investigation, it will be 
helpful for management and the board of directors 
to be able to summarize the facts that are known 
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about the predicate and have a general understand-
ing of facts to be uncovered. It also is appropriate to 
consider the extent to which the predicate logically 
suggests that other problems exist.
Determining Whether an 
Investigation is Necessary
The next question is whether the available informa-
tion suggests that an investigation is necessary. This 
is not always an easy decision. Sometimes, whistle-
blower allegations are clear and unambiguous, or 
relate to issues that clearly have significant potential 
impacts on the company and its financial reporting, 
underlying operations, or reputation. In other cases, 
an allegation might be vague, seem to spring from 
emotion rather than fact, or not appear credible. 
When balanced against the cost of a full-scale inves-
tigation, some predicates may be worthy of follow 
up. It also is human nature to discount the validity 
or importance of a complaint or allegation or the 
potential range of issues raised by an allegation.
Several considerations are relevant to the deci-
sions regarding whether an investigation is neces-
sary. First, it is helpful to have an independent or 
objective decision maker. Such decision makers may 
see more clearly than a person who may be affected 
by the outcome or upon whom the burden and dis-
traction of an investigation might fall. It also is help-
ful to assess whether an investigation is required by 
law or whether an investigation might reasonably be 
considered appropriate in the circumstances. If the 
right people conclude that the allegations have some 
credibility, are not clearly frivolous or irrelevant, 
and warrant an investigation, then the next question 
is how the investigation should be structured.
Oversight of Investigations
The decision about who will bear the responsibility 
for an investigation depends on the initial assessment 
of the allegation. When the predicate is unlikely to 
involve management and management is sufficiently 
competent and objective, the company’s manag-
ers may successfully sponsor or control an internal 
investigation. Depending on the facts and circum-
stances, either the company’s internal counsel or the 
external counsel might provide legal advice, and the 
company’s financial experts, internal auditors, or 
external accountants might provide the accounting 
expertise.
Sometimes, the predicate appears to be more 
significant.	Questions	may	arise	about	the	involve-
ment of the company’s employees or regular advis-
ers in a particular situation, or the audit committee 
or board may determine that those individuals lack 
the necessary competence, capability, objectivity, 
or resources to oversee an investigation. In such in-
stances, an audit committee or special committee of 
the board may take responsibility for overseeing an 
investigation. In these cases, the committee typically 
engages outside professionals to manage the investi-
gation, subject to oversight and direction from the 
committee. Such structures are routinely employed 
for significant financial investigations because they 
help ensure the objectivity and independence of 
the investigation and assure board members that the 
matter will be appropriately addressed from a corpo-
rate governance perspective. Typically, for privilege 
reasons, the committee will retain external counsel 
who may, in turn, retain accountants and other fo-
rensic specialists to work with them.
The sponsor of the investigation generally has re-
sponsibility, among other things, to retain and direct 
the investigators, approve the scope of the investiga-
tion, monitor the status of the investigation, con-
sider its outputs, take responsibility for the adequa-
cy of the investigation in the circumstances, reach 
findings of fact, and decide upon recommendations 
for remedial actions, if any. In some instances, the 
sponsor may be asked to make formal presentations 
and representations regarding the conduct and out-
comes of the investigation to the public, auditors, 
and regulators.
Selecting an Investigator
The decision about who should investigate is similar 
to, and flows from, the decision about sponsorship 
of the investigation. Investigators should be inde-
pendent of the people and transactions that they are 
investigating. Whether the individual team mem-
bers are attorneys or accountants, members of the 
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team need to be competent in the variety of skills 
required in the particular situation. In the case of 
our example at Grand Forge, these could include 
the following:
	 •		Potential legal issues and ramifications. Legal counsel 
should be familiar with financial reporting regu-
lations, understand the legal requirements in all 
the appropriate jurisdictions, and understand the 
potential regulatory requirements related to fa-
cilitation payments or bribery. For Grand Forge, 
this would include both China and the United 
States.
	 •		Language. Either the attorneys or forensic experts 
should speak and read both English and the na-
tive language of employees and others who may 
have relevant information for the investigation.
	 •		Financial reporting expertise. The investigative team 
needs to understand the underlying accounting 
and financial reporting issues required to assess 
which fact patterns are most relevant to financial 
reporting issues. Also, a working knowledge of 
the likely books and records, business processes, 
and local business customs is essential to quickly 
locating relevant evidentiary matter.
	 •		Electronic evidence expertise. Few investigations 
can overlook electronic evidence because it is 
sometimes the primary form of business com-
munications and transactions and the primary 
medium for certain types of books and records. 
Electronic evidence has the virtue of being 
objectively dated and readily available through 
the use of forensic technology. E-mails and other 
electronic messages also are a source of informal, 
unguarded, and occasionally highly incriminating 
communications, precisely because users often 
believe that such communications are private. 
Expertise in handling electronic evidence is 
needed because such evidence may be spoiled if 
not handled and analyzed properly and because 
the technology tools available and the standards 
for handling such evidence continue to evolve. 
In the case of Grand Forge, electronic evidence 
would likely include the company’s account-
ing records, e-mail, and other user documents 
retained on laptops or servers. 
	 •		Subject matter expertise. It is difficult to recognize 
what is unusual and improper if one has never 
learned what is normal and customary. If the is-
sue or business matter to be investigated requires 
specific industry or subject matter expertise, 
it is important to include such experts on the 
investigation team. For example, investigating 
the propriety of certain credit swap derivatives 
transactions would be informed by the input of 
financial services professionals who understand 
the transactions, industry jargon, and normal us-
age and documentation, among other things.
Typically, investigations are staffed with a team of 
resources, drawing on personnel with backgrounds 
in accounting, law, or other forensic expertise. As 
with any significant project, teamwork is essential 
to harness the benefits of the various professionals’ 
skill sets.
Establishing the Scope of the 
Investigation
The scope of any investigation is set by its spon-
sor and is specified, at least generally, in engagement 
letters or at the direction of the sponsor. The scope 
should be sufficiently broad to fully address the mat-
ters raised by the allegation of financial impropriety. 
It is unusual in an investigation of any complex-
ity for the scope to remain static from beginning 
to end. It is important to regularly reconsider the 
adequacy of the investigation’s scope as additional 
information is collected.
Accountants and lawyers can provide critical 
advice to the investigation sponsors regarding the 
various issues implied by the predicate of the in-
vestigation to ensure that they are fully addressed. 
When appropriate, the allegations and proposed 
scope should be discussed with other potentially in-
terested parties, such as a company’s financial state-
ment auditors or the appropriate regulators. Ideally, 
the outcomes of such conversations are anticipated 
at the outset, to avoid unnecessary rework to address 
all the various facets of the allegation. This prevents 
expensive rework that might have been more effi-
ciently addressed had the requirements of all the po-
tential audiences for the investigation’s outputs been 
better understood at the outset. Box 10-3 outlines 
how the scope of an investigation may be evaluated 
from a variety of viewpoints.
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•		The	issue,	question,	or	topic	to	be 
investigated.
•		Whether	the	investigation	will	be	broad	
or be narrowed to a specific time period, 
geographic region, business unit, or issue.
•		Whether	investigators	will	merely	gather	
facts or whether they might plan to in-
clude other activities, such as developing 
observations, assessments, or recom-
mendations related to employee conduct; 
specific transactions or business practices; 
estimates of financial or financial report-
ing impacts, deficiencies, weaknesses, or 
improvements in internal controls; and 
other remedial actions.
•		The	factual	conclusions	needed	by	audi-
tors, regulators, or clients who will be in-
formed of the results of the investigation 
in order for them to conclude any steps 
that they will likely take. For example, 
when a possible result of an investigation 
is a financial restatement, the scope of 
the investigation may need to be suf-
ficient to permit the external auditors to 
draw conclusions regarding the integrity 
of management. In addition, when the 
possible result of an investigation is a 
follow-up investigation by a regulator, the 
scope may need to be sufficient to permit 
the regulator to rely on the findings of 
the investigation, if he or she chooses to 
do so.
Box 10-3:  Investigation Scope Evaluation 
Considerations
Sources and Preservation of 
Information
It is a legal judgment concerning when document 
preservation is required and the extent of preser-
vation that is appropriate. Lawyers sometimes ad-
vise companies to preserve documentation as soon 
as there is reason to believe it might be relevant to 
an investigation or litigation. In the United States, 
federal law may require the retention of records 
relevant to a likely government investigation. Ac-
countants and forensic specialists can provide critical 
input to the attorneys based on their understanding 
of business processes, including the organization’s 
accounting and information technology systems. 
Accountants can help identify obstacles to proper 
preservation, provide insight regarding the nature 
and extent of preservation so that burdensome and 
overbroad preservation orders can be addressed, and 
help avoid miscommunications between lawyers 
and information technology professionals that may 
impair an investigation or litigation. When accoun-
tants, attorneys, and other specialists work together, 
the risk of miscommunications regarding the nature 
and extent of document preservation and collection 
is reduced.
Once evidence collection begins, accountants and 
lawyers often work together to identify individuals, 
both internal and external to the organization, who 
might be custodians of relevant paper or electronic 
evidence. Based on this review and the business pro-
cesses being investigated, they will suggest appro-
priate people to interview. Ideally, the accountants 
help anticipate how the predicate of the investiga-
tion might affect the financial reporting process and 
the work of the auditors. They can help attorneys 
gather the relevant information for those secondary 
users during the investigation and thereby avoid un-
necessary reword. In addition, the nature and extent 
of evidence collection and investigation interviews 
may be discussed with the external auditors to en-
sure that their needs are met in the context of the 
investigation.
Accountants often work side-by-side with at-
torneys in the interviewing process and sometimes 
take primary responsibility for conducting initial in-
quiries, collecting and evaluating documentary and 
electronic evidence, and offering preliminary obser-
vations based on that evidence. It may be appropri-
ate for people being interviewed in connection with 
an investigation to be warned about any ambiguities 
regarding whether the attorneys involved are repre-
senting them. These so-called “Upjohn warnings” 
are named for the Supreme Court decision iden-
tifying the adverse consequences of failing to pro-
vide such a warning. Whether an Upjohn warning 
is necessary is a legal judgment. Similarly, particu-
larly in non-U.S. jurisdictions, there may be legal 
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restrictions on evidence gathering, and legal advice 
about such restrictions is sometimes necessary. For 
example, some European countries limit the ability 
to access or transmit electronic evidence during an 
investigation and often will limit any access to e-
mails or documents stored on individual computers. 
Accountants should communicate proactively about 
legal requirements and limitations to ensure that the 
investigation remains within those parameters.
Executing the 
Investigation8
Suppose that Grand Forge’s investigation team has 
taken all the preceding steps and has identified and 
gathered a large body of evidence. Synthesizing and 
considering that evidence, interviewing relevant 
witnesses, and communicating about the investiga-
tion and its findings in a coherent report are im-
portant next steps. Executing the investigation is 
particularly challenging when the investigation must 
be completed by a specific point in time, such as a 
date driven by financial reporting filing deadlines or 
pending strategic transactions.
Although planning is critical at the outset of an 
investigation, few work plans survive contact with 
the evidence. Usually, an investigation starts with a 
predicate and a defined set of theories or questions 
to be included in the scope, but the work plan then 
evolves based on the nature and extent of available 
evidence and the investigators’ observations dur-
ing evidence gathering. It is possible that a smok-
ing gun will clearly identify wrongdoing, and the 
investigation might evolve to include an assessment 
of	 “What	 else	 could	have	 been	wrong?”	 In	other	
cases, the early stages of an investigation may uncov-
er information that disproves the initial allegation or 
resolves whatever misunderstandings or misconcep-
tions led to it. In still other cases, information will 
not clearly prove or disprove the allegation. In such 
situations, the investigation’s sponsors and investiga-
tors have to consider whether the nature and extent 
of their investigative procedures are sufficient to 
have addressed the issue or whether more forensic 
work is warranted.
One question that should be answered tentatively 
at the outset is whether the sponsors of the investi-
gation want a written or oral report and to whom 
such a report will be made. Clients usually expect 
some form of report. If an allegation of impropriety 
relates in any way to the financial statements, at the 
least, the facts obtained in the investigation are likely 
to be shared with the external auditors. Depending 
on the facts and circumstances, the facts or a report 
also may be shared with regulators or the public. 
For example, a company might commission an in-
vestigation and written report in an effort to address 
public criticism of the company or its management.
The form of a report varies by the type of engage-
ment, the client’s requirements, the mandate from 
the investigation’s sponsors, and the needs of outside 
stakeholders, such as auditors or regulators. Various 
considerations govern the form of the report. One 
concern is whether the company and its counsel 
desire to preserve any legal privileges regarding the 
attorney’s legal advice or work product. Another is 
whether any of the stakeholders, such as sponsors, 
regulators, or auditors, require written documenta-
tion. Still another is whether the sponsor can avoid 
disputes with those who might like to read the re-
port by not commissioning one. Investigators also 
consider the nature of the factual information to 
be conveyed and the medium which will be most 
effective in doing so. Some findings can easily be 
communicated orally. Others are so complex, de-
tailed, or technical that written communication, 
sometimes with documentary support, is necessary 
to avoid misunderstandings. One consideration is 
the nature of any current or anticipated litigation 
in which such a report might be obtained through 
discovery.
The content of an investigation report depends 
on the facts and circumstances but usually includes 
information relevant to the work of both the 
8		For	a	further	discussion	of	executing	an	investigation	engagement,	see	the	AICPA	Forensic	and	Valuation	Services	Special	Report	07-1,	Forensic Proce-
dures and Specialists: Useful Tools and Techniques,	New	York:	AIPCA,	2006.
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accountants and attorneys, including a description 
of the investigation process, the nature and extent 
of the evidence collected and considered, and the 
details of the facts discovered in the investigation.
If it falls within the scope of the investigation as-
signment, the report also may include assessments 
of the propriety of individual or corporate conduct, 
observations regarding internal controls and business 
processes, assessments of the cooperation, integrity 
and credibility of current or former employees, or 
recommendations regarding remedial actions, in-
cluding those related to individual employees.
The report also should consider any internal con-
trol aspects of the findings. Investigators often rec-
ommend steps to mitigate or remediate gaps identi-
fied in the course of the investigation. For example, 
if the Grand Forge investigation team highlights the 
facts related to the allegation of channel stuffing its 
investigation report, then it might be reasonable 
to include recommendations on how to remediate 
business processes and controls to avoid recurrence. 
Such recommendations are often grounded in the 
detailed information gathered during the investi-
gation. Here, as in most of the investigation, ac-
countants, forensic specialists, and attorneys would 
work together to deliver the best thinking to their 
clients.
Dealing With 
Investigation Stresses
Investigations create tension, and the investigation 
process can place a great deal of stress on professional 
relationships and the individuals involved in the in-
vestigation. When a credible allegation of financial 
impropriety comes to light, virtually everyone in-
volved is under pressure, including company man-
agement, the audit or special committee members, 
attorneys, internal accountants and auditors, and 
external audit teams. The investigation team itself 
will be under pressure to conclude the investigation 
quickly to avoid unnecessary expense and have ad-
equate regard for the difficulty of assessing, in hind-
sight, the motivations and judgments of the subjects 
of the investigation. When it appears that some sig-
nificant errors in judgment have occurred or that 
possibly fraudulent activity has taken place, many of 
these people will be facing this type of situation for 
the first time in their careers. Senior managers, even 
those who are not subjects of the investigation, also 
must grapple with the frustration associated with the 
fact that they do not control the investigation, and, 
instead, that the sponsor and investigators are mak-
ing decisions that necessarily detract from the pro-
ductivity of company personnel. Tensions are ex-
acerbated by unexpectedly challenging workloads. 
When one or more members of management must 
be replaced as a consequence of an investigation, 
such strains are even more intense. Even veterans of 
previous investigations find that one investigation is 
likely to be very different from another. 
Scheduling
If an investigation can be accomplished within the 
normal financial reporting schedule, that is all the 
better. Increasingly, however, when an investiga-
tion is needed because of a whistle-blower or other 
allegation that calls into question a company’s finan-
cial reporting, a company will not issue additional 
financial statements and may withdraw previously 
issued financial filings until all the parties are in a 
position to stand behind the numbers.
In recent years, financial reporting deadlines have 
become increasingly tight. The need to respond 
quickly is a major source of stress, especially if the al-
legation arises around the time of a financial reporting 
deadline. Missing filing deadlines may be significant 
to a company and its shareholders because late filings 
raise the specter of regulatory violations, may result 
in possible delisting from stock exchanges, limit the 
company’s ability to complete strategic transactions, 
restrict the availability of stock-based compensation, 
and interfere with the company’s compliance with 
debt covenants or the ability to finance itself. Let’s 
imagine that Grand Forge’s management has reason 
to believe that its Shanghai revenue recognition has 
been improper and that the revenue in question is 
material to users of the financial statements. Grand 
Forge must then consider whether to advise the 
markets upon which its securities trade that its prior 
financial statements cannot be relied upon and that 
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it may be unable to restate its prior financial state-
ments or issue new financial reports until the facts 
are known. In such a case, the pressure to complete 
an investigation as quickly as possible will be keen.
Cognizant of the risk of such adverse impacts, in-
vestigation sponsors and company managers are usu-
ally eager to complete the investigation as quickly 
as possible. Those working with attorneys should 
be aware of the desire for speed and be ready to 
respond with focus and intensity. Accountants can 
help mitigate this stress by dedicating to the inves-
tigation a sufficient number of resources with the 
right expertise, helping to focus the investigation 
when appropriate, and communicating proactively 
to ensure a high degree of teamwork.
Knowledge Transfer
Knowledge transfer from the investigators to the 
company’s management is critical, especially at the 
conclusion of fact finding. Although investigators 
have a specific role in fact finding, the company re-
tains the responsibility for its own financial records 
and reports. In the haste to complete an investiga-
tion within the shortest possible time frame, some 
investigators fail to fully anticipate how investigation 
outputs can, or could, be used by those who will 
prepare, certify, and opine on the financial state-
ments. The investigative teams (including attorneys, 
accountants, forensic specialists, and investigation 
sponsors) serve their clients well when, after their 
role in fact finding is complete, they proactively and 
attentively manage the transfer of factual informa-
tion and findings to both management and the in-
ternal and external auditors. Gaps in fact finding or 
the lack of clear, careful, and complete transmission 
of the investigation’s outputs to these secondary us-
ers can greatly lengthen the time necessary for man-
agers, preparers of financial statements, and auditors 
to fully address all the relevant aspects of the findings 
in the financial reporting process.
Moreover, for external auditors, allegations of 
misconduct by management may call into question 
a broad array of management’s representations. Au-
ditors frequently gather as much audit evidence as 
possible during an investigation. They may receive 
status updates throughout the investigation, attend 
interviews, or execute some of their audit proce-
dures side-by-side with investigators. Nonetheless, 
auditors may be cautious in articulating the neces-
sary changes to their audit approach until all the facts 
are known. With their bird’s-eye view and experi-
ence, forensic accountants involved in investigations 
can greatly reduce the stresses on various participants 
by helping them understand their respective respon-
sibilities, roles, steps, and needs. In order to avoid 
time-consuming rework and reduce the stresses of 
the investigation on normal professional relation-
ships, up-front communication of expectations and 
discussions regarding information needs at various 
points in the investigation are essential.
Working With Attorneys 
in a Litigation or 
Dispute Setting
Returning to Grand Forge, let us assume that the 
company has long since completed its investigation 
of the underlying facts related to the customer’s 
claims of substandard products and channel stuffing. 
Now, assume that the customer has filed suit against 
Grand Forge, alleging lost profits and lost business 
value as a direct result of Grand Forge’s substandard 
products. This time, let us assume that the attor-
ney representing Grand Forge is asking the forensic 
accountant to analyze the customer’s calculation of 
damages and anticipates the possibility that the fo-
rensic accountant also may prepare an expert report 
and testify as an expert witness in the legal proceed-
ings. This means the accountant faces a new situa-
tion. Now the accountant’s role is in the context of 
developing and testifying about an expert opinion in 
the litigation setting.
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Understanding the Litigation Setting
In this text, litigation refers to a variety of adversarial proceedings for resolving disputes. Litigation can occur 
in a court setting or in one of a variety of forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This chapter is not 
intended as a substitute for a legal treatise on the subject, but it is safe to say that accountants working in the 
litigation setting should familiarize themselves with the various forms of dispute resolution and the key mile-
stones in the life cycle of a legal dispute. A brief and necessarily general description of the accountant’s role in 
various types of litigation follows:
Criminal litigation. Accountants are sometimes asked to become involved in criminal litigation, generally in rela-
tion to a governmental or regulatory claim that an individual or corporation broke the law and should be punished. 
In such settings, accountants can play a variety of roles, including gathering or analyzing the evidence that might be 
used by the prosecutor or serving as an expert witness for the prosecution or defense. For example, accountants may 
help in tracing assets related to an allegation of criminal embezzlement, or they may opine on whether a difference 
in accounting judgment was reasonable in light of all the facts and circumstances.
Civil litigation. Accountants are frequently involved in civil litigation, which generally relates to claims between 
a plaintiff and defendant, with the goal of receiving redress from the court, which may take a variety of forms. Ac-
countants can be involved in a wide array of business and financial litigation and claims and also can be involved 
in the calculation of damages, even in disputes otherwise unrelated to business. For Grand Forge, for example, the 
accountant may be asked to calculate damages associated with a breach of the warranties in the purchase and sale 
agreement related to Grand Forge’s acquisition of the Shanghai operation.
ADR includes arbitration proceedings, mediations, and other dispute resolution processes.* As in civil litiga-
tion, accountants may be involved throughout the dispute’s life cycle. They also may become involved in provid-
ing testimony or making less formal presentations to regulatory authorities. Examples of such situations are 
presentations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other 
law enforcement authorities, and regulatory authorities regarding environmental compliance, health care market-
ing and reimbursement, defense contracting, or pharmaceutical regulatory compliance, among others.
Typically, the life cycle of a matter in litigation includes the initiation of the dispute, a claim within a 
particular dispute resolution forum by the aggrieved party (usually called the plaintiff in court or the claimant in 
arbitration settings), and a response from the opponent (usually called the defendant in court or the respondent 
in arbitration). After these initial steps, most types of litigation proceed to a discovery phase, during which the 
parties gather information related to the investigation from one another and third parties, and then to a process 
by which a final conclusion of the dispute is reached (such as a trial, summary judgment, or an arbitration 
proceeding).
Discovery tools include, among other things:
1.  Written requests for admission
2.  Written interrogatories
3.  Subpoenas and other requests for production of documents, including electronic documents
4.  Written reports
5.  Depositions
Many cases are settled during discovery by mutual agreement. If cases are not settled, they typically continue 
to a trial or arbitration hearing, and the matter is adjudicated by a judge, jury, or arbitrator.
(continued)
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The Accountant’s Role as 
Expert9
The role of an expert witness is to assist the trier of 
fact, usually a judge or jury. For example, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, which govern litigation in 
U.S. federal courts, state the following:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case.10
Attorneys like to hire experts who will be per-
suasive and advance the interests of their clients. Al-
though attorneys are zealous advocates on behalf of 
their clients, testifying experts should, by contrast, 
advocate only their own opinions, which should 
be formed objectively by considering the available 
facts. Some of the practical considerations of work-
ing with attorneys in the context of expert testimo-
ny are considered in box 10-4.
When the Opinion is Not as 
Desired
Sometimes, the expert’s consideration of available 
information results in an opinion or factual observa-
tion that an attorney or the attorney’s client does not 
perceive to be advantageous to their case. Almost all 
experienced witnesses have encountered situations in 
which their professional opinion, after consideration 
of the facts, was not as the attorney or the attorney’s 
client	 had	 hoped.	 Perhaps	 the	 expert’s	 calculation	
of damages yielded a figure that was lower than ex-
pected or perhaps the expert discovered flaws in the 
legal strategy or facts that were inconsistent with the 
hoped-for approach. In such situations, the experts, 
attorneys, and their clients should clearly communi-
cate the reasons for the opinion and the differences 
identified. In some situations, such dialogue results 
in the suspension of the engagement. In every in-
stance, however, the accountant, attorney, and cli-
ent benefit from hearing an unvarnished assessment 
as early in the litigation process as possible. Many 
times, such discussions lead to a change in strategy 
or approach, such as commencement or acceleration 
of settlement negotiations. In every case, the attor-
neys and their clients can make better decisions if 
they have a transparent and complete understanding 
of the professional opinion and the bases for it.
(continued)
An accountant’s role in litigation will depend, among other things, on the setting, the current status of the 
matter, and what the accountant has been engaged to do. Because the accountant’s role depends not only on 
the engagement but also on the jurisdiction and venue for the matter, along with a variety of other factors, it 
is essential that the accountant work with the attorneys to understand the legal requirements of the work being 
performed. Witnesses should ask about the venue and nature of the dispute, the status of the litigation in its life 
cycle, and the status and extent of discovery. Accountants benefit by working closely with attorneys to under-
stand this work setting and also may need to seek their own legal advice in areas in which they are unfamiliar.
*		For	further	discussion	of	an	accountant’s	role	in	alternative	dispute	resolution,	see	the	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Prac-
tice	Aid	99-1,	Alternative Dispute Resolution Services,	New	York:	AIPCA,	1999.
	 9		Additional	information	regarding	a	CPA’s	responsibilities	in	the	context	of	expert	testimony	can	be	found	in	the	article	“Expert	Testimony:	The	CPA’s	
Responsibilities”	by	Michael	G.	Ueltzen,	CPA,	CFE,	and	Robert	H.	Johnson,	Esq.,	in	The Practicing CPA,	September	2001.
10		Federal	Rules	of	Evidence	(2006),	Rule	702.	For	a	comparison	of	AICPA	professional	standards	and	Federal	Rule	of	Evidence	702,	see	the	AICPA	Consult-
ing	Services	Special	Report	03-1,	Litigation Services and Applicable Professional Standards,	New	York:	AIPCA,	2003,	app.	D-E.
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•		Define the assignment. Generally, the assignment is defined in terms of the area of inquiry or topic 
for development of an opinion. Defining the assignment in terms of a desired opinion or out-
come might be an indication of an inappropriate lack of objectivity.
•		Understand the context of the testimony in the overall legal strategy. Although accountants are not ad-
vocates, it makes sense for them to understand the legal strategy and ensure in advance that they 
are comfortable that the opinion, as positioned within the attorney’s legal strategy, would not be 
misleading. The accountant, in articulating an expert opinion, can often assist the trier of fact and 
the attorney by bringing out salient information that gives context to the opinion. In addition, 
when appropriate and to avoid confusion, the accountant can carefully select words to be consis-
tent with the nomenclature or phrases used by other participants in the process.
•		Ensure an adequate understanding of the status of the case and any deadlines. Court-ordered deadlines 
are rarely flexible, and experts rarely have unlimited time to execute their work. The expert wit-
ness should understand what limitations are imposed by the litigation schedule. Sometimes, attor-
neys do not retain experts until late in the process. Sometimes, experts are retained after the close 
of the discovery phases or near the deadlines for submission of expert opinions. Before agreeing 
to be retained, therefore, accountants should consider whether the engagement can be com-
pleted in a competent matter within the required time frame. Once the engagement is underway, 
frequent status updates are essential to understand any revisions to the schedule and to understand 
the nature and extent of any information, any new evidence arising in discovery, and any changes 
in engagement needs.
•		Clarify in advance the areas about which the expert will testify, any assumptions the expert is being asked to 
adopt, and how any facts necessary to the opinion will be brought into the record. Accountants’ opinions 
should be focused and will be based on a variety of data and assumptions. Whether and how the 
factual basis will be presented at court should be clarified in advance to avoid opinions that lack 
adequate foundation.
•		Ensure adequate access to underlying evidence. It is not at all unusual that an attorney working on a 
legal matter will pull together a series of key documents for the expert’s consideration. To avoid 
“cherry-picking,” or the appearance of it, the accountant should ensure adequate access to source 
materials and request and consider any materials that may be relevant to the opinion. Similarly, 
litigation attorneys often have most of the direct contact with the client. The accountant also 
should have adequate access to the attorney’s client, not simply to avoid misunderstandings 
among the expert, attorney, and attorney’s client but also to ensure complete understanding of 
whatever data and other information are being provided by that client.
•		Discuss with counsel the nature of the written work that the expert will prepare and the extent to which it 
is permissible to discard information relevant to the engagement. A testifying expert may be required 
to produce in discovery the information provided to the expert in connection with his or her 
work, communications with counsel, and drafts of opinions. In some instances, the expert may 
be required to explain whether the information that has been considered has been produced. In 
some jurisdictions, discarding information may be grounds to exclude the expert from testimony. 
Accordingly, the expert should have a clear understanding with counsel about what materials will 
be produced and obtain advice from counsel about the extent to which it is permissible to discard 
information relevant to the engagement.
Box 10-4:  Experts Working with Attorneys: Key Considerations
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Assisting in the Discovery of 
Opponents and Third Parties
Accountants and attorneys frequently work togeth-
er in the discovery phase. Accountants, with their 
rich background in business processes and analyzing 
business books and records, can help shape and focus 
requests for documents, requests for admission, or 
interrogatory questions in the discovery phase. Ac-
countants can frequently help in crafting subpoenas 
and requests for production of documents to ensure 
that the most salient and informative information is 
requested and that requests are specific and narrow 
enough to receive a fruitful response. Early involve-
ment of accountants has frequently saved attorneys 
and their clients both costs and aggravation because 
it focuses discovery on obtaining the necessary fi-
nancial information the first time and ensures that 
necessary information for the case and expert opin-
ion is provided on a timely basis for the litigation 
team.
In some types of litigation, discovery documents 
are accumulated in a physical or electronic docu-
ment repository. Accountants may work with the 
attorneys to locate, evaluate, and assess the docu-
mentation obtained during the discovery process.
Accountants may be involved during interviews, 
depositions, and other inquiries related to financial 
and business topics. As with document discovery, 
the accountant can help focus the questioning and 
at the same time ensure that necessary topics are not 
omitted. Accountants are often most helpful when 
they assist the attorney in asking the probing follow-
up questions in response to superficial or evasive an-
swers to the attorney’s line of questioning.
Preparing for the Discovery 
of the Expert
Depending on the evolution of a case, an expert’s 
work, working papers, and communications may 
be shared with other litigants during the discov-
ery process. Accountants serving as experts should 
anticipate this. Accountants’ professional stan-
dards require adequate documentation of the work 
performed but may provide some flexibility re-
garding the nature and extent of documentation.11 
Accountants should normally avoid preparing or 
creating unnecessary documentation and should 
take care to avoid documenting incomplete or un-
funded analyses or making flippant, extraneous, or 
unprofessional comments that could be embarrass-
ing when read by third parties. To avoid destruction 
of documentation that should be produced during 
the discovery process, accountants should discuss 
their discovery obligations and document retention 
practices with the attorneys (or with their own legal 
counsel), particularly as they relate to drafts, infor-
mation considered but rejected, and editorial revi-
sions. To facilitate later discovery, it is sometimes 
helpful to segregate working papers from source 
documents and documentation of the administrative 
aspects of an engagement.
The nature and extent of discovery requirements 
is essentially a legal issue and depends on the facts 
and circumstances of the investigation. Various types 
of documents may be subject to different discovery 
requirements. At other times, the attorneys may be 
able to limit discovery to a subset of documentation. 
For example, the parties in a litigation matter might, 
for a variety of reasons, voluntarily agree to limit 
certain kinds of document production. The nature 
and extent of document production also differs by 
the venue of the dispute. For instance, document 
production requirements for litigation tend to be 
more limited in litigation outside the United States 
or in various alterative dispute resolution settings.
When thinking of expert discovery, do not forget 
electronic media, such as e-mail, instant messages, 
faxes, and certain types of voicemail. Depending on 
the subpoena or request, all of these may be subject 
to discovery by third parties. While executing the 
engagement, it is helpful to employ a working as-
sumption that anything communicated in electronic 
format may later be made available to the oppo- 
nents and, thus, would be available for cross- 
examination.
11		For	additional	detail	regarding	an	accountant’s	responsibilities	for	working	papers	and	documentation,	see	the	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	
Report	03-1,	Litigation Services and Applicable Professional Standards,	New	York:	AIPCA,	2003,	app.	C.
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Preparing the Expert Report
Many good references exist for accountants pre-
paring expert reports, including, among others, 
the	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Practice	Aid	96-3,	
Communicating in Litigation Services: Reports. The 
opinion articulated in the expert report is that of a 
testifying witness, not that of an attorney or profes-
sional services firm. Usually, the expert personally 
signs the report and bears responsibility for it. When 
developing the content of an expert report, the ex-
pert should carefully consider the attorney’s strategy, 
terminology, and suggestions but should take care 
to form an objective professional opinion. Similarly, 
the tenor of the expert report should be professional 
and straightforward, avoiding hyperbole and advo-
cacy-oriented language.
The form of the expert report varies by jurisdic-
tion and, indeed, by practitioner. The general rules 
for expert reports in U.S. federal courts are found 
in the Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Generally, Rule 26 provides the following:
Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the 
court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a 
written report—prepared and signed by the wit-
ness—if the witness is one retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the 
case or one whose duties as the party’s employee 
regularly involve giving expert testimony. The 
report must contain:
 (i)  a complete statement of all opinions the 
witness will express and the basis and rea-
sons for them;
 (ii)  the data or other information considered 
by the witness in forming them;
 (iii)  any exhibits that will be used to summa-
rize or support them;
 (iv)  the witness’s qualifications, including 
a list of all publications authored in the 
previous 10 years;
 (v)  a list of all other cases in which, during 
the previous 4 years, the witness testified 
as an expert at trial or by deposition; and
 (vi)  a statement of the compensation to be 
paid for the study and testimony in the 
case.
Chpater 12, “Reporting on Fraud” goes into 
greater detail on rules for expert reports. Ideally, 
the	expert	drafts	the	report.	Questions	during	cross-
examination occasionally focus on whether the ex-
pert, the expert’s junior staff, or the attorney drafted 
the report. The forensic accountant retained as an 
expert witness should be prepared to testify about 
the development of the opinion, the process to draft 
and finalize the report, and any changes to it during 
its development. If the report goes through differ-
ent drafts and the drafts are made available during 
the discovery process, the expert also should be pre-
pared to defend the final conclusion and explain any 
differences from the prior drafts.
Quality Control Procedures
It is a good quality control practice to prepare a so-
called “tied-out” copy of the report, which includes 
either by footnote or cross-reference all the support 
for each of the statements, data, or assumptions. This 
practice has multiple purposes. The process is ef-
fective because it forces documentation of the final 
opinion. It also becomes a study aid as the witness 
prepares to testify. The accountant can use this pro-
cess to ensure that data in the report can be traced to 
valid sources, such as evidence obtained in discov-
ery, established industry or public sources, or other 
evidential matter. Documentation of the bases for 
any assumptions and estimates should be adequate 
because these are common areas of attack.
It also is helpful to have a skilled quality reviewer, 
such as another competent accountant, read and 
consider the report. That person can assist in iden-
tifying undocumented assumptions, unsupported 
assertions, or areas of weakness in the approach. 
Another practitioner with a fresh eye is less likely 
to have become wedded to a particular approach 
and may suggest alternatives that would yield ad-
ditional insight. Further, a quality reviewer can help 
identify areas of weakness in the report, including 
subtle biases and areas in which the accountant has 
taken more aggressive positions. These procedures 
are most helpful as early in the process as possible. 
They should be involved before the accountant 
has expressed an opinion, but they can be helpful 
throughout the engagement.
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Privilege
Accountants can benefit from a candid, up-front 
discussion with internal or external counsel about 
any legal privileges that might attach to communica-
tions and work product arising during and from the 
engagement.
Although the definitions of privileges and the 
types of communications that qualify as being gov-
erned by privilege are themselves legal judgments, 
accountants should generally be familiar with the 
following two well-recognized privileges that are 
commonly asserted:
 1.  The Attorney-Client Privilege protects commu-
nications between attorneys and their clients 
when they are discussing legal advice given in 
the context of actual or threatened litigation. 
Such privilege may not attach to communi-
cations in which attorneys are dealing with a 
purely managerial activity or communications 
that are not kept private between the attorney 
and the attorney’s client. For example, attor-
ney-client privilege may attach to documents 
or analyses prepared by the client for the at-
torney to understand the client’s assessment of 
financial damages.
 2.  The Attorney Work Product Doctrine protects an 
attorney’s internal documentation of the work 
or analyses created in support of the attorney’s 
legal representation of the client. Therefore, 
if the accountant is working at the attorney’s 
direction to assist the attorney in providing 
legal advice, the accountant’s work product 
may fall within this doctrine. For example, 
the accounting consultant’s analyses related to 
financial damages and prepared solely for the 
attorney (and not as an expert witness) may 
fall under the attorney work product doc-
trine. As with materials protected under the 
attorney-client privilege, access to materials 
protected under the attorney work product 
doctrine generally must be restricted in order 
to retain such privilege.
Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether and 
to what degree a legal privilege will attach or wheth-
er such privileges might later be waived. Documents 
and communications are not privileged merely 
because they are labeled as such or even because they 
were intended to be privileged. Instead, whether the 
communication is privileged is based, among other 
things, on the substance of the communication, the 
substance of the relationship between the attorney 
and the person to whom the communication was 
made, the nature of the matter to which the docu-
ment relates, the rules within the specific jurisdic-
tion of the matter, how widely the communication 
or documentation was circulated, and with whom it 
was	 shared.	Parties	 sometimes	contest	 assertions	of	
privilege and sometimes do so well after the fact.
For the accountant, the following are a number of 
practical considerations in managing documents and 
communications that may be privileged or fall under 
the attorney work product doctrine:
 •		Proactively discuss handling documents and com-
munications with attorneys. Whether privileges 
attach to documents and communications is, at 
its core, a legal conclusion. Accountants should 
not assume that they are aware of all the nuances 
of privilege-related law. Rather, they should 
discuss their document-handling practices with 
the attorneys with whom they are working and 
the modes that they plan to use for communica-
tion, so that the attorneys can give legal guidance 
when appropriate. In a non-litigation environ-
ment, an accountant might normally commu-
nicate directly with the company about issues 
and advice or disseminate information about 
an engagement to all appropriate stakeholders. 
For potentially privileged documents, it may be 
important to restrict distribution or preferable to 
have such communications come through the 
attorneys.	Proactive	communication	about	what	
should be communicated, and to whom and 
how, will help avoid the unintended waiver of 
potential privileges.
	 •		Label potentially privileged documents and commu-
nications. Although documents and communi-
cations may not be privileged merely because 
someone labels them so, labeling can be helpful 
by expressing the intent of the parties to keep 
the documentation privileged. From a practical 
perspective, labeling also can remind accountants 
and their teams that documentation is intended 
to be privileged and should be handled appro-
priately. Discuss the appropriate label with the 
attorneys and follow their guidance.
	 •		Assume that work may someday be disclosed. Op-
erating under the assumption that their work 
products and communications are privileged, 
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professionals sometimes feel free to draft e-mails 
that candidly describe their thinking, their 
preliminary work, the perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of the work, and their communica-
tions with attorneys regarding the engagement. 
Some, thinking that no one will ever see them, 
include embarrassing or flippant remarks in their 
writing or make statements that undermine 
their later testimony. Almost every experienced 
witness can tell tales of opponents who were 
questioned about unguarded and inappropriate 
comments after privileges were waived and their 
communications were exchanged in discovery. 
E-mails expressing preliminary conclusions, 
initial concerns, worries, or doubts also are clas-
sic fodder for cross-examination, if discovered. 
All professionals involved in litigation services 
should work as if the whole world will someday 
see their work product or read what they once 
thought were their confidential communica-
tions with their own teams or with the attorneys. 
Good working habits and discipline help prevent 
damaging disclosures.
	 •		The medium and tenor of communication. The tenor 
of the communication and work product should 
be professional, thoughtful, and consistent with 
the thorough and objective analysis that the ac-
countant has been retained to deliver. The mode 
of communication and documentation also can 
be important. Final documentation should be 
complete and adequately support the work per-
formed.	Preliminary	work,	however,	might	have	
limited or no documentation. For example, the 
accountant might meet for an in-person discus-
sion of issues, questions, and approaches without 
leaving a permanent documentary record of 
preliminary results. A phone or conference call 
might appropriately report on the status, open 
items, and concerns without leaving the docu-
mentary trail of an e-mail. Not only will such 
foresight reduce the exposure to discovery, but 
it also will limit the risk that materials could be 
copied or forwarded in ways that might cause an 
unintended waiver of any privilege that might 
otherwise be available.
Preparing to Give 
Testimony12
Many investigations or litigation situations require 
the accountant to testify. Examples of testimony by 
accountants could include the following:
	 •		Written	expert	reports	or	interrogatories
	 •		Deposition	testimony
	 •		Direct	examination	in	court	or	arbitration
	 •		Cross-examination	in	court	or	arbitration
	 •		Presentations	in	mediation	or	other	alternative	
dispute resolution settings
	 •		Testimony	or	presentations	to	regulators
	 •		Testimony	as	a	fact	witness	related	to	an 
engagement
The pressures of providing testimony are intense. 
It is prudent for accountants engaged in the mat-
ter to reconsider their role and the objectives of the 
case. Especially in preparing and giving testimony, 
the accountants should take care to remain objec-
tive, advocate only for their own opinions, and fo-
cus on the responsibility of assisting the trier of fact.
When meeting with attorneys, accountants may 
feel subtle pressure to assist the attorney in advocat-
ing for the client. Other times, pressure may come 
from within. For example, an accountant might feel 
a need to “help the team,” want to excel at the role 
of expert witness, or begin to see the opposing at-
torney as a personal adversary. There may be both 
direct and indirect pressures from attorneys and their 
clients to adopt unreasonable assumptions, take ag-
gressive positions, or phrase answers in ways that 
are advantageous to their positions. Time pressures 
also are common. All these elements can erode pro-
fessional objectivity. Keeping one’s own responsi-
bilities in mind greatly helps the witness to remain 
centered,	 despite	 such	 pressures.	 Quality	 control	
procedures and quality reviews from other accoun-
tants, described earlier, also can bolster awareness 
of such pressures and create an environment that is 
supportive of ethical, objective, and quality-orient-
ed work. Box 10-5 outlines the experiences of suc-
cessful accounting-oriented witnesses and suggests 
several keys to successful testimony.
12		For	additional	information	on	expert	testimony,	see	the	article	titled	“Working	with	Attorneys,	Juries	and	Judges”	in	the	Focus	newsletter	of	the	AICPA	
Forensic	and	Valuation	Services	Section,	January/February	2008	ed.,	vol.	4,	no.	1.
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1.  Know your own opinion. A clearly stated professional opinion sounds simple, but, in practice, it 
can be profoundly difficult to craft. An opinion to be articulated in testimony is not a casual, 
everyday opinion of personal preference. A strong, expert opinion is limited to the topics and 
matters that the accountant was asked to analyze. A good witness avoids over-extending the 
opinion to vulnerable side topics. Testimony should be supported by the facts and circumstances, 
personal experience, research, analysis, and, if appropriate, clearly defined and articulated as-
sumptions. Rule 26 requires that the expert report state all the opinions and the bases for them.
  Ideally, the expert states the opinion in a series of declarative sentences, with each statement 
supported by detailed explanations, calculations, or materials that articulate the bases for the 
opinion. Being able to articulate the opinion and its bases is usually required in the litigation set-
ting and would be good practice, even if not required. Clear statements help the testifier remem-
ber, under the pressure of cross-examination, what the opinion is not. Skilled cross-examiners 
often try to lead a witness into over-extending testimony from his or her opinion into other, 
less well-considered statements. Then, a witness could easily fall victim to a critique of any ill-
formed judgments. Similarly, many cross-examiners attempt to confuse a testifier with convo-
luted hypothetical questions, some of which may have little relevance to the matter at hand. 
Refocusing on one’s own opinion and the bases for it can help a witness remain oriented.
2.  Communicate the opinion in the context of the themes and context of the case. Although the core of 
an accountant’s testimony is usually an accounting or financial judgment, accountants are ideal 
witnesses to help attorneys tell the story of their cases in the litigation context. Because of the 
unique professional role of accountants in developing, analyzing, understanding, and communi-
cating about financial matters, their testimony includes the background of what happened or the 
business and financial context of specific transactions. Through that testimony, the judge, jury, 
or trier of fact may come to see the facts of the case from the accountant’s viewpoint.
  The accountant’s work is therefore strengthened by understanding the key themes of the 
attorney’s strategy. The accountant should appreciate whether and to what degree the attorney 
anticipates using the accountant’s testimony in building context for his or her legal arguments 
or establishing foundational elements of the case. Within the bounds of their own professional 
responsibilities, accountants also can be very helpful to judges and juries by helping them un-
derstand salient themes in the case, especially those involving matters such as money, damages, 
accounting, financial reporting and analysis, business processes and controls, the facts surrounding 
specific transactions, and quantitative analyses.
3.  Focus on the bases for assumptions. In some types of damages analysis, informed and thoughtful 
assumptions are an integral and necessary element. Expert witnesses are permitted to employ 
assumptions in their analyses. Witnesses should know the assumptions embedded within their 
work and should be able to clearly articulate the bases for them. Many assumptions are selected 
by the accountants based on verifiable inputs. Others are given to them by the attorneys. Gener-
ally, to avoid misleading the trier of fact, the assumptions given to the witness should be articu-
lated in a written report or direct examination. Sometimes, the nature of the assumption will 
be critical to the case. For example, if an accountant is asked to calculate damages assuming that 
the defendant is found liable, that testimony might become moot if the finder of fact decides the 
defendant is not liable. Similarly, if the witness were asked to calculate damages assuming that 
company revenues reached a stipulated figure, the expert opinion might be disregarded if that 
assumption were found to be unreasonable. Identifying assumptions and clearly communicating 
about them helps prepare the witness to successfully address the inevitable cross-examination
(continued)
Box 10-5:  Ten Keys to Successful Testimony
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4.  Use a variety of modes of communication. The expert may have an opportunity to use a variety of 
communication tools during the litigation process, including written reports and oral testimony. 
Depending on the facts and circumstances, the witness may use a variety of graphs, charts, dia-
grams, models, and other tools as exhibits. Because the goal is to help the trier of fact, it is worth 
investing the time to ascertain what mode of communication would help most in getting the 
message across and which modes of communication are permitted in that particular setting.
5.  Prepare.	Preparation	for	testimony	is	essential	because	the	witness	may	be	questioned	in	detail	
on any aspect of the opinion, the bases for the opinion, and about any expert report or prior 
testimony in the case. Witnesses also may be questioned on their prior writings, publications, 
or testimony in other matters or on documents they may have considered, their communica-
tions with the attorneys, and the approaches or data that they may have considered and rejected. 
Sometimes, cross-examiners ask questions far afield of the opinion for the sole purpose of mak-
ing the witness look unprepared, biased, or careless.
	 	 Witnesses	should	try	to	“over-prepare,”	if	possible.	Preparation	for	testimony	cannot	be	del-
egated because only the witness will testify. Good preparation, even over-preparation, reduces 
the likelihood that the cross-examiner will be able to confound the witness.
  Among the techniques helpful in preparing for testimony is to hand-calculate all the criti-
cal calculations underlying the opinion. In this age of computers, this may seem archaic, but 
hand-calculations force witnesses to slow down and understand each step in the calculation, thus 
allowing them to recreate the calculation on the stand, if asked. Another technique, as alluded to 
earlier, is to create a “tie-out” expert report that includes a footnote or cross-reference from ev-
ery fact, figure, and statement to its supporting documents. When embedded in the report itself, 
such cross-references fully document the basis for the opinion. They are also a great timesaver as 
the time for testimony nears.
6.  Clarify the message. Although the issues in the case often are complex, it is worthwhile for the 
expert, while preparing his or her testimony, to consider how to articulate an opinion to some-
one lacking the expert’s level of expertise and knowledge. If it can be done within the bounds 
of confidentiality, the witness might talk about the case with a person who is not skilled in 
accounting and finance. The witness can assess whether the key points are clear to the layper-
son, the listener understood the overall themes of the case, the examples or metaphors used in 
the testimony resonated, and the testimony left the listener with unanswered questions. In large 
cases, focus groups help attorneys and witnesses test their messages. For other cases, the witness 
can seek out the unvarnished feedback that will help the witness communicate more clearly dur-
ing testimony.
7.  Anticipate cross-examination. Another strategy is to consider talking through cross-examination 
with attorneys and other professionals who are knowledgeable about the case. Often, insufficient 
time is spent preparing for cross-examination of expert witnesses in the belief that experts can 
take care of themselves. Expert witnesses benefit by gaining input from others to help anticipate 
likely cross-examination questions and approaches. Sometimes, the best preparation is with an 
attorney on the team who knows the case but does not regularly interact with the witness. A 
less-experienced legal associate on the team might fill this role. An attorney’s questions 
may come from a different perspective, which is a good way for the witness to “expect the 
unexpected.”
(continued)
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 (continued) 
8.  Narrow the testimony. Testimony should focus on those topics about which the accountant has 
formed a professional opinion. Witnesses can further narrow their testimony by actively search-
ing for ways to limit the points of disagreement. This usually benefits the client by focusing the 
dispute, and it benefits expert witnesses by minimizing the number of areas on which they can 
be cross-examined. For example, although the accountant could conceivably choose the “best” 
answer for all the inputs to a damages analysis, there may be a range of reasonable answers. Some 
inputs have little true impact on the overall opinion. One example is a hypothetical situation 
in which damages are calculated as the sum of discounted cash flows. The damages calculation 
might not be sensitive to the assumption regarding capital expenditures in the tenth year of a 
projection, but it might be highly sensitive to the assumption regarding the interest rate used to 
discount the projected cash flows. The witness might limit areas of dispute by utilizing agreed-
upon or stipulated facts. Another way the witness might limit areas of dispute is by adopting the 
opponent’s assumptions when there is no substantive difference between the data or assumptions 
adopted by the witness and the opponents or when such differences have little impact. This fo-
cuses the dispute on the key drivers of the analysis, which is where the details make a difference.
	 9.		Maintain composure. Successful witness testimony depends, in part, on the witness’s self-control 
and ability to communicate clearly in a stressful context, even when subject to intense scrutiny.
  First-time witnesses are sometimes surprised at how physically and emotionally grueling it 
can be to sit in the witness chair for seven or eight hours. Good witnesses recognize that 
testifying is hard work, and it requires them to manage a number of factors, including the 
following:
	 •	 Energy. The witness needs to remain energized and focused throughout the testimony. Good 
witnesses make sure they are rested, well-fed, hydrated, and that they have addressed their 
physical needs, so that their minds can be fully engaged.
	 •	 Emotions. Sometimes, cross-examiners bait the witness to elicit an emotional response. Within 
certain bounds, they can charm, challenge, tease, ridicule, and irritate the witness. Good wit-
nesses stay focused, regardless of these tactics.
	 •	 Responses. One rule of testimony is to listen to the question. If a question is unclear, the 
witness can ask for it to be repeated or clarified. Good witnesses answer what was asked and 
manage their responses to address the questions. Depending on the context, they avoid un-
necessary disclosures, avoid opening new areas for examination, and maintain their credibility 
with the trier of fact.
	 •	 Message. Strong, direct testimony puts the expert opinion in the context of an overall theme 
or message. Whenever possible, the witness can return to the key themes of the testimony to 
reinforce the message, even during cross-examination.
	 •	 Pace. Good witnesses keep the pace of questioning and answering relatively constant under 
both direct and cross-examination. Skilled attorneys may try to disrupt or rush the witness 
by asking questions in quick succession trying, in cross-examination, to rile a witness who 
had been unruffled in direct examination; or letting silence stretch for an uncomfortably long 
time. Successful witnesses are aware of their own pace and keep themselves centered.
	 •	 Demeanor. Successful witnesses conduct themselves in a competent, thoughtful, and objective 
way. They avoid body language or behavior that suggests bias or advocacy for their clients.
10.  Tell the truth. Most testifiers take some form of the traditional oath to “tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth.” When a difficult question comes, the witness must answer 
truthfully, even if the truth is unappealing. 
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Conclusion
Grand Forge, our subject, needs good lawyers to 
help them understand and resolve their legal expo-
sures and help them benefit from their legal rights 
in disputes. The company also needs skilled accoun-
tants and forensic specialists to help uncover what 
happened and advise Grand Forge on necessary 
changes in business processes, financial controls, and 
financial reporting. Even more, the company stands 
to benefit from a synthesis of their work, drawing 
from both sets of skills to help the company make 
good business decisions. Grand Forge wants its attor-
neys and accountants to work cooperatively, avoid 
redundancy, and help them achieve their business 
objectives.
When lawyers and accountants work apart, each 
delivering their own specialized expertise in a vac-
uum, they miss a crucial opportunity to deliver to 
clients high-quality service that synthesizes the best 
approaches and skills of both the accounting and le-
gal professions. Facing the unknowns that arise with 
allegations of financial impropriety and the very real 
challenges of claims, regulatory compliance issues, 
litigation, and disputes, clients deserve to realize the 
synergies that can be achieved when attorneys and 
accountants work cooperatively to address business 
problems.
Notwithstanding the pressures and challenges 
associated with investigations and litigation, such 
work is incredibly rewarding. When attorneys and 
accountants work together in appropriately struc-
tured and organized engagements, when they rec-
ognize and take into account their respective profes-
sional responsibilities, when engagement scope and 
communication are appropriate so that the profes-
sionals work together and not at cross-purposes, and 
when the work is done competently and skillfully, 
the benefits to clients are enormous.
Strong Communication Builds Teamwork
To foster teamwork, focus on communication in the following areas:
 •  At the outset of the engagement, it is especially helpful to discuss not only the roles, skills, and expertise 
of the individual practitioners but also the resources available to them. For example, most accounting and 
law firms have resources with a variety of technical skills. Global firms may be able to supply profession-
als with experience in far-flung localities or fluency in other languages. In addition to accounting skills, 
the Big Four accounting firms have a variety of specialized forensic resources. For example, an early offer 
of assistance with electronic evidence is frequently welcome and can enhance the overall project.
 •  During an engagement, non-attorneys may ask about the legal aspects of the matter and inquire about 
any legal terminology used by the attorneys. Although many attorneys have a strong working knowledge 
of accounting and financial reporting, it can be helpful to offer additional explanations or background, 
with respect to more technical topics. The opportunity to learn and share expertise is one of the benefits of 
working with attorneys.
 •  Communicate candidly about weaknesses in or questions about the engagement approach or the facts 
uncovered. Almost every professional benefits from looking at challenges with a fresh view. Because of 
their different backgrounds and skills, attorneys and accountants can help each other see issues from other 
perspectives.
 •  Communicate about commitments and timing. Given the short time frames and deadlines associated with 
such work, communication in this area is critical.
 •  Consider the viewpoints of the company, its managers, and other stakeholders. Accountants and at-
torneys need to focus on client service. Sharing information about client needs and concerns can help both 
sets of professionals reduce stress and manage expectations. In particular, accountants with experience in 
auditing and working with people in a variety of business roles can help the attorneys build relationships 
and understand the perspectives of the financial people within the company.
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Introduction
In this age of heightened regulatory scrutiny, ac-
countants find themselves working with company 
management, board members, federal and state 
regulators, lawyers, law enforcement officials, and 
other parties investigating potential wrongdoing.
In addition to the other allegations being inves-
tigated that have been addressed in the overall case 
study at the beginning of the book1 consider the sce-
nario that follows.
Nicole Evans, an accounting manager in Finan-
cial Reporting, was performing her normal clos-
ing procedures when she continued to be confused 
by entries made by Jon and Christopher and ulti-
mately signed off on by Bill after the close process 
was completed each month. When she continu-
ally questioned Christopher, who was her boss, she 
was left with a feeling that something was unusual 
about these entries and, therefore, she continued to 
research by looking at the underlying supporting 
documentation. Still not satisfied with the entries’ 
legitimacy, she was left with no other alternative but 
to draft and submit a whistle-blower letter to the 
Grand Forge fraud response hotline system.
Jacob Willis, the general counsel for Grand Forge, 
arrived to work on a Friday morning looking for-
ward to his weekend. It has been a long three 
months as he had been dealing with the other al-
legations indentified in the original case study at the 
beginning of the book and it looked as if those were 
starting to be wrapped up. When he opened up his 
e-mail and saw the letter from Nicole, he quickly 
realized his weekend and the next few months were 
about to change dramatically. His first response after 
reading the letter was: What do I do now? What 
are the protocols and processes I need to consider 
throughout this process?
As Jacob quickly found out from our preceding 
hypothetical scenario, the roles for the parties in-
volved, such as accountants and others within the 
organization, can become quite confusing, especially 
if they have no prior experience with regulatory in-
vestigations. Allegations can surface from numerous 
sources, including whistleblowers, lawsuits, external 
and internal auditors, media reports, and investiga-
tions conducted at other companies with which the 
company does business.
The more complicated investigations involve 
multiple regulatory and law enforcement agen-
cies. For example, an alleged fraud scheme involv-
ing a bank and its publicly traded holding company 
may involve federal and state banking examin-
ers, Securities and Exchange (SEC) enforcement 
lawyers and accountants, Department of Justice 
(DOJ) lawyers, FBI agents, IRS agents, and other 
regulatory officials.
Investigations of wrongdoing conducted by mul-
tiple regulatory and law enforcement agencies result-
ing from the same set of facts are commonly referred 
to as parallel investigations. Parallel investigations al-
low each regulatory agency to fulfill its individual 
oversight responsibilities. For example, in the alle-
gations described in the case study for Grand Forge, 
the securities fraud may be investigated by the SEC 
for potential civil charges against the company or its 
employees, and the DOJ, with assistance from FBI 
agents, may investigate the same set of facts for po-
tential criminal charges. It is common for such agen-
cies to cooperate and share information and their 
investigative findings.
It also is common for a company to conduct its 
own internal investigation in parallel and in cooper-
ation with a regulatory investigation. Both the SEC 
and DOJ frequently prefer that a company conduct 
its own investigation before determining how they 
will proceed in order to leverage the company’s fact-
finding results. In these situations, the regulators will 
closely monitor how the company is conducting its 
investigation and ask for periodic updates on find-
ings and evidence.
Situations also arise in which company manage-
ment or its board becomes aware of an allegation 
of wrongdoing on the part of one or more of its 
employees that has not been previously communi-
cated to a regulatory authority. In these situations, 
the company will likely conduct its own internal or 
independent investigation and then determine, with 
1	The	reader	is	invited	to	read	the	detailed	case	study	of	Grand	Forge	Company	found	in	the	Introduction	to	this	book.
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advice from legal counsel, whether disclosure to 
regulatory authorities is required or desirable, based 
on the findings. Sometimes, disclosure is required 
even if not desirable; oftentimes, self-reporting is 
done because there is really no other option. This 
chapter is designed to assist accountants and other 
professionals not familiar with regulatory investiga-
tive processes by explaining some of the more im-
portant issues involved and describing some of the 
risks. This chapter also outlines considerations Jacob 
should be considering as he develops his course of 
action and as more information surfaces or govern-
ment investigators get involved.
Internal Investigations
Receiving a grand jury subpoena or investigative 
demand, or learning that federal or state law en-
forcement agents and prosecutors have developed 
an interest in one’s business or any individual offi-
cers or employees in that business, can cause instant 
alarm throughout an organization. At times, the 
alarm is warranted; federal law enforcement officials 
have been increasingly aggressive in investigating 
and prosecuting business crimes and even the col-
lateral consequences of becoming a subject of an in-
vestigation, such as an adverse shareholder reaction, 
harm to one’s business reputation, and even loss of 
business, can be severe.
At other times, the level of alarm is more a func-
tion of the unknown. Executives and board mem-
bers at compliance-conscious, law-abiding business 
enterprises typically have no significant experience 
that will help them discern whether the investiga-
tion should be a cause of genuine concern.
At the same time (or prior to, as the case may be) 
that a regulatory agency conducts its investigation, a 
company will always want to be conducting its own 
internal review to make an informed determination 
about what happened and what remedial actions 
should be taken. In its conduct of this second, par-
allel investigation, the company must pay as much 
attention to how it conducts its own investigation 
and the results as it does to the government’s in-
vestigation. An effective and efficient internal inves-
tigation helps the company reach a determination, 
based on the most accurate facts and understanding 
of the matter available. Understanding these facts 
should allow the company to make sound decisions 
about its succeeding course of action.2
Although some routine or less serious matters 
may be handled internally and less formally by the 
company’s internal auditors, compliance officers, 
and in-house counsel, the current regulatory and 
law enforcement environment is not forgiving to 
corporations that underreact to evidence of inter-
nal misconduct. Boards of directors, senior manage-
ment, and in-house counsel now frequently face 
situations that call for launching a vigorous internal 
investigation. Such investigations typically involve 
at least the assistance of outside professionals and of-
ten are conducted at the direction of such outside 
lawyers, including counsel experienced in not only 
conducting internal investigations but in negotiating 
with law enforcement personnel and regulators who 
have, or soon will, become aware of the circum-
stances leading to the investigation.
Jacob understood that a course of action was need-
ed and that he would have to strongly consider out-
side assistance in order to properly assess and inves-
tigate the situation, due to the parties alleged to be 
involved in this scheme. Although inevitably costly 
and disruptive, beginning such an independent and 
thorough factual investigation promptly can often 
help allay the concerns of regulators, prosecutors, 
and shareholders about allegations of wrongdoing 
that have become publicly known. Irrespective of 
whether the allegations have attracted the attention 
of regulators or law enforcement investigators, em-
barking on an internal inquiry is often a critical first 
step in assisting management in dealing with poten-
tial law enforcement actions or regulatory interven-
tion and girding the company for shareholder litiga-
tion. It also may help preempt subsequent litigation 
2		The	information	in	this	and	succeeding	sections	is	intended	to	inform	readers	about	internal	investigations	and	working	with	regulators;	nothing	in	these	
materials	should	be	construed	as	legal	advice.	In	situations	in	which	a	company	faces	an	internal	investigation	or	is	potentially	subject	to	a	govern-
ment	inquiry,	a	range	of	legal	and	strategic	issues	can	arise;	every	situation	presents	specific	challenges.	When	such	an	investigation	unfolds,	it	is	
imperative—for	the	reasons	outlined	in	the	succeeding	discussion—that	management	consult	and	engage	experienced	counsel.
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against individual board members that charges them 
with a failure to act prudently in the discharge of 
their fiduciary obligations.
When an investigation is initiated internally or by 
the government, several considerations come into 
play. These include trying to identify the potential 
violation and determining if the company is a victim 
or is potentially liable. Management or the board 
of directors also will want to determine whether 
the investigation warrants the creation of a group 
to oversee the investigation, such as a special com-
mittee of the audit committee or the board. Other 
considerations include the following:
	 •		Will	the	fraud	or	alleged	act	of	misconduct	be	
investigated internally or externally?
	 •		What	is	the	company’s	existing	document	
preservation policy and what issues should be 
considered with regard to the growing complex-
ity of electronic document preservation?
	 •		How	does	the	company	and	its	management	
team plan to ensure attorney-client privilege?
	 •		Will	a	restatement	occur	as	a	result	of	the	inves-
tigation into the fraud?
Additional considerations include devising a 
plan for making public statements and appointing 
a spokesperson who may possibly be an attorney. 
Lastly, in some cases, the possibility of leniency does 
exist. The regulatory agency may have a standard 
policy for fielding requests, providing some sort of 
regulatory safe harbor for voluntary self-reporting 
companies, or providing avenues to lessen sanctions 
if the company’s full cooperation so warrants. These 
issues are covered in more detail in the succeeding 
sections.
Identifying Violations, 
Preventing Further Damage, 
and Determining Liability
A company’s first goal is to identify whether it could 
be considered to have liability for a potential viola-
tion or whether the cause of the concern is an em-
ployee committing a violation and the company is 
a victim. A company will have criminal liability for 
the acts of its employees, officers, and agents only if 
(1) the employee, officer, or agent acted within the 
scope of his or her apparent authority granted by the 
company, and (2) the employee, officer, or agent 
acted for the benefit of the company.
In our scenario, the CEO, CFO, and Controller at 
Grand Forge created a plan to fictitiously manipulate 
the earnings over an 18-month period, and, there-
fore, Grand Forge could have criminal liability. In 
this case, the management team, led by Bill, Jon, and 
Christopher, and the company itself benefited by re-
alizing more revenues from the manipulation of the 
reserve accounts. Bill and his team received bonuses 
directly related to the performance of Grand Forge, 
and Grand Forge’s earning per share and stock pric-
es increased dramatically as a result of the schemes; 
therefore, both could have criminal liability.
If a company is a victim of an employee’s poten-
tial violation of law, the company should fully con-
sider the repercussions of not cooperating fully with 
a government investigation, which could include 
the possible adverse publicity that could result. If the 
company may have liability as a result of the em-
ployee’s potential violation, the company must care-
fully assess its liability and account for that liability in 
the strategic response to the potential violation.
In the preceding scenario, Jacob needs to deter-
mine what liability Grand Forge could suffer based 
on the potential violations of Bill and his team and, 
additionally, the pros and cons of cooperating with a 
government investigation into the matter.
Appointing Special 
Committees
For any internal investigation to succeed, it must 
have the support of a management team commit-
ted to seeing it through to its conclusion, wherever 
it may lead. To ensure its unencumbered success, 
after the initial decision is made to embark on an 
investigation, day-to-day decisions about its scope 
and direction should ordinarily be left to those re-
sponsible for the investigation. In the Grand Forge 
scenario, special consideration should be given to 
who is responsible for the investigation, in light of 
the fact that the highest levels of management are 
alleged to be involved, and who will receive the sta-
tus update and results during the progression of the 
investigation.
Correspondingly, management should appoint to 
the investigative team an officer of the company with 
sufficient authority to effectively support the inves-
tigation and serve as management’s liaison to coun-
sel. When outside counsel has been retained, that 
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liaison might be the corporation’s general counsel 
or an attorney on his or her staff, the internal audit 
director, or the corporate compliance officer. If the 
matter is being investigated by in-house staff, man-
agement is particularly well advised to manifest full 
support for the investigation and provide complete 
cooperation. Based on these facts, Jacob decided to 
retain assistance from outside counsel to assist in the 
investigation, and Jacob was the liaison from outside 
counsel to the board of directors of Grand Forge.
The concept of an internal investigation is ex-
tremely flexible; it can be as formal or informal as 
the company chooses. It can be staffed entirely at 
the company’s discretion, and its scope can be pre-
determined and later expanded or contracted at the 
company’s will.
Notwithstanding this apparent flexibility in struc-
ture, however, the decision of whether and how to 
launch an internal investigation is a critical one and 
calls for the exercise of informed judgment by man-
agement, in-house counsel, and the board of direc-
tors. As Grand Forge dealt with in our hypothetical 
scenario, during the company’s early grappling with 
what are often vague allegations of wrongdoing, 
there is substantial room (indeed, a need) for con-
sultation with counsel experienced in conducting 
corporate investigations, as well as with the particu-
lar regulatory and government agencies who might 
later be involved. The perception by the govern-
ment and public of how the company is handling 
the investigation can be critical, and obtaining the 
input of an outside professional, devoid of internal 
“protective” instincts, should be carefully weighed.
On receipt of information suggesting the exis-
tence of internal irregularities, it is appropriate that 
management or the person responsible for the inves-
tigation discretely obtain records and other docu-
mentation and conduct a limited number of infor-
mal “interviews” to help them decide how best to 
proceed. In that regard, care should be taken not to 
signal to employees that management has formed an 
adverse judgment; that employees are under suspi-
cion; or, as in our case, the highest levels of manage-
ment do not feel they are under suspicion. Docu-
ments, including employee e-mails and computer 
records, may need to be gathered and reviewed 
confidentially. Ultimately, answers to the questions 
found in box 11-1 will greatly influence manage-
ment decision making.
Reviewing a Case With 
Regulators
Typically, the first concern of management upon 
receiving a subpoena or notice from a regulatory 
agency about a pending inquiry is to learn as much 
as possible about the allegations or circumstances 
giving rise to the regulatory scrutiny (the proce-
dures for which have been addressed in the preced-
ing “Internal Investigations” section of this chapter). 
The company will first want to determine for itself 
whether the allegations have merit; second, it will 
want either a member of the internal investigative 
team or the company’s counsel to contact the gov-
ernmental agency in charge of the investigation to 
obtain as much information as possible about their 
investigation and the issues surrounding it. Depend-
ing on the nature and extent of the regulatory in-
quiry, the company often will engage external law-
yers and forensic accountants to assist the company 
in responding to the regulatory inquiries and con-
ducting fact-finding procedures to determine what 
remedial actions are needed if the allegations prove 
to be true.
Although numerous federal, state, and local agen-
cies conduct investigations of companies and their 
employees’ activities, the agencies most frequently 
encountered by company financial executives and 
accountants are the SEC and DOJ. These two agen-
cies monitor the activities of public companies, up-
hold the integrity of the financial markets, and in-
vestigate any wrongdoing. Although attorneys with 
these agencies will limit any disclosures to what is 
within the subpoena, additional information often 
can be gleaned from comments these government 
attorneys make about the subpoena and the com-
pany’s expected response.
The SEC will neither confirm nor deny the exis-
tence of an investigation unless and until it becomes 
a matter of public record. Depending on the nature 
of the issues of concern to the SEC, it will either 
commence an informal or formal inquiry. Most 
SEC inquiries involving allegations of fraudulent 
financial reporting or other violations of securities 
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laws commence as an informal inquiry. During the 
informal phase, the SEC will request that the com-
pany voluntarily produce specific information that 
typically includes documents (for example, com-
pany records, including electronic evidence such as 
employee e-mails), internal interview summaries, 
and other testimony. It is common for an informal 
inquiry to escalate into a formal investigation, pro-
vided the facts support further investigation. During 
a formal investigation, the SEC uses its subpoena 
and enforcement powers to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the issues of concern, leveraging the 
company’s internal investigative findings.
As stated on its Web site, the SEC conducts its 
investigations confidentially for two main reasons.3 
First, the agency feels it can conduct investiga-
tions more effectively if its investigations are not 
announced publicly. One particular concern is the 
preservation of evidence conceived as necessary for 
investigation; for instance, important documents and 
evidence can be destroyed quickly if people hear of 
an investigation. Second, investigations are kept 
3	See	the	“Division	of	Enforcement”	section	on	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission’s	Web	site	at	www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
	•		Is	the	allegation	or	controversy	known	publicly?	Is	it	known	to	the	government?
•		If	an	allegation	is	substantiated,	what	is	the	potential	for	adverse	regulatory	action?
•		Could	the	conduct	lead	to	prosecution?	Is	it	criminal	in	nature?
•		What	is	the	potential	corporate	liability	for	the	acts	of	the	company’s	employees?
•		Who	are	the	potential	subjects	of	the	investigation?	How	high	in	management	are	they?
•		Once	a	wrongdoing	is	revealed	and	if	it	is	substantiated,	what	is	the	potential	that	the	conduct	at	
issue will result in civil litigation and the imposition of liability?
•		Could	a	failure	to	investigate	lead	to	later	civil	liability	of	board	members?
•		Once	employees	understand	that	an	internal	investigation	is	underway,	what	is	the	potential	that	
documents, e-mails, or other important evidence will be discarded, interfered with, or destroyed?
•		Is	there	an	obligation	to	report	the	allegation	to	an	insurer	under	a	directors’	and	officers’	liability	
policy?
•		What	will	be	the	cost	of	an	internal	investigation	if	external	professionals	(counsel,	forensic	ac-
countants, and technical experts) are required?
•		If	the	allegations	are	substantiated,	what	effect	will	they	have	on	management’s	required	certifica-
tions of its financial statements?
•		What	disclosure	to	outside	auditors	might	be	required?
•		Will	some	restatement	of	income	be	required	in	this	period	or	in	prior	years?
•		If	so,	could	such	restatements	trigger	debt	covenant	defaults?
•		Are	the	allegations	the	result	of	a	whistleblowing	complaint?	Is	there	the	possibility	that	there	
already exists a qui tam action?
•		Could	the	conduct	at	issue	lead	to	disbarment	or	exclusion	from	any	government	programs	or	
contracts in which the company is engaged?
•		What	effect	will	a	failure	to	appropriately	respond	have	on	the	integrity	of	the	company’s	existing	
compliance programs?
•		What	is	the	likelihood	that	existing	audit	or	compliance	systems	are	deficient?
Box 11-1:  Special Committee Appointment Considerations
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confidential to protect the reputations of companies 
and individuals. If the agency finds no wrongdoing 
or decides that it does not have sufficient evidence 
to bring a successful action against the company or 
any of its employees, then it can close the investi-
gation without further involving the company in a 
public debate.
The existence of an SEC investigation becomes 
public when the company under investigation 
makes a public disclosure or the SEC files an action 
in court as part of its internal administrative pro-
cess. Information about public enforcement actions 
is posted on the SEC’s Web site.
Along with the SEC, the DOJ also plays an essen-
tial role in the fight against sophisticated economic 
crime. The Criminal Division of the DOJ super-
vises enforcement of all federal criminal laws, except 
those specifically assigned to other divisions. How-
ever, the scope of the Criminal Division’s jurisdic-
tion is not limited to criminal matters; it extends to 
civil matters as well. The statutes currently admin-
istered by the Criminal Division are set forth in the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) Title 9, 
quoted as follows:
The Criminal Division will provide assistance to 
a U.S. Attorney in any matter within the juris-
diction of the Division. The Division will also at-
tempt to assist a U.S. Attorney in any matter re-
lated to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
or Speedy Trial Problems. Finally, the Division 
will serve as a conduit for a U.S. Attorney to a 
higher authority within or without the Depart-
ment on matters within its jurisdiction. (USAM 
Title 9-1.000, “Department of Justice Policy and 
Responsibilities”) 
Depending on the agency conducting the in-
vestigation and the attorney in charge of it, some 
useful information can be obtained through an ini-
tial contact session. In particular, the company or 
its attorneys may be able to determine whether the 
company or only selected employees are the subject 
of the investigation and who are the proposed wit-
nesses, subjects, or targets of the inquiry.
For example, it is the stated policy of the DOJ to 
advise a grand jury witness of his or her rights, if such 
witness is a target or subject of a grand jury investi-
gation.4 The DOJ defines a target as a person about 
whom the prosecutor or grand jury has substantial 
evidence linking him or her to the commission of a 
crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, 
is a putative defendant. A subject of an investigation 
is a person whose conduct is within the scope of the 
grand jury’s investigation.
Importantly, an officer or employee of an organi-
zation that is the target of an investigation is not au-
tomatically considered a target, even if such officer’s 
or employee’s conduct contributed to the commis-
sion of the crime by the target organization. The 
same lack of automatic target status holds true for 
organizations that employ or employed an officer or 
employee who is a target. Box 11-2 outlines three 
critical preparatory steps when a company is facing 
a governmental investigation, regardless of whether 
the investigation is being driven by the SEC, DOJ, 
or any regulatory other body.
Box 11-2:  Key Business Considerations when 
Working with a Governmental 
Investigation
•		The	company	should	work	with	the	
regulatory agency as much as reasonably 
possible to understand the premise and 
objectives of the investigation. Even in 
the context of an ongoing investigation, 
the company being investigated may be 
able to guide or influence the agency’s 
activities in some reasonable regard.
•		The	company	should	determine	if	it	or	
its outside counsel will be permitted to 
attend interviews or meetings conducted 
by the attorneys or investigators retained 
by the agency.
•		The	company	should	advise	both	its	
current and former employees about the 
investigation, appropriately inform them 
of its scope and purpose, apprise them of 
their rights, and give them instructions on 
preserving all evidence in their possession 
or control, including electronic evidence 
such as e-mail.
4	United	States	Attorneys’	Manual	Title	9-11.000,	“Grand	Jury.”
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If the company makes an early determination dur-
ing the period of its being investigated that coop-
erating with the investigating agency is in its best 
interest, or if it at least determines that it has not 
yet found sufficient information to conclude that it 
should not cooperate, then the company or some 
member of the investigative team should contact the 
lead attorney or investigator from the agency con-
ducting the investigation to obtain as much infor-
mation as possible about the investigation’s premise, 
scope, and planned course. Because the company 
will want to demonstrate its willingness to coop-
erate, it would be helpful to obtain the following 
information as soon as possible:
	 •		Who	does	the	regulator	or	investigator	want	to	
interview? Learning this gives the company time 
to notify the relevant employees and determine 
if the employees should obtain outside counsel to 
assist them.
	 •		From	whom	does	the	regulator	plan	to	request	
documents for review? This is important so that 
the company can develop a plan to generate 
document production batches for the regulator 
within the requested time frame.
	 •		What	time	periods	are	subject	to	investigation?	
What are the issues involved? By establishing 
what time periods are subject to the review, the 
company and its document production team can 
set up search terms to expedite the requests for 
information.
	 •		How	soon	does	the	regulator	want	to	start	con-
ducting interviews and reviewing documents?
	 •		Will	or	should	the	company	or	its	outside	coun-
sel plan to be present for interviews of employees 
or former employees? (On a side note, company 
management should be aware that its counsel or 
representatives will almost never be permitted to 
attend the interview of an employee represented 
by separate counsel.)
Once a company has made its best attempt to 
determine the scope and structure of the regula-
tor’s investigation, management needs to determine 
whether the affected current or former employees 
should have outside counsel.
Of course, a regulator’s intent in conducting in-
terviews is to gain as complete an understanding 
as possible of the pertinent facts and circumstances 
surrounding his or her investigation. For individual 
employees who have retained their own counsel, 
some consideration must be given to whether a 
joint defense agreement is necessary between com-
pany counsel and the separate counsel for employ-
ees. This consideration will be addressed later in this 
chapter. 
Advising Employees About 
Investigations
The regulatory agency performing the investiga-
tion may choose to interview employees either at 
work or outside of work. The company also may 
choose to interview witnesses that the government 
is interviewing about their knowledge of the issues 
under investigation. In advance of such interviews, 
the company may want to ease their employees’ 
concerns about the process, typically by sending a 
letter informing said employees that they may be 
contacted or by personally speaking with them. All 
written materials shared with company employees 
regarding an investigation must be written with the 
knowledge that it also will likely be read by govern-
ment attorneys. The letter to these employees may 
include the following:
 1.  An overall description of the investigation
 2.  A general description of an employee’s rights 
about what they can do if an interview is 
requested
 3.  A statement that either the company or sepa-
rate counsel may assist the employee, usually 
at the employee’s option, in the initial stages 
of an investigation, and that the company will 
pay for the employee’s legal assistance
 4.  A recommendation that the employees ask for 
identification from any government agents 
asking for an interview and advising them to 
inquire about why he or she is being request-
ed for that interview
Additionally, the letter should include reminders 
that, first, the employees should be honest in re-
sponse to questions asked by a government investi-
gator and, second, that the employee has the right to 
take notes during his or her interview.
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How Interviews Are 
Recorded
Most investigative interviews conducted by govern-
ment agents are relatively informal, and, typically, 
no formal record of the interview is made, other 
than notes taken by a nonattorney government rep-
resentative. These notes and recollections form the 
basis for any false statement charge against an em-
ployee if the government determines that the em-
ployee had made false material statements during the 
interview. In some cases, however, the interview 
may be a more formal proceeding with a transcript 
made; certainly, all grand jury proceedings are re-
corded and transcribed. To the extent possible, an 
understanding about what type of recording will be 
done should be obtained for the employee by the 
company or counsel when it is trying to obtain the 
structure of the investigation.
Providing Documents: A 
Critical Process?
Only in rare situations will the government seize 
company documents and records under the author-
ity of a search warrant. Not infrequently, however, 
full compliance with a document production request 
emerges as an early issue because practical difficulties 
can occur in fully complying with a request.
In the vast majority of investigations, the gov-
ernment agency issues a subpoena requiring the 
company to provide documents relevant to their 
investigation. Almost immediately after receiving a 
subpoena, the company needs to implement a docu-
ment preservation and production plan and should 
quickly work with the regulatory agency to deter-
mine what documents are required to be turned 
over. It is critical to gain as complete an understand-
ing as possible from the regulator of what issues the 
investigation is centered around and whose docu-
ments the government agency wishes to review. It 
is equally important for the company to ensure that 
documents are being produced in the time frame 
requested by the investigative agency.
Electronic document production is increasingly 
becoming the principal part, and in some instances 
the entirety, of a company’s response to a govern-
ment subpoena. Due to the number of technologi-
cal issues regarding electronic document location, 
review, and production and the time required to 
manage these technical issues, the company must 
understand the scope of the electronic documents 
involved as soon as possible.
A number of considerations are important during 
this document production period. First, it is criti-
cal to determine what company documents may be 
responsive to the subpoena and establish their lo-
cation. Of those documents, the company should 
determine how many are electronically stored. Sec-
ond, company management should establish a useful 
document numbering and identification system, if 
such a system or an adequate litigation hold program 
is not in place. In those cases in which more than 
one regulatory agency is involved, the company 
will want to establish how documents are produced 
for all regulators. The scope of different regulatory 
agencies’ investigations may differ, and the docu-
ment organization and identification systems may 
vary accordingly. Third, someone will need to be 
responsible for overall maintenance of the hard copy 
master files that are being produced. Most impor-
tantly, the company should have the means to en-
sure that all employees comply with the subpoena 
and should consider using an independent law firm 
for obtaining and producing all documents request-
ed by the subpoena.
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Requirements
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed in re-
sponse to corporate scandals that severely damaged 
investor confidence in the United States. It is pri-
marily intended to protect investors by enhancing 
and improving the accuracy and reliability of cor-
porate disclosures made pursuant to the securities 
laws. Sarbanes-Oxley created new standards for 
corporate accountability and new penalties for acts 
of wrongdoing. It changed how the boards of com-
panies and their executives interact with each other 
and changed their interaction with their external 
auditors.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act specified new financial 
reporting responsibilities, including adherence to 
new internal controls and procedures designed to 
ensure the accuracy of companies’ financial records. 
One section in particular, Section 302, “Corporate 
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Responsibility for Financial Reports,” lays out 
specific requirements to address and report fraud, 
dealing primarily with the following assertions by 
management:
	 •		The	signing	officers	have	reviewed	the	report.
	 •		The	financial	report	does	not	contain	any	untrue	
statements of a material fact or omission to be 
considered misleading.
	 •		The	financial	statements	and	related	financial	
information fairly present in all material respects 
the financial condition and the results of opera-
tions of the issuer.
	 •		The	signing	officers	are	responsible	for	establish-
ing and maintaining internal control, have evalu-
ated the effectiveness of these controls within 90 
days prior to the report, and have reported on 
their conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
internal controls.
	 •		A	list	exists	of	all	deficiencies	in	the	design	
or operation of internal controls that could 
adversely affect the issuers’ ability to record, 
process, summarize, and report financial data 
and has identified material weaknesses in internal 
controls for the issuer’s external auditors.
	 •		The	company	acknowledges	any	material	or	
immaterial fraud that involves management or 
other employees who have a significant role in 
the issuer’s internal controls.
	 •		The	company	identifies	any	significant	changes	
in internal controls or related factors that could 
have a negative impact on the internal controls.
Parallel Investigations
Internal or Independent 
Investigation: A Key 
Decision
Determining the composition of the investigative 
team is a critical early decision. When the investiga-
tion is initiated, it is important to consider whether 
to use an internal group within the organization or 
an external group that may be perceived as more in-
dependent. We focus here on selecting the individu-
al or entity (external or internal) that will be primar-
ily responsible for conducting the investigation and 
marshaling the resources available to staff the effort. 
In determining who will lead the investigation, the 
company must consider two sometimes competing 
objectives: first, the need for a quick, thorough, and 
independent investigation and one that is internally 
perceived as such and, second, the need for a confi-
dential, effective, and efficient investigation.
Internal Group
If an internal investigation team is used to investigate 
the fraud, it is important for this team to understand 
that they represent the interests of the company and 
not the personal interests of any employee. If the in-
ternal team investigating the alleged fraud fails to ad-
equately represent the company’s interests, it could 
damage the credibility of the investigation and, in 
the end, cause more harm and risk to the company.
In reality, many complaints or allegations of 
wrongdoing that require an investigation can be 
handled internally, provided that the structure of 
the company allows the internal investigative team 
access to the necessary information needed to con-
duct a proper investigation. For example, in-house 
counsel may be a source of potential internal in-
vestigators; human resources professionals also often 
have the necessary skill set to conduct an internal in-
vestigation, given the proper support internally and 
the access to documents and company personnel. In 
some cases, a special committee of internal resources 
can be appointed as a team.
In the Grand Forge example, the special commit-
tee may consist of Jacob, Michele, and Judith, which 
are often the departments that get involved in the 
formation of this special committee. 
External Group
If a company is under investigation from an ex-
ternal regulatory body, they may decide to use an 
outside group to conduct the parallel investigation 
of the alleged fraud. In such a case, the company 
must decide which independent counsel or foren-
sic accountants should perform the investigation. 
Appointing an outside party to conduct an inves-
tigation has discrete advantages, including the per-
ception of objectivity and independence, as well as 
gaining specific expertise for the subject matter of 
the investigation. The skills, experience, and objec-
tive and independent approach that an external in-
vestigation team brings to the investigation can lead 
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to a more thorough approach; often, it can lead to 
a more effective investigation and clearer outcome. 
Potential external investigators can include foren-
sic accountants, legal counsel, private investigators, 
and police enforcement agencies. When reviewing 
how it should assemble the investigative team, the 
company needs to thoroughly assess what is at stake 
and who will be the most likely outside entities, in-
cluding not only the regulators and prosecutors but 
also shareholders and the media, to later assess how 
well management responded to the circumstances 
prompting the investigation.
Ultimately, several additional pragmatic factors 
should be considered, which are as follows:
	 •		First	is	the	desirability	of	using	counsel	to	lead	
the investigation by providing the investigative 
effort with confidentiality privileges ordinarily 
attending communications between attorney and 
client (that is, the attorney-client and attorney 
“work-product” privileges) in an effort to dis-
cover facts in anticipation of litigation and ensure 
management’s ability to control the extent of 
later disclosures of its results
	 •		Second	is	the	need	to	maintain	the	integrity	of	
the investigation by insulating the effort from 
inappropriate influences of management and as-
suring actual independence
	 •		Third	is	the	importance	of	preserving	 
independence
	 •		Fourth	is	the	completely	reasonable	and	sensible	
desire to minimize the cost and disruption of an 
investigation to the fullest extent possible
In making a final determination of the investiga-
tive team, at least four separate staffing scenarios can 
be reviewed. These four alternatives are reviewed 
as follows:
Alternative One: Compliance, Internal Audit, or 
Human Resources Personnel
Companies often have highly experienced, well 
trained, and truly independent nonlegal profes-
sionals on staff that management will trust to 
conduct a thorough and independent inquiry. 
At certain times, particularly when dealing with 
relatively routine, “lower-exposure” cases of 
fraud, it is entirely appropriate for management 
to choose its own internal compliance, audit, or 
human resources staff to conduct an investiga-
tion. This team would then report its findings 
either to in-house counsel or directly to senior 
management or the board of directors.
 This approach has its limitations. For example, 
it should be avoided if there is a risk that the 
suspected fraud or controversy will significantly 
expand or if it may invite public or government 
scrutiny at a later time. The results of an internal 
investigation and interview notes generated dur-
ing its course may not be protected by privilege, 
creating the risk that at some future point the 
company may be compelled to disclose them in 
a government investigation or in private litiga-
tion. In the Grand Forge scenario, the company 
must avoid assigning personnel to the investiga-
tion who may have been involved in or contrib-
uted in some way to the relevant conduct, either 
through an affirmative act or inaction or over-
sight or supervision of the employees or conduct 
involved in the investigation. The personnel in-
volved in the conduct of the investigation should 
not have a reporting obligation to managers po-
tentially assigned to the investigation.
 Moreover, there will always be the perception 
or speculation by outsiders, no matter how ill-
founded, that an internal investigator is suscepti-
ble to influence by management; the investigator 
was directed, instructed, or supervised by persons 
involved in the underlying matter being investi-
gated; or the internal investigator was influenced 
not to make adverse findings for career-advance-
ment factors. This perception is particularly 
troublesome when the company anticipates that 
it will be important to later convince a prosecu-
tor that the company acted promptly and respon-
sibly to unearth evidence of internal misconduct 
in an effort to avoid, defer, or limit the scope 
of an otherwise enormously disruptive and costly 
government investigation. Most prosecutors are 
skeptical of the results of any purely internal in-
quiry, due to concerns about the lack of integrity 
and independence, and many are cynical toward 
the sincerity of management’s early pledges of 
full cooperation.
 It does bear noting, however, that this per-
ception on the part of prosecutors is frequently 
ill-directed. Management’s decision not to fully 
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disclose the particulars of any given internal in-
vestigation to the government, relying instead 
on attorney-client privilege to limit or shape its 
disclosures, is often prudent and fully justified by 
factors having nothing to do with a desire to hide 
information from the government. Limiting dis-
semination of the full results of an investigation 
to the government reduces the risk of a “waiver” 
of the privilege that could later result in required 
disclosures to persons outside the government 
who have an interest in using it adversely against 
the company (for example, to plaintiff’s counsel 
in class-action shareholder litigation). It also can 
strengthen the company’s ability to report the 
results internally in a completely candid manner, 
in order to foster self-criticism and an open dia-
logue regarding the crafting of effective remedial 
measures and controls. Nonetheless, perception 
is often reality in the eye of the beholder, and 
management must be mindful of the suspicions 
that abound among agents and prosecutors re-
garding management’s motives when launching 
an internal investigation that is staffed entirely by 
corporate employees.
Alternative Two: In-House Counsel
Precisely because of the concerns of impartiality, 
independence, and influence previously cited, 
tasking in-house counsel with lead responsibil-
ity for an internal investigation is commonly not 
advisable in anything other than routine settings. 
In-house counsel may suffer many of the per-
ceived (or actual) limitations burdening the com-
pliance officer or internal auditor. These include 
a lack of true independence and their potential 
involvement directly or indirectly in the events 
leading to the controversy, including their hav-
ing given or not given internal advice regarding 
the matters at issue before they became the sub-
ject of the investigation. They also include the 
conception of the general counsel’s self interest 
in not being critical of senior management.
 Importantly, the privileged nature of the in-
quiry, which is one of the main benefits of using 
counsel to conduct the investigation, may be only 
illusory in this context because in-house counsel 
often serves management as business advisors, 
separately and apart from providing purely legal 
advice, and it may be difficult to later turn back 
a challenge to the company’s invocation of privi-
lege to shield the results of the investigation dur-
ing civil litigation. With the increasing frequency 
of global investigations in which a company’s or 
employee’s conduct could impact operations in 
multiple countries, the laws of privilege of all 
relevant countries also must be considered. Most 
European countries, for example, do not recog-
nize attorney-client privileges for in-house coun-
sel. Nevertheless, assuming that in-house counsel 
does not take the lead in the matter, there can be, 
as addressed subsequently, significant benefits to 
using in-house counsel as prominent members of 
the investigative team.
Alternative Three: Outside Counsel
In today’s highly charged regulatory and litiga-
tion environment in which perception is often 
all-important, management frequently resorts to 
outside counsel to lead an internal investigation 
about any material controversy, whether or not 
litigation is expected.
 The advantages of using outside counsel are 
numerous and most are obvious. Some of the ad-
vantages are as follows:
•		Retained	 counsel	 often	 brings	 a	 greater	
sense of objectivity to its task. The advan-
tage of being an outsider means the attorney 
can recognize and balance the needs of all 
corporate constituents, from regulators and 
shareholders to management and employ-
ees, rather than being conscious of reporting 
lines and internal chains of command.
•		At	the	same	time,	the	outside	attorney	can	
focus on the “end game” (that is, the civil 
litigation that might result or later regula-
tory or law enforcement consequences).
•		Findings	 and	 recommendations,	 often	
viewed as coming from a fresh and unbiased 
view of the facts, can carry more author-
ity internally among management and the 
board.
•		Frequently,	too,	outside	counsel	is	in	a	po-
sition to mobilize quicker, bring greater 
resources, and undertake the assignment 
without day-to-day operational demands 
that often impede in-house legal staff.
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 Management electing to use outside counsel 
to conduct the investigation has other benefits. 
Importantly, the use of outside counsel provides 
the greatest assurance that management will 
retain maximum flexibility in terms of its later 
decisions about disclosing the investigation’s re-
sults to the government, shareholders, and oth-
ers. Lower- or mid-level employees who know 
critical facts may be more willing to divulge these 
facts to an outsider than to an internal investiga-
tor for fear (well founded or not) that they might 
be viewed by management as disloyal long af-
ter the investigation is concluded. Using outside 
counsel provides a greater perceived assurance to 
shareholders that the company is acting respon-
sibly and that the circumstances leading to the 
investigation will be discovered, disclosed, and 
addressed. Outside counsel also may be in a bet-
ter position to provide expert legal advice about 
potential violations of law or potential liability, 
especially if those matters pertain to an area re-
quiring highly specialized legal assistance.
 Most importantly, as alluded to previously, 
prosecutors, agents, and regulators are typically 
skeptical about the results of purely internal ef-
forts. Outside counsel can provide a greater 
demonstration of objectivity, particularly if the 
investigation by the outside law firm is being 
conducted by a team including one or more for-
mer DOJ attorneys, which is not uncommon. 
Former DOJ attorneys are presumed by the 
agency to be experienced in the investigation of 
complex financial and commercial criminal mat-
ters, knowledgeable about the decision-making 
processes of prosecutors and regulators, and ca-
pable of communicating effectively and clearly 
with law enforcement. Such former prosecutors 
or enforcement counsel, often with years of ex-
perience in investigating matters in a grand jury 
setting and in preparing for criminal trials, can 
bring a unique skill set to an investigation. Their 
training often further enables them to effectively 
plan and “sequence” interviews, assess evidence 
in a way similar to his or her counterpart in ac-
tive government service, and be watchful for 
efforts by witnesses to conceal documents and 
other evidence or affirmatively mislead. They 
can be particularly adept at questioning witnesses 
who find themselves in a position in which their 
conduct may be at issue or could be questioned 
and who, therefore, suffer conflicting interests.
 In addition, the government investigator or 
prosecutor heading the criminal investigation or 
regulatory inquiry is much more likely to presume 
that outside counsel experienced in conducting 
investigations, whether former prosecutors or 
regulators, will avoid investigative missteps that 
might later be seen as influencing the substan-
tive accounts given by witnesses. Management 
needs to be careful to choose counsel who will 
not only maintain the integrity of the investiga-
tion but will be viewed by the government as 
being above reproach.
 In-house counsel are, of course, intimately 
familiar with the company, its culture, and per-
sonalities; they are known to management and 
employees and are seen as less of a threat. As a 
result, in-house counsel can play an important 
support role as a liaison, leading efforts to gather 
hard copy and electronic documents, conduct 
preliminary interviews, brief outside counsel, 
and so on in a far less disruptive (and less costly) 
manner than if these tasks were all assigned to 
outside counsel. Also, in some limited circum-
stances, structuring a hybrid approach in which 
an investigation is conducted by the in-house 
staff, who are supervised by outside counsel, may 
be appropriate.
Alternative Four: Special Investigative Counsel
At certain times, controversies arise that are of 
such sensitivity and magnitude that the board 
will be convinced, for the sake of complete in-
dependence and the appearance of the same, to 
find and retain outside counsel who have never 
previously represented the company and who 
can serve on a one-time basis as “special counsel” 
tasked with conducting a top-to-bottom investi-
gation. Such outside investigative counsel work 
under the supervision of the board of directors’ 
audit committee or a special board committee 
responsible for the investigation and frequently 
engage forensic accountants to provide support. 
This is a particularly compelling alternative if 
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the company’s current principal outside firm is 
somehow involved in the matter under investi-
gation, even if only peripherally. Occasionally, 
too, it makes sense in cases that dictate particu-
larly specialized legal expertise.
For additional information about working with 
counsel during an investigation, see chapters 6 
(“Roles and Responsibilities: How Different Stake-
holders Work During Investigations”) and 10 
(“Working with Attorneys: The Relationship With 
Counsel”).
Securing Information
Protecting and producing evidence is critical in any 
investigation, and the investigator must secure all 
pertinent physical evidence and documents. Coun-
sel experienced in conducting investigations will 
have an inventory of items to be gathered (usually 
including e-mails, informal notes, calendars, expense 
reports, toll records, and other electronic records), 
and management should provide the support neces-
sary to ensure that the task is accomplished fully and 
expeditiously. The company’s normal document re-
tention policy should be suspended along with the 
regular practice of recycling back-up tapes.
Once discovered, and assuming his or her intent 
to conceal, the destruction of records or data by a 
manager often assures his or her indictment. In-
dividuals who might be viewed as subjects of the 
investigation should not be asked to gather docu-
ments; rather, uninvolved personnel should be en-
listed. Document destruction can have disastrous 
results for the company as well. In more extreme 
cases, in which spoliation of evidence is possible, in-
ternal audit or compliance staff may be enlisted to 
secure documents, and IT professionals may be used 
to obtain electronic records and secure computer as-
sets for review. Chapter 7, “Sources of Evidence,” 
covers how to secure evidence in greater detail.
Document Preservation: 
Policy and Practice
The process of securing books, records, data, and 
other materials for an investigation can be disrup-
tive, and in many circumstances, it can have adverse 
effects on morale. Moreover, employees are often 
quick to judge that an investigation means some 
wrongdoing has occurred, which is not necessarily 
the case.
In these cases, the disruption and demoralization 
can be lessened if the company issues a memoran-
dum that outlines the importance of preserving 
documents. The communication should point out 
that, even if no wrongdoing is discovered, having 
preserved documents helps the company to later 
convince the government and public of the integ-
rity of the investigative process. In choosing to send 
such a notice, management should consult with 
counsel to ensure that the memorandum, or oth-
er internal communications to affected employees, 
does not have the opposite and inadvertent effect 
of encouraging destruction of documents and other 
evidence.
Another way to ensure the preservation of infor-
mation and documentation that may later be relevant 
to an investigation is to have an effective, systematic 
process and formal policy for document retention 
and records management. The goal of such a policy 
is to achieve the following:
	 •		Retain	important	documents	for	future	use	and	
reference.
	 •		Delete	documents	that	are	no	longer	necessary	
for the proper functioning of a company.
	 •		Organize	important	documents	for	efficient	
retrieval.
	 •		Ensure	that	all	employees	are	aware	of	the	docu-
ment retention policy and that, as a result of 
this understanding, each employee should know 
what documents should be retained, the length 
of their retention, their means of storage, and 
when and how they should be destroyed.
State and federal laws require companies to main-
tain certain types of records for particular periods. 
Failure to properly maintain the correct records for 
the correct amount of time could subject the com-
pany to penalties, fines, and obstruction of justice 
charges and have a negative effect on a company’s 
position in a litigation matter. Chapter 7, “Sources 
of Evidence,” covers how to preserve evidence in 
greater detail.
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Protecting Attorney-Client 
Privilege
Everyone preparing documents during the inves-
tigation should assume that anything prepared can 
and will be used in subsequent legal proceedings. 
Whether legal counsel are asked to conduct the 
investigation themselves or instead are retained to 
advise those company employees who conduct it, 
the attorney-client privilege must be maintained in 
connection with documents produced for investiga-
tors or generated by them.
Government seizure of computers, servers, and 
hard copy files inevitably prompts questions about 
the agents’ sensitivity toward the privileged nature 
of legally protected and highly confidential files, 
such as those containing communications between 
clients and their attorneys. Generally, a document 
is privileged and protected from disclosure (and sei-
zure) if it constitutes or reflects any communication 
between the company and its lawyers that is intend-
ed to have been confidential and was made for the 
direct or indirect purpose of obtaining legal advice 
or assistance. Even records showing the transmittal 
of documents to lawyers may fall within the scope 
of the privilege. Of course, privilege can be waived; 
importantly, also, it does not extend to communica-
tions with counsel that have been shared with third 
parties.
From the perspective of the forensic accountant, 
investigator, or executive responsible for an inves-
tigation, it is important to recognize that financial 
records and mere “transactional documents” pre-
pared by counsel are ordinarily not covered by the 
privilege. Records reflecting the payment of fees to 
counsel, for example, are not necessarily privileged; 
however, although attorney billing statements may 
reflect on their face the activities of your attorneys 
on your behalf, the detail on activities represented 
in the underlying records may be protected from 
disclosure, either as attorney-client privileged com-
munications or on the strength of the attorney work 
product doctrine.
Under that doctrine, government investigators 
are typically not entitled to obtain so-called “work 
product” materials (that is, materials generated or 
prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation 
or that reflect an attorney’s independent thought 
process, counsel’s legal analysis, and the efforts of 
counsel in anticipation of litigation). Because coun-
sel frequently task a corporate client’s employees 
with gathering records and documents for attorneys’ 
further review, those instructions and compilations 
also may be protected from disclosure, insofar as 
they effectively constitute the work product of the 
attorney (on a principal-agent theory) or are reflec-
tive of the attorney’s mental impressions.
Both the attorney-client and work product privi-
leges must be stringently guarded so they are not 
inadvertently waived. Protecting these privileges 
is even more important when the company has 
already commenced its own internal investigation 
about matters likely within the scope of the search 
warrant. The proliferation of e-mail communica-
tion between counsel and client virtually assures that 
company e-mail servers contain confidential work 
product and other privileged material. As a result, 
if company electronic records are seized by gov-
ernment investigators and some of the information 
seized is thought by the company or its attorneys 
to be privileged, it is important that the existence 
of privileged materials is immediately disclosed to 
the investigating agents, that those communications 
with the agents are promptly documented, and that 
the company catalogues for counsel the types of 
privileged documents that were likely seized so that 
appropriate relief can be obtained, if necessary.
Distinguishing between privileged and non-
privileged information in legal files demands some 
thought. When agents engaged in a search believe 
themselves authorized to seize nonprivileged mate-
rials in the company’s legal files, a separate team is 
sometimes assembled to determine what materials 
are nonprivileged and therefore subject to seizure. 
In such cases, the agents will have been instructed 
to cursorily review only the headings of file folders 
or the captions of documents to ascertain wheth-
er those files are likely to contain privileged (and 
relevant) material. If this review occurs on the com-
pany’s premises during the execution of a search 
warrant, it is important that these activities be 
closely monitored. Typically, in such circumstances, 
the agents involved permit counsel or senior man-
agement to be present to observe their conduct 
and the procedures employed by them to prevent 
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inadvertent seizure of privileged materials and to 
protect against later claims that there was wholesale 
rummaging through legal files.
Obviously, if an internal investigation has already 
begun and interview memoranda and the like ex-
ists in the files, effort should be made to urge the 
agents to simply set those files aside (that is, not even 
review the documents for privilege) pending a ne-
gotiated review process agreed to by the prosecuting 
attorney and your counsel.
Protecting Proprietary Data
As a general proposition, U.S. courts are far less 
protective of proprietary data than they are toward 
protecting attorney-client privilege and confidential 
communications. The courts also are familiar with 
fashioning protective orders to prevent the further 
dissemination of proprietary information; these sorts 
of orders are granted daily in civil cases, and if the 
company subject to a search believes that its files or 
subfiles contain highly proprietary data, it should in-
form the government’s investigating agents and their 
counsel. The government might not be required to 
return such data, but upon appropriate application 
by counsel, it can be prevented from sharing the 
data with competitors and witnesses.
Encouraging Employee 
Cooperation
Needless to say, employees are frequently upset by 
a search and investigation and seek assurances from 
company management about what the search might 
mean to them. However, it is not advisable to dis-
cuss the search, investigation, or any presumed im-
plications with individual employees or groups of 
employees while the search is being conducted. Fol-
lowing an encounter as stressful as the intrusion of 
law enforcement officers into their place of work, 
employees will likely not accurately remember what 
a manager has told them or may misconstrue the 
manager’s words.
Correspondingly, however difficult it may be to 
avoid such discussions, the recommended course 
is to inform the employees that the company has 
pledged its full cooperation to the investigation. The 
company may decide to hold a meeting with the 
employees in the days after the search to discuss it. 
As difficult as it may be, company personnel should 
resist any inclination to talk substantively about the 
circumstances underlying the investigation or de-
clare the company’s innocence. Management should 
allow the situation to defuse, addressing employees 
only after having had time for reflection and coun-
sel. The company’s legal counsel can advise manage-
ment precisely about what can and should be said to 
employees after the search. In most situations, days 
will have passed, allowing time for a script to be 
prepared.
Providing Legal Counsel to 
Employees
Conflicts occur frequently during internal investiga-
tions. An employee under investigation for sexual 
harassment, for example, may be subject to discipline 
by the company; the company, on the other hand, 
needs to protect itself from possible government in-
vestigation and private litigation. In such a case, the 
company’s and the individual’s interests obviously 
conflict. In many instances, therefore, the attorneys 
or law firm advising the company cannot represent 
both the company and the individual employees of 
the company during an investigation. Even in cir-
cumstances in which representing both parties is 
technically permissible, it may not be advisable. This 
applies equally to in-house and external counsel.
In circumstances in which a company is under 
investigation (such as investigations of accounting 
or customer fraud), the company and the individ-
ual employee appear to have a common interest—
avoiding company liability. However, the employ-
ee’s interests may diverge from the company’s if that 
employee has or may have information that could 
create liability for the company. If made aware of 
an actual conflict of interest, a court would not al-
low an attorney to represent both parties; often, the 
court requires the attorney to withdraw from repre-
senting either party. Also, government investigators 
are inherently skeptical about one attorney or law 
firm representing both the company and individual 
employees.
In almost all circumstances, the same attorneys 
cannot represent both the company and individual 
employees because of legal reasons and the need 
to maintain the appearance of independence and 
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uphold that independence in fact. As a result, in 
communications with employees, a company should 
inform employees that its attorneys represent the 
company, not the employees. Typically, this is most 
important in prefatory conversations before inter-
views of employees because the company will want 
to mitigate against future claims by an employee 
that company attorneys led him or her to believe 
that the attorneys represented the employee. Such a 
claim, if upheld, could prevent the use or disclosure 
of information that the employee provides during 
an interview.
Although informing employees about this policy 
is necessary, its communication need not be forceful, 
aggressive, or alarming in tone or substance; a sim-
ple statement that the company’s attorney represents 
only the company for the purposes of the investiga-
tion is sufficient. Moreover, in some cases, the com-
pany may want to pay for separate legal counsel for 
one or more employees; under many state laws and 
employment agreements, companies are required to 
pay for employees’ separate legal counsel. Of course, 
companies are not required to pay legal fees for em-
ployees who have violated a law that subjects the 
company to liability, and many state laws prohibit 
a public corporation from paying legal fees of an 
employee or officer who has been convicted of a 
felony. Until a conclusion has been reached that an 
employee has violated a law, however, the company 
should usually pay his or her attorneys fees and seek 
reimbursement if the employee is found to have 
violated the law.
Notwithstanding the preference—if not the re-
quirement—for independent counsel, a company’s 
attorneys often work closely with employees’ at-
torneys. A common strategy of sharing informa-
tion obtained during the company’s investigation, 
and in the employee’s separate interviews by his or 
her attorney, is frequently the best defense to a gov-
ernment investigation or civil litigation. Concomi-
tantly, attorneys for the company and its employees 
may form a “joint defense agreement” to document 
their common interests and specify the conditions 
under which information will be shared. If the com-
pany and its employees have a common interest, 
the attorney-client and the work product privi-
leges will extend to the separate attorneys’ shared 
communications.
Planning for Public 
Statements
Imagine television cameras showing footage of gov-
ernment agents carting off box after box of a compa-
ny’s records, along with hard drives, laptops, work 
stations, and servers. Any executive faced with such 
a picture would feel the urge to defend themselves 
and his or her company immediately and publicly.
The executive should refrain from reacting quick-
ly, consult with counsel, and urge the company to 
express its intent to fully cooperate with law en-
forcement and defer comment about the expected 
progress and outcome of the investigation. When the 
facts precipitating an investigation become known, 
management has an important role in managing the 
flow of information, both internally and externally. 
They should be prepared for the alleged fraud or 
its investigation becoming public and recognize that 
negative publicity about a suspected fraud or inves-
tigation of wrongdoing could trigger shareholder 
lawsuits. In such circumstances, it is advisable to 
retain a public relations firm that specializes in so-
called “crisis communications.” At the same time, 
the company should designate one spokesperson to 
respond to media requests and coverage.
External audiences are not the only concern. Pre-
mature disclosure of a controversy or investigation 
can trigger rumors and have disruptive effects, in-
cluding the possibility that employees might tam-
per with or destroy evidence. This strongly suggests 
that, if the particulars of the matter are not gener-
ally known, information regarding the investigation 
be disseminated internally on a strict need-to-know 
basis. Legal counsel responsible for the investiga-
tion need the opportunity to quietly gather infor-
mation and conduct preliminary interviews with-
out un-due distraction. Further, because securing 
physical evidence is of critical importance, counsel 
should be given the full opportunity to do so before 
disclosure.
If internal disclosures are premature (that is, issued 
before management has been able to obtain a clear 
understanding about the magnitude of the contro-
versy or issue), then the rumors can invite media 
inquiries, further spur the interest of regulators or 
law enforcement, and even prompt litigation. At 
some point, if for no reason other than to avoid 
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speculation and rumor, management may deem it 
advisable to make a brief statement to employees, 
announce the commencement of an internal inves-
tigation, and express management’s commitment to 
a prompt and thorough review and resolution. For 
obvious reasons, that statement should be crafted 
and delivered only upon consultation with counsel. 
Typically, no public statement regarding the results 
of the investigation should be disseminated until the 
investigation is complete.
Once a company sees the facts of an investiga-
tion made public, its initial reaction to anticipate 
and manage media inquiries is often to craft a state-
ment that suggests how the company will manage 
and minimize the expected impact of the search and 
investigation of the company’s business. At times, 
such statements are appropriate, but it is advisable 
to consult with legal counsel first. Frequently, the 
company will have little idea regarding the precise 
scope and direction of the investigation, and often, 
the less said the better.
Restatements: Managing the 
Process
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco. The list of multibillion 
dollar frauds over the past 10 years is a long one. In 
most of these cases, companies have made restate-
ments of their financial statements. If a restatement 
of previously issued financial statements is necessary, 
the company should consider the following as it tries 
to get through this costly endeavor:
	 •		Communicate	with	the	media,	analysts,	and	
other relevant members of the public that there 
will be a restatement.
	 •		Provide	information	through	disclosure	or	
other means to explain why the restatement is 
necessary without disclosing the findings of the 
investigation.
	 •		Determine	if	any	existing	members	of	manage-
ment were involved in the accounting decisions 
that led to the financial restatement and whether 
any action should be taken.
	 •		Consider	Section	304	of	the	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act	
of 2002, which discusses forfeiture of CEO and 
CFO bonuses and profits.5
For more information regarding financial statement 
restatements, please review chapter 3, “Financial 
Statement Restatements: Protocols and Process.”
Disciplinary Action
After any discovery of fraud or financial wrongdoing, 
some action must be taken to recover from the dam-
age, revisit the control environment, and set a tone 
for the future. Disciplinary action is a necessity in 
such circumstances, especially because the employ-
ees should know the consequences of breaching the 
fundamental code of conduct at the company. That 
code, along with any other documents and policies 
in place, such as an ethics policy or fraud prevention 
policy, help establish the tone and culture in an or-
ganization. They also must be enforced; a company 
with a weak tone or culture that does not follow the 
code of conduct and other documents that spell out 
the disciplinary action in an organization can create 
an environment susceptible to management over-
ride, financial misstatement, and fraud.
In developing its disciplinary approach, the orga-
nization should consider all of the following:
 •		Executive	management	develops	a	clear	and	ex-
plicit message related to fraud and the organiza-
tion’s tolerance to such actions.
	 •		The	organization	maintains	a	strong	control	
environment.
	 •		The	organization	explicitly	discusses	expectations	
related to fraud and acceptable behavior.
	 •		The	organization	encourages	reporting	of	un-
usual or fraudulent activities.
	 •		The	organization	maintains	formal	programs	to	
broadly and frequently communicate the code of 
conduct and other related documents that depict 
the disciplinary action of the company.
	 •		The	organization	conducts	formal	training	on	
fraud awareness and ensures that employees read 
and understand the code of conduct and other 
disciplinary items.
	 •		Executive	management	and	the	audit	committee	
take swift and decisive actions to address fraud, 
as well as appropriately communicate the lessons 
learned.
	 •		Disciplinary	actions	are	clearly	communicated	
and consistently applied.
5	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act	of	2002,	Section	304.	Available	at	www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf,	p.	34.
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Additional discussion of post fraud investigation 
activities can be found in chapter 14, “Antifraud 
Programs.”
Conclusion
As Jacob found out as a result of the investigation 
performed at Grand Forge, there are multiple factors 
to consider when faced with the issue of investi-
gating a potential allegation of wrongdoing. A po-
tential or actual criminal investigation or regulatory 
proceeding, receipt of a grand jury or administrative 
subpoena, a search warrant, document preservation 
issues, attorney-client privilege, and possible restate-
ments are the most frequently recurring investiga-
tive scenarios. They are also the types of adverse 
circumstances companies always hope to avoid, and 
they require effective management responses and 
often difficult judgments. Faced with any or all of 
these, management is well advised to promptly enlist 
the assistance of a legal team that includes not only 
experienced counsel but also a forensic accountant 
with experience in investigating “white-collar” 
fraud, the defense of such investigations, and corpo-
rate compliance. The adverse appearances that can 
flow from management missteps are often hard to 
shake and they can significantly and negatively af-
fect the outcome of an investigation or enforcement 
action. Not only can these professionals guide the 
company through the investigation, they also can 
help the company avoid errors that affect the per-
ceptions that government officials form about the 
company or its individual managers.
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Introduction
As discussed in earlier chapters of this book, mat-
ters involving fraud often require forensic account-
ing services.1 Forensic accountants provide litigation 
services, usually only acting as consultants to an at-
torney or expert witness. Fraud investigation is one 
of the many services considered litigation services. 
A forensic accountant is often retained to perform 
a wide range of consulting services, including litiga-
tion services.
After the investigation has been performed and 
data has been gathered, the forensic accountant may 
prepare a written report of his or her findings under 
the direction of in-house counsel or external coun-
sel. The objective of the report often is to present 
the findings and observations to the client or oppos-
ing party in a litigation matter.
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 states 
that all fraud findings should be reported to the cli-
ent’s audit committee. The report will usually pro-
vide a description of the work performed; interviews 
conducted; exhibits, data, and other documentation 
supporting the findings; and observations.
The accounting firm should ensure that the find-
ings and observations detailed in the report follow 
the professional standards listed by the AICPA.2 The 
professional standards used to provide the services, as 
well as the standards and guidelines followed to issue 
a report, are determined by the specific objectives 
set forth by the client.3 For example, in the Grand 
Forge Company4 case study, as in most fraud in-
vestigations, the client is seeking recommendations 
or advice about a certain matter involving fraud or 
allegations of fraud.
This chapter provides an overview of the vari-
ous reporting standards that apply when an account-
ing firm is hired in a litigation services engagement. 
The chapter will further discuss in detail the types of 
standards that apply when issuing a report for a fraud 
investigation. The first part of this chapter discusses 
the standards used when issuing reports on fraud en-
gagements and the circumstances under which these 
standards are applied. The second part of this chap-
ter discusses in detail the various guidelines related 
to the preparation and distribution of such reports.
Reporting Standards
One form of communication between the account-
ing firm and the client is a written report. The prac-
titioner from the accounting firm should be careful 
in his or her wording to avoid giving the impression 
that the report follows additional standards when it 
does not. For instance, words such as assure, review, 
ensure, and assurance could be associated with audit-
ing standards and should be avoided when issuing 
a written report based on consulting standards pro-
vided to the client.
Statements on Standards for Consulting Services 
(SSCSs) are issued by the AICPA Management Con-
sulting Services Executive Committee. This com-
mittee issues pronouncements in connection with 
consulting services. Consulting services provided to 
clients have broadened from just accounting-related 
matters to a range of services over various industries 
and practices, including tax services. For fraud in-
vestigations, specifically in the context of litigation, 
the SSCSs require the results of the investigation 
be communicated to the client. The SSCSs do not 
specify what form of communication; this decision 
is determined by the arrangement made between 
the client and its practitioner.
The client may request the practitioner perform 
procedures that are not categorized into one of the 
specific standards. The prescribed forms may require 
the accounting firm to report findings based on 
1		According	to	the	AICPA	Forensic	and	Valuation	Services	Practice	Aid	07-1,	Forensic Accounting & Fraud Investigations,	no	specific	standard	terminol-
ogy	is	used	to	name	the	accountant’s	litigation	services	assignment	when	fraud	is	suspected	or	alleged.	Many	terms	are	used	interchangeably,	including	
forensic	or	fraud	audit,	examination,	investigation,	or	accounting.
2		Statements	on	Standards	for	Consulting	Services	issued	by	the	AICPA.
3		Paragraph	.03	of	ET	section	92,	Definitions	(AICPA,	Professional Standards,	vol.	2),	defines	the	client	as	“any	person	or	entity,	other	than	the	member’s	
employer,	that	engages	a	member	or	a	member’s	firm	to	perform	professional	services	or	a	person	or	entity	with	respect	to	which	professional	services	
are	performed.”
4		The	reader	is	invited	to	read	the	detailed	case	study	of	Grand	Forge	Company	found	in	the	Introduction	to	this	book.
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limited procedures applied to certain assertions. Un-
der these circumstances, the rules and guidelines of 
a regulatory body or third-party user (for example, 
federal rules governing discovery) for which the re-
porting is intended may indicate to the practitioner 
the nature and extent of tests and other procedures 
required. In such circumstance, the procedures and 
guidelines set forth are effectively the agreed-upon 
procedures that will be the framework for the in-
vestigation. In an agreed-upon procedures engage-
ment, the practitioner does not provide an opinion 
or negative assurance. Instead, the agreed-upon 
procedures report is in the form of procedures and 
findings. Because each party has a specific role in 
agreeing upon the procedures performed or to be 
performed, the use of the report is restricted to those 
specified parties.
The application of professional standards in an en-
gagement that requires litigation services requires a 
deep understanding of the client’s specific needs. In 
order to select the most applicable professional stan-
dard, the client and the accounting firm can use the 
decision tree in appendix A to determine the profes-
sional standards that apply.
Guidelines for the 
Preparation of the 
Report
Work Product and Report 
Formats
Communication with the client, attorney, and tri-
er-of-fact about the results from work and events 
may take many forms. Generally, the practitioner 
would issue a written report to communicate the 
fraud investigation’s results and findings. Although 
no standard proscribed formats are required, one 
should consider including certain basic elements in 
the written reports. In certain circumstances, the cli-
ent may require the written report to be prepared 
in accordance with Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (Federal Rule 26) because the prac-
titioner is serving as a testifying expert witness and 
is required to issue a written report to be submitted 
to the court. If that is the case, specific defined ele-
ments must be included in a Federal Rule 26 report. 
Federal Rule 26 reports will be discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter and are also discussed in 
Chapter 10, “Working With Attorneys: The Rela-
tionship With Counsel.”
General Written Report 
Format
The nature and format of reports in fraud investi-
gations vary widely from case to case. This gener-
ally depends on the nature of the case, the counsel’s 
recommendations, the practitioner’s personal pref-
erence, and the needs of the client. As a result, no 
standard reporting format is appropriate for all fraud 
investigations. It is recommended that certain perti-
nent facts be considered for inclusion in the written 
reports. The minimum elements for written reports, 
such as a report to document the findings from a 
fraud investigation, should include the background, 
scope and objectives, findings and recommenda-
tions, restriction on the use of the report, date, and 
signature. Additional language may be used for spe-
cific circumstances that arise from the investigation.
Background
The background section provides a brief description 
of the engagement and, if necessary, a discussion 
about the client and the parties involved. The back-
ground forms the basis for the scope of the engage-
ment and provides the reader the context on the 
subject matter to be covered in the body of the re-
port. In our case study, Perusi & Bilanz LLP would 
provide a summary describing the pertinent parties, 
the current accounting procedures in the Shanghai 
office, and the allegations of wrongdoing.
Scope and Objectives
A section summarizing the scope and objectives of 
the work performed and any exclusion is an essen-
tial part of the accounting firm’s report. The related 
activities not covered in the scope are described, if 
necessary, to clarify and delineate the boundaries of 
the investigation. The nature and extent of work 
performed also are described in this section. Alter-
natively, the accounting firm may reference the en-
gagement letter (indicating the date of that letter) 
when a description of the scope of the engagement 
is included. When appropriate, the language spec-
ifying that the work product and report does not 
constitute an audit or review, in accordance with 
any generally accepted auditing or review standards, 
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should be included in this section. An example of 
such language may be as follows:
Unless otherwise noted, the information in this 
report is based on assertions made by individuals 
or contained in documents provided to Perusi & 
Bilanz LLP and has not been tested for verac-
ity and accuracy. The procedures that Perusi &  
Bilanz LLP performed were advisory in nature 
and do not constitute an audit or other attest ser-
vice, as defined by the AICPA. Further, they do 
not constitute an audit of Grand Forge Compa-
ny’s historical financial statements in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards, nor 
do they constitute an examination of prospec-
tive financial statements or an examination or 
review of a compliance program in accordance 
with standards established by the AICPA. The 
procedures were necessarily limited in scope and 
cannot be relied upon to detect fraud or other 
illegal acts.
This preceding statement is necessary to ensure 
that the reader understands that the work was per-
formed in accordance with consulting standards and 
did not include an audit or review of the data noted 
in the report. This also assists to clarify that the con-
sulting work does not offer any type of assurances 
on the financial data used in the written report or 
examined as part of the engagement.
In certain agreed-upon procedures engagements, 
the report should provide a detailed description of 
any agreed-upon materiality limits used during the 
engagement. Although engagements performed un-
der agreed-upon procedures generally follow con-
sulting standards, the guidelines are eventually set 
forth by discussions between the client and the prac-
titioner. As a result, it is essential to include a list of 
the procedures performed and related findings.
In our case study, Perusi & Bilanz LLP would 
describe what they were engaged to do as agreed 
upon in their engagement letter with Grand Forge 
Company. Perusi & Bilanz LLP also would include 
a list of general procedures that were performed as 
part of their investigation (for example, obtained an 
understanding of Grand Forge Company’s Shanghai 
office organization and accounting procedures, in-
terviewed selected Grand Forge Company person-
nel, reviewed certain accounting transactions, and so 
on). This list of procedures should follow language 
stating that the procedures were performed under 
the direction of counsel, such as “At the direction 
of Grand Forge Company’s Office of the General 
Counsel, Perusi & Bilanz LLP performed the fol-
lowing procedures as part of its investigation.”
Findings and Recommendations
The results of the work also should be disclosed in 
the report. Issues or findings are pertinent statements 
of fact that outline significant items identified and 
documented throughout the engagement. The re-
port should list issues in order of significance or risk 
to the client. Less significant or lower-risk issues may 
be communicated orally or through informal means 
of communication when agreed to by the client. It 
may be appropriate to include information about 
positive aspects of the client’s business (for example, 
improvements since the last engagement) to fairly 
represent the existing issues and provide perspective 
and balance to the report. If applicable, based on 
the scope and objective of the engagement, general 
or specific recommendations are provided describ-
ing suggestions for action to correct existing condi-
tions or improve operations. For example, in some 
circumstances, it may be desirable to recommend a 
general course of action and specific suggestions for 
implementing the recommended course of action. 
In other circumstances, it may be appropriate only 
to suggest further investigation or study. At times, 
the recommendations may be developed with the 
client.
In our case study, Perusi & Bilanz LLP would 
document its findings related to the allegations and 
quantify the accounting errors related to the abu-
sive practices by Grand Forge Company’s employ-
ees in its Shanghai operations. Prior to finalizing its 
documentation of the findings in the report, Perusi 
& Bilanz LLP shared its tentative findings with se-
lect Grand Forge Company senior management to 
confirm their understanding and quantification of 
the accounting errors. Grand Forge Company se-
nior management pointed out that although two of 
the allowances for bad debt accounts were high, the 
amounts were reasonable and not part of the abusive 
accounting practices by its employees like the other 
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accruals and allowance for bad debt accounts. Grand 
Forge Company senior management explained that, 
based on recent communications with these two 
clients, they do not expect to be paid in full. As a 
result, Perusi & Bilanz LLP adjusted their quantifi-
cation of accounting errors. The practitioner may 
not always be aware of certain nuances due to his 
or her lack familiarity with the client’s operations or 
certain communications with client personnel, and 
such a confirmation process with the client may ex-
plain certain irregularities.
Restriction on Use
Another section that should be included is the limi-
tation and restriction on the use of the practitioner’s 
report. The practitioner should advise the client that 
the report is not to be distributed to anyone out-
side the client, unless specified other users have been 
identified and the specified users have signed appli-
cable third-party access letters. Specific language 
should always be included to restrict the use of the 
practitioner’s report. Further details for this section 
can be found in the “Limiting the Use of Reports” 
section later in this chapter.
Date and Signature
Lastly, the report should be signed and dated. Gen-
erally, the report is dated the day it is signed and 
issued, which is different from the day the work was 
completed. For instance, the fieldwork for a fraud 
investigation may be completed on a certain date, 
but the accounting firm’s report may not be issued 
until a week later. It is typical that the written report 
would not be issued until several days subsequent to 
the conclusion of the fieldwork. The practitioner 
would typically need time to complete his or her 
analyses, summarize his or her findings and recom-
mendations, and draft the written report. The re-
port also would need to pass through several levels 
of quality reviews by managers and partners of the 
accounting firm before it is issued to the client.
The date the work was concluded should be clear-
ly specified in the body of the report. When man-
agement’s responses are included, the report may be 
dated on the day that all of management’s responses 
are received. When a signature is required on the 
report or cover letter, the practitioner is responsible 
for signing the report in the accounting firm’s name, 
unless applicable professional standards or local legal 
or regulatory requirements dictate otherwise.
Additional Language for Specific 
Circumstances
For specific circumstances, other language may be 
included in the written report. One situation when 
additional language would be advised is when the 
engagement involves working as part of, or jointly 
with, a client team, and the client issues the report 
in a manner that associates the firm with the report. 
The accounting firm should consider requesting the 
client include a clarification statement, such as the 
following, which pertains to the case study:
Perusi & Bilanz LLP assisted in a joint project, 
and the results of Grand Forge Company’s work 
are included in this report. However, this report 
is the responsibility of Grand Forge Company.
Another situation when additional language would 
be recommended is when a client requests the en-
gagement team include findings and recommenda-
tions from work prepared and reviewed only by cli-
ent personnel. In such a case, it would be advised 
that a clarification statement, such as the following, 
which pertains to the case study, be included:
These findings and recommendations, along 
with the underlying work, were performed and 
reviewed by Grand Forge Company personnel.
Federal Rule 26 Reports
According to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, those experts who are “retained 
or specially employed to provide expert testimony 
in the case or whose duties as an employee of the 
party regularly involve giving expert testimony” 
must provide expert reports to the other parties 
in the case. The practitioner may be engaged as a 
consultant, an expert witness, or both. Sometimes, 
the practitioner may begin an engagement only as 
a consultant and then later be designated as an ex-
pert witness. If a Federal Rule 26 report is required 
because the report will be submitted to a court as 
part of a litigation matter, certain elements must be 
included in the expert’s written report.
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Federal Rule 26 requires experts to prepare writ-
ten reports before delivering an opinion testimony at 
trial. The report must completely state the expert’s 
opinions and include any exhibits that exemplify 
or support them. The basis, as well as substance, of 
opinions and conclusions and the methodology fol-
lowed also should be in the report. Any other data 
and information that the expert considered must be 
included in the report, as well. In addition, details of 
the expert’s qualifications should be disclosed in the 
report, including a list of publications from the past 
10 years, a list of cases in which the expert testified 
during the past 4 years, and the compensation paid 
to the expert for his or her study and testimony. The 
Federal Rule 26 sections that the practitioner should 
include are as follows:
 a.  Table of contents
 b.  Executive summary
 c.  Introduction and background
 d.  Scope of the engagement that includes adopt-
ed assumptions or unaddressed issues, expla-
nation of major work steps, or tasks and roles 
of any other parties who participated in the 
engagement
 e.  References to source documents relied on to 
formulate the expert’s opinion
For additional discussion of Federal Rule 26 re- 
ports, review Chapter 10, “Working With Attor-
neys: The Relationship With Counsel.”
Written Work Product 
Other than a Report
If written work products other than the report are 
issued, the accounting firm should ensure that the 
information being provided to the client is informa-
tion that can be included in the final report. These 
results can be are summarized in a presentation and 
the findings also should be referenced in the full re-
port or work product that is ultimately provided to 
the client. The practitioner may be asked to provide 
any or all of the following:
 (1)  A review of the client’s procedures or con-
trol documentation
 (2)  Summary presentations
 (3)  Draft policies related to a business process
 (4)  Strategy documents instead of a report
The client also may request formal or informal 
interim progress reports throughout an engage-
ment. Interim progress reports, if the engagement 
letter included such provisions, also may be used to 
document potential scope changes. Interim progress 
reports and work products can be either written or 
presented orally. The reports are critical to com-
municate engagement issues. As a result, these in-
terim progress reports generally should be included 
to form part of the engagement documentation and 
should be maintained, subject to the policies regard-
ing retention of such reports agreed upon with the 
client.
Maintaining Confidentiality 
of Work Products
Rule 301, Confidential Client Information (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 301), of the 
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct refers to liti-
gation services and states that, “[a] member in pub-
lic practice shall not disclose any confidential client 
information without the specific consent of the cli-
ent.” The only situation in which this may not ap-
ply is when the accounting firm is ordered through 
a subpoena or court order to disclose confidential 
information. For certain engagements, information 
might be protected through protective orders. Pro-
tective orders can be as general as signing an agree-
ment to maintain confidentiality of information, but 
they also can be as specific as keeping information 
from a particular party.
In a fraud investigation, the practitioner should 
consider being retained by the client’s in-house or 
external counsel on behalf of the client. As an ex-
ample, in our case study, Grand Forge Company 
would not engage Perusi & Bilanz LLP directly. 
Instead, Grand Forge’s external counsel would re-
tain Perusi & Bilanz LLP on behalf of Grand Forge 
Company. The attorney-client privilege protects 
communication between a client and its attorney, 
thereby maintaining confidentiality. This privilege 
is available to both corporate clients and individu-
als and applies to communications between attor-
ney and client and vice versa. In the case of a fraud 
investigation requiring forensic accountants, the 
attorney-client privilege is then extended to the fo-
rensic accountants who are retained by the attorney 
on behalf of the client.
Privilege is maintained if all information gathering 
is performed at the direction of the client’s in-house 
or external counsel. In our case study, if Perusi & 
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Bilanz LLP was retained by Grand Forge Company’s 
external counsel, all information gathered by Perusi 
& Bilanz LLP in its investigation could be consid-
ered privileged and may not be readily available to 
the opposing side in the event of a subsequent civil 
lawsuit. However, if a criminal prosecution arises, 
access to the information may be granted, regardless 
of whether the material is marked “attorney-client 
privilege working paper.” For instance, if the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) issues a subpoena or sim-
ply a request to the corporation to waive its attor-
ney-client and work product protection, the work 
products may have to be turned over, regardless of 
the privilege that may have existed.5,6 To further 
preserve privilege for working papers and reports, 
the working papers and reports should be marked 
as “attorney work product” and should not be dis-
seminated without discussing the situation with the 
client’s external counsel. This includes updating the 
client’s senior management with an interim status 
report regarding the investigation.
Specific communications pertaining to the prac-
titioner are protected via attorney-client privileges 
insofar that the practitioner is retained by the client’s 
external counsel on behalf of the client. Certain 
communications, such as the final written report and 
the intermediate working papers, are a main concern 
for protection. A written report prepared by the ac-
counting firm is protected under the attorney-client 
privilege if the report is only delivered to specific 
relevant parties, such as the board of directors, the 
audit committee, or certain individuals of manage-
ment. However, should the report receive wider 
distribution, the client may appear to be voluntarily 
waiving their privileges. In certain circumstances 
when the client loses privilege due to providing 
the report to a government agency, the client could 
procure an agreement with the government agency 
to keep the report confidential. Nevertheless, this 
does not guarantee complete confidentiality.
Likewise, the working papers supporting the prac-
titioner’s written report also are protected. Some ex-
amples of working papers include interview notes, 
memorandums, affidavits, declarations, analyses that 
support the written report’s conclusions but are not 
included in the written report, and so on. These are 
protected by the work product doctrine that states 
that tangible material or its intangible equivalent 
that is collected or prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion is not considered discoverable and is protected 
from disclosure. Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
privilege could be waived by virtue of disclosure.7
In some instances, the client or its external coun-
sel, or both, may prefer not to have a written report 
even when the practitioner’s work is protected by 
the attorney work product doctrine. The attorney 
work product doctrine is not absolute and can be 
readily challenged. For instance, by showing undue 
hardship, the opposing party can obtain an order 
exempting an accounting firm’s work from the at-
torney work-product privilege. As a result, a chance 
still exists that a written report containing possible 
negative implications for a client’s case may be 
turned over to the opposing party.
Indicating Document Status
Any expert witness retained to present evidence 
at a trial or other evidentiary proceeding and any 
personnel working at the direction of such expert 
witness are required to preserve all documents, 
including draft reports and electronic data, which 
have been reviewed or created by or at the direc-
tion of the expert witness. It is important to ensure 
that during the preparation of the report, the phrase 
“Draft—Subject to Change” is clearly indicated on 
each page. The term “Draft—Subject to Change” 
should only be removed when providing the final 
report to the client.
It is common for legal disputes to go through 
several rounds of settlement conferences before 
they are settled in court. For this purpose, the 
5		January	20,	2003,	memorandum	titled	Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations	from	former	Deputy	Attorney	General	Larry	D.	Thomp-
son	to	Heads	of	Department	Components	and	United	States	Attorneys.
6		October	21,	2005,	memorandum	titled	Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection	from	Acting	Deputy	Attorney	General	Robert	D.	
McCallum	Jr.	to	Heads	of	Department	Components	and	United	States	Attorneys.
7		There	has	been	significant	controversy	within	the	legal	community	surrounding	recently	enacted	policies	and	regulations	regarding	the	mandatory	
waiver	of	attorney-client	privilege	and	work	product	doctrine	in	the	context	of	corporate	investigations	conducted	by	federal	agencies.
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practitioner may provide analyses strictly for the set-
tlement discussions and have that information pre-
cluded in court should the settlement fall through. 
In this situation, documents should be labeled with 
language, such as “Prepared at the direction of 
counsel for settlement discussion purposes only.” 
This label is important to clarify the purpose and use 
of the accounting firm’s analyses or report so that it 
will not be misconstrued later on if the settlement 
talks fall through and the parties go to trial.
Working Paper 
Documentation
Although the consulting standards do not have any 
specific working paper requirements, preparing and 
maintaining working papers are still important be-
cause they are the basis for forming opinions, as well 
as any advice provided to the client. One specific 
area in which one’s working papers are closely ex-
amined is litigation. In litigation matters, working 
papers are not subject to discovery unless the role 
of the practitioner is an expert witness. The AICPA 
Professional Standards apply to expert testimony and 
require that the opinion expressed be reached us-
ing reliable principles and methods properly applied 
to the source data and facts of the case. However, 
regardless of the role, the working papers should be 
prepared and kept under the belief that they will be 
scrutinized by others.
A number of factors need to be considered when 
preparing working papers. The main purpose of the 
working papers is to support the analyses and conclu-
sions stated in the report, so the information in the 
working papers should reflect the results of the in-
vestigation. The working papers should exclude ex-
traneous information that was not relied upon when 
forming one’s opinion and not used to arrive at the 
conclusions. In addition, one should be sensible in 
any annotations and markings, including highlight-
ing, on working papers because they become part of 
the working papers. When considering annotations, 
watch for conclusions that may have become super-
seded as the engagement progressed. The working 
papers also should follow the methodology applied 
to the data set to arrive at the opinion.
Working papers that support the opinion general-
ly are not introduced as exhibits at a trial because the 
trier-of-fact usually has neither the inclination nor 
the ability to review the working papers. However, 
the opposing party may use the working papers as 
evidence of carelessness or erroneous conclusions if 
the opposing party finds errors or inconsistencies in 
them. The opposing party also may introduce the 
working papers as evidence if the opinions they sup-
port are contrary to those of the expert.
In order to guard against such use of working pa-
pers, the contents of the working papers should be 
carefully controlled and avoid the inclusion of irrel-
evant materials. The working papers supporting the 
opinions should be retained and properly organized 
so that the practitioner can find the source materials 
that are the bases for the opinion. It should be noted 
that the practitioner cannot remove anything after 
receiving a subpoena. Any relevant documents pre-
pared by the accounting firm, whether they support 
the opinions stated in the report, must be produced 
in response to a subpoena.
It is worth nothing that working papers labeled as 
“subject to the attorney-client privilege and/or at-
torney work-product doctrine” may lose the privi-
leges if the practitioner’s role changes to that of an 
expert witness and the practitioner’s working papers 
become subject to discovery.
Review of Reports and 
Work Products
The typical investigation is usually led by a partner 
from the accounting firm. On large scale investiga-
tions or investigations that span multiple countries, 
the accounting firm may deploy multiple partners to 
handle different work streams or different countries. 
The lead partner on the engagement (engagement 
partner) should always review each report and work 
product, including interim progress reports and in-
terim work products, prior to providing the report 
to the client. Evidence of timely review by the en-
gagement partner should be noted in the documen-
tation. For example, the engagement team may pre-
pare memorandums to the file or make annotations 
that should be reviewed and signed off on by the 
engagement partner. All required review procedures 
should be completed prior to issuance of the re-
ports or work products. These review requirements 
also apply to the final input the engagement team 
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provides to a client-owned report, even though the 
client may continue to alter the document after the 
team ceases its involvement.
A formal quality assurance program should be in 
place to ensure the quality of the work products that 
are submitted to the client and external parties. Ap-
pendix C contains an example of a quality assur-
ance procedure. The example shown is a template 
that can be used to assist engagement teams in the 
effective qualifying, planning, delivering, and clos-
ing of an engagement. Appendix D contains another 
form that assists engagement teams to ensure quality 
is maintained for all deliverables and work products. 
The example shown is a form that could be filled 
out whenever the accounting firm issues a report or 
work product. The practitioner(s) responsible for the 
deliverable or work product represents that quality 
has been ensured throughout. The six objectives of 
a quality assurance program include identifying and 
mitigating risk on projects that are:
 (1)  unusually complex.
 (2)  designated as high risk during the engage-
ment acceptance process.
 (3)  expected to last significantly longer than av-
erage (for example, longer than six months).
 (4)  expected to result in the issuance of a large 
number of reports or work products during 
the course of the engagement.
 (5)  led by an engagement partner who has joined 
the firm within the preceding six months.
 (6)  utilizing a new service (that is, a service 
not previously used to deliver a client 
engagement).
Once the engagement partner reviews the report 
or work product and is satisfied with it, the report or 
work product should be submitted for a preissuance 
review. A preissuance review also should be a com-
ponent of the accounting firm’s quality assurance 
program. A quality assurance partner (sometimes 
known as an independent review partner), who is 
another partner of the accounting firm other than 
the engagement partner, generally will function as a 
preissuance reviewer. The preissuance reviewer, at 
a minimum, reads the report or work products and 
summary memorandum, refers to the engagement 
letter to confirm the scope of services provided, and 
discusses significant matters with the engagement 
partner. The preissuance reviewer also may read se-
lected engagement documents (for example, project 
descriptions, procedure summaries, and memoran-
dums describing significant findings) to objectively 
evaluate significant engagement execution and re-
porting matters.
The engagement partner should schedule the pre-
issuance review as early as possible to avoid delays 
in providing the report to the client. The engage-
ment partner also should consider involving the 
preissuance reviewer at various interim stages of the 
engagement to facilitate a timely final preissuance 
review. In addition, the involvement of the preissu-
ance reviewer is more extensive when the engage-
ment is higher risk, more complex, or employing an 
unconventional methodology.
In certain situations, if counsel and the client per-
mits, the practitioner and the suspected wrongdoer 
could review the draft report. This allows the sus-
pect to counter any findings, recommendations, or 
conclusions. However, for these meetings, the pres-
ence of the client or counsel is often requested by 
the practitioner.
Guidelines for 
Deliverables to the 
Client
Communicating the 
Conclusion of the 
Engagement
The nature of some engagements is such that the 
completion date is not evident (for example, those 
engagements that do not result in the delivery of an 
oral presentation or written report to the client). In 
these situations, the completion date might be speci-
fied in the engagement letter. If the completion date 
is not specified in the engagement letter, it may be 
communicated in a cover letter accompanying the 
final bill, or the practitioner may obtain acknowl-
edgement from the client that the engagement has 
been completed.
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Report Audience
An accounting firm that is involved in a civil fraud 
investigation should be aware that a parallel pro-
ceeding, such as a criminal investigation, may also 
be underway. As a result, the accounting firm’s find-
ings of the case may be presented to law enforce-
ment authorities or subpoenaed. Examples of law 
enforcement agencies or personnel include the FBI, 
the SEC, the DOJ, the Office of Inspector General, 
the U.S. Attorney General, the CIA, and other fed-
eral and state regulatory agencies. Because dealings 
with law enforcement agencies and personnel are 
likely to involve highly sensitive, confidential, and 
even classified information, a heightened sense of 
confidentiality is recommended in such cases.
Presenting findings to law enforcement is highly 
specific to individual engagement circumstances, 
and consultation with senior management of the 
accounting firm who are familiar with legal issues, 
law enforcement, regulatory, and governmental 
procedures is strongly advised. In certain circum-
stances, the accounting firm’s Office of the General 
Counsel should be involved. In all cases, the law 
firm retained by the client should be involved in this 
process. Similarly, if a meeting with a law enforce-
ment or regulatory agency is requested or arranged, 
all appropriate authorization must be obtained from 
the senior management of the accounting firm prior 
to such a meeting. This also applies to any decision 
making or final determination of disclosure to law 
enforcement. Again, the law firm retained by the 
client should be involved and be an integral part of 
this process.
Returning to our case study, the abusive account-
ing practices resulted in a material error in accruals 
accounts, and a restatement of Grand Forge Com-
pany’s financial statement was required. As a result, 
Grand Forge Company notified the SEC of the issue 
and worked with its financial statement auditors to 
begin the preparations for a restatement. The SEC 
requested specific analyses and supporting docu-
mentation, as a result of this disclosure. Perusi & Bi-
lanz LLP has agreed to assist Grand Forge Company 
in preparing some the requested analyses. Now that 
the SEC is involved, Perusi & Bilanz LLP decided 
that a preissuance reviewer with SEC experience 
should be involved in the engagement.
Limiting the Use of Reports
Another section of the report would its use. Typi-
cally, fraud investigations are conducted for the 
benefit of the client. Accordingly, the practitioner 
should advise the client that the report is not to be 
distributed to anyone outside the client, unless spec-
ified other users have been identified and they have 
signed applicable third-party access letters. In addi-
tion, the accounting firm should not agree to the in-
clusion or referral of its report in a public document 
(for example, an offering circular or registration 
statement). For instance, in our case study, Perusi & 
Bilanz LLP’s report would contain language, such as 
the following:
This report is intended solely for the informa-
tion and use of the management of Grand Forge 
Company and is not intended to be and should 
not be used by anyone other than these specified 
parties. Perusi & Bilanz LLP, therefore, assumes 
no responsibility to any user of the report other 
than Grand Forge Company. Any other persons 
who choose to rely on our report do so entirely 
at their own risk.
In certain instances, it is encouraged to limit the 
use of disclaimer language for a variety of reasons. 
Instead, the accounting firm might prefer to use 
an annotation, such as a header, footer, or title, to 
convey the limitations in the analyses. An example 
would be to include a more specific title, such as 
using the name of the case or dispute on the pages 
of the report.
If it is determined that the audience should ex-
pand beyond the client, the practitioner should 
work with the client to specify the audience for the 
report, so that the findings can be properly commu-
nicated. When the report is to be distributed outside 
the client, the consent of the client (or former client) 
is requested before making the engagement docu-
mentation available to others. Unless the account-
ing firm is precluded from doing so under the terms 
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of a subpoena or other legal process, the review of 
the documentation is part of a peer review or qual-
ity review performed by a regulatory authority, and 
the right to review by designated third parties is in-
cluded in the engagement letter or designated by a 
process of law.
Such consent is obtained in writing and signed 
by the executive in the client’s organization who 
has the authority to provide the consent. In obtain-
ing the client’s consent, the accounting firm should 
determine whether the client has an adequate un-
derstanding of what has been authorized, and the 
practitioner should inform the client about sensitive 
matters contained in the documentation. In addi-
tion, the practitioner should consider offering the 
client the opportunity to read the documentation 
before obtaining consent.
Issuance of Report
The report is considered issued when it is printed, 
signed on firm letterhead, and the final copy has 
been sent to the client (or meets other completion 
criteria agreed upon with the client in the engage-
ment letter). When the report is in the form of a 
presentation or other written work product by the 
accounting firm, it is considered issued when the 
transmittal letter is signed on firm letterhead and sent 
to the client. If the client agrees to electronically for-
matted reports, the final report is typically prepared 
in a format that retains the original source image 
of the document (for example, an Adobe Acrobat 
PDF file) and sent via an appropriate transmission 
method with consideration of the confidentiality 
and sensitivity of the information. Further guide-
lines for electronic formats of a report are discussed 
subsequently.
Sending Electronic Reports
The practitioner should consider creating docu-
ments in a format that retains the original source 
image of the document to decrease the risk of inad-
vertently including confidential client or accounting 
firm metadata information to third parties. When 
the client requires an electronic copy, the practi-
tioner should convert the file, whether it is a docu-
ment (Microsoft Word), spreadsheet (Microsoft 
Excel), or presentation (Microsoft PowerPoint), to 
a format that retains the original source image of 
the document (Adobe Acrobat PDF) and transmit 
that file rather than the source file. Such transmis-
sion removes the possibility of disclosure of nonvis-
ible historical data and metadata information. The 
format that retains the original source image of the 
document is more secure because it prevents the al-
teration of critical documents by the recipient.
Reissuance of Reports
Reports are typically issued shortly after the comple-
tion of the work or in accordance with the timing or 
other protocols agreed upon with the client. Delays 
due to disagreement with the client regarding fac-
tual matters should be promptly communicated to 
the client. Delays due to internal matters should be 
resolved as soon as practical. If the engagement team 
determines that a progress report, interim report, 
or the final report contains a significant or mate-
rial error or inaccuracy, the accounting firm should 
determine whether the matter is significant enough 
to warrant issuing an amended report. When an 
amended report is issued, the accounting firm iden-
tifies the information being corrected and distributes 
the report to all individuals included in the original 
report distribution. The amended report should be 
dated contemporaneously and reference the date of 
issuance of the original report.
Conclusion
Reporting under different fraud litigation services 
requires an understanding of the applicable standards 
and guidelines. These standards help safeguard and 
minimize the practitioners’ exposure regarding fraud 
engagements. An investigation into fraud or allega-
tions of fraud is necessary to determine whether the 
allegations are true, who is responsible for what al-
leged wrongdoing, and how far back the fraudulent 
activities have been committed. Litigation services 
associated with fraud include investigations of sus-
pected fraud, investigations of specific assertions of 
fraud, or quantifying losses due to fraud.
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Fraud investigation is one of many services con-
sidered litigation services.8 Litigation services are 
classified as transaction services in SSCS No. 1, 
Consulting Services: Definitions and Standards (AIC-
PA, Professional Standards, vol. 2, CS sec. 100), and 
are subject to SSCSs and the professional standards 
embodied in the AICPA Code of Professional Con-
duct. Appropriate adherence to applicable standards 
ensures that the practitioner is always mindful of the 
fact that the work is properly performed and docu-
mented and avoids the risk of public embarrassment 
and loss of professional reputation.
8		Litigation	services	and	applicable	professional	standards	are	discussed	in	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	Report	03-1,	Litigation Services and Ap-
plicable Professional Standards.
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Appendix A
Decision Tree to Determine the Application of 
Professional Standards
Practitioners	can	use	the	following	decision	tree	to	determine	which	professional	standards	apply	in	a	litigation	ser-
vices	engagement.9	The	Grand	Forge	Company	case	study	is	applied	to	illustrate	the	application	of	the	decision	tree	in	
appendix	B.
9		AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	Report	03-1,	Litigation Services and Applicable Professional Standards.
The CPA is contacted by the 
attorney or litigant regarding 
possible litigation 
engagement. 
Does the
engagement meet
the definition of
litigation services
as in AT sec.
9101.35?*
Does the
litigation services
engagement
encompass
only those consulting
services identified
under the
SSCS?
Does the
litigation services
engagement
also contain elements
that require adherence
to SSARSs, SSAEs,
or SASs?
 
Perform the engagement
in compliance with
the SSCSs.
Apply appropriate standards 
to that portion of the 
engagement. 
Conduct further 
research to determine 
the nature of service. 
 
Complete engagement
according to all standards or
required authoritative guidance
that applies to each portion of
the engagement.
 
Yes 
Yes Yes 
No 
No 
No 
*		Interpretation	No.	3,	“Applicability	of	Attestation	Standards	to	Litigation	Services,”	at	section	100	Attest Engagements	(AICPA,	Professional Standards,	
vol.	1,	at	sec.	9101	par.	35)
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Question:	What	form	of	service	is	being	requested?
Answer:	The	answer	to	the	question	can	be	determined	by	
applying	the	decision	tree	in	appendix	A,	as	follows:
Appendix B
Professional Standards Application for the Grand 
Forge Company Case Study*
The	following	questions	and	answers	illustrate	the	process	of	determining	which	professional	standards	must	be	com-
plied	with	in	the	Grand	Forge	Company	case	study:
Step Criteria Decision
1. Does	the	engagement	meet	the	definition	of	litigation	
services?
Yes.	Grand	Forge	Company	requires	a	forensic	ac-
counting	investigation,	and	forensic	accounting	is	a	
litigation	service.
2. Does	the	litigation	services	engagement	encompass	
only	those	consulting	services	identified	under	the	
Statements	on	Standards	for	Consulting	Services	
(SSCSs)?
Yes,	Perusi	&	Bilanz	LLP	is	requested	to	perform	
consulting	services.
3. Does	the	litigation	services	engagement	also	contain	
elements	that	require	adherence	to	the	Statements	
on	Standards	for	Accounting	and	Review	Services	
(SSARSs),	Statements	on	Standards	for	Attestation	
Engagements	(SSAEs),	or	Statements	on	Auditing	
Standards	(SASs)?
No.	See	the	following.
Exemption	from	the	SSARSs,	SSAEs,	and	SASs	require	a	“No”	answer	to	question	(a)	or	a	“Yes”	answer	to	any	questions	from 
(b)-(e).
a.	Will	the	practitioner	issue	a	written	communication	
that	expresses	a	conclusion	about	the	reliability	of	a	
written	assertion	that	is	the	responsibility	of	another	
party?
No.
b.	Will	the	service	comprise	being	an	expert	witness? No.
c.	Will	the	service	comprise	being	a	trier-of-fact	or	
acting	on	behalf	of	one?
No.
d.	Is	the	practitioner’s	work,	under	the	rules	of	the	
proceedings,	subject	to	detailed	analysis	and	chal-
lenge	by	each	party	to	the	dispute?
No.
e.	Is	the	practitioner	engaged	by	an	attorney	to	do	
work	that	will	be	protected	by	the	attorney’s	work	
product	privilege,	and	is	such	work	not	intended	to	be	
used	for	other	purposes?
Yes.
4. Determine	the	nature	of	the	elements	not	covered	by	the	SSCSs,	SSARSs,	SSAEs,	or	SASs	and	adhere	to	ap-
propriate	standards	or	refer	to	available	guidance.
5. Complete	the	engagement.
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Question:	Would	the	answer	be	different	if	no	formal	re-
port	was	requested	and	the	results	were	to	be	supported	
only	by	Perusi	&	Bilanz	LLP’s	working	papers?
Answer:	No,	the	answer	would	be	the	same.	The	written	
report	is	not	a	criterion	for	distinguishing	engagements.
Question:	If	Perusi	&	Bilanz	LLP	constructs	the	engage-
ment	as	an	agreed-upon	procedures	engagement,	would	
the	firm	be	governed	by	AT	section	201,	Agreed-Upon 
Procedures Engagement	(AICPA,	Professional Standards,	
vol.	1),	on	agreed-upon	procedures	or	by	the	attestation	
standards?
Answer:	Neither.	The	answer	would	be	the	same.	Agreed-
upon	procedures	can	be	used	in	a	consulting	engage-
ment,	and	the	practitioner	can	look	to	AT	section	201	for	
guidance	but	should	not	indicate,	imply,	or	construe	the	
engagement	as	falling	under	the	attestation	or	auditing	
standards	(including	AT	section	201).
*Adapted	from	AICPA	Consulting	Services	Special	Report	03-1,	Litigation Services and Applicable Professional Standards.
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Appendix C
Engagement Quality Procedures: An Example
This	document	is	designed	to	assist	engagement	teams	in	the	effective	qualifying,	planning,	delivering,	and	closing	of	an	
engagement.	It	serves	as	a	reminder	of	key	engagement	processes	that	should	be	completed.	The	work	steps	contained	
in	this	document	should	not	be	altered	or	deleted;	however,	engagement	teams	may	supplement	or	customize	this	
checklist	with	additional	procedures	that	are	specific	to	their	respective	engagements.
Each	work	step	is	manually	signed	off	on	and	dated	by	the	individual	completing	the	task	or,	if	the	procedure	is	not	
applicable,	noted	with	an	“N/A”	and	an	indication	why	it	is	not	applicable.	As	indicated	in	the	engagement	quality	
procedures	(EQPs),	certain	steps	are	required	to	be	manually	signed-off	on	and	dated	by	the	executive	in	charge	(EIC)	
of	the	engagement.	The	EIC	need	not	necessarily	complete	these	steps	personally	but	signs	to	indicate	that	he	or	she	
is	satisfied	the	steps	have	been	completed.	It	is	indicated	in	the	form	when	the	EIC	must	complete	the	step,	in	whole	or	
in	part.	The	completed	EQP	is	retained	in	the	engagement	documentation	along	with	other	documents	supporting	the	
completion	and	resolution	of	the	applicable	steps.
Client Name: _____________________________________________________________________________________
Engagement Name: ________________________________________________________________________________
Preparer: ________________________________________________________________________________________
Date Completed: __________________________________________________________________________________
I have reviewed the engagement quality procedures and determined that they have been completed appropriately and 
accurately (provide manual signature):
Engagement Executive or Manager: Date:
__________________________________________________________________________  ________________
Engagement Executive in Charge:  Date:
__________________________________________________________________________  ________________
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Brief Engagement Description: 
Identify Applicable Professional Standards Under Which This Engagement Is Being Performed.
AICPA	Consulting	Standards	  ________
AICPA	Attestation	Standards	  ________
Other	(must	provide	explanation	of	standards)	  ________
Describe Expected Report(s) or other Work Product(s):
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Engagement Procedure
Date
Completed
Completed
by
Comments or
References
QUALIFY
Proposal
	 1.	 	Prior	to	submitting	a	proposal	to	the	client	(or	potential	cli-
ent),	the	team	should
 a.	 	consult	with	and	obtain	approval	from	the	engagement	
partner.
 b.	 	review	that	appropriate	terms	and	titles	were	used	for	
non-CPAs
 c.	 	review	that	appropriate	verbiage,	language,	and	ter-
minology	were	used	within	all	aspects	of	the	proposal	
document	or	presentation.
 d.	 	review	that	an	adequate	description	of	the	scope	and	
services,	as	well	as	professional	fees,	if	applicable,	are	
evident.
 e.	 	review	that	client	logos,	names,	trademarks,	or	refer-
ences	were	used	appropriately	and	with	permission	from	
the	client.
Client Acceptance
	 2.	 	Perform	background	checks	on	the	client	prior	to	client 
acceptance.
 a.	 	The	executive	in	charge	(EIC)	of	the	engagement	signs	
off	that	client	acceptance	has	been	completed	and	ap-
proved	if	this	is	a	new	client.
Engagement Acceptance
	 3.	 	If	significant	changes	in	client	circumstances	were	identified	
during	the	engagement,	an	evaluation	needs	to	be	performed	
on	the	client.
	 4.	 	Determine	if	there	are	any	potential	conflicts	of	interest	
regarding	any	other	clients	the	firm	has	at	the	present	time.
 a.	 	Perform	conflict	checks	of	other	known	parties.
 b.	 	If	there	are	any	potential	conflicts	of	interest	identi-
fied,	the	firm	should	take	steps	to	manage	the	conflict.	
The	firm	needs	to	document	the	steps	taken.	The	firm	
also	must	obtain	a	signed	consent	letter	from	the	client	
acknowledging	the	potential	conflict	of	interest.
 c.	 	The	engagement	partner	should	sign	off	that	any	poten-
tial	conflicts	of	interests	with	the	other	clients	have	been	
appropriately	considered	and	documented.
	 5.	 	Evaluate	any	engagement	independence	requirements.	Such	
evaluation	should	include	engagements	performed	under	
AICPA	attest	standards.	Perform	the	following,	when 
applicable:
 a.	 	Confirm	the	status	of	the	ultimate	parent	or	controlling	
entity	of	the	client.
 b.	 	Confirm	the	approval	from	the	engagement	partner	
and	determine	that	the	services	to	be	provided	are	not	
prohibited,	for	independence	purposes,	under	applicable	
regulatory	or	professional	standards,	including	Interpre-
tation	No.	101-3,	“Performance	of	Nonattest	Services,”	
under	Rule	101,	Independence	(AICPA,	Professional 
Standards,	vol.	2,	ET	sec.	101,	par.	.05),	for	nonattest	
services	to	audit	clients.
 c.	 	Have	the	EIC	of	the	engagement	sign	off	that	all	applica-
ble	independence	matters	were	appropriately	considered	
and	documented.
Chapter 12.indd   246 8/6/09   4:12:55 PM
Chapter	12:	Reporting	on	Fraud
247
(continued)
	 6.	 	Perform	and	document	engagement	acceptance	in	order	to	
consider	and	approve	potential	risks	of	the	engagement.	The	
following	procedures	should	be	performed	prior	to	issuing	an	
engagement	letter:
 a.	 	Determine	that	the	proposed	services	are	within	the	ap-
proved	guidelines	for	the	applicable	service	offering.
 b.	 	Complete	the	forms	to	estimate	engagement	economics.	
 c.	 	For	any	engagement	in	which	a	business	relationship	
with	a	third	party	(for	example,	subcontractor,	contract	
employee,	alliance	partner,	third-party	subject	matter	
resource,	and	so	on)	is	used,	obtain	approvals.
 d.	 	Have	the	EIC	of	the	engagement	sign	off	that	the	engage-
ment	acceptance	was	completed	and	approved	and	that	
all	required	engagement	acceptance	approvals	have	
been	obtained	and	documented.	
 e.	 	Have	the	EIC	of	the	engagement	sign	off	that	the	other	re-
quired	approvals	mentioned	in	step	6(c)	were	completed,	
approved,	and	documented	and	that	the	use	of	such	
business	relationship	was	disclosed	to	the	client.
	 7.	 	Develop	and	issue	the	engagement	letter	(EL)	or	statement	of	
work	(SOW).
 a.	 	Determine	that	the	EL	or	SOW
	 	 (1)	 	includes	the	objectives,	scope,	and	limitations	of	
services	to	be	performed.
	 	 (2)	 	restricts	the	use	and	distribution	of	the	report,	if 
appropriate.
	 	 (3)	 	addresses	the	responsibilities	of	both	the	firm	and	
client	staff.
	 	 (4)	 	discusses	the	work	products	and,	if	applicable,	the	
timing.
	 	 (5)	 	provides	for	a	fee	arrangement,	including	appropriate	
description	of	the	calculation	methodology.
	 	 (6)	 	provides	for	a	payment	schedule	and	adequately	
describes	the	fee	arrangement.
	 	 (7)	 	was	reviewed	and	approved	by	the	engagement	
partner	prior	to	delivery	to	the	client.
	 	 (8)	 	incorporates	or	references	the	standard	terms	and	
conditions	included	in	the	overall	approved	master	
service	agreement,	if	issued	under	a	SOW.
Enter	any	additional	comments	needed	relating	to	the	EL	or	SOW	
in	the	following	space:
	 8.	 	Obtain	approval	signature	on	the	EL	from	the	appropriate	
client	representative.
 a.	 	The	EIC	of	the	engagement	signs	off	that	an	appropriate,	
approved	EL	or	SOW	was	developed	and	executed	with	
the	client	and	included	in	the	engagement	files.
PLAN
	 9.	 	The	EIC	understands	and	agrees	with	the	client	about	the	
expectations,	protocols,	expected	work	products,	and	timing	
of	the	engagement.
10.	 	Plan	and	staff	the	engagement	with	the	appropriate	team.	
Discuss	engagement	goals,	objectives,	and	expectations	
with	the	engagement	team,	including	the	nature, 
extent,	form,	and	content	of	the	planned	engagement 
documentation.
11.	 	Develop	a	written	work	program	that	includes	descriptions	of	
key	work	steps.
Engagement Procedure
Date
Completed
Completed
by
Comments or
References
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12.	 	Finalize	the	detailed	scope	of	the	engagement	and	update	
the	EL	or	SOW,	if	appropriate.
13.	 	Determine	that	the	client	has	designated	an	appropriate	
management-level	individual	to	be	responsible	for	oversee-
ing	the	services,	in	accordance	with	Interpretation	No.	101-3.
	 	 Identify	the	individual	designated	by	management	to	be	
responsible	for	overseeing	the	services,	including	his	or	her	
functional	position.
	 	 Document	the	procedures	performed	to	assess	and	
conclude	whether	the	designated	individual	possesses	the	
suitable	skills,	knowledge,	or	experience	for	such	oversight.
14.	 	If	this	is	an	attest	engagement	under	AICPA	attestation	stan-
dards,	determine	that	the	engagement	executive	who	will	be	
signing	the	attestation	report	is	a	CPA	licensed	to	practice	in	
the	state	in	which	the	office	issuing	the	report	is	located.
15.	 	Plan	and	perform	the	engagement	in	accordance	with	the	
applicable	attestation	policies	and	procedures.	Assurance	or	
agreed-upon	procedures	engagements	require	the	participa-
tion	of	professionals	experienced	in	providing	these	services.	
(Note:	Certain	attestation	engagements,	such	as	agreed-
upon	procedures,	are	subject	to	additional	guidance.)
16.	 	If	applicable,	review	and	approve	the	quality	assurance	
plans	and	programs.
17.	 	Review	and	approve	additional	risk	management	procedures,	
if	the	engagement	was	classified	as	other	than	low	risk	in	
engagement	acceptance	or	continuance.
DELIVER
18.	 	Create	engagement	documentation	throughout	the	engage-
ment	to	provide	sufficient	evidence	to	support	the	results	of	
the	work	communicated	to	the	client	and	document	critical	
advice	given.
19.	 	Document	the	software	used	on	the	engagement.	Describe	
procedures	used	to	evaluate	the	adequacy	of	the	software	or	
application.
20.	 	In	regard	to	the	work	of	a	third-party	contractor	or	specialist	
or	the	firm’s	subject	matter	resource
 a.	 	evaluate	and	document	the	work	performed,	if	the	
engagement	involved	the	work	of	an	external	third-party	
specialist	or	other	contractor	or	the	internal	subject	mat-
ter	resource.
 b.	 	confirm	that	the	industry	sector	subject	matter	resources	
and	tax	and	other	professionals	were	consulted,	when	
appropriate,	and	that	these	consultations	were	appropri-
ately	documented.
21.	 	Continually	assess	the	engagement	for	significant	changes	
in	engagement	scope,	progress	(timelines),	or	economics	
(fees).	Document	agreed	changes	as	an	amendment	to	the	
EL	or	SOW	and	obtain	approval	signature	of	the	appropriate	
client	signatory.
22.	 	Determine	that	adequate	engagement	supervision	of	work	is	
performed,	including	documentation	thereof.
23.	 	Provide	adequate	client	updates	and	project	communica-
tions	to	an	extent	consistent	with	the	timeframe	and	com-
plexity	of	the	project.
Engagement Procedure
Date
Completed
Completed
by
Comments or
References
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(continued)
24.	 	Prepare	or	review	appropriate	documentation	for	consulta-
tions	on	significant	issues,	including	being	satisfied	that	
those	individuals	consulted	were	informed	of	the	relevant	
facts	and	circumstances	on	a	timely	basis	and	that	the	
conclusions	reached	are	reasonable	and	consistent	with	
professional	standards.
	 	 Memorandums	that	address	significant	issues	on	which	
consultation	occurred	are	included	in	the	engagement	
documentation	with	written	evidence	of	approvals	by	those	
consulted.
25.	 	Obtain	any	signed	access	letters,	consent	letters,	third-party	
report	access	letters,	nondisclosure	agreements,	acknowl-
edgement	and	consent	letters	for	any	potential	conflicts	of	
interest,	or	letters	of	representation,	when	applicable.
 a.	 	The	EIC	of	the	engagement	signs	off	that	all	appropriate,	
signed	external	letters	have	been	obtained.
26.	 	Prepare	a	summary	memorandum.
27.	 	Complete	required	reviews,	including	second-level	reviews	
and	preissuance	reviews	(when	applicable)	of	engagement	
documentation,	report(s),	or	work	product(s).
CLOSE
28.	 	Draft	any	required	engagement	report(s)	or	other	work	
products	based	on	applicable	professional	standards	and	the	
terms	of	the	engagement	letter.	Determine	that	the	report	is	
appropriately	worded	based	on	the	nature	and	scope	of	the	
engagement	and	avoids	inappropriate	words.
 a.	 	The	EIC	of	the	engagement	signs	off	on	the	compliance	of	
all	applicable	firm	reporting	requirements.
29.	 	Communicate	the	final	results	of	the	work	to	the	appropriate	
client	personnel.
 a.	 	The	EIC	of	the	engagement	signs	off	that	the	final	results	
of	the	engagement	have	been	communicated	to	the	ap-
propriate	client	personnel.
30.	 	Complete	and	obtain	all	required	signatures	on	the	engage-
ment	quality	review	form,	when	applicable.	The	form	should	
be	used	for	all	engagements,	unless	another	form	has	been	
approved	for	the	engagement.	
 a.	 	The	EIC	of	the	engagement	signs	off	that	all	required	ap-
provals	have	been	obtained	and	documented	on	the	form.
31.	 	Finalize	and	archive	the	engagement	in	accordance	but	not	
limited	to
	 •			clearing	and	deleting	review	comments	and	to-do	lists.
	 •		destroying	superfluous	engagement	documentation,	includ-
ing	e-mails.
	 •		not	sharing	draft	copies	of	reports	with	the	client.
32.	 	Communicate	with	the	engagement	team	their	responsibili-
ties	for	conducting	procedures	to	determine	that	the	docu-
ment	retention	policies	have	been	followed.	This	includes	
determining	that	confidential	client	or	personally	identifiable	
information	has	been	removed	from	the	engagement	docu-
mentation	and	other	collateral	devices	and	either	returned	
to	the	client	or	disposed	of	in	a	secure	manner	when	such	
information	is	not	required	to	be	retained	as	engagement	
documentation.
	 	 Indicate	in	the	comment	column	how	the	preceding	was	
communicated	to	the	engagement	team.
Engagement Procedure
Date
Completed
Completed
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33.	 	Initiate	an	assessment	of	the	quality	of	service	provided,	if	
applicable.	Request	that	the	client	complete	the	survey,	as	
deemed	appropriate.
34.	 	Complete	performance	assessments	for	engagement	team	
members,	if	applicable.
35.	 	Complete	knowledge	submissions,	if	applicable.
36.	 	Communicate	the	results	of	the	project	to	the	engagement	
partner	of	the	client.
37.	 	Conduct	a	postengagement	team	meeting	to	debrief	the	team	
on	the	engagement.
Engagement Procedure
Date
Completed
Completed
by
Comments or
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Appendix D
Engagement Quality Review Form for 
Engagement Reports or Work Reports
Name	of	Client: ___________________________________________________________________________________
Name	of	Engagement: ______________________________________________________________________________
Description	of	reports	or	work	products,	including	date: ___________________________________________________
This	engagement	quality	review	form	must	be	completed	on	every	engagement.
ENGAGEMENT TEAM’S REPRESENTATIONS
Based	on	my	role	and	responsibilities	on	this	engagement,	I	make	the	following	representations:
I	have	completed	my	assignments	and	duties,	including
	 •	supporting	engagement	documentation	preparation,	review,	retention,	and	filing.
	 •	supervision	and	review	of	engagement	team	members’	documents	and	associated	outputs.
	 •	preparation	and	quality	assurance	of	engagement	reports	or	work	products.
	 •	compliance	with	professional	standards	and	firm	policies,	procedures,	and	practices.
	 •	resolution	of	differences	of	professional	opinion,	if	any.
List Quality Procedures to Be  
Completed Before Reports or 
Work Products Are Released Completed by Date
Representations and Conclusions Name Signature Date
Staff	or	Senior	Staff
Manager(s)	and	Senior	Manager(s)
Executive	in	Charge*
Preissuance	Reviewer
*	The	Executive-in-Charge	and	Pre-Issuance	Reviewer	do	not	sign	the	engagement	quality	review	form	prior	to	the	satisfactory	completion	of	the	open	
items.
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Recovering From Fraud: 
Fidelity Claims and Directors 
and Officers Claims
13
Introduction
Fidelity Insurance Coverage:  
 Types and Claims
	 •		Financial	Institution	Bond
	 •		Insuring	Agreements	and	Riders
	 •		General	Agreements
	 •		Conditions	and	Limitations
	 •		Exclusions
	 •		Commercial	Crime	Policy
	 •		Fidelity	Claims:	The	Process
	 	 –		Notice
	 	 –		Investigation	Protocol
	 	 –		The	Investigative	Team
	 •		Comparing	Fraud	Investigation 
Reports	to	Other	Types	of	Claims	
	 	 –		Fraud	Investigation	Versus 
Fidelity	Claim
	 	 –		Fraud	Investigation	Versus 
Civil	and	Criminal	Prosecution
	 •		Phases	of	a	Fraud	Investigation
	 	 –		Preliminary	Loss	Estimate
	 	 –		Loss	Investigation
	 	 –		Loss	Documentation
	 	 –		Developing	and	Submitting	a 
Claim
	 	 –		Negotiating	and	Settling 
Claims
	 	 –		Subrogation
Joe Galanti, Partner/Principal
Bruce Zaccanti, Partner/Principal
D&O Insurance Liability Insurance 
 Protection
	 •		Wrongful	Acts	Committed	by	D&O
	 	 –		Inaccurate	Disclosure	(Including	
Financial	Reporting)
	 	 –		Options	Backdating
	 	 –		Employee	Discrimination
	 	 –		Wrongful	Termination	or	Discharge
	 	 –		Other	Events	That	Trigger	a	Claim
	 •		D&O	Coverage
	 •		Risk	Management	Using	D&O	Coverage
	 	 –		Applying	for	D&O	Insurance
	 	 –		False	Statements:	The	Warranty	in	
the	D&O	Application
	 •		The	D&O	Claims	Process
	 	 –		Claim	Notification
	 	 –		Claim	Reporting
	 	 –		Claim	Confirmation
	 	 –		Duty	to	Defend	versus	Nonduty	to	
Defend
	 	 –		Permission	to	Incur	Expenses
	 	 –		Duty	of	Association
	 	 –		Claim	Settlement	and	Allocation
	 •		Areas	of	Dispute	in	D&O	Claims
Conclusion
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Introduction
The post-Sarbanes-Oxley era has seen a significant 
expansion of companies’ and stakeholders’ aware-
ness and reporting of all three primary categories of 
occupational fraud: asset misappropriation, financial 
statement fraud, and corruption. Certainly, since 
Sarbanes-Oxley and even before it, the incidence of 
fraud is distressingly high. Recent estimates suggest 
that two particular types of business fraud—embez-
zlement and employee theft—cost American busi-
nesses an estimated $1.5 trillion each year.1
Although the number of fraud investigations has 
grown considerably in past years, and notwithstand-
ing the heightened regulatory scrutiny of corporate 
financial reporting, many involved in the investiga-
tive process sometimes overlook important follow-
up procedures after conclusions are drawn about the 
fraud hypothesis. The focus of investigations is often 
on whether a fraudulent act occurred, rather than on 
how to recover potential losses. This is understand-
able, but in some instances, business unit operational 
managers are not aware of investigative protocols or 
potential recovery options, such as insurance.
A typical fraud investigation involves the follow-
ing seven basic steps:
 1.  Identification and classification
 2.  Planning and deployment
 3.  Gathering evidence and documentation
 4.  Concluding
 5.  Reporting
 6.  Insurance Recovery (if applicable)
 7.  Prosecution and litigation or negotiation and 
settlement (if applicable)
The focus of this chapter will be the sixth step in 
this process: insurance recovery. To the extent that 
they touch on the insurance claims and recovery 
process, the other steps in the typical fraud investi-
gative process also will be discussed.
In the wake of a discovery of fraudulent activity 
and with a determination that fraud has actually oc-
curred, it is incumbent on company management 
to ensure that such fraud does not continue and ap-
propriate controls be implemented to prevent such 
fraud in the future. In addition, although often over-
looked by many in the company, more work needs 
to be done (for example, filing an insurance claim or 
identifying other venues to recover losses).
Addressing fraud risk only after the fact by claim-
ing on a policy is insufficient. Company manage-
ment and fraud investigation professionals need to 
ensure that they consider recovery options both be-
fore and after a fraud has occurred. Insurance cover-
age is available for certain fraud-related risks but not 
all. In addition, companies might also seek recovery 
from the fraud perpetrators via civil and criminal 
prosecution. Assessing the potential fraud risks fac-
ing a company and estimating the likelihood of their 
occurrence and possible severity can assist manage-
ment in determining what insurance coverage it 
might seek for additional protection against certain 
risks, beyond traditional controls and monitoring.
This chapter addresses the various types of insur-
ance coverage available to mitigate fraud risk and 
reviews frequent requirements under such policies, 
along with some consideration of the process of fil-
ing a claim for recovery and related aspects of insur-
ance. The chapter comprises three major topics:
 1.  Fidelity insurance coverage
 2.  Fidelity claims process
 3.  Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance li-
ability protection
Fidelity Insurance 
Coverage: Types and 
Claims
Fraud is an unfortunate fact of life. Although com-
panies can seek to reduce the potential risk of fraud 
by establishing rules and guidelines for behavior, set-
ting a zero-tolerance tone at the top policy, insti-
tuting well-conceived internal control policies, and 
monitoring controls rigorously, fraud risk cannot be 
entirely eliminated.
Fraud is one of the primary crimes against which 
companies seek to protect themselves through pur-
chasing insurance. Fidelity insurance coverage pro-
vides policyholders with protection against the risk 
of certain crimes, including ones committed against 
1	Zurich	commercial	crime	and	fidelity	coverages,	August	2006,	2.
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the insured by employees and outside parties. The 
surety and fidelity industry is over 100 years old and 
currently generates approximately $3.5 billion and 
$930 million in annual premiums for surety and fi-
delity bonds, respectively.2
The Surety & Fidelity Association of America 
(SFAA) is the U.S.-based organization that compris-
es insurance companies that underwrite surety and 
fidelity bonds. Such bonds are intended to facilitate 
commerce, enhance economic development, and 
protect consumers and policyholders from a variety 
of risks. The two primary types of insurance cov-
erage available to protect companies against fraud-
related risk are financial institution bonds (FIBs) and 
commercial crime policies (CCPs). Below, each of 
these is described in turn.
As with all insurance policies, each policy is differ-
ent and should be reviewed carefully to determine 
what specific coverage is afforded therein. Policy-
holders should work with their carriers, brokers, 
and other insurance professionals to develop com-
prehensive programs covering specific fidelity risks 
against which they wish to protect themselves.
Financial Institution Bond
The FIB was introduced in 1986 as a tool for fi-
nancial institutions to insure against fraud risks. It 
evolved from the bankers blanket bond, which was 
created in 1916; however, the FIB is quite different 
than its forerunner because the financial services in-
dustry and relevant risks significantly changed dur-
ing the interim period. The FIB risk management 
tool is unique to the financial services industry, but 
the CCP is used across many industries.
The FIB covers losses discovered during the pol-
icy period, and it is subject to an aggregate limit 
of liability per policy period, as well as limits for 
each occurrence during the policy period. When 
the aggregate policy limit is reached, the bond is 
cancelled. The FIB can be terminated immediately 
when requested in writing by an insured or with 60 
days’ notice when terminated by an insurer. It also 
can be terminated with 60 days’ notice when the 
insured is taken over by a receiver, a liquidator, or 
the government or when the insured is involved in 
a merger.
To claim against a FIB in the aftermath of dis-
covering a loss, the insured must provide notice of 
a loss as soon as practicable but in no event later 
than 30 days after the loss is discovered. A detailed 
proof of loss must then be filed within 6 months of 
discovery, unless an extension is agreed on in or-
der to fully investigate and document the loss. Legal 
proceedings against the insurer cannot be filed until 
at least 60 days after the original proof of loss is filed 
and not subsequent to 24 months thereafter. The 
average basic deductible is generally approximately 
1 percent of the total limit of liability, although all 
policies are different and carriers set prices commen-
surate with the specific risks insured. The insurer is 
liable under the FIB for the amount that a single loss 
exceeds the deductible.
Insuring Agreements and 
Riders
In its current form, the FIB consists of seven sepa-
rate insuring agreements, each of which provides 
coverage for different fraud-related risks. The in-
suring agreements are enumerated A-G, as origi-
nally introduced in 1941 as Standard Form No. 24, 
a bankers blanket bond. The basic bond coverage 
afforded under Standard Form No. 24 comprises 
insuring agreements A-C and F. The remaining in-
suring agreements, as well as other potential riders, 
provide optional additional coverage.
Following are descriptions of each insuring agree-
ment, as well as several popular riders:
Insuring Agreement A—Fidelity
Insuring agreement A provides coverage for loss-
es directly attributable to intentionally dishonest 
or fraudulent acts committed by an insured’s em-
ployees. It is noteworthy that unauthorized acts 
by an insured’s employees are usually not cov-
ered unless the employee had a manifest intent 
to cause harm and benefit financially, which will 
warrant further discussion subsequently.
 Certain other characteristics of the fraud also 
must be present for coverage to respond. Unless 
2	See	the	“About	the	Industry”	section	on	The	Surety	&	Fidelity	Association	of	America	Web	site	at	www.surety.org.
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committed in connection with a loan loss claim, 
the illegal acts can be committed alone or in col-
lusion with others. The insured is not required 
to give the insurer notice when hiring or ter-
minating employees, although those employees’ 
actions may trigger coverage under the policy.
 The central questions that generally require 
affirmative answers to confirm coverage under 
insuring agreement A are as follows:
1.  Was a loss incurred by the insured?
2.  Did the loss result directly from certain acts 
by an employee?
3.  Were these acts committed by an employ-
ee?
4.  Were these acts dishonest or fraudulent?
5.  Were these acts committed with the mani-
fest intent to cause the insured to sustain a 
loss and to obtain a financial benefit for the 
employee or another?
6.  Was financial benefit intended to be re-
ceived by the employee or another?
7.  In connection with a loan loss claim, did 
the employee act in collusion with one or 
more parties to the transactions?
8.  In connection with a loan loss claim, did 
the employee receive a financial benefit 
of at least $2,500 in connection with these 
transactions?3
 One of the most disputed coverage-related 
questions involves the term manifest intent, as used 
in the preceding question 5, and the meaning of 
that clause in the insuring agreement. Establish-
ing manifest intent clearly implies the ability to 
assess an employee’s state of mind in committing 
a purported fraud; thus, it is not surprising that 
disagreements between policyholders and carri-
ers are fomented by this provision to secure and 
exclude coverage, respectively. Some believe the 
clause was intended to limit coverage only to acts 
that were truly dishonest or fraudulent, rather 
than those resulting from negligence, misman-
agement, or ineptitude. A company’s ability to 
clearly establish that fact in every circumstance 
is not easy, and enjoining the agreement of the 
insurance carrier to such a claim is not always 
straightforward either.
 Other areas frequently occasioning disputes 
are the preceding questions 7–8, which relate to 
loan loss claims. The FIB defines a loan as “all 
extensions of credit by the Insured and all trans-
actions by which the Insured assumes an existing 
creditor relationship.”4 However, because claims 
associated with loan losses involve additional re-
quirements, such as collusion and a financial ben-
efit of at least $2,500 to the employee, a policy-
holder might seek to demonstrate that the losses 
it sustained related to something other than loans. 
Demonstrating collusion or evidencing that an 
employee obtained a financial benefit of at least 
$2,500 can be difficult, even if such activity was 
characteristic of the loss. For example, cash bribes 
can sometimes be impossible to document. If an 
insured cannot satisfy the additional coverage 
requirements related to loan losses, then only 
that portion of the aggregate loss not related to 
loans, if any, can be recovered. Thus, if a poli-
cyholder can evidence losses attributable to some 
nexus outside the definition of a loan, then that 
claim may avoid the additional requirements for 
coverage.
 Third-party claims are one further area of 
potential dispute that deserves mention in con-
nection with insuring agreement A. Generally, 
such claims are covered if they relate to actual 
payments made to third parties by the insured 
to settle claims attributable to dishonest acts of 
the insured’s employees. Conversely, carriers are 
generally not required to afford coverage to third 
parties that seek claim payments directly from a 
separate insured’s carrier, regardless of whether 
the dishonest acts of the insured’s employee gave 
rise to the claim.
3		Keeley,	Michael,	and	Harvey	C.	Koch,	“Employee	Dishonesty:	The	Essential	Elements	of	Coverage	Under	Insuring	Agreement	(A).”	In	Financial Institution 
Bonds,	edited	by	Duncan	L.	Clore,	28–29,	American	Bar	Association,	1998.
4		Financial	Institution	Bond,	Standard	Form	No.	24,	Conditions	and	Limitation—Definitions,	Section	1(m).	In	Financial Institution Bonds,	edited	by	Duncan	L.	
Clore,	683,	American	Bar	Association,	1998.
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Insuring Agreement B—On Premises
Insuring agreement B covers the loss of prop-
erty on the insured’s premises that results directly 
from robbery, burglary, misplacement, mysteri-
ous unexplainable disappearance, theft, false pre-
tenses, and common-law or statutory larceny. It 
also covers loss or damage to the insured’s office 
itself and loss or damage to furniture, fixtures, 
supplies, and equipment resulting from theft, 
burglary, robbery, malicious mischief, larceny, or 
vandalism, as long as the insured is the owner 
of such property or liable for such loss or dam-
age. Notably, insuring agreement B specifically 
excludes coverage for losses caused by fire.
 Coverage issues that may arise in connection 
with the on premises provision often involve 
whether the loss actually occurred on the prem-
ises, as required for coverage. For example, if a 
fraudster calling from a location other than the 
premises of a bank convinces a bank employee to 
purchase fictitious bonds, the bank would likely 
be denied coverage under the on premises provi-
sion. Because at the time of loss the fraudster was 
able to effect the fraudulent transfers from the 
bank to his or her account by telephone from a 
remote location and not on the premises of the 
bank, the loss would not satisfy the physical pres-
ence requirement of this provision.
Insuring Agreement C—In Transit
Insuring agreement C covers the loss of property 
resulting directly from robbery, common-law or 
statutory larceny, theft, misplacement, and mys-
terious unexplainable disappearance when the 
property is in transit anywhere in the custody of 
a messenger or transportation company (or as a 
replacement thereof in an emergency situation). 
Coverage begins upon receipt of the property by 
the messenger or transportation company and 
ends on its delivery to the designated recipient.
Insuring Agreement D—Forgery or Alteration
Insuring agreement D covers losses resulting  
directly from the forgery or alteration of any  
negotiable instrument, acceptance, withdrawal 
order, receipt for the withdrawal of property, cer-
tificate of deposit, or letter of credit specified in the 
insuring agreement. Such losses include the un-
authorized transfer of funds as well as the creation 
of unauthorized credit lines.
 Coverage issues that may arise in connection 
with the forgery or alteration provision involve 
the question of what constitutes forgery and alter-
ation. First, the definition of forgery encompasses 
“the signing of the name of another person or 
organization”5; it is unclear whether this would 
extend to fictitious persons or payees. Second, 
alteration is undefined in the policy; however, 
courts often look to Uniform Commercial Code 
§307-407(a) for meaning in order to determine 
whether certain acts meet the threshold defini-
tion for coverage.
Insuring Agreement E—Securities
Insuring agreement E covers losses resulting di-
rectly from the insured having acquired, sold, de-
livered, given value, extended credit, or assumed 
liability for a financial instrument, based on the 
insured’s belief that the original financial instru-
ment obtained was authentic but which was later 
determined to have a forged signature or been 
altered, lost, or stolen. The loss can occur in the 
insured’s account or the account of a third party. 
The transaction must have been entered into in 
good faith and the insured must have relied on 
the authenticity of the original financial instru-
ment for the insured to seek coverage.
Insuring Agreement F—Counterfeit Money
Insuring agreement F covers losses resulting di-
rectly from the receipt of any counterfeit mon-
ey of the United States, Canada, or any other 
country in which the insured maintains a branch 
office. The transaction must have been entered 
into in good faith for the insured to seek cover-
age. Relatively high deductibles typically accom-
pany such coverage, so claims are rare.
5		Michael	R.	Davidson,	The Other Insuring Agreements of Commercial Crime Policies,	in	Commercial Crime Policy, Second Edition,	edited	by	Randall	I	
Marmor	and	John	J.	Tomaine,	288,	American	Bar	Association,	2005.
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Insuring Agreement G—Fraudulent Mortgages
Insuring agreement G covers losses resulting di-
rectly from the acceptance by the policyholder of 
any real property mortgage that proves defective 
due to a fraudulent signature.
Computer Systems Fraud Insuring Agreement 
(Rider)
This rider covers losses resulting directly from 
fraudulent electronic data entry or a change of 
electronic data or computer program within a 
computer system covered under the rider.
Extortion—Threats to Persons Insuring 
Agreement (Rider)
This rider covers losses resulting directly from 
the surrender of property by the insured due to a 
threat to the insured to do bodily harm to one of 
its directors, trustees, employees, or partners, or 
a relative of any of the preceding, when such an 
individual or individuals have been kidnapped or 
allegedly been kidnapped.
Extortion—Threats to Property Insuring 
Agreement (Rider)
This rider covers losses resulting directly from 
the surrender of property by the insured due to 
a threat to the insured to do damage to any of its 
premises or properties.
General Agreements
In addition to the specific insuring agreements and 
riders previously enumerated, FIBs also contain the 
following six general agreements:
Nominees
In the event of an assignment of some or all of 
the insured’s employees to a specific entity cre-
ated to handle business transactions for the in-
sured, any losses sustained by that entity would 
be treated in the same manner as if they were 
sustained directly by the insured.
Additional Offices or Employees: Consolidation, 
Merger, or Purchase of Assets—Notice
In the event of a change in the risk profile of 
the insured due to growth in its business through 
consolidation, purchase, merger, or acquisition, 
written notification from the insured to the in-
surer is required before the effective date of such 
combination. Written consent related to the ex-
panded coverage must be obtained from the in-
surer, and any additional premium must be paid 
prior to securing coverage. Notice and additional 
premium payments are not required for organic 
growth until the next policy period.
Change of Control—Notice
In the event of a change in control of the insured, 
the insured is required to provide written notice 
to the insurer upon the insured’s learning of the 
change. Control is defined as “the power to de-
termine the management or policy of a control-
ling holding company or the Insured by virtue of 
voting stock ownership.”6 A change in direct or 
indirect ownership of 10 percent or more of the 
voting stock is considered a change in control for 
this notice provision.
Representation of Insured
The representations of the insured made in its 
application for the bond must be complete, true, 
and correct. “Any misrepresentation, omission, 
concealment, or any incorrect statement of a ma-
terial fact” can result in rescission of the bond by 
the insurer.7
Joint Insured
In the event that multiple insureds are covered 
under the bond, the first named insured will act 
for all insureds. If the first named insured ceases 
to be covered, the next named insured will act 
for the remaining insureds. Aggregate losses for 
all insureds are limited to the amount that would 
have otherwise been sustained if there was only 
one insured. In addition, knowledge of one of 
the insureds is deemed to be possessed by all of 
the insureds.
Notice of Legal Proceedings Against Insured—
Election to Defend
In the event a legal proceeding is brought against 
the insured, it should notify the insurer as soon 
as practicable but in no event later than 30 days 
6	See	the	“General	Agreements”	section	of	Financial	Institution	Bond	Standard	Form	No.	24.
7	Ibid.
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after notice thereof. Legal proceedings requiring 
notice are those that might constitute a loss under 
the bond. The insured also must provide copies 
of all relevant pleadings and documents to the 
insurer when giving notice. If the insurer elects 
to defend the insured in whole or in part, any 
settlements, judgments, and legal expenses will 
be deemed to be covered losses under the bond.
Conditions and Limitations
Conditions and limitations are located in the FIB 
immediately after the general agreements previously 
described. There are 21 definitions in the “Condi-
tions and Limitations” section of the FIB. The fol-
lowing two key definitions can be the subject of 
differing coverage interpretations:
Employee
An employee is defined as
(1)  an officer or other employee of the In-
sured, while employed in, at, or by any of 
the Insured’s offices or premises covered 
hereunder, and a guest student pursuing 
studies or duties in any of said offices or 
premises;
(2)  any attorney retained by the Insured and 
an employee of such attorney while ei-
ther is performing legal services for the 
Insured;
(3)  a person provided by an employment con-
tractor to perform employee duties for the 
Insured under the Insured’s supervision at 
any of the Insured’s offices or premises 
covered hereunder;
(4)  an employee of an institution merged or 
consolidated with the Insured prior to the 
effective date of this bond; and
(5)  each natural person, partnership or corpo-
ration authorized by the Insured to per-
form services as data processor of checks 
or other accounting records of the Insured 
(not including preparation or modification 
of computer software or programs), here-
in called Processor. (Each such Processor, 
and the partners, officers and employees 
of such Processor shall, collectively, be 
deemed to be one Employee for all the 
purposes of this bond, excepting, howev-
er, the second paragraph of Section 12. (A 
Federal Reserve Bank or clearing house 
shall not be construed to be a processor.)8
 Because coverage generally depends on the 
acts of the insured’s employees, the definition of 
an employee can be an important determinant 
of whether a loss is covered. Most policy lan-
guage does not require that specific employees 
committing a dishonest act be identified in order 
to recover losses, despite the legal threshold that 
fraud be proven with particularity in the crimi-
nal context. Contractors and agents generally do 
not fall within the definition of an employee but 
part-time employees generally do. Courts look 
at the level of control the insured has over the 
person committing the dishonest act when seek-
ing to determine if that person is an employee. 
Persons controlling their own actions typically 
do not meet the definition of an employee.
Loan
A loan is defined as “all extensions of credit by 
the Insured and all transactions creating a creditor 
relationship in favor of the Insured and all trans-
actions by which the Insured assumes an existing 
creditor relationship.”9
As previously discussed in the section on fidelity 
insuring agreements, additional coverage require-
ments arise if a transaction is considered a loan, as 
previously defined—specifically, the need for the 
insured to prove collusion and demonstrate that the 
employee committing the wrongful act received a 
financial benefit of at least $2,500. Accordingly, de-
termining whether a transaction is a loan can deter-
mine whether a loss is wholly covered.
Exclusions
The “Exclusions” section of the FIB follows the def-
initions in the “Conditions and Limitations” section 
and lists 26 specific exclusions. Some of the more 
relevant exclusions are discussed subsequently.
8	See	the	“Conditions	and	Limitations”	section	of	Financial	Institution	Bond	Standard	Form	No.	24.
9	Ibid.
Chapter 13.indd   259 8/4/09   1:09:54 PM
260
The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud
Several of the exclusions limit coverage to the 
conditions described in the “Insuring Agreements” 
section. For example, the FIB does not cover losses 
attributable to forgery or alteration unless covered 
under insuring agreements A, D, E, or F. Similarly, 
losses attributable to civil unrest are not covered in 
transit unless, firstly, they meet the criteria of in-
suring agreement C and, secondly, no knowledge 
of the unrest was present prior to initiating transit. 
Losses caused by an employee also are excluded un-
less covered by insuring agreement A, B, or C.
Income not realized by the insured also is ex-
cluded because such losses are typically unknown at 
the time of underwriting, and they represent future 
costs generally not intended to be covered. The po-
tential income exclusion usually results in coverage 
for only direct, out-of-pocket losses. Unpaid inter-
est income on fictitious loans, for example, would 
generally not be covered; however, inconsistent 
court rulings exist on this issue.
Damages of any type for which an insured is lia-
ble, other than compensatory damages, are not cov-
ered. Thus, punitive damages are not covered even 
if the insured is found liable to pay them by a court. 
In addition, damages resulting from any legal pro-
ceeding in which the insured allegedly violated the 
Racketeering and Influencing Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act statutes are not covered unless the insured 
establishes that the acts giving rise to the violations 
were committed by an employee and caused a loss 
under insuring agreement A.
Fees and expenses related to investigating, quan-
tifying, and documenting the loss are not covered 
in the standard form. Neither are indirect or con-
sequential losses. However, additional coverage for 
such costs is usually available and often obtained by 
the insured.
Commercial Crime Policy
The current coverage provisions of the CCP are 
generally the same as those found in the rudimen-
tary form of the policy that originated back in 1940, 
unlike the FIB, which underwent significant re- 
visions since its inception in 1986. Most CCPs cov-
er losses sustained during the policy period as long 
as they are discovered within one year after the ter-
mination date, unlike the FIB, which covers only 
losses discovered during the policy period. Most 
other provisions of the FIB generally mirror those 
of the CCP. The SFAA offers five coverage forms 
under the CCP, and they are detailed in box 13-1.
Box 13-1:  Commercial Crime Policy Coverage 
Forms
Coverage Form A—Blanket Employee 
Dishonesty
This form provides coverage for losses 
caused by the dishonest acts of all of the 
insured’s employees.
Coverage Form A—Schedule Employee 
Dishonesty
This form provides coverage for losses 
caused by the dishonest acts of only the 
insured’s employees listed on the schedule 
of the coverage form.
Coverage Form B—Forgery or Alteration
This form provides coverage for losses 
caused by the forgery of checks and other 
financial instruments issued by the insured.
Coverage Form O—Public Employee  
Dishonesty (per Loss)
This form provides coverage for losses 
caused by the dishonest acts of an employ-
ee of a governmental entity. The coverage 
limit applies to a single occurrence, regard-
less of the number of employees who may 
be involved in the loss.
Coverage Form O—Public Employee  
Dishonesty (per Employee)
This form provides coverage for losses 
caused by the dishonest acts of an employ-
ee of a governmental entity. The coverage 
limit applies to each employee involved in 
a single occurrence.
In addition to the CCP, the SFAA also offers 
the crime protection policy (CPP), which contains 
fidelity, forgery, burglary, and theft coverage in a 
single, all-inclusive policy form. The six insuring 
agreements of the CPP are very similar to those 
previously described in connection with the FIB, 
namely employee dishonesty, forgery or alteration, 
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loss inside the premises, loss outside the premises, 
computer fraud, and money orders and counter-
feit paper currency. Although the coverage may be 
similar, the FIB, as its name connotes, is for financial 
institutions, and the CCP and CPP have broader 
application for other industries. Two additional 
available insuring agreements beyond the basic form 
are loss of clients’ property resulting from employee 
dishonesty and funds transfer fraud; each of these ad-
ditional agreements can be added by endorsement. 
The SFAA’s CPP may contain between one and 
eight of the specific insuring agreements previously 
enumerated.
The CPP covers all losses discovered during the 
policy period, regardless of when the dishonest acts 
giving rise to the loss occurred. The CPP is available 
only to mercantile entities, not government entities. 
The employee dishonesty and forgery provisions 
of the CCP are basically identical to those in the 
CPP.
The Insurance Services Office (ISO) offered the 
following four stand-alone crime policies shortly 
after the SFAA introduced the CPP on March 1, 
2000:
 1.  CCP (discovery form)
 2.  CCP (loss sustained form)
 3.  Employee theft and forgery policy (discovery 
form)
 4.  Employee theft and forgery policy (loss sus-
tained form)
The most significant difference between the 
crime forms of the ISO and those of the SFAA’s 
CPP is the ISO’s use of employee theft language in 
the fidelity insuring agreement, as opposed to em-
ployee dishonesty. This is important because under 
the theft language provided in the ISO’s forms, the 
insured is not required to prove the employee’s in-
tent to cause the insured a loss and obtain a financial 
benefit, as required under the dishonesty language 
used by the SFAA. Instead, for the ISO form, the 
claimant is required only to demonstrate that a theft 
occurred to the detriment of the insured.
In summary, two general categories of fidelity 
policies have been reviewed here: those with loss 
sustained coverage and those with discovery cover-
age. Loss sustained coverage provides coverage for 
losses that occur during the policy period and are 
discovered either during the policy period or within 
a limited time thereafter. Discovery coverage pro-
vides coverage for losses that are discovered during 
the policy period or within a limited time thereafter, 
regardless of when the acts or events causing the loss 
occurred. Table 13-1 outlines the different crime 
policy categories and their attributes graphically.
Fidelity Claims: The Process
As anyone familiar with preparing an insurance 
claim knows, several elements are key to success. 
Chief among these are timeliness of reporting and 
communications and thoroughness in document-
ing the claim or claims. Another vital component 
is having the right investigative and claims teams in 
place. Lastly, management must have the willingness 
to work cooperatively, not only with the insurer 
and broker but also with outside advisors and the 
internal personnel necessary to ensure that all aspects 
of the claim are appropriately reviewed, evidenced, 
and submitted.
Every policy is different; insureds must first re-
view their policy and understand their specific re-
quirements for coverage in order to determine if 
they should file a claim. If the policy language is 
ambiguous, it will be interpreted by the courts in 
favor of the insured; however, such a determination 
of coverage is made based on a review of the policy 
as a whole.
Notice
Providing timely notice of a suspected or proven 
loss can be the first step to a successful claim; fail-
ure to give adequate or timely notice, on the other 
hand, can seriously impede a settlement and even 
negate coverage. As previously noted, in the event 
of a loss, the insured is required to give notice to 
its carrier “as soon as possible” after discovery of a 
loss.10 In this context, discovery occurs when the 
insured “first become[s] aware of facts which would 
cause a reasonable person to assume that a loss cov-
ered by this policy has been or will be incurred, 
10	The Commercial Crime Policy,	Master	Appendix	Exhibit	B,	Commercial	Crime	Policy	(Discovery	Form)	Standard	Form	No.	CR	00227,	695.
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even though the exact amount or details of loss may 
not then be known.”11
Thus, a reasonableness test is what dictates the 
triggering of the notice provision. Alternatively, 
discovery can occur in connection with a third-
party claim when the insured “receive[s] notice of 
an actual or potential claim [ ] alleging facts that if 
true would constitute a covered loss under [the] 
policy.”12 Mere suspicion is generally insufficient to 
qualify as discovery and actual knowledge is gen-
erally too stringent. Therefore, the reasonableness 
test in determining the trigger of discovery generally 
falls somewhere between mere suspicion and actual 
knowledge.
The standard for providing notice after discovery 
is a reasonable time. Although a typical policy does 
not provide for any specific type of notice, the notice 
should be sufficient to enable the insurer to protect 
its interest. For example, the insurer should gener-
ally be afforded the opportunity to initiate its own 
investigation when witnesses to the facts of a loss are 
still presumed to be largely available. Detailed infor-
mation on the quantum of the loss is not necessary 
at the time of notice, although it can be helpful to 
the carrier in setting reserves. Importantly, commu-
nicating notice using the telephone is typically not 
sufficient; some formal issue of a written notice must 
be provided by the claimant to the insurer.
Investigation Protocol
Fraud investigations most often begin with tips from 
employees or anonymous sources.13 Such investiga-
tions usually concern specific allegations from which 
one or more fraud hypotheses are developed and 
tested. Because of whistle-blower hotlines, some or-
ganizations are inundated with allegations of fraud 
and other improprieties. Accordingly, developing 
a protocol for properly investigating such claims is 
important so management, internal audit, or an in-
vestigative unit can sift through allegations and rea-
sonably evaluate which may have merit and which 
do not. Having a formal protocol can help ensure 
that all allegations are thoroughly addressed and 
management’s fiduciary responsibility to sharehold-
ers is met. An investigative protocol that is prop-
erly developed, implemented, and applied can im-
prove consistency in the investigative approach and 
the response to the alleged wrongdoing. It also can 
serve as a deterrent to future fraudsters because the 
perceived opportunity to commit fraud is reduced. 
Moreover, because litigation is always a potential 
when prosecuting fraudsters or otherwise recover-
ing monies, those investigating fraud should con-
duct their inquiries under the direction of internal 
or outside counsel to protect any legal privileges or 
confidentiality that may apply.
The Investigative Team
Many fraud investigations begin internally by us-
ing company resources. Depending on the gravity 
of the allegations and their potential severity, the 
investigations can escalate and external professional 
resources are often engaged to independently ex-
amine allegations. Such resources should be experi-
enced in both fraud investigations and fidelity claims 
and recovery. From the opening moments of the 
investigation, the team should include a claims pro-
fessional to help plan and execute the project and 
ensure that insurance considerations are appropri-
ately addressed. That claims professional can assist 
with the following:
	 •		Assessing	possible	recovery	options	and	identify-
ing potential coverage that may respond
	 •		Complying	with	notice	and	proof-of-loss	 
provisions in the relevant policies
	 •		Developing	a	claim	strategy
	 •		Managing	and	accelerating	the	claim	process
	 •		Providing	preliminary	loss	estimates	to	help	the	
adjuster with reserve setting
	 •		Obtaining	and	preserving	evidence,	including	
requesting or conducting computer forensic 
analyses (for example, imaging hard drives,  
querying e-mails, and conducting other elec-
tronic discovery)
11	Ibid.
12	Ibid.
13		See	the	“Initial	Detection	of	Occupational	Fraud”	chart	on	page	18	of	the	2008	Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners	Report to the Nation on 
Occupational Fraud & Abuse.
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	 •		Interviewing	parties	relevant	to	the	investigation
	 •		Responding	to	information	requests	from	the	
carrier(s)
	 •		Coordinating	the	communications	among,	and	
efforts of, internal departments involved in claim 
preparation (for example, Legal, Risk Manage-
ment, Finance, Accounting, Internal Audit, 
Marketing, Operations, Human Resources, and 
so on) within the insured’s company
	 •		Coordinating	communication	with	external	
parties (for example, outside counsel, insurers, 
adjusters, insurer’s accountants, brokers, lenders, 
and so on)
	 •		Managing	expectations	of	the	insured	and	the	
carrier
	 •		Preparing	a	well-documented	proof	of	loss
	 •		Obtaining	partial	payments	on	segmented	claims
	 •		Working	toward	a	fair	and	timely	claim 
settlement
Failure to utilize an experienced claim profession-
al on the investigative team can result in an unde-
sirable outcome—chief of which is an unsupported 
claim, which could result in denial of said claim or 
a delayed or inadequate claim settlement due to 
inadequate claim support and insufficient coop-
eration with the carrier’s adjusters and accountants. 
Other oversights that can place limitations on the 
claims team include overlooked sources of recovery, 
spoliation of evidence, and voided coverage due to 
noncompliance with provisions governing timely 
notice and proof of loss. One other potential dan-
ger is inadequate reserves on the part of the carrier, 
though this is a circumstance over which any indi-
vidual insured has less control. In addition to the 
claim professionals, who are often focused on the 
quantum portion of the loss, outside counsel should 
be considered to assist with the coverage or liability 
portion of the loss. Counsel is especially important if 
coverage issues are complex or the insured believes 
the claim will be contentious.
Despite the prevalence of fraud and corruption 
throughout business over time, large-scale finan-
cial fraud remains rare enough that one individual 
company is unlikely to face it frequently, which is a 
fact that surely gives management some small com-
fort. However, in the case of a significant investi-
gation, both the examination of the fraud and the 
ensuing claims process can be new to many on the 
internal team. In the case of a significant and po-
tentially damaging fraud risk (sometimes alluded to 
as a “bet-the-company” case), it is therefore worth 
remembering that management and its claims team 
will likely be on unfamiliar ground. In the case of 
a public company, for example, a company’s ob-
ligations to shareholders and the board should be 
managed by counsel. The protocols for a successful 
insurance claim also will depend on the advice of 
outside experts.
Consequently, it is helpful for the insured to use 
independent resources. Often, the insurance compa-
ny will rely on a team of experienced loss adjusters, 
third-party accountants, and, sometimes, external 
counsel. These are practical and prudent resources 
for the insured to rely on, as well as to mirror the 
expertise of the carrier team. In addition to poten-
tial external consultants and attorneys, the insured’s 
claim team also should include key stakeholders from 
its Legal, Risk Management, Finance, Accounting, 
Operations, and Human Resources departments 
and from any other relevant departments, as need-
ed. A cohesive team helps ensure adequate internal 
communication, representation of all constituents, 
accurate claim development, optimal claim strategy, 
departmental accountability, and accelerated claims. 
Company management should appoint a designated 
leader of the claim team to manage the claim process 
and establish a single point of communication with 
the carrier.
Comparing Fraud 
Investigation Reports to 
Other Types of Claims
Fraud Investigation Versus Fidelity 
Claim
Conducting fraud investigations and preparing insur-
ance claims are not identical. A fraud investigation 
often identifies potentially illegal acts and quantifies 
the resultant losses, but a typical investigative report 
of findings for management may not be sufficient 
support for a fidelity claim, which must conform 
to policy provisions. In contrast to a findings report 
for management, which may not have a specific 
threshold of proof, fidelity claims must be well doc-
umented and must usually pass a reasonableness test 
for full recovery. Different thresholds of evidence 
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are relevant to each, and depending on the nature 
of the investigation and desired level of diligence 
directed by those leading it, an investigative report 
for management or a company’s audit committee 
may or may not contain suitable documentation for 
a fidelity claim.
For example, if management sought a high-level 
understanding of an alleged fraud and a ballpark esti-
mate of resultant losses, the attendant report of find-
ings would likely not be adequate for recovery under 
a CCP. Alternatively, if a company with unlimited 
resources conducted a thorough investigation that 
left no stone unturned and had contemporaneous 
supporting documentation, then such report might 
be suitable for a fidelity claim, even though that may 
not have been its intended purpose.
It is therefore critical to determine the purpose 
of a fraud investigation before it starts. The purpose 
should be based on intended or possible outcomes. 
For example, if a company does not have crime 
insurance coverage and does not plan to prosecute 
fraudsters, then it may opt to avoid expensive and 
time-consuming investigations. Companies should 
balance the necessary thoroughness of a fraud inves-
tigation and its corresponding cost with what they 
perceive will be the benefit of knowing the full story. 
They should consider this in light of their apparent 
options for recovery, through insurance claims, and 
with the desire that most companies share—to es-
tablish and uphold a zero-tolerance policy for fraud 
with absolute prosecution of fraudsters.
Fraud Investigation Versus Civil and 
Criminal Prosecution
As previously noted, a high-level fraud investigative 
report for management is likely not suitable support 
for a fidelity claim. It also is not likely to be suit-
able support for a civil action or criminal prosecu-
tion. The burden of proof in civil matters, similar to 
the reasonableness test for fidelity claims, requires 
plaintiffs to prove their claims by a preponderance 
of the evidence or a more likely than not standard. 
Criminal prosecution, as to be expected, requires an 
even higher standard of proof, requiring plaintiffs 
to prove their claims beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
an insured conceives that it may eventually seek to 
prosecute fraudsters civilly or criminally, it should 
plan the fraud investigation to ensure that relevant 
evidentiary requirements of both proceedings will be 
met without significant rework. This is particularly 
important with regard to electronic evidence and 
fraudster confessions. Quantifying losses in connec-
tion with a fraud investigation may require several 
different iterations that comport with the relevant 
evidentiary requirements of a management report, 
fidelity claim, civil matter, or criminal matter.
Phases of a Fraud 
Investigation
Depending on how suspicion of fraud arises, the 
circumstances of an investigation and its conduct 
can differ widely. Some investigations end shortly 
after they begin, such as those involving allegations 
that clearly lack merit. Fraud investigations that in-
volve fidelity claims generally have five constitutive 
phases, including identifying what type of fraud may 
have occurred; planning an investigation and de-
ploying the necessary resources gathering evidence, 
including electronic documentation; drawing con-
clusions from the investigation; and reporting to 
management.
Following these come the two compensatory 
phases in which a company seeks redress, firstly, 
through actual recovery and restoration of property 
that has been fraudulently obtained or through pre-
viously described insurance claims and, secondly, 
through prosecution, litigation, or settlement. Al-
though insurance is sometimes not considered as an 
option for recovery until after a fraud investigation 
has concluded, it is important, as previously dis-
cussed, to plan and execute the investigation with 
a possible claim in mind when coverage may exist. 
If a company cannot, through negotiation, recover 
losses from the fraudsters who caused them, then 
the company should consider seeking to prosecute 
those individuals. Other avenues of recovery for the 
victim organization, assuming it has crime coverage 
and its claim gets denied, include litigation against 
its carrier to determine coverage for insured losses 
and pursuing potential bad faith claims.
The ensuing section, therefore, describes the 
typical elements of the insurance recovery phase, 
although some components may occur in earlier 
phases. Figure 13-1 depicts the six primary elements, 
which occur in order.
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Preliminary Loss Estimate
The claim team should endeavor to develop a pre-
liminary loss estimate shortly after discovery and 
typically within 30–60 days after providing notice 
of a potential claim to the insurer. Some investi-
gations, especially those involving complex fraud 
schemes, may obviously require longer than 60 days 
for even preliminary loss estimates; however, esti-
mates should be formulated and communicated to 
the insurer as soon as practical. The preliminary loss 
estimate is very important to the claims process be-
cause it establishes a potential claim range that the 
insurer can use to set an appropriate reserve.
The preliminary loss estimate must be presented 
appropriately and be based on the limited informa-
tion available at the time it was prepared. It also 
should be stressed that the preliminary loss estimate 
will change as the investigation progresses and as 
additional information and supporting documenta-
tion is obtained. Unlike property claims, in which 
losses can be both substantial and more easily verified 
(that is, visible) and under which insureds can seek 
and obtain cash advances based on a preliminary loss 
estimate, fidelity claims generally require full in-
vestigation by the insurer prior to their issuing any 
payment.
Loss Investigation
Investigating a loss usually begins immediately on 
its discovery and continues during formulation of 
the preliminary loss estimate. This preliminary loss 
estimate is a high-level task because it often is devel-
oped by making some significant assumptions; the 
investigation phase, therefore, seeks to thoroughly 
delve into the details and identify the pertinent facts 
surrounding the loss. During this more detailed 
phase, the forensic accountant or investigator must 
pay particular attention to what caused the loss (that 
is, to link the insured’s loss with fraudulent acts of its 
employees). Interviews and data collection should 
typically start with those most distant from the 
fraudsters and work inward toward the fraudsters, 
gathering facts and understanding the loss prior to 
interviewing them.
The investigation also should develop and sup-
port a reasonable fraud hypothesis, based on the facts 
ascertained. Investigating fraud is an iterative process 
in which individual hypotheses should be formulated 
and either proven or disproven prior to developing 
and testing a new hypothesis. Developing and test-
ing multiple hypotheses at the same time can render 
the investigation ineffective and cause it to drag on, 
often leading to no definitive conclusion. Although 
fraud is a legal conclusion that requires proving li-
ability, losses can be quantified and recovery can be 
sought based on reasonable assumptions and facts 
that support the fraud hypothesis.
Loss Documentation
Data that documents a loss should be compiled 
throughout the investigation and corroborating evi-
dence should support the hypothesis from the per-
spective of both liability and quantum. For obvious 
reasons, confessions are considered the most pro-
bative evidence of dishonesty. A report of findings 
should include detailed, cross-referenced exhibits, 
including confessions (if available) that state with 
specificity the facts underlying dishonest employee 
involvement. All such documentation should be 
compiled, referenced, and provided to the carrier as 
part of the claim. Copies are acceptable and origi-
nals should be returned to the insured to preserve 
chain-of-custody for potential use in prosecution 
of the wrongdoers. The report should contain only 
facts, not opinions, and the loss documentation 
should support those facts. Adequate supporting 
Preliminary
Loss
Estimate
Investigation Documentation Submission Settlement Subrogation
Figure 13-1: Typical Fidelity Claim Process
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documentation is often key to a successful claim, 
both in terms of timeliness of payment and amount 
of recovery. However, many claims can be difficult 
to support, particularly those involving cash pay-
ments, complex schemes, poor financial records, 
or experienced fraudsters. Creativity, investigative 
skills, and technical prowess can sometimes over-
come supporting documentation challenges. Aside 
from coverage issues, documentation challenges are 
often primary drivers of claim reductions (see sub-
sequent sidebars).
Developing and Submitting a Claim
The next step is to combine the results of an inves-
tigation and supporting documentation into a com-
prehensive report of findings or formal proof of loss. 
There is no standard proof of loss form; most carri-
ers prefer their own. In addition, there is generally 
no specific requirement on the part of the insured 
in preparing the proof of loss, other than enabling 
the carrier to fairly and correctly assess its rights and 
liabilities. In that context, it is prudent to itemize 
losses and open financial records to the extent pos-
sible to satisfy reasonable requests from the carrier so 
they may fully investigate the loss. Periodic meet-
ings with the carrier and its claim team to explain 
the background of the loss, as well as the loss meth-
odology and supporting documentation, will help 
facilitate understanding of the carrier, manage ex-
pectations, and expedite settlement of the claim.
Negotiating and Settling Claims
After the insured submits a fidelity claim, the car-
rier verifies the particulars of the claim. During this 
period, the carrier conducts its own due diligence 
and investigation to verify both its obligation to pay 
a claim and the amount of said claim. The length of 
this period can vary significantly depending on mul-
tiple factors, including the complexity of the claim, 
amount of supporting documentation provided, and 
experience and diligence of the carrier’s and in-
sured’s claim teams. Once the carrier is satisfied with 
its obligation to pay and has determined the amount 
it believes it owes under the coverage afforded by its 
policy, negotiations typically occur with the claim 
teams and a settlement is reached.
Subrogation
Subrogation is the right of the carrier to be put in 
the position of the insured in order to pursue re-
covery from third parties who may be legally re-
sponsible to the insured for the loss paid by the 
insurer. Subrogation often occurs after the claim is 
paid by the carrier, although it may occur sooner. 
Recovery efforts from the fraudsters should be con-
current with the claims process. If the fidelity claim 
is denied, the insured still benefits if some level of 
recovery is successful against the fraudsters. If the 
claim is paid by the carrier, the carrier benefits with 
an offset to the claim payment. Most importantly, 
prosecuting fraudsters sends a message throughout 
the insured’s organization that those who commit 
fraud will be pursued and prosecuted. This can serve 
as a significant deterrent to would-be perpetrators 
in the future.
D&O Insurance Liability 
Insurance Protection
D&O insurance coverage provides D&O with in-
demnity and defense coverage for claims related to 
the management of the organization. Arguably, the 
1990s saw the largest increase in the procurement 
of higher limits of D&O coverage. Premiums for 
such coverage rose about 10 percent annually dur-
ing the mid-1990s before another dramatic upswing 
in premiums occurred, coupled with a reduction 
of insureds’ capacity to take on more risk after the 
Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, WorldCom, and Parmalat 
debacles.
However, although there was a large spike in the 
number of D&O claims reported in the early part 
of the 21st century, their volume is beginning to 
decrease. The direct cause for this decrease is dif-
ficult to pinpoint but likely involves a combination 
of the following factors: the distraction of plaintiffs’ 
counsel to focus on a few very large cases, as a result 
of a spate of options backdating cases; the rigorous 
involvement of regulators; relative stock market sta-
bility in a growth market; and some of the recent 
high-profile settlements and punishments in fraud 
cases.
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In the final analysis, however, the enactment of 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be the 
biggest contributing factor. Targeting corporate 
disclosures and establishing criminal liability for their 
misrepresentations, the act has the explicit goal of 
eliminating expense abuses, off-balance sheet invest-
ment vehicles, and other corporate misdeeds.
Wrongful Acts Committed 
by D&O
Although the frequency of D&O claims has recently 
begun to wane, the severity of those claims, espe-
cially those against Fortune 100 companies, has con-
sistently increased over the last decade, and there 
are no indications that this trend will soon change. 
These lawsuits and claims are spurred by many 
causes, including allegations of inaccurate disclosure, 
stock options backdating, employee discrimination, 
and wrongful termination. Of these, the major-
ity of claims over the past decade, especially those 
involving large, publicly-traded companies, have 
been triggered by inaccurate financial reporting and 
deceptive accounting practices that were designed to 
give the impression that the company was perform-
ing much better than it actually was. The following 
sections summarize these types of claims, explaining 
their causes.
Inaccurate Disclosure (Including 
Financial Reporting)
D&O insurance coverage is frequently provoked 
by a claim of some form of inaccurate disclosure or 
irregular accounting practices. In these situations, 
companies and their directors or officers are alleged 
to have misled their investors by overstating their 
earnings or the values of organizations they have ac-
quired in order to improve the appearance of their 
financial success and growth. Once discovered, the 
inaccurate financial reports are corrected with a re-
statement of the affected years’ reports, usually lead-
ing to significant loss in historical revenue and a cor-
responding drop in stock price.
Options Backdating
Exposure to a claim against D&O coverage from 
options backdating occurs when a company execu-
tive receives their stock options in the company at 
a retroactive, favorable price (sometimes right after 
the release of negative news or before a sharp gain in 
stock price), which results in an added financial gain 
for the holders of said options at a later time. Not 
only does this expose D&O to claims of fraudulent 
Fidelity Claim in Focus: 
Documentation  
Challenges in a Shipping 
Industry Payroll Fraud
A shipping company discovered a multimil-
lion dollar payroll fraud that had been occurring 
aboard its ships for several years. The fraud 
scheme was discovered by an internal auditor 
through a tip from a crew member on one of 
the company’s ships. All payroll payments to 
crew members were paid in cash onboard the 
ships. The fraudsters responsible for counting 
and distributing the cash to the crew colluded on 
each ship to inflate the cash payroll primarily 
through a ghost employee scheme. When payroll 
was funded, the fraudsters simply retained the 
excess cash that was purportedly to be paid to 
the ghost employees. Because the payments were 
made in cash on the high seas, it was difficult 
to demonstrate that the loss occurred, as well as 
determine the size of the loss. Unless one was 
involved in the fraud or physically present to wit-
ness the entire cash payment process, it would be 
difficult to identify and trace the excess payments 
because they were made in cash and, thus, there 
was no audit trail. The investigation and fidelity 
claim required a creative approach to quantify 
and support the shipping company’s losses with 
contemporaneous documentation.
Payroll records were used to determine what 
cash was funded for each crew member. Such 
records were then compared to crew manifests to 
determine whether the crew members enumerated 
in the payroll records were present on the ship 
to collect their cash payment. Physical presence 
on the ship is a requirement for crew members to 
receive payroll payments. The payments to crew 
members that were not on the ship were deemed 
to be fraudulent. This approach to the quantifi-
cation was corroborated by the fraudsters during 
investigative interviews.
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or illicit behavior, it also amounts to a violation of 
security laws and further likely triggers tax liability 
for the company (because in retroactively revalu-
ing the stock awards and accounting for their value, 
the company’s tax basis may change). In essence, 
backdating allows for the use of hindsight when 
determining the grant date for stock options and, 
therefore, the price. Also, backdating gives the ap-
pearance that the contract was issued “at the mon-
ey” in the past, when the contract is actually “in the 
money.”
According to data from Bloomberg L.P., as of 
April 2007, more than 200 companies had been 
investigated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) or announced their own inqui-
ries into how they had set options prices.14 Eighty 
D&O have lost their jobs and companies face more 
than 400 options-related lawsuits. Although this 
conduct typically does not result in prison time, an 
executive recently was sentenced to over 1 year in 
jail, raising the stakes for all those involved.
Employee Discrimination
This additional D&O exposure arises from situations 
in which employees of the company sue a director 
or officer of the company due to allegedly unfair 
or harassing treatment based on race, gender, age, 
and so on. Grievances usually are based on what 
the plaintiff believes is unfair treatment in regard 
to being passed over in the hiring process, promo-
tional opportunities, or a salary increase, and claims 
are made under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. This act states that an employer acts in an 
illegal and discriminatory fashion when it
 1.  fails, refuses to hire, discharges, or otherwise 
discriminates against any individual with re-
spect to his or her compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment because 
of some protected characteristic, such as race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
disability.
 2.  limits, segregates, or classifies employees or 
applicants in any way that would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
or her status as an employee because of some 
protected characteristic.
Fidelity Claim in 
Focus: Documentation 
Challenges in an Auto-
Leasing Fraud Scheme
Management of an auto-leasing company col-
luded with a lease broker to engage in a fraud 
scheme to divert monies from a $400 million 
lease portfolio. The head of the auto-leasing 
company effected over $50 million in fidelity 
losses through fictitious leases, improper payment 
transfers, retained lease payments, multiple-
funded leases, and other tactics. The scheme 
occurred over numerous years and was uncovered 
by an internal auditor. The fraud scheme was 
very complex so it took a considerable amount of 
time and effort to determine what had happened 
and how much damage had been done. Prepara-
tion of the claim required deep technical skills 
in computer forensics and data analysis because 
there was scant hard copy documentation avail-
able as support.
Various data sources, such as customer pay-
ment histories, caller notes, and account origina-
tion files, were obtained and uploaded into a 
centralized database so that account summaries 
could be created for each lease. The data in the 
database was analyzed and each lease in the 
portfolio was categorized into one of numerous 
fraud schemes, as appropriate, based on query 
results. For example, if the caller notes evidenced 
an improper payment transfer or if two differ-
ent leases had identical vehicle identification 
numbers, then the leases would be categorized 
into those two respective classifications. Reviewer 
notes describing the fraud scheme and supporting 
data available for each account summary were 
then created to support the losses. This facilitated 
understanding of the aggregate loss and acceler-
ated the ultimate claim settlement.
14	Torbenson,	Eric.	“Tangled	in	Stock	Scandal:	Several	Area	Firms	Feel	Effects	of	Options	Backdating	Inquiries.”	Dallas Morning News,	April	23,	2007.
Chapter 13.indd   269 8/4/09   1:09:58 PM
270
The Guide to Investigating Business Fraud
Wrongful Termination or Discharge
An allegation and suit based on a claim of wrongful 
termination is initiated by former employees when 
they believe that they were terminated for illegiti-
mate or discriminatory reasons. Wrongful termina-
tion claims encompass any unfair or illegal dismissal 
and can include breach of contract (regardless if a 
formal employment contract exists) or breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (a 
subset of breach of contract), whistle-blower claims 
(in which an employer dismisses an employee for re-
porting the employer to a regulatory agency), and re-
taliatory discharge (in which an employer discharges 
an employee for exercising a statutory right).
Other Events That Trigger a Claim
Typical sources of D&O claims include sharehold-
ers, shareholder-derivative actions, customers, reg-
ulators, competitors, employees, and other third-
party organizations, such as environmental activists. 
Along with the acts committed by D&O, a number 
of so-called “resulting events” can indicate that a 
misrepresentation or illegal act has been committed 
within a company. Indeed, a host of attorneys mon-
itor these situations and act quickly if they believe 
illegal or inappropriate acts have occurred.
These situations, which can precipitate legal ac-
tion brought by plaintiffs’ counsel or current or for-
mer employees, shareholders, and outside parties, 
include a significant decline in stock price, the fail-
ure of a company, a corporate reorganization, and 
the discrimination against and dismissal of one or 
more employees. Box 13-2 outlines these further 
special situations.
Box 13-2:  Potential D&O Resulting Events
•		Significant decline in stock price. claims over the past decade have been triggered by rapid, significant 
declines in the stock price of a company. Although the stock market has been rather unstable over 
this time period (which has helped inflate the number of D&O claims that are occurring), most 
of these price drops have been followed by important corporate announcements admitting to ac-
counting inaccuracies and the required restatement of financial figures from previous years.
•	 Failure of the company. As in the cases of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and many others during 
the early 2000s, many D&O lawsuits were triggered by company failures following announce-
ments of fraudulent accounting practices and the resulting collapse of the company’s stock price.
•		Corporate reorganizations (for example, a merger, acquisition, or divestiture). Some D&O exposures and 
subsequent claims have occurred following a company’s acquisition of another firm or its take-
over by an outside entity. Litigation resulting from mergers, acquisitions, or divestitures typi-
cally originates from the shareholders’ desire for the company to not participate in the merger, 
a perceived loss-of-value from the proposed terms (that is, the acquisition stock price is lower 
than key shareholders believe is appropriate), or the disclosure that the financial reports of one of 
the corporations involved in the transaction had been adjusted to improve the appearance of the 
acquisition to the public. In rare cases, a D&O claim may be brought because the purchaser has 
assumed some unanticipated and unwelcome liability (for example, legal, financial, environmen-
tal, and so on) during an asset purchase and such liability threatens the acquirer’s balance sheet, its 
market capitalization, and its perceived value going forward.
•		Discrimination or dismissal of employee. Another major trigger of D&O claims is the manner in 
which D&O interact with their employees. If an employee believes that he or she has been treat-
ed in a discriminatory manner or was terminated from his or her position for reasons beyond the 
normal scope of employment, the employee may initiate litigation against the firm or individual 
directors or officers the employee perceives to be the cause the action.
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D&O Coverage
Corporations and senior executives may find them-
selves subject to allegations, claims, and lawsuits even 
when they make decisions with the best intentions 
of ensuring legal compliance, taking ethical action, 
and making appropriate disclosures. D&O liabil-
ity insurance has become an integral feature of risk 
management programs at many U.S. corporations 
and trusts and is a requirement for recruiting and 
retaining board members and senior executives.
D&O liability policies generally provide coverage 
for the alleged wrongful acts of the insured com-
pany and D&O. Generally, such coverage is broad, 
and the actions of the insured are covered unless 
excluded or not defined within the policy as a loss. 
Similar to other types of insurance policies, D&O 
policies contain several sections, including declara-
tions; the insuring agreements, definitions, exclu-
sions, and limit of liability; and a retention clause. 
Depending on the insurer’s policy, there may be 
over 20 sections detailing policy requirements or 
provisions that impact how claims must be reported, 
payment of defense costs, cancellation of the policy, 
and more. As a result, each of these sections requires 
a thorough understanding of its components, and 
policyholders often will benefit from reviewing each 
section’s elements with their corporate risk manager 
or insurance broker. Knowing a D&O policy’s car-
rier is vital because it will guide the insured in how 
the carrier will respond to any given claim.
CFOs, treasurers, and general counsel often will 
be present when the risk manager discusses D&O 
insurance coverage options with underwriters or 
brokers. The discussion normally will include con-
templating limits, retentions, and exclusions and the 
side agreements A–C, which offer an expanded set of 
specialized coverages that can help protect the com-
pany and individual D&O. These so-called “sides” 
can be an important set of provisions for protecting 
the company and its D&O, including those who are 
meeting with the risk manager. They are worth ex-
plaining in some detail:
Insuring Agreement A (Side A)
A common coverage in U.S. companies, this 
side agreement generally provides coverage for 
defense costs and liability payments for D&O 
for any allegations of wrongful acts. It provides a 
layer of coverage exclusively for individual D&O 
and is a method to address potential severability 
issues. Side A is important for individual D&O 
because it provides coverage when the company 
does not or cannot indemnify them against a cov-
ered claim. The attractiveness of side A coverage 
is that it protects the personal assets of D&O and 
generally does not have an associated retention 
or deductible.
 Another variation on the side A coverage is for 
the company to purchase excess coverage, which 
is referred to as side A—difference in conditions. 
This option usually has fewer and less restrictive 
coverage exclusions than a traditional side A–C 
policy. In the event of a company’s insolvency, 
individual D&O remain covered.
 Side A policies that are stand-alone are attrac-
tive to many D&O because a traditional D&O 
policy that includes side A runs the risk of ex-
hausting its coverage limits due to payments of 
indemnified claims and defense costs. Stand-
alone side A coverage, however, is not used to 
pay claims against the company or reimburse the 
company for such indemnified claims. Along 
with its evident attractiveness to covered D&O, 
depending on market conditions, stand-alone 
side A coverage also may be viewed as a good 
risk for the insurers, which traditionally have 
viewed traditional D&O coverage as more likely 
to incur the payment of claims as opposed to a 
pay-out on stand-alone side A coverage. Because 
of their perception of a lower risk position, in-
surers also may offer favorable language relating 
to exclusions and severability.
Insuring Agreement B (Side B)
This coverage reimburses the corporation, not 
its D&O, for the company’s indemnification re-
sponsibilities for its individual D&O, including 
the cost of claims, settlements, and legal defense. 
Commonly, side B coverage entails a retention 
deductible. Thus, side B coverage protects the 
balance sheet of the company.
Insuring Agreement C (Side C)
This coverage reimburses the company for se-
curities claims made against the corporate entity. 
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For public companies, side C coverage responds 
to securities law claims, such as shareholders as-
serting a claim against the company in conjunc-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities. Side 
C coverage usually has a retention deductible 
similar to that of side B coverage.
Risk Management Using 
D&O Coverage
D&O coverage is offered and purchased on a claims-
made basis. Simply stated, this means that insurance 
companies write D&O policies with the require-
ments that (1) the claim must be made against the 
insured during the policy period and (2) the incident 
giving rise to the claim must occur within the policy 
period. Importantly, with regard to this second re-
quirement, an organization will face a gap in cov-
erage any time it changes insurance carriers. As a 
result, many insurers will extend the policy period 
retroactively by providing prior acts coverage or will 
extend the retroactive date to the date of the initial 
policy’s inception. Prior acts or retroactive coverage 
is critically important with claims-made coverage.
For the corporate CFO or risk manager seeking 
to transfer risk by using D&O coverage, a number 
of considerations come into play. Some issues to 
review internally, as well as with the corporation’s 
insurance broker (preferably before the policy is 
bound) can be found in box 13-3.
Box 13-3:  Risk Transfer Assessment Considerations
•		What	is	the	corporation’s	philosophy	toward	retaining	and	managing	risk,	as	opposed	to	transfer-
ring it?
•		How	has	this	philosophy	been	validated	by	the	past	history	of	risks,	exposures,	and	claims?
•		What	is	the	risk	appetite	of	the	board	and	its	individual	members?
•		How	much	coverage	should	be	purchased?	What	is	the	cost	of	coverage	for	“optimal”	scenarios?	
What is practical?
•		What	is	the	cost	of	coverage	of	various	retentions	deductibles,	and	what	are	the	retentions?
•		What	is	the	financial	rating	of	the	insurance	company	issuing	the	policy?
•		What	will	the	policy	pay	for	(that	is,	claims,	defense	costs,	SEC	investigations,	or	informal	 
inquiries)?
•		Who	is	covered	under	the	policy	and	who	is	excluded?	What	is	the	definition	of	an	insured	 
person? Are spouses covered?
•		How	are	outside	directors	covered	and	to	what	extent?
•		Are	nonprofit	or	outside	activities	of	the	directors	on	behalf	of	the	organization	covered	under	the	
policy?
•		What	are	the	stipulations	for	reporting	a	claim,	and	when	must	a	claim	be	reported	to	the	insurer?
•		What	are	the	change	in	control	provisions	of	the	policy	if	a	change	in	ownership	occurs?	How	
might a merger or acquisition related to the company and its subsidiaries affect coverage?
•		Should	stand-alone	side	A	coverage	be	purchased	in	addition	to	traditional	side	A-C	coverage?
•		What	are	the	insolvency	provisions	of	the	policy?
•		Is	so-called	“tail	coverage,”	which	extends	the	policy	a	number	of	years	beyond	the	original	expi-
ration date, a consideration?
•		What	information	is	required	in	the	application	for	coverage,	and	how	are	the	warranty	provi-
sions defined, related to disclosure of potential future claims?
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Applying for D&O Insurance
Companies are required by insurers to complete a 
D&O insurance application as part of the underwrit-
ing process, so they may fully review and understand 
the risks and exposures of the proposed insured. The 
application also provides written protection to the 
insurer insofar as it documents the activities germane 
to the type of coverage, exclusions, or exceptions to 
those exclusions. D&O underwriters usually want 
to meet with company executives to discuss their 
claims and litigation history and gain an understand-
ing of who they are insuring.
Certain of the information necessary for filing an 
application is readily available and immediately obvi-
ous; it includes identifying the company’s corporate 
addresses, the names of the insured, and the officer 
of the company to be designated as the representa-
tive to receive notices from the insurer on behalf of 
entities and persons proposed for D&O insurance.
Insurers largely rely on the applicant’s statements 
and disclosures in establishing and then underwriting 
risk. Rightly, D&O insurers require a great deal of 
information about the applicant seeking to purchase 
coverage and require that the application be true, 
accurate, and complete. To apply for insurance and 
prepare for such a meeting and review, the company 
seeking coverage also should plan to have the fol-
lowing information and disclosures available:
	 •		A	detailed	list	of	recently	completed	large	dives-
titures of stock, along with a list of anticipated 
divestitures
	 •		A	list	of	past	merger	and	acquisition	activities,	
along with some reasonable detail on acquisitions 
and divestitures pending or anticipated
	 •		A	list	of	ongoing	litigation	involving	antitrust	
actions, copyrights, or patents
	 •		Details	on	any	civil,	criminal,	or	administrative	
proceedings alleging or investigating violations of 
any securities regulations
	 •		A	list	of	past	or	pending	class	action	or	derivative	
suits
	 •		A	list	of	and	detail	about	any	claims	made	against	
persons or entities
	 •		A	copy	of	the	company’s	latest	SEC	10-Q	and	
8-K reports, proxy statement, Form 10-K, and 
most recent annual report
	 •		A	copy	of	the	company’s	prospectus	and	offering	
circular
	 •		Audited	financial	statements,	including	all	notes	
and schedules
	 •		Copies	of	all	provisions	of	the	applicant’s	charter	
and bylaws relating to indemnification of its 
D&O
During a review of the insured for setting policy 
limits, coverage, and endorsements, insurers also 
may ask somewhat more probing questions about 
the current situation of the company and current in-
tent of the company’s management in seeking insur-
ance. This can involve management consenting to 
policy language, including a statement such as “No 
person or entity proposed for this insurance is cog-
nizant of any fact, circumstance or situation which 
they have reason to suppose might afford grounds 
for any claim such as would fall within the scope of 
the proposed insurance.” If the applicant has such 
information or knowledge, then some description 
of that information or knowledge is required in the 
application. If the information disclosed is new or 
previously unknown to the underwriter or broker, 
the underwriter will likely want to discuss the dis-
closed information, in addition to simply reading 
the disclosure on the application.
False Statements: The Warranty in 
the D&O Application
A warranty statement in the application asserts that 
no insured person is aware of any matter that may 
give rise to a future claim, unless such matter is dis-
closed to the insurer on the application. Warranty 
statements vary among insurers, and due care must 
be taken to appropriately disclose potential future 
claims related to the D&O coverage. For example, 
some warranties may require disclosure of informa-
tion that “might” or “may” give rise to a future 
claim. Other applications may include language that 
requires disclosure of information if it is “reasonably 
likely” to give rise to a D&O claim. For example, if 
the applicant has been provided notice of a threat-
ened securities claim against the company and fails 
to disclose such notice, then the applicant has failed 
to provide information that “might” give rise to a 
future claim.
Insurers routinely consider any documentation or 
filings attached to an application to be part of that 
application, including audited financial statements 
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and any public filings, such as reports required by 
the SEC. In some cases, companies completing the 
application will include a statement that refers the 
insurer to the applicable SEC document. At that 
point, the referred public filing is considered “at-
tached” to the application, and it will be considered 
by the insurance underwriter along with other in-
formation disclosed in the application.
If information in an application submitted to the 
insurer is false, the strongest action the insurer can 
attempt is a rescission action. Rescission voids the 
coverage from the beginning; in effect, the insurer 
asserts that the D&O coverage never existed. In 
such cases, the insurer must demonstrate that the in-
sured made a false statement or representation. Gen-
erally, for an insurer to successfully win a rescission 
action, the insurer must prove that the insured made 
a false representation; that the false representation 
was “material”; that the insurer relied upon the false 
representation; and, further, that the insured had 
knowledge of the false representation, called scienter 
(this standard is not required in all states). Because 
insurance companies are regulated on a state basis, 
case law varies depending on the jurisdiction.
A false representation is usually considered mate-
rial if it influenced the insurer’s decision to accept 
the risk or if it affected the amount of the premium 
calculated by the underwriter. The burden of proof 
in such cases falls to the insurer, which must prove 
it would not have been bound to the coverage and 
would not have issued the policy had it received ac-
curate information at the time of entering the con-
tract. The insurer also could assert that the terms 
or endorsements would have been different if true 
information had been provided during the under-
writing process.
Materiality is often established by reviewing the 
insurer’s process of collecting and reviewing infor-
mation for underwriting and by analyzing the data 
received by the underwriter. This does not mean 
that the insurer will automatically prevail in court 
against the insured. In a New York case, Chicago 
Ins. Co. v. Kreitzer & Vogelman, 210 F. Supp. 2d407 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), the court refused to grant sum-
mary judgment based on materiality for an insurer 
in which only subjective testimony was provided by 
the underwriter.
Above all, to move for rescission, an insurer must 
show that the underwriter relied on the false infor-
mation in the application to determine its coverage. 
Insurers are usually not required to independently 
validate the information in an application if such 
validation would exceed the bounds of normal due 
diligence in their underwriting processes. However, 
if the insurer can prove that the false information 
was relied upon to approve the coverage, then the 
insurer may indeed prevail. If an insurer is successful 
in rescinding a D&O policy, then the premium paid 
is returned to the previously insured.
Some states require a higher standard to rescind 
the policy: to wit, that insurers establish that the in-
sured intended to deceive the insurer in the applica-
tion. Depending on the jurisdiction, scienter can in-
clude the insurer’s establishing that the insured acted 
in bad faith by providing false information in the 
application. Scienter also can be established if the 
applicant did not take reasonable efforts to ensure 
that the information contained in the application 
was correct. Because state laws vary on the necessity 
and interpretation of scienter related to insurance 
polices, you should consult with legal counsel for 
your specific situation.
In some jurisdictions, it is presumed that an insurer 
would have simply charged a higher premium had 
it known the accurate information; in such cases, 
the insurer would not prevail in a rescission action, 
though its responsibility for full payment of a claim 
may be moderated or reduced by the court.
Rescission is a harsh measure and not always nec-
essary. In some instances, insurers may instead seek 
to exclude coverage rather than exercising the re-
scission option. A warranty exclusion allows insur-
ers to exclude certain coverage with language, for 
example, such as “the circumstances or wrongdoing 
which could give rise to a future claim exists prior 
to inception of coverage, and any subsequent claim 
arising from such wrongdoing is excluded from cov-
erage.” This exclusion allows the policy to remain 
in effect, at least for the nonexcluded items. The 
insurer also keeps the premium that was paid by the 
insured. For the insured company and D&O, a war-
ranty exclusion can substantially dilute coverage.
In summary, whenever a corporation or other or-
ganization seeks D&O coverage, the organization’s 
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CFO, chief risk officer, insurance manager, or other 
key members of the management team will want 
to carefully prepare and review available coverage; 
terms; side agreements; policy provisions and en-
dorsements; and, of course, premiums. In prepar-
ing their application for said coverage, they should 
carefully consider what information is presented, 
ensuring its thoroughness and reviewing with legal 
counsel its disclosures, admissions, and asseverations. 
Every effort should be made to answer questions in 
good faith to mitigate the possibility of rescission or 
a warranty exclusion.
The D&O Claims Process
To succeed in the D&O claims process, any individ-
ual claim needs to be prepared and managed based 
on its specific facts of the alleged wrongful act, case 
law, and whatever slight nuances in insurance policy 
language may apply under the circumstances.
This section discusses the general processes to be 
followed in preparing and submitting D&O claims. 
These processes include the wrongful act, notice of 
claim, policy reporting requirements, claim confir-
mation, the requirements of duty to defend versus 
duty to pay, choosing representation, reimburse-
ment of expenses, duty of association, and settle-
ment. Given the complexity of D&O insurance and 
claim handling, it is always advisable to consult with 
an attorney that specializes in this area.
Claim Notification
The D&O claim process starts with notification of 
the alleged wrongful act to the insured in the form 
of a written demand seeking either monetary or 
nonmonetary relief. Once notice has been received, 
the insured has a duty to notify its insurance com-
pany in accordance with the terms outlined in the 
policy provisions. A typical policy will have explicit 
provisions that call for this notice, such as language 
like the following:
The Directors and Officers shall, as a condition prec-
edent to their rights under this Policy, give the Insurer 
notice, in writing, as soon as practicable of any Claim 
first made against the Directors and Officers during the 
Policy Period or Discovery Period, but in no event later 
than ninety (90) days after such claim is made, and 
shall give the Insurer such information and cooperation 
as it may reasonably require.15
The insured need be mindful of reporting re-
quirements and understand the specific definitions 
of wrongful act and claim in the policy.
Claim Reporting
The language used for reporting requirements in 
D&O policies varies, and these requirements can 
consist of the following:
	 •		As	soon	as	practicable
	 •		Reporting	during	the	policy	period
	 •		Reporting	not	more	than	90	days	after	the	policy	
termination
	 •		Reporting	not	more	than	90	days	after	the	claim	
is first made.16
Certain policies specify which individuals at the 
insured must receive notice of the claim in order 
for the clock to start on notice requirements. This 
provision might list the risk manager, chief legal 
counsel, CFO, and CEO. Having clear and explicit 
language of this type in the policy provision gov-
erning notification is helpful and preferable to the 
insured because it helps them avoid a situation in 
which a claim may be reported to someone at the 
insured’s organization but not correctly reported to 
the specified individuals and, thus, is not reported to 
the company’s insurer.
Sound practice dictates that a claim be reported in 
writing to both the insurance broker and insurance 
carrier. Many insureds have arrangements in place 
to report claims to the broker, leaving the broker 
responsible for reporting to the primary and excess 
insurance carriers. However, reporting the claim to 
the insurance broker alone leaves open the possibil-
ity of the report being late and even scenarios in 
which the company and its broker fail to fully or 
correctly report the claim. By reporting directly to 
the insurer, the insured can be confident that it has 
met its reporting requirements.
15	International	Risk	Management	Institute,	Inc.,	2008.
16	Monteleone	–	Tressler,	Soderstrom,	Maloney	&	Priess	(IRMI	2007).
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Claim Confirmation
Once a claim is reported to the insurer, the insured 
should request written confirmation of their claim. 
This confirmation, which can be in the form of a 
claim acknowledgement, coverage letter, or reserva-
tion of rights letter, also can be a denial. In what-
ever form this written acknowledgement arrives, the 
confirmation from the insurer provides the insured 
with evidence that their claim was filed.
Duty to Defend Versus Nonduty  
to Defend
When considering how a claim is to be managed, 
the policy offers guidance about who is responsible 
for defense and choosing defense counsel.
There are two types of provisions in D&O poli-
cies: duty to defend and nonduty to defend. Duty-
to-defend provisions require the insurer to provide 
the defense of the claim, giving the insurer choice 
of defense counsel and the ability to manage the 
claim. Under the nonduty-to-defend provisions, the 
insured has the right to manage the defense of the 
claim and choose defense council, subject to the in-
surer’s approval. Insureds that have a level of sophis-
tication with D&O coverage or want to be involved 
in the management of their claim would most likely 
not be well served by the duty-to-defend provision 
and would more likely choose a nonduty-to-defend 
provision.
Under policies with a nonduty-to-defend provi-
sion, the insured begins to incur defense costs from 
the onset of the claim. There are two ways to struc-
ture how D&O policies address the reimbursement 
of these defense costs: reimbursement during the 
claim or reimbursement once the claim has settled.
In the past, D&O policies did not advance defense 
costs until the resolution of the claim. Now, how-
ever, the majority of policies have provisions that 
allow for advancing defense costs. The advancement 
of defense costs does come with conditions associ-
ated with meeting the retention and the reduction 
of the limit of liability; moreover, such advances do 
not alter the intent of any reservation of right letter 
and are repaid if it is found that the costs are not 
insured under the policy.17
Permission to Incur Expenses
Prior to incurring any expenses on the claim, it is al-
ways a sound practice to obtain permission from the 
insurer to do so. Obtaining such permission helps 
avoid potential disputes.
Duty of Association
Under the nonduty-to-defend provisions, the in-
sured has a duty of association with the insurance 
company. This duty requires the insured to keep the 
insurer current on the status of the claim and any 
potential settlements and, moreover, to not settle 
the claim without the insurer’s consent.
Claim Settlement and Allocation
With the settlement of the claim comes the allo-
cation process in which the insured and its insurer 
negotiate how to allocate monies received in the 
settlement. Allocation issues usually arise in two in-
stances. First, when there are parties to the claim 
that do not have coverage under the policy (for 
example, attorneys and accountants) and, second, 
when certain aspects of the wrongful act are not 
covered under the policy (for example, professional 
services). The typical areas of discussion surrounding 
allocation with the insurer are insured versus nonin-
sured parties, insured versus noninsured claims, and 
insured versus noninsured capacity.18
The typical allocation structures in D&O poli-
cies are predetermined allocation and methodology. 
In predetermined allocation, which is exactly as it 
sounds, the insurance policy predetermines the al-
location. In methodology, the policy sets forth how 
the allocation will be determined.
Areas of Dispute in D&O 
Claims
Predictably, given the complexity of D&O insur-
ance policies and litigation, disputes between the 
insured, insurer, and insurance broker can arise in 
numerous areas. The most common of these areas 
are described in box 13-4.
17	International	Risk	Management	Institute,	Inc.,	2008.
18	Allocation,	Dan	Bailey,	Bailey	Cavalieri	LLC.
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Box 13-4:  Common Areas of Dispute in D&O Claims
Late Notice
In almost all D&O insurance policies, specific guidelines determine when notice of claims must be 
made. Notwithstanding the clarity of the language in such guidelines, disputes can nevertheless still 
arise surrounding when the claim first occurred, the insured first had notice of the claim, and the 
insured reported the claim to the insurance company. Although policy language varies, notice to 
the insurer within the policy period or immediately thereafter is usually a condition precedent to 
coverage. The insured should therefore pay careful attention to the notice provisions in the policy 
form.
Choice of Defense Counsel
The insured and insurer should agree prior to binding the insurance policy how counsel will be se-
lected if it becomes necessary to exercise a claim against the policy. If panel counsel is provided for 
in the policy, the insured should determine if they are allowed to go outside of the panel counsel 
for certain types of claims, such as nonsecurity claims, and whether multiple attorneys can be used 
when conflicts between insureds arise.
Failure to Report
The insured should avoid the error of reporting the claim to the insurance broker with the expecta-
tion that the broker will unfailingly report the claim to the insurer or report the claim in a timely 
manner. Notice should always be given concurrently to both the broker and insurance company, 
and the insured should request confirmation of receipt from each.
Allocation Issues
Allocating claim expenditures can occur at two points in the claim life cycle. First, allocation of 
defense costs and expenses can occur during the period in which the underlying claims against the 
director or officer are pending. Second, allocation of indemnity payments occurs at the time of 
settlement or judgment. When a policy makes no reference to issues of allocation, insurance com-
panies can attempt to allocate costs of defense and indemnity on a 50-50 basis, even when little or 
no investigation of the surrounding facts has taken place. Allocation is an example of the potential 
for insurance company claims handling to erode the scope and quality of coverage.
Cooperating With the Insurer
The insured has a duty of association with the insurance company; however, at times, insureds 
can be concerned about disclosing confidential information to the insurer that the insurer feels is 
relevant to the claim. These types of issues, especially when they pertain to matters of competitive 
advantage or intellectual property, should be openly addressed between the insured and insurer in 
advance of pursuing a claim. Failure to do so can mean compromising coverage, especially when an 
insured chooses not to divulge information that the insurer feels it has a right to learn.
Fraud in the Application
Many policy forms require the insured to complete an application that will be included in the 
policy form. That form may include a clause whereby the insurance carrier incorporates all of a 
company’s public statements into the policy application, including statements filed with the SEC, 
such as Forms 10-K and 10-Q. In securities cases, the truth of the company’s public statements 
are arguably always at issue. In restatement claims, specifically, plaintiffs’ counsel can allege that a 
restatement rendered the company’s prior SEC filings false. In those cases, carriers might use the 
“Incorporation by Reference” clause in their policies to argue that coverage should be rescinded 
because the policy was induced by a misstatement of a material fact in the insurance application.
(continued)
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Conclusion
In conclusion, D&O insurance coverage provides 
D&O with indemnity and defense coverage for 
claims related to the management of the organiza-
tion. The late 1990s and early part of the 21st cen-
tury saw policy procurement and claim severity in-
creasing while claim frequency was decreasing. The 
enactment of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act is the likely driver behind this reduction.
Potential triggers to D&O claims are inaccu-
rate disclosures, options backdating, employee dis- 
crimination, wrongful termination or discharge, 
significant decline in stock price, and corporate 
reorganizations.
The D&O insurance policy has three coverage 
parts: side A, side B, and side C. Side A coverage 
indemnifies the individual D&O when the cor-
poration is prohibited by law or unable to do so, 
typically as a result of insolvency. Side B coverage 
provides reimbursement to the corporation for its 
costs associated with the indemnity and defense of 
the D&O. Side C coverage reimburses the corpora-
tion for the indemnity and defense of claims against 
the corporation.
Applying for D&O insurance typically requires 
completion of an application and providing infor-
mation, such as public financials and details of merg-
ers, acquisitions and divestitures, and litigation. It is 
important to remember that false statements under 
an application can lead to the policy being voided 
back to its inception date.
The D&O claims process needs to be prepared 
and managed based on the individual claim circum-
stances. The general claim process includes claim 
notification, claim reporting, claim confirmation, 
permission to incur expenses, duty of association, 
and claim settlement and allocation.
Common areas for dispute between the insurer 
and insured are late notice, choice of defense coun-
sel, failure to report, allocation, and fraud in the 
application.
It is important to engage legal counsel to assist 
the organization in the D&O application process 
because unintended mistakes can prove to be quite 
costly to the individual D&O and corporation.
Box 13-4:  Common Areas of Dispute in D&O Claims (continued)
State Insurance Codes Can Cause Coverage Problems
State insurance codes and regulators can complicate insurability for claims brought against D&O. 
For example, many state laws prohibit insurance companies from providing coverage for liability 
due to willful conduct. Carriers may not be held responsible for providing coverage to the insured 
to cover liability for securities fraud because courts may find securities fraud liability required a 
finding of willful conduct.
Public Policy Concerns
Courts may agree with a carrier’s defense and refuse to order coverage for claims that otherwise 
appear to meet the definition of covered claims. The allegation is that a claim for securities fraud 
did not constitute a loss under the terms of the policy because the court found that the plaintiffs 
were essentially seeking restitution from an ill-gotten gain. The court may reason that it was against 
public policy for an officer or director to lose an action requiring restitution of ill-gotten gains to 
plaintiffs and then may expect an insurance company to cover the costs.
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Introduction
Given the economic crisis in the United States 
beginning in 2008, which includes unemploy-
ment reaching 30-year highs of from 9 percent to 
10 percent, the continued decline in the housing 
market, foreclosure rates continuing to increase, the 
daily evaporation of consumer confidence, constant 
comparisons of this recession to that of the Great 
Depression, and the recent uncovering of several 
major fraud schemes, management and other key 
stakeholders are being constantly challenged to 
proactively think about fraud before it occurs. The 
continued impact of the current global economic 
downturn has created a robust environment for 
fraud. As internal and external pressures mount for 
individuals within organizations, some may resort to 
committing various fraud schemes to maintain their 
jobs; to continue to live a lifestyle to which they 
have grown accustomed; or due to other personal 
factors. The robust environment for fraud is mag-
nified by the fact that many companies continue 
to downsize and reduce spending on nonmission-
critical objectives, which may create tremendous 
strains on internal controls and create more oppor-
tunity for fraud. As Roland Brasky, the Chairman 
of Audit committee for Grand Forge Company and 
Grand Forge1 found out in the opening case study, 
the identified allegations of fraud and the internal 
and external pressures that are increasing in the cur-
rent marketplace are contributing factors that may 
be creating the perfect storm for increased corporate 
fraud (see figure 14-1).
1	The	reader	is	invited	to	read	the	detailed	case	study	of	Grand	Forge	Company	found	in	the	Introduction	to	this	book.
Figure 14-1: The Perfect Storm is Brewing
Opportunity to
commit fraud
Internal
controls
Internal and
external pressure
Roland asked his Internal Audit Director, Mi-
chele Hart, what the company was currently doing 
proactively to address this potential increase in fraud 
in the current economy. Michele contacted  Perusi 
& Bilanz LLP, to determine options she should be 
considering to address fraud.
Perusi & Bilanz LLP’s recommendation was that 
Michele work to implement a holistic antifraud pro-
gram for Grand Forge Company.
Due to the fact that this was a new concept for 
Michele, she naturally had questions for Perusi & 
Bilanz LLP on the structure of this program. Mi-
chele asked the following questions:
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 1.  What should the overall framework for the 
antifraud program look like?
 2.  Describe for me in detail the elements of an 
antifraud program.
 3.  How do I implement the various elements 
and develop action items? Specifically, how 
do I conduct a fraud risk assessment?
 4.  What are the benefits of implementing an an-
tifraud program?
 5.  If I take the lead in implementing this anti-
fraud program, as directed by Roland, who 
should ultimately own the process and what 
should Internal Audit’s role be?
As is the case with Grand Forge Company, the 
challenge for most companies is the lack of a formal 
antifraud program to address their rising concerns 
about fraud. Even within their Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX) compliance activities, many compa-
nies have not implemented a program that addresses 
the risk of fraud holistically (that is, SOX compli-
ance relates to internal controls around financial re-
porting; therefore, fraud risks related to corruption 
or asset misappropriation and the related factors of 
pressure, rationalization, and opportunity may not 
be addressed). In addition, many companies con-
tinue to address fraud through reactive investiga-
tions rather than proactive measures. As a result, 
companies can incur significant expenses, strained 
resources, and unwanted exposure due to fraud 
investigations.
Another challenge facing clients is determining 
what their duty is regarding fraud prevention within 
their organization. Chapter 8 of the 2007 Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2 provides the follow-
ing seven points management should consider when 
establishing an antifraud program:
 1.  The organization must have established com-
pliance standards and procedures that are to 
be followed by its employees and other agents 
and that are reasonably capable of reducing 
the prospect of criminal conduct.
 2.  Specific individual(s) in high-level positions 
in the organization must have responsibility to 
oversee compliance with such standards and 
procedures.
 3.  The organization must have used due care not 
to delegate substantial discretionary authority 
to individuals whom the organization knew, 
or should have known through the exercise of 
due diligence, had a propensity to engage in 
illegal activities.
 4.  The organization must have taken steps to ef-
fectively communicate its standards and pro-
cedures to all employees and other agents.
 5.  The organization must have taken reasonable 
steps to achieve compliance with its stan-
dards.
 6.  The standards must have been consistently 
enforced through appropriate disciplinary 
mechanisms, including, as appropriate, disci-
pline of individuals responsible for the failure 
to detect an offense. Adequate discipline of 
individuals responsible for an offense is a nec-
essary component of enforcement; however, 
the form of discipline that will be appropriate 
will be case specific.
 7.  After an offense has been detected, the orga-
nization must have taken all reasonable steps 
to respond appropriately to the offense and 
prevent further similar offenses, including any 
necessary modifications to its program to pre-
vent and detect violations of law.
Regulations, such as the 2007 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual previously mentioned, SOX, and 
the 1997 Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Anti-Bribery Convention, re-
quire companies to be much more vigilant in their 
efforts to prevent and detect fraud. As a result of 
both the acts of fraud and the heightened regula-
tory environment, board members, independent au-
ditors, and other stakeholders are asking executive 
management pointed questions about how the com-
pany is responding to these risks and regulations.
This chapter will outline an approach to address-
ing fraud proactively and reactively through the 
design and implementation of a holistic antifraud 
program.
2 An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines,	Paula	Desio,	Deputy	General	Counsel,	United	States	Sentencing	Commission.
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Antifraud Program  
Basics
Companies are continuing to look for ways to miti-
gate the potential for fraud from occurring. Hav-
ing the ability to address fraud more proactively 
is an initiative that is now being pursued more of-
ten, due to the increased concern of fraud by inter- 
nal audit directors, general counsel, chief risk of-
ficers, and other members of management within 
organizations. 
Roland asked Michele what Grand Forge Com-
pany had done to respond to the allegations of fraud 
identified in the original case study and asked her to 
perform an assessment of this process. More specifi-
cally, Roland wanted to know what the organization 
is doing to ensure it has a consistent and documented 
approach in the way it investigates the potential alle-
gations of fraud. Michele again was tasked with de-
termining what the company is currently doing and 
how this process could be improved. Management 
can set the proper tone, execute a robust fraud risk 
assessment, and design internal controls to prevent 
and detect fraud, but, unfortunately, at some level 
fraud will still occur. Recent studies done by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
estimate that as much as 7 percent of U.S. compa-
nies’ revenues are lost each year due to fraud.3
Perusi & Bilanz LLP described in detail for 
Michele the elements of the overall antifraud pro-
gram, which are grouped into the following three 
categories:
 1. Tone at the top
 2. Proactive
 3. Reactive
Michele was eager to start the design and imple-
mentation of a holistic antifraud program. Michele 
looked to Perusi & Bilanz LLP for guidance about 
how to get started with creating and implement-
ing this program and the various elements that are 
involved.
As previously indicated, Michele wanted to know 
what the overall framework for the antifraud pro-
gram should look like because she was tasked with 
creating and implementing a program at Grand 
Forge Company.
The key to an antifraud program is to provide 
the framework for an organization to prevent, de-
tect, report, and investigate both internal and ex-
ternal fraud. As a framework, an antifraud program 
cannot provide absolute assurance that a fraud will 
not occur within a company. However, a strong 
antifraud program will provide management and 
its employees with the opportunity, guidance, and 
support needed to understand the expectations of 
the company, what types of behavior are considered 
unacceptable, what procedures should be followed 
if fraud is suspected, and what actions will be taken 
if fraud is detected.
The key to an effective antifraud program is its 
communication to and understanding by all stake-
holders. Understanding the roles and responsibilities 
of all stakeholders regarding the antifraud program 
is paramount to its success. Some factors to consider 
for roles and responsibilities with respect to the an-
tifraud program can be found in box 14-1. These 
factors also will be described in more detail later in 
the chapter.
Antifraud programs are designed to provide man-
agement with a framework to mitigate their orga-
nization’s exposure to fraud and also assist in creat-
ing, developing, and improving the organization’s 
culture and how management reacts and responds 
to fraud-related issues. The three main aspects of 
a holistic fraud prevention program include the 
following:
 (1)  Setting the proper tone at the top within the 
organization
 (2)  Proactively identifying fraud risks and moni-
toring internal controls to prevent or detect 
the fraud risks
 (3)  Developing reactive protocols in the event 
that fraud is suspected
3	Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiner’s	(ACFE’s)	2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse.
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Figure 14-2 depicts an illustrated view of the 
framework for an antifraud program.
Setting the Proper Tone at 
the Top
People commit fraud; therefore, setting the proper 
tone at the top and the way in which management 
reinforces its message regarding fraud have a per-
vasive impact on the company. The starting point 
for any antifraud program is the tone at the top 
of the company. Setting the proper tone within a 
company is a critical step in preventing and detect-
ing fraud. To create a culture of constant integrity, 
management must go beyond stating that they hire 
good people or they operate their company with 
integrity and demonstrate how tactically their tone 
is embedded into the company’s day-to-day op-
erations. Adopting a code of conduct, formalizing 
fraud policies and procedures, and conducting fraud 
awareness training are key elements to a successful 
tone-setting fraud prevention program. The tone 
of the organization can be defined as the integrity, 
ethical values, management philosophy, and operat-
ing style within the organization. The tone of the 
organization influences the control consciousness 
of its people, provides the foundation for all other 
components within the organization, and helps de-
termine the discipline and structure of the organiza-
tion. The tone at the top of the organization can 
be split into the following areas: code of conduct, 
culture, governance, fraud prevention policies, and 
fraud awareness training and communication.
•  Audit committee. Responsible for overseeing the procedures established by management for the 
antifraud program, ensuring any reported matters are communicated to the appropriate body, and 
reviewing the potential for management override of controls or other inappropriate influence 
over the financial reporting process.
•  Executive management. Responsible for providing management sponsorship and coordination of 
the antifraud program. Report to the audit committee the status of current investigations, com-
pleted investigations, results of the fraud risk assessment, and action plans to mitigate the risk of 
fraud within the company.
•  Managers and line supervisors. Responsible for overseeing the implementation and ongoing effec-
tiveness of the antifraud program. Report to executive management any indicators of suspicious 
activity.
•  Employees. Responsible for the implementation of the antifraud program. Report suspicious 
activities or violations of the code of conduct via the various communication tools established 
by the organization (for example, whistle-blower hotline, general counsel, chain-of-command, 
internal audit, and so on)
•  Other stakeholders (for example, vendors, customers, joint venture partners, and so on). Responsible for 
awareness of the company’s antifraud program and understanding how to report issues.
Box 14-1:  Antifraud Program Roles and Responsibilities
Figure 14-2: Holistic Antifraud Program Framework
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Code of Conduct
The code of conduct is the clear set of business rules 
set forth by an organization, and it can provide a 
framework to guide the response of the organization 
in the challenging and sometimes difficult choices 
that are presented to members of the organization. 
The purpose of a code of conduct is to promote the 
following:
 •  Honest and ethical conduct
 •  Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable 
disclosure in reports and documents
 •  Compliance with applicable governmental laws, 
rules, and regulations
 •  Prompt internal reporting of violations of the 
code
 •  Accountability for adherence to the code and the 
sanctions to be imposed for failure to adhere to 
the code
The code of conduct is typically approved by the 
audit committee and reviewed on an annual basis. 
The code of conduct should be part of the new hire 
practice (that is, all new employees must read and 
sign the code as part of their condition of employ-
ment) and periodically reaffirmed by those in posi-
tions of confidence.
Culture
As Michele continued to learn more about the vari-
ous elements of the antifraud program and, specifi-
cally, the fraud risk assessment element, she started 
to identify the benefits of conducting a fraud risk 
assessment, which would allow her to prioritize 
her efforts and, perhaps, the efforts of others within 
Grand Forge Company to address fraud risks more 
effectively and efficiently.
During the fraud risk assessment and the con-
trols monitoring exercise, Roland wanted to ad-
dress some issues that had been found in the surveys 
done as part of the fraud risk assessment. He was 
alarmed that employees did not know how to access 
the hotline in the event they discovered a fraudulent 
action. He was troubled by the responses received 
when assessing the employees’ understanding of 
fraud. He indicated that he wanted to strengthen the 
message around fraud and raise the overall awareness 
of fraud. He indicated to Michele that he wanted 
her to assist in creating a fraud awareness and com-
munication plan that would strengthen the overall 
tone and culture within the organization concerning 
fraud.
Culture is the personality of the organization. 
What do the employees of the organization do in 
response to the message from the tone at the top? 
Culture can best be defined as the values and be- 
liefs that shape the behavior and determine the pro-
cess by which things get accomplished within an 
organization. The following factors must be con-
sidered when determining the culture within an 
organization:
 •  Is the organization driven by earnings results and 
organization achievement or internal and exter-
nal relationships with its employees, customers, 
and other stakeholders?
 •  How effective is the knowledge sharing within 
the organization that may undermine the perfor-
mance of the antifraud program?
 •  Is there a rigid or flexible structure?
 •  Does the organization have an inclusive environ-
ment embedded within its organization?
 •  How does the culture change with respect to the 
different geographies within which it operates?
 •  How tactically is the tone embedded into the 
company’s day-to-day operations to create a 
culture of constant integrity? 
Culture can tell you a lot about an organization. 
This includes the messages that executives send 
with not only their words but their actions, how 
behavior within the organization is reinforced, the 
organization’s appetite for risk, the communication 
throughout the company, and how the organization 
embraces change.
Understanding culture often creates uncomfort-
able situations for the executives within an organi-
zation because they are not entirely sure what it is, 
how to measure it, and if change to the culture is 
needed and how that is accomplished. Typically, an 
assessment of culture is the first step, and it is often-
times accomplished through a series of interviews 
and surveys.
Governance
Governance specifies the relationship and the dis-
tribution of rights and responsibilities among the 
main groups of participants within an organization. 
Governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, 
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laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation 
is directed, administered, or controlled. Corporate 
governance also includes the relationships among 
the many stakeholders involved and the goals for 
which the corporation is governed. An important 
aspect of corporate governance is to ensure the ac-
countability of certain individuals in an organization 
through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate 
the potential problem from occurring. It is helpful 
to consider if the strategy, objectives, and plans of 
the antifraud program are aligned with the business’s 
strategy and plans.
Fraud Prevention Policies
Fraud prevention policies and procedures provide 
knowledge and support regarding what conduct is 
acceptable and how to report suspected violations.
Fraud prevention policies are a framework for an 
organization to prevent, detect, report, and investi-
gate internal and external fraud. Formal fraud pre-
vention policies should
 •  be specific to the individual organization and its 
operations.
 •  guide employees through complex issues, includ-
ing facilitation payments, commission fees, gifts, 
and conflicts of interest.
 •  provide a channel for employees or third parties 
to report fraud.
 •  establish procedures to govern the escalation of 
fraud allegations and guide important resource 
decisions.
The fraud prevention policies are typically re-
viewed and approved at the appropriate level within 
the organization, such as audit committee or execu-
tive management. Additionally, the fraud preven-
tion policies are maintained in such a way that the 
most current version(s) are readily available to the 
appropriate employees. Finally, the fraud preven-
tion policies are periodically updated to reflect the 
changes in the business environment.
Examples of fraud prevention policies include the 
following:
 •  Hiring and promotion practices
  –  Prehiring screenings and effective background 
checks
  –  Promotion of those that demonstrate the  
organization’s values
   –  Performance evaluations
 •  Segregation of duties
  –  Reassignment of incompatible duties (that is, 
separation of authorization, custody, recording, 
and control activity)
  –  Position rotation
 • User or physical access
  –  Removal of incompatible user access
  –  Limitation of physical access
Fraud Awareness Training and  
Communication
Proper policies and procedures set the expected 
standards for behavior by employees. Virtually all 
organizations have a code of conduct as a mecha-
nism for disciplining employees who are behaving 
inappropriately and below a minimum expected 
standard of conduct. Codes of conduct are a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for setting expected 
behavior.
Many organizations have other policies provid-
ing guidance to employees on appropriate conduct. 
These can include, for example, topics such as the 
following:
 •  Assignments of authority and responsibility
 •  Ethical conduct guidance
 •  Accepting and giving gifts
 •  Fraud response plans
 •  Ethics hotlines or whistle-blower programs
 •  Hiring, promotion, and retention
 •  Incentive compensation
Fraud awareness training reinforces management’s 
message and provides stakeholders with information 
regarding the latest issues, challenges, and concerns 
of the company.
Fraud awareness training is another significant and 
often overlooked aspect of an antifraud program and 
a key element in setting the tone within an organiza-
tion. Lack of understanding and reinforcement of a 
company’s antifraud policies, procedures, reporting 
protocols, and fraud risks exposes a company to em-
ployees, vendors, customers, and other stakeholders 
not knowing what is considered acceptable behav-
ior or how to effectively report suspected fraudulent 
activities.
A fraud awareness training program is only as ef-
fective as the audience it reaches. All employees 
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should receive annual fraud awareness training, 
which should be part of the company’s annual train-
ing program. Fraud awareness training also should 
be part of the new hire orientation process and part 
of the integration process for newly acquired com-
panies, joint ventures, or subsidiaries. Additionally, 
significant vendors and customers should be trained 
regarding specific aspects of the company’s antifraud 
polices (that is, communicate to customers or ven-
dors the company’s policy regarding gifts, enter-
tainment, whistle-blower hotline, and so on). The 
results of the training (that is, who attended, when, 
and where) should be recorded and summarized for 
the audit committee.
Fraud awareness training should include the 
following:
 •  Background and understanding of the company’s 
overall antifraud program
 •  Options for reporting any suspicious activities 
to management via the chain-of-command or 
whistle-blower hotline
 •  An overview of the company’s whistle-blower 
protection program
 •  Understanding the disciplinary process for those 
who violate the code of conduct or ethics
 •  Understanding and review of fraud risks most 
applicable to the company’s business
Additionally, the fraud awareness training pro-
gram should contain examples of what could be 
considered violations of the code of conduct or sus-
picious activity for which to be on the lookout, such 
as insider trading, receiving or giving gifts, consult-
ing fees, and so on. As we will describe in more 
detail subsequently, the fraud awareness training 
should include specific examples of identified fraud 
risks that are relevant to the organization.
Employees cannot be reasonably expected to fol-
low policies of which they are unaware. Policies 
may be communicated in many ways, either in hard 
or soft form or through provision of access to the 
policy. Some policies and procedures are particularly 
important or complex and may require more active 
communication. For example, specific training or 
certification on technical revenue recognition ac-
counting might be more appropriate than passive 
provision of access to the policy in which revenue 
recognition financial statement fraud is a significant 
risk. Three key fraud awareness program policies 
that are often overlooked by employees but should 
be reinforced are:
 •  The offer of employment and orientation pro-
gram provides an early opportunity to communi-
cate behavioral expectations to new hires.
 •  The tone at the top is an important communica-
tion channel because leadership by example is a 
powerful communication tool.
 •  Whistle-blower channels are often the last resort 
considered by employees before turning outside 
the organization. For this reason, a dispropor-
tionately large effort is often made to communi-
cate the existence and availability of the whistle-
blower channel.
When breaches of the policy are tolerated without 
consequence, even adequate, well-communicated 
policies will become ineffective. Absent consistent 
enforcement, policies become “paper tigers” and 
their ability to regulate behavior is eroded.
Adoption of a code of conduct or ethics, formal-
izing fraud policies and procedures, and conduct-
ing fraud awareness training are key elements to 
a successful tone-setting element of the antifraud 
program. The code of conduct or ethics establishes 
the guiding principles of the company. Fraud poli-
cies and procedures provide knowledge and support 
regarding what conduct is acceptable and how to 
report suspected violations
Codifying formal antifraud policies is an element 
often overlooked by many companies. On a global 
basis, according to recent surveys done by Ernst & 
Young, over 40 percent of companies do not have 
a formal antifraud policy. Among larger companies 
with revenues greater than $1 billion, 30 percent 
do not have any antifraud policy, and 18 percent of 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regis-
trants, regardless of size and location, do not have a 
formal antifraud policy.4 
4	Ernst	&	Young’s	10th	Global	Fraud	Survey	Corruption or Compliance—Weighing the costs.
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Proactive
As illustrated in this cartoon, companies are find-
ing it much more efficient, from a cost perspective, 
to be proactive with respect to fraud than to incur 
the costs, damage to reputation, and other negative 
effects of going through a fraud investigation. The 
ACFE indicates that the average fraud schemes last 
approximately 24 months, so there is an opportunity 
to become more diligent in efforts to address fraud 
proactively and to attempt to eliminate schemes in 
their early stages versus the latter stages, which are 
unquestionably more costly. The proactive element 
of an antifraud program allows management to ac-
tively assess what fraud type their company is sus-
ceptible to and identify internal controls to prevent 
or detect those risks. Although this process does not 
provide absolute assurance that all frauds will be 
identified, prevented, and detected, it should pro-
vide management with the opportunity to address 
significant fraud risks and consciously implement 
controls, such as IT analytics, delegation of author-
ity, and user-restricted access, to reduce the likeli-
hood and impact of those risks.
The fraud risk assessment can be based on poten-
tial schemes or focus on specific fraudsters who could 
commit significant fraud. The key is to understand 
the vulnerabilities a company may have regarding 
the way fraud could occur and management’s ability 
to override business processes. According to recent 
studies done in the industry, 55 percent of corporate 
frauds were committed by management, and various 
schemes were used to circumvent internal controls.
Many fraud risk assessments focus on two ques-
tions: what is the most common fraud that could 
occur within any company or organization (for 
example, revenue recognition, conflict of interest, 
kickbacks, and so on), and what are the most com-
mon frauds that could occur within the industry 
or geographic location in which the organization 
operates?
If management decides to go through the exercise 
of performing a fraud risk assessment, then, upon 
completion of the identification and prioritization 
of the fraud risks, the next step within this proactive 
element is to identify and monitor internal controls 
to mitigate those risks. Action plans should be devel-
oped to identify, document, and evaluate the con-
trols to mitigate those fraud risks that were identi-
fied and prioritized within the fraud risk assessment. 
The action plans should specify who will be respon-
sible for identifying, documenting, and testing the 
controls, as well as who will review the results of 
their work. In most cases, objective, independent, 
and well-qualified individuals should be tasked with 
identifying and testing internal controls.
Specific reporting channels should be established 
for reporting the results of the fraud risk assessment 
and internal control monitoring. The reporting 
channels should include a line to the audit commit-
tee so they are informed about fraud risks, action 
plans to mitigate those risks, and the results of the 
testing efforts. Additionally, any control failures or 
suspected fraudulent activity should be communi-
cated to the audit committee as soon as practical.
Execution of a robust fraud risk assessment is the 
first proactive step management should undertake. 
The purpose of the fraud risk assessment is to iden-
tify areas (for example, business processes, location, 
transaction types, geographic locations, and so on) 
that pose a higher risk of fraud. It is important to 
keep in mind that people commit fraud, not IT sys-
tems, business processes, or the heating system in 
the corporate office. Therefore, when executing a 
fraud risk assessment, it is imperative that manage-
ment understand vulnerabilities and the causes of 
fraud, which are commonly referred to as the fraud 
triangle and illustrated in figure 14-3. The fraud tri-
angle is discussed at length in chapter 1, “Basics of 
Investigations.”
Figure 14-3: Fraud Triangle
Pressure or
Incentive
RationalizationOpportunity
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In our hypothetical Grand Forge Company case 
study, Roland specifically asked Michele to identify 
relevant industry-specific exposures that have affect-
ed or could affect Grand Forge Company. Michele 
set out to gain a better understanding of the allega-
tions that were being raised in the original case study 
and of the fraud triangle and how they might assist 
her in her quest to implement and conduct the fraud 
risk assessment process at Grand Forge Company.
The fraud triangle concept is relevant to identify-
ing and understanding the importance of fraud risk 
factors that may be present in an organization. These 
are the three conditions usually present when people 
commit financial fraud, misappropriation of assets, 
or corruption-type schemes. Internal audit directors 
and others involved in a fraud investigation must be 
alert for the following conditions:
 •  Incentives or pressures on management to perpe-
trate fraud to achieve desired financial results
 •  Opportunities (for example, control weaknesses) 
to carry out fraud without being detected
 •  Personnel who are able to rationalize to them-
selves a need for the fraud (that is, convince 
themselves the fraud is justified)
In addition to factoring in the fraud triangle, a 
good place to start designing and implementing a 
comprehensive fraud risk assessment is with the 
ACFE’s fraud tree, which organizes fraud into the 
following three broad types:
 •  Fraudulent financial reporting. Most fraudulent 
financial reporting schemes involve earnings 
management arising from improper revenue 
recognition, the overstatement of assets, or the 
understatement of liabilities.
 •  Misappropriation of assets. This type involves 
external and internal schemes, such as embezzle-
ment, payroll fraud, and theft.
 •  Corruption. This type refers to commercial and 
public bribery, as well as other improper pay-
ment schemes.
Upon identification of the three main areas, it is 
useful to review these fraud risk types in relation to 
the organization’s business and determine the fraud 
risks that are relevant for your organization. It also 
is important to develop an initial point of view of 
those relevant key fraud risks that are more signifi-
cant than others, based on your knowledge of the 
client, input from your industry, and subject matter 
resources and other sources (for example, partner(s) 
who have previously worked in this industry).
Creating and Conducting a Fraud 
Risk Assessment
When creating and conducting a fraud risk assess-
ment, it is encouraged to focus a fraud risk assess-
ment with a risk-based approach and top-down 
view of corresponding controls, as deemed neces-
sary. Stakeholders within the company are generally 
aware of the areas of the organization most vulner-
able or prone to the risk of fraud, based on factors 
such as industry experience, the organization’s own 
prior experience, current issues in the organization’s 
regulatory environment, and the facts and circum-
stances unique to the organization at that point in 
time.
A fraud risk assessment is used to identify and 
manage fraud risks. On June 20, 2007, the SEC 
published Interpretive Release No. 33-8810, which 
provides interpretive guidance for management’s 
report on internal control over financial reporting. 
The following guidance indicates the importance of 
creating the fraud risk assessment:
Management’s evaluation of the risk of mis-
statement should include consideration of the 
vulnerability of the entity to fraudulent activ-
ity (for example, fraudulent financial reporting, 
misappropriation of assets and corruption), and 
whether any such exposure could result in a ma-
terial misstatement of the financial statements. 
The extent of activities required for the evalua-
tion of fraud risks is commensurate with the size 
and complexity of the company’s operations and 
financial reporting environment.
Management should recognize that the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud ordinarily ex-
ists in any organization, regardless of size or type, 
and it may vary by specific location or segment 
and by individual financial reporting element. 
... [E]ffective fraud risk assessments will require 
sound and thoughtful judgments that reflect a 
company’s individual facts and circumstances.
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The relevant fraud risks would be drawn from a 
universe of fraud risks. An example of a universe 
of fraud risks is the fraud tree, which we described 
earlier. The tree is useful in that it identifies a range 
of fraud risks, categorized within the categories of 
fraudulent statements, asset misappropriation, and 
corruption. The relevant risks, based on the factors 
in the preceding paragraph, would be identified for 
prioritization.
When creating and implementing a fraud risk as-
sessment, it is very important to determine how the 
organization will define fraud. In other words, what 
does fraud mean to your organization, and how do 
you define fraud? Both of these questions will assist 
you greatly when determining fraud risks during the 
assessment phase. Fraud is generally a misrepresenta-
tion intended to secure an unlawful benefit.5 Fraud 
is not a new phenomenon. There have been many 
instances throughout history in which fraudsters 
have unlawfully and intentionally prejudiced others 
to their own advantage. The Bernard Madoff issues 
come to mind when considering a recent example 
of this concept. The renegade Wall Street financier 
faces a possible sentence of up to 150 years in prison 
after being formally charged with a list of crimes, 
including laundering millions of dollars in ill-gotten 
gains through London. Federal prosecutors in Man-
hattan detailed 11 criminal charges against Madoff, 
including fraud, perjury, theft, false statements, and 
international money laundering. The U.S. De-
partment of Justice described his alleged crimes as 
“extraordinary” and “unprecedented” in scale, 
orchestrated through an alleged $50 billion Ponzi 
scheme dating back to the 1980s.
Similarly, our recent experiences have shown that 
general assumptions with respect to fraud and its 
definition and related controls may, in certain cir-
cumstances, be invalid. For example, segregation of 
duties is generally relied upon to ensure appropriate 
checks and balances over the behavior of any indi-
vidual, but the quality of segregation of duties at the 
level of the CEO can be inadequate to effectively 
control the risk of management override. Although 
management would be responsible for the antifraud 
program, the directors, particularly the audit com-
mittee, would have some responsibility for manag-
ing the risk of management override. Additional 
information on segregation of duties during a fraud 
investigation can be found in chapter 6, “Roles and 
Responsibilities.”
In the case of our Grand Forge Company exam-
ple, Perusi & Bilanz LLP assisted Michele in cre-
ating, designing, and implementing the fraud risk 
assessment by asking the questions found in box 14-
2, among others, to gain an understanding of how 
she and Grand Forge Company wanted to structure 
their fraud risk assessment and when and where they 
wanted to get started within the organization. Perusi 
& Bilanz LLP also asked other thought-provoking 
questions to assist in designing a tailored fraud risk 
assessment for their needs. Questions like these are 
critical to address up front as a company begins the 
process to create a more comprehensive and, there-
fore, more effective fraud risk assessment.
5  Black’s Law Dictionary	defines	fraud	as	“An	intentional	perversion	of	truth	for	the	purpose	of	inducing	another	in	reliance	upon	it	to	part	with	some	valu-
able	thing	belonging	to	him	or	to	surrender	a	legal	right;	a	false	representation	of	a	matter	of	fact,	whether	by	words	or	by	conduct,	by	false	or	misleading	
allegations,	or	by	concealment	of	that	which	should	have	been	disclosed,	which	deceives	and	is	intended	to	deceive	another	so	that	he	shall	act	upon	it	
to	his	legal	injury.”
1.  Is the organization decentralized? 
This will determine if you want to struc-
ture your fraud risk assessment by business 
unit or conduct an assessment over the 
entire company.
2.  Does the organization have interna-
tional interest? This will determine how 
you want to structure your process (for 
example, in person interviews, facilitated 
sessions, or surveys). Do you need to 
consider fraud risk specific to that area of 
operations (that is, Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act and so on)?
(continued)
Box 14-2:  Grand Forge Company Fraud Risk Assessment Questions
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Based on Grand Forge Company’s structure with 
international operations, Michele indicated that she 
wanted to conduct a company-wide fraud risk assess-
ment that focused on issues relevant to the corporate 
headquarters and international operations. Using the 
previous questions as a guide, she determined that 
she wanted to conduct the fraud risk assessment us-
ing all three of the following methods:
 (1) Interviews
 (2) Surveys
 (3) Facilitated sessions
Typically, these three methods are used to con-
duct a fraud risk assessment because they are valu-
able tools and mechanisms for capturing information 
from participants in order to understand where fraud 
risks or exposures are located within an organization. 
Determining what method to use is based on how 
members of the company tasked with completing 
the fraud risk assessment feel that process would be 
received within the organization and how the com-
pany wants to structure the fraud risk assessment. 
In the case study example with Grand Forge Com-
pany, Michele started the process by conducting 25 
interviews of key members of management at the 
corporate level to obtain an overall understanding of 
where they felt exposures to fraud risk were located 
within the organization. She performed similar in-
terviews with selected members of management at 
each of the international locations. While Perusi & 
Bilanz LLP was assisting Michele conduct the in-
terviews, she also sent out a 40-question survey to 
randomly selected employees (no one that was in-
terviewed completed a survey) throughout the or-
ganization to gain insight into what the tone at the 
3.  Does the company want to conduct 
interviews, facilitated sessions, or 
surveys as a means to gather infor-
mation from participants in deter-
mining what fraud risks affect the 
organization? This is critical as you start 
to determine how broad your fraud risk 
assessment will become.
4.  How will results be compiled? Will 
a report be issued to the board and 
so on? This is important as you start to 
develop the work plan to accomplish the 
fraud risk assessment.
5.  Has the organization experienced 
fraud previously? Did the company do 
anything to mitigate this risk from hap-
pening again? Previous frauds that actually 
occurred should be identified as a fraud 
risk in the future and evaluated with the 
other potential fraud risks that have been 
identified.
6.  Are there new accounting or statu-
tory regulations? Would there be an 
incentive to manipulate the numbers if 
these new regulations may have an area 
for manipulation in their implementation 
(that is, a “gray area”)?
7.  Has the organization recently re-
structured, acquired, merged, or 
announced a business unit disposal? 
Fraud oftentimes occurs in units that are 
being disposed because the focus is no 
longer on them, with respect to con-
trols. Acquisitions can be ripe with fraud 
because companies that are being acquired 
try and make their company appear 
stronger or more profitable to increase the 
purchase price.
8.  Is the organization’s industry com-
petitive with declining margins or 
customer demand? This can be a po-
tential fraud risk because individuals may 
try and make the external reports appear 
better or stronger than they are, which 
affects other contracts.
Box 14-2:  Grand Forge Company Fraud Risk Assessment Questions (continued)
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top of the organization was like; additional fraud 
risks from different perspectives within the compa-
ny; awareness of fraud within the company; and also 
to gain an understanding of how fraud is handled, 
talked about, and dealt with internally.
Upon compiling the results from each interview 
and the results of the surveys, Perusi & Bilanz LLP 
assisted Michele in preparing for each facilitated 
session. Sessions were conducted at the corporate 
headquarters and each manufacturing facility within 
the company. The facilitated session is a process in 
which selected members of management are pre-
sented the ideas gathered and then asked to obtain 
consensus among themselves about the likelihood of 
fraud occurrence and the significance of its impact. 
As Michele prepared for the facilitated sessions, Pe-
rusi & Bilanz LLP indicated that she should group 
the fraud risks obtained into the three main areas of 
fraud, which indicated earlier and are as follows:
 1. Misappropriation of assets schemes
 2. Financial statement schemes
 3. Corruptions schemes
The schemes are discussed in greater detail in 
chapters 2-4 of this book. The primary reason to 
group the fraud schemes into the three main areas 
of fraud is because, when voting on likelihood and 
significance of impact, it is valuable to view these 
schemes in the same category, rather than compar-
ing all schemes together from the three categories 
previously mentioned. The following quick example 
demonstrates this point by illustrating the loss values 
associated with each main category of fraud. To fur-
ther illustrate, if one was looking at travel and enter-
tainment reimbursement fraud on the same scale as 
a fraudulent financial statement scheme, such as rev-
enue recognition manipulation, the results would be 
skewed because the median results are so different. 
Therefore, when prioritizing efforts to address these 
identified risks, it is helpful to keep this concept in 
mind. Table 14-1 is based on information from the 
ACFE’s 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational 
Fraud & Abuse and further describes the point of the 
differences in the three types of fraud from a median 
loss perspective.
Table 14-1:  Types of Occupational Fraud and Abuse
(Source: 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse. 
Copyright 2008 by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc.)
Loss	is	defined	as	the	total	amount	of	money	or	decrease	in	reported	revenues	attributable	to	the	scheme	being	committed.
Category Description Examples Median	Loss
Asset	Misappropriations Any	scheme	that	involves	the	theft	or	
misuse	of	an	organization’s	assets
•	Fraudulent	invoicing
•	Payroll	fraud
•	Skimming	revenues
$	 	150,000
Corruption Any	scheme	in	which	a	person	uses	his	
or	her	influence	to	obtain	unauthorized	
benefit	contrary	to	that	person’s	duty	to	
their	employer
•	Acceptig	or	paying	a	bribe
•		Engaging	in	a	business	transaction	in	
which	there	is	an	undisclosed	conflict	or	
interest
$	 	375,000
Fraudulent	Statements Falsification	of	an	organization’s	financial	
statements	to	make	it	appear	more	or	less	
profitable
•	Booking	fictitious	sales
•	Recording	expenses	in	the	wrong	period
$2,000,000
Michele agreed to use the three main areas of 
fraud and the breakdown by median loss as a basis to 
structure the fraud risk assessment, which she con-
sidered a logical and useful method. Although these 
don’t represent materiality levels for the financial 
statements, they do represent a point in which to 
gauge losses from a rating perspective when consid-
ering significance of impact.
One of the most critical elements when conduct-
ing the fraud risk assessment is how to compile the 
results. Perusi & Bilanz LLP indicated to Michele 
that she should consider using a “heat map” model 
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to plot each fraud risk learned from the interviews 
and surveys, based on an assessment of likelihood of 
occurrence and severity of impact from the facili-
tated sessions. Michele agreed that this was an excel-
lent way to pictorially show the results of the fraud 
risk assessment.
The relevant fraud risks are generally prioritized 
based on likelihood of occurrence and severity of 
impact. The likelihood of occurrence can be a factor 
in either the inherent or residual risk of fraud af-
ter the impact of internal controls. When creating a 
fraud risk assessment, an important decision to make 
is how to factor in the likelihood of occurrence. Do 
you review the fraud risks with the knowledge of 
the current controls in place to potentially mitigate 
those risks, which is residual risk, or do you assume 
the absence of controls, which is inherent risk? The 
severity should allow for both the quantitative and 
qualitative impact of the fraud. In practice, a rela-
tively immaterial dollar amount might have a severe 
impact. For example, a fraud with regulatory con-
sequences involving misrepresentations by senior 
management would have a severe impact, even 
when amounts involved were not a material dollar 
value, with respect to the overall financials.
In the Grand Forge Company case, a manipula-
tion of earnings through management override by 
executives within the company could cause Michele 
tremendous concern about the tone and culture of 
the organization. A fraud committed from this per-
spective could be material, irrespective of the dollar 
amounts associated with the scheme, given the sig-
nificance of those involved.
The individual facts and circumstances of the or-
ganization are relevant to determining the priority 
of fraud risks. The model most commonly used to 
identify the relevant individual facts and circum-
stances is the fraud triangle, which considers the 
following three conditions generally present when 
fraud occurs:
 •  An incentive or pressure providing a reason to 
commit fraud
 •  An opportunity to commit fraud through miss-
ing, ineffective, or overridden controls
 •  An ability to rationalize the commission of the 
fraud
The individual facts and circumstances within an 
organization can differ widely across geographies. 
For example, concerns of corruption are stronger in 
emerging markets, and concerns of financial state-
ment misrepresentation are stronger in developed 
markets. Similarly, they can differ across the op-
erations of the entity (for example, the conditions 
may be significantly different at a recently acquired 
operation).6 
Figure 14-4 provides an example of a “heat map” 
chart to illustrate the power of compiling the results 
in this manner. Perusi & Bilanz LLP assisted Michele 
in compiling three individual “heat maps,” one for 
each major area of fraud previously described (mis-
appropriation of assets, fraudulent statement, and 
corruption schemes). Perusi & Bilanz LLP took the 
information obtained from the surveys and inter-
views of each business unit and selected a group of 
25 members of management to sit in a 6-hour facili-
tated session and rank each of the identified fraud 
risks, based on a predefined scale for likelihood of 
occurrence and severity of impact (See figure 14-
5.). The scale used during the session and the output 
for fraudulent statement schemes from one of the 
sessions is detailed in figure 14-6. Each number on 
the “heat map” pertains to a corresponding fraud 
risk identified during the interviews, survey, and fa-
cilitated session.
As a result of the fraud risk assessment performed 
and the identification of the fraud risks identified, 
Michele, with assistance from Perusi & Bilanz LLP, 
set up a communication and training program. She 
ensured that the most relevant information and high-
est risk fraud schemes identified from the fraud risk 
assessment were portrayed in the training program.
Studies done by the ACFE suggest that the num-
ber one way in which fraud is caught is by a tip, so 
companies are exploring ways to ensure that their 
employees are educated on fraud schemes that are 
relevant to their organization.7 Therefore, it is help-
ful to use the fraud risk assessment as a starting point 
in creating a fraud awareness training program. This 
6	Ernst	&	Young’s	10th	Global	Fraud	Survey	Corruption or Compliance—Weighing the costs.
7	ACFE	2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse.
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Figure 14-4: Risk Rating Criteria: Severity of Financial Impact
 
Score
 Fraudulent Financial Misappropriation of 
Corruption  Statements Assets
 
5—Critical:
 Critical Loss Critical Loss Critical Loss
  > $2,000,000 > $150,000  > $375,000
  Severe Loss Severe Loss Severe Loss
 4—Severe: $750,000– $75,000– $375,000–
  $2,000,000 $150,000 $250,000
  Significant Loss Significant Loss Significant Loss
 3—Significant: $250,000– $25,000– $250,000–
  $750,000 $75,000 $175,000
  Moderate Loss Moderate Loss Moderate Loss
 2—Moderate: $75,000– $10,000– $175,000–
  $250,000 $25,000 $50,000
 
1—Minor:
 Minor Loss Minor Loss Minor Loss
  < $75,000 < $10,000 < $50,000  
Figure 14-5: Risk Rating Criteria: Likelihood of Occurrence
 
Score
 Fraudulent Financial Misappropriation of 
Corruption  Statements Assets
 5—Highly Likely: The event will or has occurred once or more on an annual basis.
 
4—Likely:
 The event has occurred several times and could easily occur 3–4 times
  every 2–3 years.
 3—Possible: The event has occurred or might be likely to occur every 3–4 years.
 
2—Rare:
 The event has occurred or might occur once or twice during the last 
  5–7 years.
 
1—Very Rare:
 Have heard of this happening or it could happen, but likely only once or
  twice in the last 10-year period.
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will give the organization the ability to identify and 
potentially strengthen areas of concern identified 
during the fraud risk assessment process and will 
ultimately assist in determining what type of train-
ing the employees within an organization should 
receive.
Controls Monitoring
Upon identification of the fraud risks relevant to 
the organization, it is critical to evaluate the con-
trols currently in place to mitigate these fraud risks. 
Management’s evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
processes and related controls in managing the fraud 
risks can indicate opportunities for improvement of 
the processes or controls in managing the fraud risks 
or management’s planned actions to monitor or im-
prove the processes or controls.
Control monitoring begins by listing the pro-
cesses and initiatives that address the areas of focus 
identified as high-assessed fraud risks, followed by 
moderate-assessed fraud risks, and then low-assessed 
fraud risks. In some instances, there may be so many 
high- or moderate-assessed fraud risks or associated 
processes and initiatives that it becomes necessary to 
further prioritize to streamline the process.
Ultimately, management or the audit committee 
are responsible for determining which of the iden-
tified risks will result in performance of controls 
Figure 14-6: Fraudulent Statement Schemes Chart
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monitoring or improvement activities, after consid-
ering the potential impact of the fraud risks and the 
cost to execute such procedures. 
Gap Analysis
As we indicated in the overview of the case study, 
the next logical question to ask is “What does the 
organization do with the results?”
Through a controls mapping process, identifica-
tion of gaps in the controls structure is needed to 
determine the location of controls that were not in 
place to mitigate the risk identified from the fraud 
risk assessment. This also will help validate the 
placement of the fraud risks on the preceding “heat 
map,” from a likelihood of occurrence and severity 
of impact perspective.
The following are the two main types of 
controls:
 1)  Entity-level controls
 2)  Transaction-level controls
Entity-Level Controls
These controls span the breadth of the organization. 
Entity-level controls set the tone and establish the 
expectations of the organization’s control environ-
ment. Entity-level controls can be used to monitor 
the extent to which that tone and those expectations 
are being fulfilled. In short, entity-level controls help 
management deliver on its promise to stakeholders 
to run their companies effectively and efficiently.
The benefits of effective and efficient entity- 
level controls can be significant and may include the 
following:
 •  Reduction of the likelihood of a negative risk 
event by establishing and reinforcing the infra-
structure that sets the control consciousness of 
the organization.
 •  A broad risk coverage over financial report-
ing and operations. For companies conducting 
evaluations of internal controls, the presence of 
effective entity-level controls can contribute to a 
more effective and efficient evaluation strategy.
 •  Generation of efficiencies in other businesses and 
operational processes.
 •  Reinforcement for all stakeholders of the impor-
tance of internal controls to the success of the 
business.
Entity-level controls generally have a wide-scope 
impact on the achievement of the company’s ob-
jectives for internal control. Entity-level controls 
are organized in categories consistent with the basic 
components of internal control (monitoring, infor-
mation and communication, control activities, risk 
assessment, and control environment), as defined by 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission.
The impact that entity-level controls can have on 
an organization may vary, based on the control and 
the company. Some entity-level controls help define 
the overall control conscience of the organization 
but do not directly mitigate specific financial state-
ment or operating risks. Other entity-level controls 
are implemented at the sub-process, process, loca-
tion, business unit, or company-wide level. These 
controls are generally used to monitor specific busi-
ness and financial risks and operate at the level of 
precision necessary to directly detect and correct 
breakdowns in the application of a company’s poli-
cies and procedures. Example areas within an or-
ganization where entity-level controls may typically 
be found are outlined in box 14-3.
Whether compelled by governmental regulation, 
industry guidelines, or business executives seek-
ing accountability, companies around the globe are 
evaluating the effectiveness of their internal controls. 
As part of a top-down fraud risk assessment, which 
helps identify and prioritize relevant business and fi-
nancial fraud risks, the identification and evaluation 
of effective entity-level controls may be used to un-
derstand how identified risks are mitigated and redi-
rect evaluation and other resources toward priority-
risk areas. This helps increase both the effectiveness 
and efficiency of management’s risk assessment and 
controls evaluation.
The benefits of entity-level controls can be fur-
ther enhanced by focusing on those controls that are 
most effective at mitigating identified risks.
Leading companies are constantly striving to in-
crease the effectiveness and efficiency of their inter-
nal control structure. They want improved internal 
control along with, not in place of, an increase in ef-
ficiency. In addition, they desire an internal control 
environment that helps generate improved business 
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Monitoring
•  Ongoing monitoring activities. Periodic review of processes and controls using relevant management 
reporting tools. For example, these would include a monthly review of aging of accounts receiv-
able to determine the extent of reserves required for doubtful debts.
•  Independent assessment mechanism. Use of external specialists or professionals to review and assess 
internal controls. For example, this might include the use of external tax professionals to review the 
controls around tax positions developed by the in-house tax team.
•  Variance analysis reporting. Comparison and reporting of actual performance against predetermined 
benchmarks, if used appropriately, can serve as an early-warning mechanism. For example, a steady 
increase in debtor turnover might indicate varying levels of collection-related issues.
•  Remediation mechanism. This refers to a systematic approach to resolving identified internal control 
issues. Although an issue could be identified by either an internal or external monitoring mecha-
nism, the remediation mechanism is usually management owned.
•  Management triggers embedded within IT systems. Most enterprise applications configure business rules 
in a manner to prevent undesired access or entries, require preapproval for access or entries, or alert 
relevant management personnel in the event that certain preset thresholds are not observed. For 
example, a sales application could deploy a control preventing sales transactions above the specified 
credit limit of a customer. As another example, an application may allow the same transaction but 
only after having secured certain approvals. As a final example, the same application could be set to 
simply alert the relevant management personnel after such a transaction has been recorded.
Information and Communication
•  Internal communication and performance reporting. This refers to the lines of communication that run 
through an organization’s structure, both top down and bottom up, including peer communica-
tion. Performance reporting is part of internal communication and usually involves a two-way 
process of setting expectations and monitoring performance against agreed-upon expectations.
•  Tone setting. Tone setting refers to various components of the tone at the top, which are the build-
ing blocks of the character of an organization. Having set the right tone, it is equally important to 
have open channels of communication so that those within and outside the organization under-
stand and act upon it. Examples of such components of tone include a code of ethics and corporate 
governance practices.
•  Board or audit committee reporting. Board members, including independent directors, assume fiduciary 
responsibilities that require them to have access to accurate and relevant information. Although 
most countries have enacted laws regarding formal reporting to the board of directors and the audit 
committee of the board, these usually constitute baseline procedures and requirements. Companies 
are free to adopt more stringent measures regarding board or audit committee reporting, such as 
holding more frequent formal audit committee meetings than required by law.
•  External communication. This refers to the communication to the shareholders, stock market, cus-
tomers, regulators, vendors, and other entities outside the company’s formal boundaries. The an-
nual report is an example of external communication about the company’s performance, financial 
statements, vision, goals, and targets.
Control Activities
•  Policies and procedures. Policies are the business rules and formalized practices that the organiza-
tion and its employees need to observe. These policies and procedures are governed by both legal 
and regulatory requirements and management philosophy. For example, accounting policies are 
typically aligned to prevailing accounting standards, whereas credit policy is dependent on manage-
ment’s risk appetite.
(continued)
Box 14-3:  Entity-Level Control Process Levels
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(continued)
•  Internal Audit reviews. Internal Audit serves as a tool for both the audit committee and manage-
ment to dive into identified high-risk areas for identification of issues and recommendations on 
their remediation. Internal Audit frequently reports to the audit committee and can be either 
internally- or externally-staffed.
•  Segregation of duties. This concept requires an independent review of the work performed by an 
individual to prevent him or her from being able to both start and complete a critical transaction. 
Segregation of duties is a key antifraud control.
•  Accounts reconciliations. Periodic reconciliation of accounts helps identification of errors, omis-
sions, and even fraud. For example, a reconciliation of customer accounts could identify payments 
received but not applied to the correct customer account.
•  System balancing and exception reporting. System balancing refers to a built-in system of checks to 
verify the integrity of data transferred from another application. Examples include a mechanism 
for comparing batch totals between an original data source and data transferred into a new ap-
plication. Exception reporting relates to the reporting of exception items to management so that 
management can use its time more effectively. For example, the sales manager could potentially 
review all sales transactions for a day, but it is more time efficient if the review and approval 
process is focused on transactions that are not sold at the list price or sold above a certain prede-
termined discount percentage.
•  Change management. This refers to management of changes to processes, people, organizational 
structures, and so on in a manner to minimize business disruptions that might otherwise harm 
overall business performance.
Control Environment
•  Code of conduct. This refers to the norms to which the organization voluntarily agrees to comply. 
For example, the company’s code of conduct might include a policy prohibiting employees from 
accepting gifts from vendors.
•  Governance. Governance is a mechanism for monitoring how the resources of an organization are 
being put to an efficient use by management, with an emphasis on transparency and accountability.
•  Assignment of authority and responsibility. The term authority refers to the right to perform the orga-
nization’s activities. The term responsibility refers to the obligation to perform assigned activities. 
It is important for the achievement of control objectives that authorities and responsibilities be 
consistent with the goals of the organization’s business activities and be assigned to appropriate 
personnel.
•  Hiring and retention practices. Hiring and retaining skilled resources is critical to an organization’s 
success. Policies and procedures regarding job definition, recruitment, training, performance ap-
praisal, employee retention programs, and management of employee exits are important compo-
nents of managing human resources.
•  Fraud prevention, prevent and detect controls, and analytical procedures. This refers to the antifraud con-
trols and procedures used by management to prevent, detect, and mitigate fraud. Examples might 
include segregation of duties, setting up an ethics hotline, and periodic job rotation.
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and operational performance. Entity-level controls 
can provide a foundation upon which companies are 
able to build a more effective and efficient internal 
control environment, and they allow management 
to establish expectations, provide guidance, and de-
velop communication channels by which they can 
more effectively reach all levels of the organization. 
Entity-level controls provide management with a 
tool it can use to monitor adherence to the com-
pany’s expectations.
Working in concert with each other, well-de-
signed and effective entity-level controls help man-
agement better meet business and financial objec-
tives and should be considered a key element of a 
leading-class internal control structure.
Transaction-Level Controls
These controls tend to have a narrower scope. They 
are important because they may be sufficiently spe-
cific to prevent or detect fraud on a timely basis. At 
the specific transaction level, internal control refers 
to the actions taken to achieve a specific objective 
(for example, how to ensure the organization’s pay-
ments to third parties are for valid services rendered). 
Internal control procedures reduce process varia-
tion, leading to more predictable outcomes. These 
controls could be identified to specifically address 
one of the identified fraud risk schemes.
As is often the case, Michele indicated she wanted 
to focus on entity- and transaction-level controls 
already in place or those that needed to be put in 
place to mitigate the identified fraud risks. Perusi & 
Bilanz LLP developed an approach to complete the 
gap analysis with Michele in which she would list
 •  the fraud risks identified during the assessment.
 •  the corresponding controls in place to mitigate 
the fraud risks and the potential controls that 
could be implemented to mitigate each identified 
fraud risk.
 •  a process owner who would follow up on this 
fraud risk.
 •  the potential incorporation of data analytics into 
the process to help prevent, detect, and monitor 
each identified fraud risk.
 •  the timeframe for desired follow up.
Monitoring Activities
Monitoring controls to prevent or detect frauds 
are the means by which the organization develops 
a sense of the level and location of potentially ir-
regular activity. The controls might be as simple as 
periodic conversations between people who might 
reasonably come across red flags, such as security, 
internal audit, and general counsel.
Common monitoring controls include the 
following:
 •  The results of exit interviews
 •  Internal audit reports
 •  Period end financial reporting processes, includ-
ing reconciliations, executive reviews, and 
certifications
In more sophisticated environments, the controls 
might include real-time transaction validation con-
trols, integrated compliance monitoring systems, 
or automated reporting of whistle-blower activity 
to multiple parties, including the chair of the audit 
committee.
Following this approach allows for the opportuni-
ty to push the process forward, rather than own the 
process, and treat the control monitoring exercise 
almost like an internal audit finding, which allows 
the Internal Audit department to remain indepen-
dent from the process so that it can continue to audit 
the process from an effectiveness standpoint.
Reactive
The final step in a cohesive antifraud program is the 
establishment of reactive elements. Management 
can set the proper tone, execute a robust fraud risk 
assessment, and design internal controls to prevent 
and detect fraud, but fraud will still occur. As men-
tioned earlier, recent studies done by the ACFE es-
timate that as much as 7 percent of U.S. companies’ 
revenues are lost each year due to fraud8. As a result, 
management should establish various protocols to 
react to those situations in which fraud is suspected.
Maintaining a fraud response plan is the corner-
stone of any reactive element in an antifraud pro-
gram. Policies and procedures should be established, 
reviewed, approved, and maintained regarding the 
company’s response to potential fraud threats. The 
8	ACFE	2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse.
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fraud response plan should encompass investigations, 
remediation, and uniform disciplinary processes.
Investigation protocols should be established so 
that management has a framework from which to 
operate if a fraud is suspected. The protocols should 
state that all suspected frauds, regardless of source, 
will be investigated; management will lead the in-
vestigations; and the results of the investigations 
will be communicated to the audit committee in a 
timely manner. The setup of policies and procedures 
that establish the uniform practice of disciplining 
any individual, regardless of position, who commits 
fraud, fails to comply with federal or state regula-
tions, or fails to comply with the organization’s code 
of conduct or ethics is considered a best practice. 
Additionally, any disciplinary action that is taken 
against an employee, vendor, or customer should to 
be communicated to the audit committee.
Results of the fraud investigations will be re-
viewed to determine what remediation, if any, is 
required to eliminate the potential for reoccurrence 
(for example, changes in policies, procedures, or 
processes). Management should be required to re-
port the status of the remediation plans to the audit 
committee.
In order for the fraud response plan to be effec-
tive, upon identification through the whistle-blow-
er hotline, a tip, or otherwise, the fraud response 
process should allow for this alleged potential com-
plaint to escalate properly and enable an appropri-
ate investigation of the facts. In some circumstances, 
an investigation of the facts would be appropriately 
conducted by line management, but, in other cir-
cumstances, it might be more appropriate for the 
investigation to include a broader internal or even 
external team.
In our Grand Forge Company case study example, 
Michele worked with Perusi & Bilanz LLP and the 
general counsel, Jacob Willis, to create an outline of 
what the fraud response plan should look like and 
include. Jacob then worked to draft the document 
and, once completed, the company used an internal 
webcast to ensure all employees were aware of the 
newly developed policy. The fraud response plan 
that was created for Grand Forge Company may 
look something like figure 14-7, which captures all 
of the key fraud prevention elements necessary in a 
response plan.
Figure 14-7: Fraud Response Plan
Fraud
Response
Plan
Investigate
Findings and
Exceptions
Remediate
or
Enhance
Controls
Create
Uniform
Discipline
Policy
Purpose
• Assign responsibility for 
investigating fraud
• Develop and initiate disciplinary 
actions
• Maintain mechanism to record
reported fraud
Detection and Action Taken
• Action plan upon the detection of 
suspected fraud
Prevention of Further Loss
• Ensure discipline is applied 
consistently
• Ensure assets or information within 
the organization are not destroyed
Establish and Secure 
Information
• Establish procedures to secure 
information and assets during an 
investigation
• Determine applicability of laws and 
regulations to evidence
Recovery of Losses
• Legal advice should be obtained 
on options to recover losses
Reporting Suspected Fraud
• Written report clearly indicating the 
findings and recommendations upon 
completion of all investigations
Review of Plan
• Review the plan at least annually
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Ownership of the  
Antifraud Program
Ownership of the overall antifraud program is not 
something Internal Audit can do alone, and, quite 
frankly, it should not have overall ownership of the 
program due to the fact that it will want to audit 
the individual elements and the overall effectiveness 
of the program once it is implemented. The key to 
designing and implementing an effective antifraud 
program is getting support from higher levels of 
management within an organization. This allows the 
employees to understand this is a key initiative, and 
it further strengthens the tone and culture within a 
company. It sends the message that fraud is some-
thing the company takes very seriously.
Michele was feeling more comfortable in her un-
derstanding of an antifraud program and the ben-
efits to designing and implementing such a program. 
However, she was concerned that she couldn’t ulti-
mately own the process and remain independent and 
eventually audit the effectiveness of the program if 
Internal Audit was the driving force for putting the 
program in place.  Perusi & Bilanz LLP agreed with 
Michele and offered a chart depicting the various 
roles that are typically involved in the design and 
implementation of an antifraud program (see fig-
ure 14-8). The key to implementing an antifraud 
program is determining what role each individual 
and department will play, with respect to the overall 
program.
Figure 14-8: Roles and Responsibilities for the Grand Forge Company Antifraud Program
Board of Directors
— Setting the proper tone
— Ensure management designs effective fraud
     risk management policies
— Establish mechanisms to ensure it receives
     accurate and timely information
— Monitor the effectiveness of the Anti-Fraud
     program
Audit Committee:
— Comprises indendence board members
— Active role in the risk assessment process
— Monitors fraud risks via internal auditing
— Direct reporting channel for external audit
Antifraud Program
Roles and
Responsibilities
Internal Audit:
— Ensures fraud prevention and detection controls 
     are sufficient for identified risks
— May be responsible for investigating suspected
     instances of fraud
— Company charter should dictate Internal Audit’s
     role with respect to antifraud development
Management:
— Responsible for design and implementation
     of the Antifraud program
     — Setting the proper tone
     — Reactive
     — Proactive
— Reinforces setting the proper tone at the top
— Helps to create a culture of zero fraud
     tolerance
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As previously described, for the antifraud program 
to be truly effective and properly implemented into 
the company it needs to have support from the vari-
ous members of management.
Benefits of an Antifraud 
Program
Upon creating an antifraud program, the following 
points are considered to be benefits for designing 
and implementing the various elements of the anti-
fraud program:
 (1)  Provide tangible evidence of a culture of in-
tegrity
 (2)  Allow Internal Audit to use to the results 
from the fraud risk assessment to drive the 
internal audit plan for the year
 (3)  Help prevent fraud and facilitate early detec-
tion
 (4) Improve controls monitoring
 (5) Increase fraud awareness
 (6)  Limit unpleasant surprises that affect reputa-
tion, credibility, and stock price
 (7)  Increase confidence of major stakeholders
 (8)  Reduce potential for class action lawsuits
Conclusion
Fraud is a significant threat facing businesses all over 
the world. According to Ernst & Young’s 9th Global 
Fraud Survey: Fraud risk in emerging markets, one in 
five companies surveyed has experienced a signifi-
cant fraud in the past two years. Although organiza-
tions cannot be imprisoned, they can be fined, sen-
tenced to probation for up to five years, ordered to 
make restitution and issue public notice of convic-
tion to their victims, and exposed to forfeitures. The 
consequences of a financial statement fraud often re-
sult in bankruptcy, significant changes in ownership, 
financial penalties, and possibly delisting by national 
exchanges.
For these reasons, management should implement 
a strong antifraud program that helps prevent fraud 
or detect it in its early stages and improves fraud 
awareness among the organization’s employees, 
vendors, and customers through training and com-
mitment to ethical behavior. Additional benefits of 
a strong fraud prevention program include improv-
ing the business by reducing surprises, increasing the 
external auditor’s and board of directors’ satisfaction 
with the internal controls environment, and reduc-
ing the potential of a class action lawsuit.
Enron; WorldCom; Tyco; Adelphia; Societe 
Generale; the Satyam fraud; and, recently, the Ponzi 
scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff are just a few 
examples of frauds that have occurred and caused 
devastating effects on their organizations, employ-
ees, and investors. These events continue to alter the 
public’s perception of fraud in Corporate America 
and are causing management within organizations to 
explore ideas on how to proactively deal with fraud. 
All organizations are subject to fraud schemes oc-
curring within their organization, and, as we noted 
earlier, 7 percent of organizations’ revenues are lost 
each year due to fraud.9
With the continued onset of one of the worst eco-
nomic downturns in the history of the United States 
and internal and external pressures on employees, a 
perfect is storm brewing for the potential for fraud 
to reach an all-time high. This is further magnified 
by the fact that companies continue to downsize and 
reduce spending on nonmission-critical objectives, 
which is creating tremendous strain on internal con-
trols, such as segregation of duties, just by reductions 
in people alone. Millions of dollars lost each year to 
fraud; actual incidents of fraud, like the examples 
previously listed; the fear of an increase in potential 
frauds occurring due to the downtown in the econ-
omy; and the heightened regulatory environment 
are causing board members, independent auditors, 
members of management, and other stakeholders to 
ask pointed questions about how their company is 
responding to fraud risk.
Due to these factors, more and more exposure in 
the industry is currently being given to the concept 
of antifraud and fraud risk management and how 
to incorporate a holistic antifraud program within 
9	ACFE	2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse.
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an organization. As previously indicated, more and 
more companies are designing and implementing 
antifraud programs to help raise the awareness of 
fraud and proactively deal with fraud risk manage-
ment. Antifraud programs should be viewed as a 
continuous process; all the elements of the antifraud 
program are interrelated and support each other and 
are fully represented as a holistic antifraud program 
in figure 14-9.
Figure 14-9: Antifraud Program Cycle
The elements of an Antifraud
Program cover three areas:
Setting the Proper Tone,
Proactive Measures and Reactive
Protocols.
Code of
Ethics
Fraud
Response
Plan
Fraud
Controls
Monitoring
Fraud
Prevention
Policies
Communication
and Training
Fraud
Risk
Assessment
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Glossary
1997 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment Anti-Bribery Convention. An organization that 
establishes legally binding standards to criminalize 
bribery of foreign public officials in international busi-
ness transactions and provides for a host of related 
measures that make this effective.19
40+9 Recommendations. The Financial Action Task 
Force’s (FATF) 40 Recommendations set out a 
comprehensive framework for anti-money launder-
ing efforts, and encompass criminal justice and law 
enforcement, the financial system and its regula-
tion, and international cooperation. The Financial 
Action Task Force 40 lay out principles for countries 
to implement according to their particular circum-
stances and constitutional frameworks. In a related 
initiative, FATF identifies countries and jurisdictions 
that do not cooperate in the international fight against 
money laundering. After the events of September 11, 
2001, FATF adopted 9 Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing. Adopted on October 31, 2001 and 
updated on October 22, 2004, Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing, when combined with the FATF 
40, set out a comprehensive framework to detect, 
prevent, and suppress the financing of terrorism and 
terrorist acts.1
Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 20, 
Accounting Changes. A statement that changes the 
requirements for the accounting for and reporting of 
a change in accounting principle. This statement ap-
plies to all voluntary changes in accounting principle. 
It also applies to changes required by an account-
ing pronouncement in the unusual instance that the 
pronouncement does not include specific transition 
provisions. When a pronouncement includes specific 
transition provisions, those provisions should be 
followed.12
accounts payable disbursement fraud. The payment to 
vendors for goods and services never provided or 
procured at excessive amounts usually due to bribes 
or kickbacks being paid by the vendor. The fraud also 
includes paying fictitious vendors who were set up 
with the intention of perpetrating a fraud.
active online. Information stored on magnetic disks, such 
as hard drives, attached to a computer or server.
adversarial proceedings. Or dispute settings, which 
include litigation, arbitration, mediation, or presenta-
tions to regulators about controversies or adversarial 
matters.
advocate. A person who pleads for the cause of another.17
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption. A practical policy approach to enable 
accountability in the flow of data while preventing im-
pediments to trade. It provides technical assistance 
to those Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
economies that have not addressed privacy from a 
regulatory or policy perspective.4
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agreed-upon procedures engagement. An engagement in 
which a practitioner is engaged by a client to issue 
a report of findings based on specific procedures 
performed on subject matter. The client engages the 
practitioner to assist specified parties in evaluating 
subject matter or an assertion as a result of a need 
or needs of the specified parties. (AICPA—State-
ments on Standards for Attestation Engagements, 
Agreed-upon Procedures Engagements 2602.03.) In 
the context of a fraud investigation, the procedures 
and guidelines agreed to with the client effectively 
describe in detail the framework for the procedures 
that will be performed in an investigation.
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct. The code con-
sists of two sections—(1) the Principles and (2) the 
Rules. The Principles provide the framework for the 
Rules, which govern the performance of professional 
services by members. The Council of the AICPA is 
authorized to designate bodies to promulgate techni-
cal standards under the Rules, and the bylaws require 
adherence to those Rules and standards.
AICPA Management Consulting Services Executive 
Committee. The committee designated to promulgate 
standards under Rule 201 (General Standards of the 
Code of Professional Conduct) and Rule 202 (Compli-
ance with the Standards) with respect to the offering 
of management consulting services.
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Refers to any means 
of settling disputes outside of the courtroom. ADR 
typically includes arbitration, mediation, early neutral 
evaluation, and conciliation.
American Arbitration Association (AAA). A not-for-profit-
organization that provides time- and court-tested 
rules and procedures.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA). A national professional membership 
organization that represents practicing CPAs. The 
AICPA establishes ethical and auditing standards as 
well as standards for other services performed by its 
members. Through committees, it develops guidance 
for specialized industries.
analytics. An efficient and reliable method of analyzing 
large sets of unstructured or structured data in a 
variety of fields, or a variety of ways for more in-depth 
analysis.
annotation codes. Symbols included in the e-mail review 
tool so that the e-mail review team can code the doc-
uments as they review them. The codes will typically 
be established for two reasons: first, to indicate the 
level of relevancy of a particular e-mail and, second, 
to put e-mails into meaningful categories.
anti-money laundering (AML). A term mainly used in the 
financial and legal industries to describe the legal 
controls that require financial institutions and other 
regulated entities to prevent or report money launder-
ing activities. Anti-money laundering guidelines came 
into prominence globally after the September 11, 2001 
attacks and the subsequent enactment of the USA 
Patriot Act.
anton piller order. An order that secures and preserves 
documents or other evidence that might otherwise 
be disposed of by the defendant. The order allows for 
the applicant to enter the respondent’s premises and 
search for, inspect, seize, or make copies of docu-
ments or other evidence.
appeal level. A request made after a trial by a party that 
has lost on one or more issues that a higher court 
review the decision to determine if it was correct.5
arbitral award. The outcome of arbitration, typically 
a monetary amount. The awards are enforceable 
through the civil court system.
arbitration. The hearing of a dispute by an impartial third 
person or persons. The third person is chosen by the 
parties, whose decision and award the parties agree 
to accept.5
archiving systems. A system frequently used to alleviate 
space issues on the active e-mail servers by remov-
ing information regarding past e-mail communica-
tions regarding previous engagements.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy 
Framework. The framework promotes a flexible ap-
proach to information privacy protection across APEC 
member economies, while avoiding the creation of 
unnecessary barriers to information flows.4
asset management system. A system that tracks and 
maintains a history of assets. An asset management 
system will help in determining what systems a custo-
dian has access to now or had access to in the past.
asset misappropriation. Comprises any scheme that in-
volves the theft or misuse of an organization’s assets. 
Typical examples would includes, theft of assets such 
as fixed assets, inventory, cash, intellectual property 
and other assets, travel and entertainment reimburse-
ment fraud, fake vendor fraud, and payroll manipula-
tion fraud.
asset tracing. Tracking the true economic substance of 
the transactions used to move the assets, as well as 
identifying the location of the assets.
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Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). An anti-
fraud organization that provides anti-fraud training 
and education. The ACFE has nearly 50,000 members. 
The goal of the ACFE is to reduce business fraud 
world-wide. They offer and administer the designa-
tion of Certified Fraud Examiner.
attorney work product doctrine. A policy that protects 
an attorney’s internal documentation of the work or 
analyses created in support of the attorney’s legal 
representation of the attorney’s client.
attorney-client privilege. The protection of communi-
cation between a client and its attorney, thereby 
maintaining confidentiality.
audit command language (ACL). A tool used to prepare 
data for analysis from other programs. The software 
has many uses, including: data extraction and trans-
formation, statistical analysis, and identification of 
exceptions and irregularities.
audit committee. A committee established by and 
amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the 
purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial 
reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the 
financial statements of the issuer.25
audit committee of the board of directors. A committee 
(or equivalent body) established by and amongst the 
board of directors of an issuer for the purpose of 
overseeing the accounting and financial reporting 
processes of the issuer and audits of the financial 
statements of the issuer; and if no such committee 
exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board of 
directors of the issuer. 25
authorization level. Those threshold levels that require 
certain signatures or other forms of approval for 
desired use. 
backup protocols. The process and methodology of stor-
ing live electronic data and software onto tapes or 
other media. 
balance sheet. The statement of financial condition at 
a given date which lists the organizations assets, 
liabilities and owners or stockholders equity. Assets = 
Liabilities + Equity.
bankers blanket bond. Covers losses as a result of dis-
honest or fraudulent acts by officers and employees, 
attorneys retained by the bank, and nonemployee 
data processors while performing services for the 
insured.8
bid-rigging. Bid-rigging occurs in the procurement 
process generally when a member of the offering 
organization that has placed a “request for proposal” 
fraudulently assists a vendor or contractor in winning 
a sale or contract through some form of manipulation 
of the offering organization’s bid process. 
big bath adjustments. When a company takes a large 
charge in a quarter in which the company knows that 
it will not make its earnings target. The idea is that a 
company will incur a “big bath” charge in a bad year 
in order to artificially inflate its earnings in future 
quarters. 
bill and hold arrangements. A situation that arises when a 
company completes the manufacturing of a product, 
but the customer is not, in reality, ready to take deliv-
ery of the goods, due to lack of space, and/or delays 
in customer production schedules; therefore, the bills 
are held until a future date. 
blog. A Web site that contains an online personal journal 
with reflections, comments, and often hyperlinks 
provided by the writer.17
bonus scheme. When someone within the organiza-
tion intentionally creates a bonus payment and that 
payment is improperly entered in the organizations’ 
payroll system and paid to a non deserving employee. 
books and records provisions. As part of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), issuers are required to 
keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reason-
able detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transac-
tions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and 
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances 
that transactions are executed in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization.
Boolean logic. Relating to, or being a logical combinato-
rial system that represents symbolically relationships 
between entities.17
Boolean syntax. A way of searching electronic databases 
(indexes, catalogs and Web search engines) that al-
lows users to indicate relationships between search 
terms by using the words “AND”, “OR”, and “NOT”.
bribe. A scheme that falls under the corruption category. 
It involves the promise to pay money or some other 
form of compensation or favor to someone in a posi-
tion of power or decision making, with the hope of 
intentionally influencing that individuals’ judgment or 
behavior.
business drivers. Employees that take responsibility for 
finding solutions to business problems. 
business intelligence (BI). A system implemented 
infrastructure used to gather information pertinent 
to investigations. Some BI systems include Hyperion, 
Crystal Reports, Business Objects, and Cognos. 
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business systems. Systems containing the online financial 
and operational transaction records for a company. 
These systems may be multitiered with a presentation 
layer running on one computer system, a database 
layer on another system, and a business logic layer 
on yet another system. 
capitalizing expenses. Intentionally and inappropriately 
capitalizing costs as an asset on the balance sheet 
that should be correctly expensed in the income 
statement, such as research and development 
charges. 
cash flows. The net of cash receipts and cash disburse-
ments relating to a particular activity during a speci-
fied accounting period.3
cash in bank accounts. The total sum cash and cash 
equivalents in the organizations financial accounts.
cash larceny. The actual theft of cash on hand or from 
daily receipts. Attempts to conceal cash larceny are 
typically undertaken in one of three ways: by making 
no record of cash received, altering supporting docu-
ments to conceal theft of cash, or by falsifying journal 
entries to cover up the fraud. 
cash on hand. All money, cash, and cash equivalents in 
the organizations cash registers and safes on the 
premises; as opposed to cash in the bank.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). An independent U.S. 
Government agency responsible for providing nation-
al security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers.
chain of custody. Refers to the chronology of who has 
had possession of physical evidence and where that 
evidence was stored. 
chain of custody log. A record that will enable evidence to 
be traced from the point and time of original collec-
tion to the point and time when it is presented in a 
proceeding. 
channel stuffing. Occurs when a company offers large 
discounts and other incentives to a distributor or re-
tailer to take large orders late in the reporting period 
in order for the company to meet the designated sales 
or profit targets. 
chart of accounts. A list of accounts in the general ledger, 
systematically classified by title and number. The ac-
count number can be referred to as the GL code. The 
financial transactions are posted to these GL codes.
check fraud. A type of misappropriation of asset fraud 
scheme. It involves the manipulation of checks in 
such a way as to deceive victims expecting value in 
exchange for their money.
civil investigation. Providing and seeking information 
needed for a court case involving citizens who are 
disputing an issue that relates to their rights.
civil penalties. A fine assessed as a result of a viola-
tion against an individual by a state or government 
agency.
Civil Rights Act of 1964. An act that made racial discrimi-
nation in public places, such as theaters, restaurants 
and hotels, illegal. The act also required employers to 
provide equal employment opportunities.
claim. A legal action to obtain money, property, or the 
enforcement of a right against another party. 
claimant. The aggrieved party in an arbitration setting. 
clustering. Grouping data with similar properties. Cluster-
ing data can help uncover patterns that can identify 
fraud. 
code of conduct. The clear set of business rules set forth 
by an organization. The code can provide a frame-
work to guide the response of the organization in the 
challenging and sometimes difficult choices that are 
presented to members of the organization. 
collaborative systems. A system that allows users to 
collectively share and search a body of information 
typically related to a single project. 
Commercial Crime Policy (CCP). In 1986, as a part of the 
movement in the insurance industry to simplify policy 
forms, the Surety Association of America and the 
Insurance Services offices introduced this policy. 
This policy contained “simplified language” and was 
designed to be more “user friendly.”16 
commission scheme. A plan perpetrated by either falsely 
reporting sales or other activity for which a commis-
sion is to be paid or the rate at which the commission 
is to be paid. 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). Sponsored by five major profes-
sional associations in the United States, the American 
Accounting Association, the AICPA, Financial Execu-
tives International, The Institute of Internal Auditors, 
and the National Association of Accountants (now 
the Institute of Management Accountants). It is a 
voluntary private sector organization dedicated to 
improving the quality of financial reporting through 
business ethics, effective internal controls, and 
corporate governance.
commonwealth countries. A voluntary association of 53 
independent states working together in the common 
interests of their citizens for development, democracy 
and peace.
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compliance audits. The review of financial records to de-
termine whether the entity is complying with specific 
procedures or rules. 
compliance culture. Sometimes referred to as tone of the 
top, this represents the vision to identify the specific 
risks that could arise within each strategic area or 
the organization, establishes controls for each of 
these risks, is well documented, and makes sure key 
members of the organization are accountable for 
managing each specific element of the compliance 
system.
compliance officers. A person or function in a corpora-
tion responsible for the company’s agreement with 
relevant legal requirements and regulations and 
responsible for assessing and understanding the 
compliance culture.
compliance programs. Set of procedures and method-
ology implemented by an organization to ensure 
that the rules and regulations are being met by the 
organization.
computer forensics. Encompasses a range of activi-
ties, from relatively straightforward tasks, such as 
searching a single computer system for evidence 
of unauthorized use, to searching for deleted e-mail 
messages that might remain on a computer network. 
conclusion. A reasoned judgment, usually containing the 
summing of a point regarding statements of opinions 
and decisions reached.17
confidential process. Procedures or steps that are imple-
mented to keep sensitive/privileged information and/
or communication secretive throughout the duration 
of the event.
consent. Agreement as to action or opinion; voluntary ac-
ceptance of the wish of another.17
constructive trust. An agreement where the third party 
becomes a trustee whose sole duty is to transfer the 
title and possession to the rightful owner. 
consulting fees. The amount of money spent for informa-
tion and services provided by an expert.
control. Power or authority to guide or manage.17
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technol-
ogy (COBIT). An information technology governance 
framework and supporting toolset that allows manag-
ers to bridge the gap between control requirements, 
technical issues and business risks. The framework 
enables clear policy development and good practice 
for IT control throughout organizations. It emphasizes 
regulatory compliance, helps organizations to in-
crease the value attained from IT, enables alignment 
and simplifies implementation.6
controller. An individual within an organization who 
is responsible for the accounting activities of the 
organization.
controls mapping process. The process of identifying 
gaps in the control structure. Identification of gaps in 
the control structure is needed to determine the loca-
tion of controls that were not in place to mitigate the 
risk identified from the fraud risk assessment. 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions. 
Establishes legally binding standards to criminalize 
bribery of foreign public officials in international busi-
ness transactions and provides for a host of related 
measures that make this effective. The 30 Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) member countries and eight nonmember 
countries—Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, 
Israel, the Slovenia and South Africa—have adopted 
this convention.19
conventions. Event or session where different countries 
align themselves toward a common standard. 
cookie jars. Slang term used to represent a contingency 
or liability that is placed on the balance sheet in 
anticipation of a future expense or loss. 
corporate crises. A dramatic event such as an accident, 
scare, damaged product or scandal that sparks 
widespread and tremendous public attention, disrupts 
a company’s regular operations, and damages its 
culture and reputation.
corporate intelligence professional. An employee or 
consultant tasked with the collection and analysis of 
public and nonpublic information that has strategic 
business value.
corrupt intent. The objective to perform corrupt acts. 
corruption. Refers to a payment or offer of a bribe or any-
thing of value to obtain or retain business or improper 
advantage. This is one of the three main types of 
fraud schemes. 
counsel. A lawyer appointed or retained to advise and 
represent a client in legal matters.
crime protection policy (CPP). Offers fidelity, forgery, bur-
glary and theft coverages in a single, unified policy 
form. The CPP is an all-inclusive policy that contains 
six basic insuring agreements, declarations page and 
policy conditions. Two additional insuring agreements 
may be added by endorsement.7
criminal investigation. Performing a process to gather 
necessary information to determine what criminal 
violations were violated by an individual or organiza-
tion to potentially convict.
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criminal liability. A liability imposed on a company for the 
acts of its employees, officers, and agents only if (1) 
the employee, officer, or agent acted within the scope 
of his or her apparent authority granted by the com-
pany, and (2) the employee, officer, or agent acted for 
the benefit of the company. 
criminal penalties. The suffering in person, rights, or 
property that is annexed by law or judicial decision to 
the commission of a crime or public offense.17
crisis communications. The practice of communicating 
with key stakeholders in a documented consistent 
manner during times of crisis such as material fraud 
allegations that may warrant a financial restatement.
cross-jurisdictional conventions. When investigative 
activity on a case needs to be conducted outside the 
geographic jurisdiction of the primary regional office, 
the primary regional office may request the regional 
office having jurisdiction over this area (auxiliary of-
fice) to perform the work.9
cross-jurisdictional investigations. The investigations 
into fraudsters who have long known that moving 
their assets (and themselves) to a different location 
and beyond reach of the “long arm of the law” is an 
effective strategy for trying to cover up fraud. 
culture. The personality of the organization. 
custodian. Key individuals within an organization with 
whom to collect documents from in obtaining suf-
ficient evidence to conduct an investigation.
data mining. An analytic technique that involves search-
ing through large amounts of data to identify relevant 
information, patterns, trends, and differences indica-
tive of fraud. 
de minimis. An investigation that is deemed immaterial in 
momentary amount as well as complexity and there-
fore would not require significant outside experts to 
assist.
deduplicating. The process of removing duplicate compo-
nents of data, such as addresses or names or entire 
exact duplicates of documents from a database.
defendant. The individual, company, or organization who 
defends or is asked to respond to the a legal action 
taken or complaint made by a plaintiff and against 
whom the court has been asked to order damages 
or specific corrective action redress some type of 
unlawful or improper action alleged by the plaintiff.
delaying expenses. The failure to accrue for goods and 
services at the period end or creating a prepayment 
for an expense for which the good or service has 
already been received by the end of the period. 
Department of Commerce (DOC). The cabinet department 
of the United States government concerned with 
promoting economic growth.
Department of Justice (DOJ). The primary federal criminal 
investigation and enforcement agency. Their primary 
mission is as follows: to enforce the law and defend 
the interests of the United States according to the 
law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign 
and domestic; to provide federal leadership in pre-
venting and controlling crime; to seek just punishment 
for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure 
fair and impartial administration of justice for all 
Americans.
departmental share. Repositories for user-created docu-
ments used by multiple custodians. 
disclaimer language. A denial or disavowal of legal 
claim.17
discovery. A pretrial process in which each side requests 
relevant information and documents from the other. 
Parties must provide the requested information or 
documents or show good cause to the court why they 
should not have to do so.15
discovery phase. The time during which the parties gather 
information related to the investigation from one 
another and third parties. 
dispute settings. Or adversarial proceedings, including 
litigation, arbitration, mediation, presentations to 
regulators about controversies or adversarial mat-
ters, and other such situations. 
document holds. A legal notice that is generated when 
litigation or an investigation is pending or in progress 
and there is a requirement to preserve information 
and prevent or suspend destruction of paper docu-
ments and electronic data that must be retained 
during a litigation hold.
document preservation and production plan. A process 
that occurs after receiving a subpoena. The company 
should quickly work with the regulatory agency to 
determine what documents are required to be turned 
over. 
document repository. The place where discovery docu-
ments are accumulated physically or electronically. 
domestic criminal offenses. Participation in an organized 
criminal group, money laundering, corruption, and 
obstruction of justice. 
duty to defend. Insurers are required to defend the 
insured against all actions brought against them 
which are, judging by the allegations of such actions, 
potentially within coverage of the policy.
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early case assessments (ECAs). An analysis conducted 
soon after data is first loaded to the review plat-
form, for the purpose of evaluating the collection of 
electronic evidence to determine potentially relevant 
information that may drive case strategy, such as 
key topics or themes of the case, dates and amounts, 
specific vocabulary and jargon, and people. 
electronic data environment. Key systems and sources of 
electronic evidence.
electronic evidence. Electronic records such as computer 
network logs, e-mails, word processing files, and 
“.jpg” and picture files. Typically, depending on the 
particular circumstances of an investigation, there 
are two types of electronic evidence commonly ana-
lyzed, e-mail correspondence of key individuals and 
financial records of the company.
electronic evidence review process. The process 
includes discovery processing, including data col-
lection, data extraction and conversion (which may 
include elimination of system files or other high-level 
culling techniques), deduplication, data culling or 
searching, and data review. 
electronically stored information (ESI). Information stored 
on backup tapes, in e-mail messages, and in trace 
remnants of deleted electronic files on a laptop. 
embezzlement. A type of fraud that would be classified 
as a misappropriation of asset scheme. It is an act 
where someone within the organization inappropri-
ately and intentionally takes assets typically financial 
in nature, for their own use.
employee. A person who has agreed by contract or other 
form of agreement to perform specified services 
for an organization, in exchange for money or other 
forms of compensation.
employee theft. The intentional stealing, use, or misuse of 
an employer’s assets without permission. This type 
of fraud would be classified as a misappropriation of 
asset scheme.
enforcement lawyers. The division of enforcement for the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have 
lawyers on staff to investigate possible violations of 
securities laws, recommend SEC action when appro-
priate, either in federal court or before an administra-
tive law judge and negotiate settlements.
engagement partner. The lead partner on each                  
engagement. 
engagement plan. A document used to help plan, orga-
nize, and guide the engagement.
English common law. English common law is made by 
judges sitting in courts, applying their common sense 
and knowledge of legal precedent (stare decisis) to 
the facts before them. A decision of the highest ap-
peal court in England and Wales, the House of Lords, 
is binding on every other court in the hierarchy, and 
they will follow its directions.17 
enterprise applications. Software designed to integrate 
all aspects of a firm’s operations and processes.
EU privacy law. The rights that stem from The European 
Union Directive on Data Protection of 1995, which 
mandated that each EU nation pass a national privacy 
law and create a Data Protection Authority to protect 
citizens’ privacy and investigate attacks on it.
European Commission. The executive branch of the Eu-
ropean Union. The body is responsible for proposing 
legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the 
Union’s treaties and the general day-to-day running 
of the Union.
European Union (EU). Economic, scientific, and political 
organization consisting of Belgium, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, & Romania.17
European Union Directive 95/46/EC. A directive that limits 
the scope of data and information on individuals 
that may be processed and restricts the terms and 
conditions under which transfers of data to locations 
outside the EU may occur unless there are adequate 
safeguards for the protection of the personal 
information. 
evidential matter. The support collected through inspec-
tion, observation, or confirmation and other selected 
procedures ordinarily performed during an audit.
ex parte. Something done on behalf of only one party, 
without notice to any other party. For example, a re-
quest for a search warrant is an ex parte proceeding, 
since the person subject to the search is not notified 
of the proceeding and is not present at the hearing.5
exception list. A list that must be able to account for 
all data dropped from review because of filtering 
decisions and should be prepared to defend those 
decisions. 
executive management. A team of executives responsible 
for providing management sponsorship and coordina-
tion. The team among other responsibilities, reports 
to the audit committee the status of current investiga-
tions, completed investigations, results of the fraud 
risk assessment, and action plans to mitigate the risk 
of fraud within the company. 
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expert reports. The report that contains the opinion articu-
lated by the testifying witness, not that of an attorney 
or professional services firm. Usually, the expert 
personally signs the report and bears responsibility 
for the report. 
external auditors. Independent CPAs who are retained by 
organizations seeking qualified professionals to per-
form independent audits of their financial statements.
external resources. A source or supply of support that is 
used outside of the particular firm or corporation.
facilitating payments. Payments known to expedite or 
obtain a routine government action. 
false statement charge. The statute criminalizes one 
who “knowingly and willfully” falsifies, conceals, or 
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a mate-
rial fact; makes any materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statement or representation; or makes or 
uses any false writing or document knowing the same 
to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or entry.26
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement 
No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies. The statement 
that establishes standards of financial accounting 
and reporting for loss contingencies. It requires 
accrual by a charge to income (and disclosure) for 
an estimated loss from a loss contingency if two 
conditions are met: (a) information available prior to 
issuance of the financial statements indicates that 
it is probable that an asset had been impaired or a 
liability had been incurred at the date of the financial 
statements, and (b) the amount of loss can be reason-
ably estimated. Accruals for general or unspecified 
business risks (reserves for general contingencies) 
are no longer permitted.11
FASB Concept Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteris-
tics of Accounting Information. The purpose of this 
statement is to examine the characteristics that make 
accounting information useful. Those who prepare, 
audit, and use financial reports, as well as FASB, 
must often select or evaluate accounting alterna-
tives. The characteristics or qualities of information 
discussed in this statement are the ingredients that 
make information useful and are the qualities to be 
sought when accounting choices are made.10
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). A federal agency 
that is designed to protect and defend the United 
States against terrorist and foreign intelligence 
threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of 
the United States, and to provide leadership and 
criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, 
and international agencies and partners.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rule 26). Parties 
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition, and location of any documents or other 
tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons who know of any discoverable matter.28
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The manual that 
contains the federal sentencing guidelines and policy 
statements effective November 1, 2008.
fictitious vendor. Commonly also referred to as a fake 
vendors, this type of fraud can be classified into 
the misappropriation of assets category of fraud 
schemes. The situations arises when fake or falsified 
vendor enters into the system and invoices for prod-
ucts or services that the company is not receiving but 
subsequently is paying for.
fiduciaries. A person who occupies a position of special 
trust and confidence.
FASB Statement No. 154, Accounting Changes and Error 
Corrections—a replacement of APB Opinion No. 20 
and FASB Statement No. 3. This statement applies 
to all voluntary changes in accounting principle. 
This statement requires retrospective application 
to prior periods’ financial statements of changes in 
accounting principle, unless it is impracticable to 
determine either the period-specific effects or the 
cumulative effect of the change. When it is impracti-
cable to determine the period-specific effects of an 
accounting change on one or more individual prior 
periods presented, this statement requires that the 
new accounting principle be applied to the balances 
of assets and liabilities as of the beginning of the 
earliest period for which retrospective application is 
practicable and that a corresponding adjustment be 
made to the opening balance of retained earnings (or 
other appropriate components of equity or net assets 
in the statement of financial position) for that period 
rather than being reported in an income statement.12
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). An intergovernmental 
body whose purpose is the development and promo-
tion of national and international policies to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).  
Established by the U.S. Department of Treasury in 
1990 to provide a government-wide multisource 
financial intelligence and analysis network. The 
organization’s operation was broadened in 1994 to 
include regulatory responsibilities for administer-
ing the Bank Secrecy Act, one of the nation’s most 
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potent weapons for preventing corruption of the U.S. 
financial system.
financial institution bond (FIB). A special form of bond de-
signed to insure banks and other financial institutions 
against loss from employee dishonesty, burglary, 
robbery, larceny, theft, forgery, misplacement, and 
certain other perils. Previously called a “bankers 
blanket bond.”
financial intelligence unit. A central, national agency 
responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, request-
ing), analyzing, and disseminating to the competent 
authorities, disclosures of financial information (i) 
concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) 
required by national legislation or regulation, in order 
to counter money laundering.22
financial intermediaries. Financial institutions that borrow 
from consumers and savers and lend to companies 
that need resources for investment.
financial statement fraud. That act of deliberate mis-
statements or omissions of amounts or disclosures of 
financial statements to deceive financial statement 
users, particularly investors and creditors. This is one 
of the three main types of fraud schemes. Examples 
could include falsification, alteration, or manipulation 
of material financial records, supporting documents, 
or business transactions.
financial statement restatements. The restatement of 
a previously issued financial statement due to an 
error or omission, this can be due to a mistake or a 
fraudulent act that has occurred and subsequently 
corrected.
flash drive (or thumb drive). A small, portable flash 
memory card that plugs into a computer’s USB port 
and functions as a portable hard drive.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). An act that 
generally makes it a federal criminal offense for any 
U.S. person, issuer, or domestic concern, or any 
foreign person while in the United States, directly or 
indirectly, to make a corrupt payment to any foreign 
government official to obtain or retain any business 
advantage (the anti-bribery provisions). The FCPA 
also requires companies with securities registered 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to make 
and keep appropriate books and records and to 
maintain a system of adequate internal controls. This 
fraud can be classified as one of the corruption fraud 
schemes examples.
forensic accountant. Accountants that act as fact gather-
ers and investigate allegations of fraud or the lack of 
management integrity. The accountants are trained 
specifically in fraud prevention, deterrence, data  
collection and analysis, interviewing, investigation, 
and detection. 
forensic professionals. Workers in a wide variety of dif-
ferent disciplines who ultimately focus on applying 
science to the practice of law.
forensic tools. The tools that capture a forensic or “mirror 
image” of the original evidence media. This mirror 
image is a bit-by-bit copy and will contain the active 
files found on the media along with the unallocated 
storage space, which is the location on the hard drive 
where erased or deleted files may be found. Forensic 
tools must not change either the content of the data 
or information used by the computer to classify a 
file or directory, such as the date and time the file or 
directory was created. 
forgery. Relates to the unauthorized use a purported 
maker’s signature. Making, altering, uttering, or 
possessing, with intent to defraud, anything false in 
the semblance of that which is true. Attempts are 
included.24
form K-8 filings. The “current report” companies must file 
with the SEC to announce major events that share-
holders should know about.13
formal inquiry. A more in-depth than an informal inquiry 
but also requires notification to the target that such 
an investigation is taking place, resolving doubt, or 
solving a problem.
formal interview. The interview of employees significant 
to an investigation. These interviews should be 
conducted at the outset of the investigation to gather 
information and relevant facts. Follow-up interviews 
of these individuals can be conducted as needed, 
based upon new information obtained further into the 
investigation. 
formal investigation. An investigation where the SEC uses 
its subpoena and enforcement powers to conduct a 
thorough investigation of the issues of concern, lever-
aging the company’s internal investigative findings. 
fraud. Intentional deception by one or more individuals 
among management, employees, or third parties 
where one individual or group of individuals have 
received a direct or indirect gain and one individual, 
group of individuals or organization has suffered a 
loss.
fraud awareness training. The training that increases 
awareness and understanding of fraud and 
corruption. 
fraud prevention policy. A framework for an organization 
to prevent, detect, report, and investigate internal and 
external fraud. 
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fraud prevention procedure. Procedures focused on 
protecting the company’s assets and information by 
stopping fraud from occurring or identifying it in the 
earliest stages.
fraud risk assessment. The process and methodology 
performed to identify areas (for example, business 
processes, location, transaction types, geographic 
locations, and so on) that pose a higher risk of fraud 
and then prioritize those fraud risks indentified for 
follow up procedures to attempt to mitigate the risk 
from occurring. 
fraud tree. A process used to organize fraud into the 
following three types: fraudulent financial reporting, 
misappropriation of assets, and corruption. 
fraud triangle e-mail analytics. Advanced analytic 
technique using an objective list of key words that 
are specific to each component of the Fraud Triangle 
(Opportunity, Pressure, Rationalization) to look for 
co-occurrences of these terms to identify potential 
areas of concern from a fraudulent perspective. The 
co-occurrence of these terms is supported by the 
Fraud Triangle, which indicates that all three factors 
are present when fraud occurs.
full investigation. To conduct a comprehensive and 
systematic examination; to conduct an official inquiry 
of an allegation of potential wrong doing.
fuzzy searching. The text retrieval technique based on 
fuzzy logic. The technique finds matches even where 
the keywords (search words) are misspelled or only 
hint at a concept.
G-7 member states. A meeting of government bodies 
subject to international law, whose competences are 
limited basically by the will of the participant states 
and whose means of action are those permitted by 
international law. 
gap analysis. Identification of gaps in the controls struc-
ture is needed to determine the location of controls 
that were not in place to mitigate the risk identified 
from the fraud risk assessment. This also will help 
validate the placement of the fraud risks on the “heat 
map,” which attempts to prioritize from a likelihood of 
occurrence and severity of impact perspective. 
gatekeepers. Accountants, lawyers, or others who may be 
involved in business transactions involving financial 
transactions or instruments. 
general ledger. The central repository for transactions 
for an organization’s accounting transactions with 
offsetting debit and credit entries. This is the main 
accounting record for an organization.
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
Accounting principles based on a framework of 
concepts determined by local legislation, by rules is-
sued by professional bodies, and by the development 
of general practice within a country or other defined 
region.
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Standards 
that management is responsible for adopting for 
sound accounting policies and for establishing and 
maintaining internal controls that will, among other 
things, record, process, summarize, and report trans-
actions (as well as events and conditions) consistent 
with management’s assertions embodied in the 
financial statements.
ghost company. A company that has been created for the 
sole purpose of creating fraudulent documentation to 
deceive an organization to pay money for these ser-
vices or product that the organization did not receive. 
Sometime referred to as a fake vendor scheme.
ghost employees. Falsification of employees on the payroll 
list that result in overpayment, fraudulent commission 
or bonus schemes, and false workers compensa-
tion claims. This is one of the most common types of 
payroll schemes. 
global reach. A characteristic that accounting firms ex-
emplify when they can provide qualified professionals 
who are both fluent in the local languages and famil-
iar with the business practices of almost any locality 
or specialized industry. Collaboration between the 
accounting and legal firms can ensure that an ad-
equately staffed and a well-integrated team balances 
the needs for various skills, expertise, language, 
nationality, or ethnicity of executing an investigation 
in various localities, including the requirements for 
employee rights and handling evidence. 
governance. The set of processes, customs, policies, 
laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation 
is directed, administered, or controlled. 
grease payments. A payment to a foreign official, politi-
cal party or party official for “routine governmental 
action,” such as processing papers, issuing permits, 
and other actions of an official, in order to expedite 
performance of duties of nondiscretionary nature, 
that is, which they are already bound to perform.17
hand search (field search). Hand search involves the 
examination of original, hard copy, or source records. 
handheld personal devices. A personal digital assistant 
(PDA) is a handheld computer, also known as a  
palmtop computer. Many PDAs can access the 
Internet, intranets, or extranets via Wi-Fi, or wireless 
wide-area networks (WWANs).17
hash value. A “digital fingerprint” of a file or media. 
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heat map. A graphical representation of data used to 
display the fraud risks in certain areas of the orga-
nization. The heat map is an excellent way to show 
each identified fraud risk plotted from a likelihood of 
occurrence and significance of impact perspective. 
This allows the organization to prioritize the fraud 
risks and follow up in a more efficient manner.
hold (preservation notice). An order that seeks to ensure 
the preservation of any and all documents presumed 
to be pertinent to any given investigation. The order 
is issued to all employees of the company whose re-
cords are being reviewed and employees are bound 
to adhere to it. 
International Criminal Court (ICC). A highly facilitated and 
endorsed arbitration forum with 86 member countries. 
identification. The process of determining which data 
sources are in the scope of the investigation and 
should be preserved, collected, and processed for 
review. 
impairment charges. The charge associated with 
writing-off fixed assets or inventory that has become 
obsolete or otherwise declined in value. 
improper advantage. The advantage gained from the il-
legal actions in violation of the FCPA.
independent directors. A director who has not been 
employed by the Company or its related parties in the 
past five years.
independent investigation. An investigation performed by 
an independent third party.
informal inquiry. An investigation during the informal 
phase. The SEC will request that the company 
voluntarily produce specific information that typically 
includes documents (for example, company records, 
including electronic evidence such as employee 
e-mails), internal interview summaries, and other 
testimony. 
informal meeting. Meetings are typically held between 
forensic accountants and employees for a particular 
purpose, potentially to gain information regarding a 
certain document or transaction at hand. Relevant 
information obtained from these meetings would 
be captured in the forensic accountants’ working 
papers, as deemed necessary. 
information leaks. The process by which information, 
through rumors, external publicity, and other forms 
of unintended communication arrives to parties not 
intended to receive this information.
Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
(ISACA). An association dedicated to the audit, con-
trol, and security of information systems.
information technology (IT). The technology involving 
the development, maintenance, and use of computer 
systems, software, and networks for the processing 
and distribution of data.
initial triage. The process of making a rapid assessment 
of the currently available information and making 
critical initial decisions on the nature and extent of 
the response. 
initiation. A claim within a particular dispute resolution 
forum by the plaintiff and a response from the op-
ponent, usually called the defendant. 
insolvency. The situation where the business is unable to 
pay the claim in the ordinary course of business or its 
liabilities exceed its assets. 
Institute of Internal Auditors. An institute that conducts 
an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity designed to add value and improve an organi-
zation’s operations. 
insurance recovery. The act of an insured attempting to 
recoup damages from an insurer for losses covered 
by a policy.
insurance recovery phase. The period after damages are 
inflicted on an insured entity in which the insured 
attempts to recoup losses.
Insurance Services Office (ISO). An organization that sup-
plies data, analytics, and decision-support services 
for professionals in many fields, including: property/
casualty insurance, mortgage lending, healthcare, 
government, human resources, and information for 
risk managers in all industries.
insuring agreements. Part of every insurance policy; 
specifies what the insurance company has agreed to 
pay for or to provide in exchange for the premium. 
intangible assets. Long-lived assets without physical sub-
stance that are used in business, such as licenses, 
patents, franchises, and goodwill.
integrated team. A team of attorneys and accountants 
that brings diversity of thought and approach and 
helps ensure that multiple avenues are explored, 
many sides of the issue are addressed, and the needs 
of a variety of stakeholders are considered. 
intellectual property. Usually a patent, trademark, service 
mark or copyright, or any concept, idea, or invention 
that a person or entity can claim to have created. 
Inventions are protected by patents. Brand names are 
protected by trademarks. Advertising slogans, as well 
as product and service descriptions, are protected 
by service marks. Written documents (including 
software) are protected by copyrights.
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interim progress reports. Unaudited financial statements 
or report on a specific issue issued periodically, 
monthly, quarterly, or biyearly, by a company in order 
to give shareholders or board members up to date 
information on company performance.
internal audit department. A department that is an inde-
pendent, objective assurance and consulting activity 
designed to add value and improve an organization’s 
operations. It helps an organization accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined ap-
proach to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls 
put into place by management. 
internal audit director. The executive responsible for the 
internal audit team, and responsible for reporting to 
the audit committee.
internal certification process. A process in which finan-
cial and other individuals throughout the company 
are asked to provide a certification to the CEO and 
CFO in order to provide them with some comfort of 
the accounting and financial information and controls 
system at the lower levels. The certifications gener-
ally have a section where individuals can write in 
concerns or items noted during the year that could 
help the investigation team identify potential risks that 
have previously been identified or other concerns 
employees have raised. 
internal controls. A process, effected by a client’s board 
of directors, management, and other personnel, 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of operating, financial reporting and 
compliance objectives. It consists of all the policies 
and procedures adopted by the management of a 
client to assist in achieving management’s objective 
of ensuring, as far as practicable, the orderly and 
efficient conduct of its business, including adherence 
to management policies, the safeguarding of assets, 
the prevention and detection of fraud and error, the 
accuracy and completeness of the accounting 
records, and the timely preparation of reliable finan-
cial information.
internal counsel. Also known as “in-house” counsel or 
the legal team employed by an organization.
internal executives. People that have administrative or 
managerial authority within an organization.
internal investigation. An investigation of an organization 
led by the organization itself.
internal reporting. Data accumulated by people within 
an organization to be communicated to someone 
else within the organization, not for use outside of 
organization. Generally this information is utilized by 
management in order to make more informed 
decisions. 
internal resources. The resources within a company that 
are used during different situations to reach a con-
clusion on a matter. Most importantly a company’s 
internal legal, accounting, and auditing resources, 
are used as appropriate, and take advantage of their 
proximity and familiarity with the systems, processes, 
and issues. 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The federal agency that 
administers the Internal Revenue Code. The IRS is 
part of the United States Treasury Department.
International Accounting Standard (IAS) No.1, Presenta-
tion of Financial Statements. This standard pre-
scribes the basis for presentation of general purpose 
financial statements to ensure comparability both 
with the entity’s financial statements of previous 
periods and with the financial statements of other 
entities. It sets out overall requirements for the 
presentation of financial statements, guidelines for 
their structure and minimum requirements for their 
content.
International Accounting Standard (IAS) No. 8, Account-
ing Policies, Changes in Accounting, Estimates and 
Errors. Prescribes the criteria for selecting, applying, 
and changing accounting policies. In addition it deals 
with the accounting treatment and disclosure of 
changes in accounting policies, changes in account-
ing estimates and the correction of errors.
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The voice of 
world business championing the global economy as 
a force for economic growth, job creation, and pros-
perity. ICC activities cover a broad spectrum, from 
arbitration and dispute resolution to making the case 
for open trade and the market economy system, busi-
ness self-regulation, fighting corruption or combating 
commercial crime. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). A set 
of accounting standards, developed by the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (IASB) that is 
becoming the global standard for the preparation of 
public company financial statements.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). An organization of 186 
countries, working to foster global monetary coopera-
tion, secure financial stability, facilitate international 
trade, promote high employment and sustainable eco-
nomic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.
International Crime Police Organization (INTERPOL). The 
world’s largest international police organization. The 
organization operates in 187 member countries. 
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INTERPOL and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
Anti-Corruption Academy. The world’s first educa-
tional institution dedicated to fighting corruption was 
established yesterday. An agreement was signed be-
tween the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) and UNODC to establish the International 
Anti-Corruption Academy. 
INTERPOL Anti-Corruption Office. INTERPOL established 
the INTERPOL Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC) 
in 1998, and is currently in the process of develop-
ing the INTERPOL Anti-Corruption Office (IACO) and 
International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA). These 
components support anti-corruption activities by es-
tablishing policies and standards, as well as conduct-
ing or assisting with education, research, training, 
investigations, and asset-recovery operations.
INTERPOL Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC). A 
multidisciplinary group representing all of INTER-
POL’s regions which facilitates the co-ordination and 
harmonization of the different national and regional 
approaches to combating corruption. In addition, 
the group includes a host of other international 
stakeholders in the global anticorruption campaign. 
The rationale underlying this structure is the general 
belief that law enforcement should combat corruption 
as a phenomenon holistically, in cooperation with all 
major players and the community at large.
interview memorandum. A record or written statement 
summarizing an information finding meeting.
interviews. A process that seeks to obtain information 
regarding various areas, including an individual’s 
current and past roles at the company and his or her 
knowledge of certain business practices. 
investigation sponsor. The person or persons who 
will take responsibility for and/or oversee the 
investigation. 
investigative demand. A demand issued in writing prior 
to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding. The 
demand is served upon such person or enterprise 
that may be in possession, custody, or control of any 
documentary materials relevant to a racketeering 
investigation. The demand requires such person to 
produce such material for examination.27
investigative interview. A questioning session conducted 
where notes are made and they form the basis for any 
false statement charge against an employee if the 
government determines that the employee had made 
false material statements during the interview. 
investigative public record researcher. People who are 
familiar with all aspects of public records, includ-
ing knowledge of sources and proper protocol in 
obtaining the information. These individuals can 
assist forensic accountants in managing all aspects 
of identifying the various sources of information, the 
jurisdictions in which they reside, and the process of 
record retrieval. 
investigative settings. When attorneys and accountants 
work together in several different ways, with the 
accountant retained either directly by the same client 
as the attorney (usually a company, but sometimes an 
individual) or indirectly by the attorney in connection 
with the attorney’s legal advice to the client. 
investigative team. A group of people tasked with per-
forming a close examination and systematic inquiry.
iron curtain approach. An approach that quantifies the 
misstatement based on the effects of correcting the 
misstatements existing in the balance sheet at the 
end of the current year, irrespective of the year of 
origination of the misstatement(s). 
issuers. The entity whose securities are being sold 
circulated.
joint defense agreement. The agreement formed between 
attorneys for the company and its employees to docu-
ment their common interests and specify the condi-
tions under which information will be shared. If the 
company and its employees have a common interest, 
the attorney-client and the work product privileges 
will extend to the separate attorneys’ shared com-
munications. 
journaling systems. A system that captures all prede-
termined incoming and outgoing information which 
users do not control only administrators of systems 
control.
kickback. A kickback can take many forms but it is 
typically a form of money, gift or some other form of 
compensation that is given to an individual in return 
for performing a desired task. This fraud is classified 
as a corruption type scheme. An example would be 
someone that has inappropriately steered a contract 
or other form of business to a vendor in return for a 
gift of money or other non-monetary compensation.
lapping. Practice of concealing theft of cash, whereby an 
employee steals cash from one customer’s payment 
and covers it up by crediting that customer’s account 
with the next customer’s payment. While this process 
is occurring at least one customer’s account will 
always be overstated.
legal hold. In affect a do not destroy memo, which is an 
order to cease destruction and preserve all records, 
regardless of form, related to the nature or subject of 
the legal hold.
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legal privilege. A right intended to protect an individual’s 
ability to access the justice system by encouraging 
complete disclosure to legal advisers without the fear 
that any disclosure of those communications may 
prejudice the client in the future. 
legal technology professionals. People who gather elec-
tronic evidence, such as e-mail and computer-based 
files, as part of investigations and business litigation. 
letters rogatory. A formal request from a court to a foreign 
court for assistance; utilized as a request from a 
court in the United States to the appropriate judicial 
authorities in another country to obtain evidence from 
a witness, either through testimony to answer ques-
tions or through the production of documents. 
liable. Obligated according to law to be held respon-
sible to perform some action based on a result of an 
outcome.
likelihood of occurrence. The probability that an event 
will take place potentially based on qualitative and 
quantitative factors.
line supervisors. With respect to antifraud implementation 
and oversight—these individuals are responsible for 
overseeing the implementation and ongoing effective-
ness of the antifraud program. The supervisors report 
to executive management any indicators of suspi-
cious activity. 
loan. All extensions of credit by the Insured and all trans-
actions creating a creditor relationship in favor of the 
Insured and all transactions by which the Insured 
assumes an existing creditor relationship. 
logistics companies. Companies that regularly transport 
goods in and out of countries that may be subject to 
customs, duties, or other charges. 
management’s liaison to counsel. The officer of the com-
pany appointed to the investigation with sufficient 
authority to effectively support the investigation. 
manifest intent. The intent to cause the injured to sustain 
loss and therefore obtain benefit financially. 
mareva injunction. A court order that freezes assets so 
that a defendant cannot frustrate a judgment by dis-
sipating his or her assets from beyond the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
master file. Source of relatively authoritative collection 
of related data or information stored as a single unit 
with single name.
materiality. The magnitude of an omission or misstate-
ment that individually or in aggregate, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that 
the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the 
financial statements would have been changed or 
influenced by such omission or misstatement.
materiality threshold. The cutoff point of the information 
that if its omission or misstatement occurred, could 
that influence the economic decisions of users taken 
on the basis of the financial statements.
mediation. A form of alternative dispute resolution aimed 
to assist two (or more) disputants in reaching an 
agreement. The disputes may involve states, organi-
zations, communities, individuals or other representa-
tives with a vested interest in the outcome.
metadata. The embedded electronic data about the data. 
monetary judgment. A formal order issued by an authori-
tative body that one party to the disagreement is to 
pay the other party a sum of money.
money laundering. The process where proceeds gener-
ated from criminal or illegal activity are “cleaned” to 
intentionally disguise their illegal origin. This cleaning 
process involves circulating the money through le-
gitimate businesses which ultimately disseminate the 
funds into the local economy, knowingly or unknow-
ingly as the case may be.
monitoring controls. A process that assesses the qual-
ity of internal control performance over time and 
determines the effectiveness of the controls for their 
stated objective. It is accomplished through ongoing 
activities, separate evaluations, or by a combination 
of the two.
mutual legal assistance treaty. A treaty creating alliances 
between two foreign countries for the purpose of 
gathering and exchanging information in an effort to 
enforce criminal laws. 
NASDAQ. The National Association of Securities Deal-
ers Automated Quotations is a United States stock 
exchange. It is the largest electronic screen-based 
equity securities trading market in the United States.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL). A conference that provides states 
with nonpartisan, well-conceived and well-drafted 
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical 
areas of the law. NCCUSL’s work supports the federal 
system and facilitates the movement of individuals 
and the business of organizations with rules that are 
consistent from state to state.
National Software Reference Library. A library designed 
to collect software from various sources and incor-
porate file profiles computed from this software into 
a Reference Data Set (RDS) of information. The RDS 
can be used by law enforcement, government, and 
industry organizations to review files on a computer 
by matching file profiles in the RDS.
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monitoring controls. Various types of physical or network 
security device logs used to collect information. 
These may include card swipe logs, closed circuit 
video, Internet logs, remote access logs, and intru-
sion detection server logs.
mutual legal assistance treaty. A treaty creating alliances 
between two foreign countries for the purpose of 
gathering and exchanging information in an effort to 
enforce criminal laws. 
NASDAQ. The National Association of Securities Deal-
ers Automated Quotations is a United States stock 
exchange. It is an electronic screen based equity 
securities trading market with approximately 3,800 
companies and corporations.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL). A conference that provides states 
with nonpartisan, well conceived and well drafted 
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical 
areas of the law. NCCUSL’s work supports the federal 
system and facilitates the movement of individuals 
and the business of organizations with rules that are 
consistent from state to state.
National Software Reference Library. A library designed 
to collect software from various sources and incor-
porate file profiles computed from this software into 
a Reference Data Set (RDS) of information. The RDS 
can be used by law enforcement, government, and 
industry organizations to review files on a computer 
by matching file profiles in the RDS.
near-line. Information stored on removable media, such 
as optical discs, that can be made available by a 
device, such as an optical “jukebox.” 
negotiated settlements. An agreement composing 
differences.17
New York Convention. A meeting of the 144 participating 
states that are required to recognize arbitral awards 
and enforce them, in accordance with specific pro-
cedural rules in international commercial disputes. 
Most major trading nations, as well as many other 
countries, have ratified the New York Convention, giv-
ing the convention broad acceptance and making this 
an effective proceeding for financial recovery. 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Operates six cash 
equities exchanges in seven countries and eight 
derivatives exchanges. It is a world leader for listings, 
trading in cash equities, equity and interest rate de-
rivatives, bonds, and the distribution of market data.
nonduty to defend. A situation where the insured has the 
right to manage the defense of the claim and choose 
defense council, subject to the insurer’s approval. 
non-reporting issuer. An issuer that is not subject to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 filing requirements. 
An Issuer is a corporation that has distributed to the 
public, securities, registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.23
Norwich Pharmacal order. An order that allows for the 
discovery of evidence from innocent third parties, 
such as financial institutions. The principle underlying 
the order is that if, through no fault of his or her own, 
a person facilitates the wrongdoing of others, then 
that person comes under a duty to assist the victim. 
He or she can assist by giving the victim full informa-
tion and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers. 
notice. Formal notification to the party that has been sued 
in a civil case of the fact that the lawsuit has been 
filed.5
objective advisor. Independent, third party who makes 
recommendations regarding a decision or course of 
conduct.
occupational fraud. The use of ones’ occupation to inten-
tionally misuse or misapply their organizations’ assets 
or information for the direct or indirect benefit to that 
individual. Occupational fraud can be classified into 
three main areas of fraud schemes, misappropriation 
of asset schemes, fraudulent statement schemes, and 
corruption schemes.
offer of employment. A job offer, typically defining the 
terms of employment.
Office of Inspector General (OIG). An office that protects 
the integrity of a corporation. OIG has a responsibil-
ity to report program and management problems and 
recommendations to correct them both to the Secre-
tary and to the Congress. OIG’s duties are carried out 
through a nationwide network of audits, investiga-
tions, evaluations, and other mission related functions 
performed by OIG components. 
Office of the General Counsel. A diverse legal practice, at-
torneys supervise the development of the Department 
of Commerce’s legislative and regulatory programs, 
defend decisions of commerce officials against 
judicial challenge, and advise agency officials on 
personnel, procurement, and budget matters.
offline storage. The storage used for disaster recovery or 
archiving that must be made available through human 
intervention. Backup tapes are typically used for 
offline storage. 
ontology. Involves an analysis conducted soon after data 
is first loaded to the review platform, for the purpose 
of evaluating the collection of electronic evidence to 
determine potentially relevant information that may 
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drive case strategy, such as key topics or themes of 
the case, dates and amounts, specific vocabulary and 
jargon, and people. 
open-source information. Information derived from public 
sources which now includes the enormous and 
growing repository of online data, including search 
engines, Web logs (blogs), and Web sites. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions. An organization that establishes legally 
binding standards to criminalize bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions 
and provides for a host of related measures that make 
this effective.19
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). An organization that brings together the gov-
ernments of countries committed to democracy and 
the market economy from around the world to support 
sustainable economic growth, boost employment, 
raise living standards, maintain financial stability, 
assist other countries’ economic development, and 
contribute to growth in world trade. The organiza-
tion provides a setting where governments compare 
policy experiences, seek answers to common prob-
lems, identify good practice, and coordinate domestic 
and international policies.19
orientation program. A program typically attended by 
a new employee after the offer of employment is 
accepted. This session is designed to assist new em-
ployees in adjusting to their jobs and work environ-
ment and they can become better acclimated into the 
culture within an organization.
parallel investigations. Investigations that occur when 
multiple civil regulatory and criminal law enforcement 
authorities simultaneously initiate proceedings that 
relate to the same facts or overlapping targets.21
parallel proceeding. Situations where both criminal and 
civil investigations and cases are in progress at the 
same time. An example would be when a trustee 
is conducting an adversary proceeding to recover 
property, while there is a criminal investigation of the 
debtor for bankruptcy fraud involving concealment of 
the same asset.29
pay and return scheme. Schemes frequently carried out 
by using the invoices of legitimate, third party vendors 
who are not a part of the fraud scheme. In these 
cases, the perpetrator is an internal employee who 
intentionally mishandles payments owed to legitimate 
vendors. There are different versions of the scheme 
generally used: double paying invoices, paying incor-
rect vendors, and vendor overpayment. 
personal share (or home directory). A portion of the 
server’s disk storage that has been allocated for file 
storage. A personal share or home directory is used 
by a specific custodian. 
petty cash. Typically a small amount of cash that is kept at 
the organization to be used for small miscellaneous 
types of expenditures. When theft of petty cash oc-
curs it would be classified as a misappropriation of 
asset type fraud scheme.
plaintiff. A person who brings an action; the party who 
complains or sues in a civil action.5
playbook. A predetermined set of criteria that helps deci-
sion makers sort through the available information 
in a more objective way. This set of predeveloped 
criteria greatly enhances the consistency and speed 
of the initial response to an allegation of fraud. 
portable document format (PDF). A file format created by 
Adobe Systems in 1993 for document exchange. PDF 
is used for representing two-dimensional documents 
in a manner independent of the application software, 
hardware, and operating system.
practitioner. Someone who practices a learned 
profession.17
preissuance reviewer. A person who reads the report or 
work products and summary memorandum, refers 
to the engagement letter to confirm the scope of 
services provided, and discusses significant matters 
with the engagement partner. 
preliminary loss estimate. Initial estimate of a business’ 
insured losses after reinsurance recoveries and net 
of reinstatement premiums. 
preliminary work plan. A plan that will set the overarch-
ing objective and divide the tasks into manageable 
work streams. 
preservation. The process that begins with notification 
to custodians that they must preserve ESI in their 
custody or control, which is a process known as a 
legal hold. 
preservation notice. A communication that suspends the 
normal disposition or processing of records. 
preservation plan. A process or methodology that an 
organization will create so that, in the event of a need 
to preserve necessary documents, the organization 
has a plan in place that explains the technique(s), 
including schedules for preservation actions, quality 
assurance testing, backups, and so on, and instruc-
tions for documentation that will be followed.
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privacy statutes. The expectation that confidential per-
sonal information is disclosed in a private place and 
will not be disclosed to third parties. 
private branch exchange (PBX). A private switching 
system, usually located on a customer’s premises 
with an attendant console. It is connected to a com-
mon group of lines from one or more central offices to 
provide service to a number of individual phones.14
privileged. Information that is not subject to disclosure 
in a court of law. Intended to protect an individual’s 
ability to access the justice system by encouraging 
complete disclosure to legal advisers without the 
fear that any disclosure of those communications 
may prejudice the client in the future. Investigative 
findings commissioned by legal advisors to provide 
advice to their clients also may be privileged.
privileged work products. The work product of an at-
torney is not discoverable unless the court deter-
mines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice 
the party seeking discovery. The actual work of the 
investigation can be apportioned among the com-
pany, attorneys, accountants, and other specialists in 
any way that is appropriate, as long as the attorney 
directs the work and the work is conducted in the 
context of assisting the attorney in rendering legal 
advice.
processing. The stage at which data may be filtered for 
content. 
procurement fraud. Classified as a corruption type of 
fraud scheme and includes cost and labor mischarg-
ing, defective pricing, defective parts, price fixing, bid 
rigging, and product substitution.
profiled. To look for clusters of similar variables, for 
example, by location, by frequency, by product type, 
and so on, so that a predictive model can be built to 
monitor for risks. 
Project Management Institute (PMI). The world’s leading 
not-for-profit association for the project management 
profession. PMI advocates project, program and port-
folio management that can enhance and accelerate 
organizational change.
project planning. The planning process that encompasses 
a range of activities related to scope, schedule, cost, 
quality, staffing, communication, risk, and procure-
ment that are used to develop a project management 
plan and manage the project. 
proof of loss. Documentation or declaration given to in-
surer by policyholder stating or substantiating insured 
loss.
proprietary data. Data that is privately and exclusively 
owned and may be protected by secrecy or law.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). A 
private sector, nonprofit corporation, created by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to oversee the auditors 
of public companies in order to protect the interests 
of investors and further the public interest in the 
preparation of informative, fair, and independent audit 
reports.
public disclosure. The notes that investigation team uses 
to report its findings to the appropriate party, such as 
directors, legal counsel, and oversight bodies. 
public records. Records that include any document filed 
or recorded by a public agency in a public office that 
the general public has a right to examine. Historically 
stored in hard copy, public record information now is 
widely available on searchable computer databases. 
quality assurance partner (independent review partner). 
A partner of the accounting firm other than the en-
gagement partner that will function as a pre-issuance 
reviewer. 
quality assurance program. A program to ensure the 
quality of the work products that are submitted to the 
client and external parties. 
Racketeering and Influencing Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO). Part of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970. The goal of the act was to punish and deter 
organized and organizational crime.
receivership. A court action that places property under 
the control of a receiver during litigation so that it can 
be preserved for the benefit of all. When a trustee or 
liquidator has been appointed, he or she has the legal 
authority to further the investigation by recovering as-
sets or compelling witnesses to provide information. 
Trustees, liquidators, or receivers also have broad 
powers to control the business; investigate missing 
assets, and distribute the assets. 
records management program. A planned, coordinated 
set of policies, procedures, and activities needed 
to manage an agency’s recorded information. The 
program encompasses the creation, maintenance 
and use, and disposition of records, regardless of 
media. Essential elements include issuing up-to-date 
program directives, properly training those respon-
sible for implementation, publicizing the program, and 
carefully evaluating the results to ensure adequacy, 
effectiveness, and efficiency.2
regulators. Subsystem or independent group that deter-
mines and maintains the operating parameters of a 
system or activity.
regulatory investigation. An internal investigation 
conducted by a company on behalf of a government 
regulatory agency such as the SEC or DOJ. The  
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regulatory agency, such as the SEC and DOJ, would 
then leverage the company’s fact finding results 
before proceeding with their own course of action. 
regulatory officials. The officials in charge of implement-
ing regulatory procedures by making sure law and 
policies are followed. These officials could include 
SEC enforcement lawyers and accountants, DOJ 
lawyers, FBI agents, and IRS agents. 
regulatory safe harbor. The attempt by a regulatory 
agency to potentially reduce or eliminate an organiza-
tions’ liability under the law, on the condition that the 
organization performed its actions in good faith. The 
regulatory agency may have a standard policy for 
fielding requests, for voluntary self-reporting compa-
nies, or providing avenues to lessen sanctions if the 
company’s full cooperation so warrants. 
relational database. A type of database that supports very 
efficient analysis of structured data. 
remote access technologies. Provides the ability to 
connect to the network from a distant location, for 
example those employees who work from home or 
travel extensively. The ability to access the system 
from a remote location typically requires a computer, 
a modem, and remote access software to allow the 
computer to dial into the network over a telephone 
line, cable, or satellite service. 
report database. A collection of data organized for rapid 
search and retrieval.
request list. A list submitted to the client asking for certain 
types of information and documentation believed to 
be relevant to the investigation, based upon informa-
tion known at that time. 
rescission action. To abrogate (a contract) and restore 
the parties to the positions they would have occupied 
had there been no contract.17
residual data. Data that has been deleted or is no longer 
active on a computer system and is no longer visible 
using the application with which the original file was 
created. For example, documents may be recovered 
from a hard drive stored in a networked office printer. 
respondent. The party that responds to a claim filed in 
court against them by a plaintiff. A term used in arbi-
tration for the defendant.  
restitution order. Remedies intended to reverse unjust 
enrichment and prevent a wrongdoer from profiting 
from the crime provided by criminal courts. 
resulting events. Events that arise as a consequence, 
effect, or conclusion.
revenue recognition review. In the context of an investi-
gation into a revenue recognition issue, a review of 
keywords such as accelerate, big bath, cookie jar, 
stretch, gap, pull-in, and close the gap, can be used 
to determine how prevalent this issue was in the 
emails and other documents used to review during 
the investigation. 
revenue recognition schemes. Schemes that seek to 
increase the amount of revenue recognized or ac-
celerate the timing of the revenue recognition. These 
types of fraud would be classified as fraudulent state-
ment schemes. 
review protocol. The procedure to identify key e-mails 
and associated documents of interest in the 
investigation. 
rider. Additional insurance coverage provided for some-
thing that is not specifically covered by the primary 
policy that is in place. 
risk criteria. Objective criteria used to help in assess-
ing incoming reports of matters potentially requiring 
investigation. 
rollover approach. Quantifies a misstatement based on 
the amount of the error originating in the current year 
income statement. This approach ignores the effects 
of correcting the portion of the current year balance 
sheet misstatement that originated in prior years 
(that is, it ignores the carryover impact of prior year 
misstatements). 
Rule 26. A regulation that requires that the expert report 
state all the opinions and the basis for them. 
rules based queries. When using analytics, these queries 
rely heavily on the individual performing the analytic 
test, to ask questions of the data based on what is 
known currently about the data. 
sales pursuit cycle. The time and effort that it takes to se-
cure a contract which often represents a significant 
amount of revenue to the proposing companies. 
sanctions. The detriment, loss of reward, or coercive in-
tervention annexed to a violation of a law as a means 
of enforcing the law.17
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). An act to protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securi-
ties laws, and for other purposes. 
SAS. An acronym for Statement on Auditing Standards, 
which are issued by the Auditing Standards Board 
(ASB) of the AICPA.
scienter. The misrepresentation or omission is intended to 
deceive or defraud investors.30
search warrant. A written order issued by a judge that 
directs a law enforcement officer to search a specific 
area for a particular piece of evidence.5
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Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The act that em-
powers the SEC with broad authority over all aspects 
of the securities industry. This includes the power 
to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, 
transfer agents, and clearing agencies as well as 
the nation’s securities self regulatory organizations 
(SROs).
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The mis-
sion of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation. Congress—during the peak year of the 
Depression—passed the Securities Act of 1933. This 
law, together with the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, created the SEC, which was designed to restore 
investor confidence in our capital markets by provid-
ing investors and the markets with more reliable 
information and clear rules of honest dealing.
Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Accounting 
Bulletin (SEC SAB) No. 99, Materiality. This SAB ex-
presses the views of the staff that exclusive reliance 
on certain quantitative benchmarks to assess materi-
ality in preparing financial statements and performing 
audits of those financial statements is inappropriate; 
misstatements are not immaterial simply because 
they fall beneath a numerical threshold.
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). An executive 
non-departmental public body sponsored by, but op-
erationally independent from, the Home Office. SOCA 
is an intelligence-led agency with law enforcement 
powers and harm reduction responsibilities.
server. A computer in a network that is used to provide 
services (as access to files or shared peripherals 
or the routing of e-mail) to other computers in the 
network.17
severity of impact. A rating used to determine the 
magnitude of a fraud that has occurred, such as the 
following: high equals a $2 million dollar loss. The 
impact can describe both the loss of actual dollars 
or the effect on qualitative factors such as brand and 
reputation, or both, which are hard to quantify with a 
specific dollar amount. 
shadow investigation. An investigation that independently 
assesses whether the audit committee’s findings, ac-
tions, and recommendations are appropriate. 
share. A portion of the file server’s disk storage that has 
been allocated for file storage. 
side A coverage. Typically provides coverage directly to 
the directors and officers for loss—including defense 
costs—resulting from claims made against the, for 
their wrongful acts.
side agreements. Agreements made outside of publicly 
known contracts.
side B coverage. Reimburses a corporation for its loss 
where the corporation indemnifies its directors and 
officers for claims against them.
side C coverage. Optional coverage that protects the 
corporation against securities claims or other spe-
cial types of claims not covered by general liability 
policies.
signatories. Signer with another or other.17
site visit. Going to a client location and evaluating 
processes to gain access to hard copy and relevant 
documents. 
skimming. The theft of all or a portion of the cash receipts 
of a business at a particular point of sale or other 
point where cash or payments enter a business. 
These schemes are “off-book” frauds, meaning that 
the money is stolen before it is recorded in the ac-
counts of the victim organization. 
slush funds. Off-book cash that is maintained and can be 
used for illicit purposes such as corruption or for the 
personal benefit of those company representatives 
generating and maintaining the funds. These funds 
are frequently built from the improper conversion of a 
company’s cash. 
special committee. A committee formed by the board 
of directors when allegations of potential financial 
statement fraud first surface. The committee is 
formed to evaluate the veracity of the allegations and 
lead the related investigation. 
spokesperson. A person designated to respond to media 
requests and coverage.17
spoliation. The intentional destruction, mutilation, altera-
tion, or concealment of evidence, usually a document.
SPSS. Predictive analytics software used by companies 
to anticipate change, manage both daily operations 
and special initiatives more effectively, and realize 
positive, measurable benefits. 
Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 104, Revenue Rec-
ognition. Issued in 2004, the prevailing accounting 
guidance related to revenue recognition. Generally, 
SAB 104 requires that 4 requirements must be met to 
recognize revenue, including persuasive evidence of 
an arrangement, delivery has occurred or services 
have been rendered, seller’s price to buyer is fixed 
and determinable, and collectability is reasonably 
assured.
stakeholders. May include shareholders, directors, man-
agement, suppliers, and others within an organization 
who have interest in the success of an organization in 
delivering intended results, objectives, and maintain-
ing the viability of the organization’s products and/or 
services.
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Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1, Codifica-
tion of Accounting Standards and Procedures. The 
AICPA professional standard that states that it is 
management’s responsibility “to design and imple-
ment programs and controls to prevent, deter, and 
detect fraud.” 
SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients. This statement 
prescribes the nature and extent of the consideration 
an independent auditor should give to the possibil-
ity of illegal acts by a client in an audit of financial 
statements in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards. The statement also provides guid-
ance on the auditor’s responsibilities when a possible 
illegal act is detected.
SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial State-
ment Audit. An auditing statement issued by Auditing 
Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants in October 2002. SAS No. 99 
requires the auditor to gather information necessary 
to assess the potential risk of fraud in two areas: fi-
nancial reporting, and the misappropriation of assets.
Statements on Standards for Consulting Services (SSCSs). 
SSCS supersedes the Statements on Standards for 
Management Advisory Services and provides stan-
dards of practice for a broad range of professional 
services, including, but not limited to, consulting 
services, management advisory services, business 
advisory services, or management services.
structured ESI. Contained in databases, such as financial 
or accounting databases (that is, general ledger, ac-
counts payable, and payroll) and other databases. 
subpoena. A writ commanding a person designated in it to 
appear in court under a penalty for failure.
subrogation. The right of the carrier to be put in the posi-
tion of the insured in order to pursue recovery from 
third parties who may be legally responsible to the 
insured for the loss paid by the insurer. 
summary memorandum. A comprehensive record or writ-
ten statement.
Surety & Fidelity Association of America (SFAA). The 
U.S.-based organization that comprises insurance 
companies that underwrite surety and fidelity bonds. 
Such bonds are intended to facilitate commerce, en-
hance economic development, and protect consum-
ers and policyholders from a variety of risks. 
sweep. A search for offline media, such as backup tapes 
pulled out of rotation, hard drives, and other magnetic 
media. A sweep may require the development of a 
questionnaire that the company implements on its 
own regarding these media, or it may involve technol-
ogy advisors performing a physical sweep (walk-
through and collection of media). 
systems administrators. Database server administrators, 
e-mail server administrators, network specialists, 
and desktop application support personnel who have 
a specific expertise but are typically not trained in 
forensic disciplines. 
tax-deductible expenses. An item or expense subtracted 
from adjusted gross income to reduce the amount of 
income subject to tax.
technical advisors. People who assist with the collection 
and management of electronic evidence. 
The IT Governance Institute (ITGI). Established in 1998 in 
recognition of the increasing criticality of information 
technology to enterprise success.
third party claims. A claim by the respondent against a 
party not already named in the proceeding.
tied-out. A process that includes either by footnote or 
cross reference all the support for each of the state-
ments, data, or assumptions has been agreed to 
supporting documentation. 
tone at the top. Leadership personnel who set an example 
through actions and communications. The tone at the 
top is the message disseminating from the very top of 
the organization to the bottom. 
transactional documents. Documents created by organi-
zations through their financial computing system.
transactional systems. A system that processes the  
data from financial transactions in a database 
system. 
Transparency International. The global civil society orga-
nization leading the fight against corruption, brings 
people together in a powerful worldwide coalition 
to end the devastating impact of corruption on 
men, women and children around the world. 
Their mission is to create change towards a 
world free of corruption.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index. The index provides an overview of how the 
perceived level of corruption in a particular country 
compares with other countries. 
U.S. Attorney General. The Judiciary Act of 1789 created 
the Office of the Attorney General which evolved 
over the years into the head of the DOJ and chief law 
enforcement officer of the federal government. The 
Attorney General represents the U.S. in legal matters 
generally and gives advice and opinions to the Presi-
dent and to the heads of the executive departments of 
the government when so requested.
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U.S.–European Union (EU) Safe Harbor Framework. 
The framework that would prohibit the transfer of 
personal data to non-EU nations that do not meet the 
EU’s “adequacy” standard for privacy protection. 
While the U.S. and the European Union share the goal 
of enhancing privacy protection for their citizens, the 
United States takes a different approach to privacy 
from that taken by the European Union.31
U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. An 
organization created in 2001 with the guidelines to 
govern the imposition of sentences by federal judges 
on organizational defendants. The guidelines impose 
harsh penalties upon organizations whose employees 
or other agents have committed federal crimes. Pen-
alties include restitution, remedial orders, community 
service, and substantial fines, based upon a point 
system for determining severity of offense. 
U.S.–Swiss Safe Harbor Framework. The framework that 
simplifies the transfer of personal data by Swiss firms 
to American companies that self-certify to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. In addition to administra-
tive simplifications for businesses, the bilateral data 
protection framework will also strengthen the data 
protection rights of those concerned with respect to 
these companies.31
unicode. A unique number for every character, no mat-
ter what the platform, no matter what the program, 
no matter what the language. The code enables a 
single software product or a single Web site to be 
targeted across multiple platforms, languages and 
countries without re-engineering. It allows data to be 
transported through many different systems without 
corruption.32
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgment Recognition 
Act. Provided for enforcement of foreign country 
judgments in a state court in the United States. The 
1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition 
act has been enacted in 32 states.
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). 
The convention promotes and strengthens measures 
to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and 
effectively. 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. A 
convention that focuses on providing comprehen-
sive measures against drug trafficking but includes 
provisions against money laundering and provides for 
international cooperation, including aspects of the 
transfer of proceedings of profits. 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime. The purpose of this convention is to 
promote cooperation to prevent and combat transna-
tional organized crime more effectively.20
unstructured ESI. A centralized system of managing 
telephone messages for a large group of people. The 
term is also used more broadly, to denote any system 
of conveying voice message, including the answering 
machine. 
Upjohn warnings. Also known as “Corporate Miranda,” 
contains the following elements: (1) the attorney 
represents the corporation and not the individual em-
ployee; (2) the interview is covered by the attorney-
client privilege, which belongs to and is controlled by 
the company, not the individual employee; and (3) the 
company may decide, in its sole discretion, whether 
to waive the privilege and disclose information 
from the interview to third parties, including the 
government.18 
USA PATRIOT Act. The act is an enhanced law enforce-
ment investigatory tool for responding to terrorist 
financing that has provided significant impetus to 
global AML initiatives. 
victim. One that is acted on and adversely affected by a 
force or agent.17
voluntary disclosure. A disclosure issue concerning 
whether the company should self report to the gov-
ernment. Self disclosure avoids the risk of involuntary 
disclosure by third parties, such as government 
investigations or whistleblowers. If the government 
discovers that the company knew about the issue and 
did not raise it with the government, the punishment 
meted out by the government could be more severe. 
waived. To relinquish voluntarily (as a legal right).17
waiver. The act of intentionally relinquishing or abandon-
ing a known right, claim, or privilege. 
whistleblower. An employee who exercises from speech 
rights to challenge corporate and government abuses 
of power that betray the public trust.33
whitewash. When the composition of the board consists 
of mainly company executives during an investigation 
which leads to allegations of bias. 
work product doctrine. Under this doctrine, government 
investigators are typically not entitled to obtain work 
product materials (that is, materials generated or pre-
pared by counsel in anticipation of litigation or that 
reflect an attorney’s independent thought process, 
counsel’s legal analysis, and the efforts of counsel in 
anticipation of litigation). 
working paper. Records kept by the auditor of the proce-
dures applied, the tests performed, the information 
obtained, and the pertinent conclusions reached in 
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the course of the audit and any records developed by 
a CPA during an audit.3
World Bank Group. A lending institution whose aim is 
to help integrate developing and transition econo-
mies with the global economy, and reduce poverty 
by promoting economic growth. The bank lends for 
policy reforms and development projects and policy 
advice, and offers technical assistance and nonlend-
ing services to its 181 member countries.19
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